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Richard M. Swain
U.S. Army

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“The Hedgehog and the Fox”: Jomini, Clausewitz, and History

Colonel Richard M. Swain, U.S. Army

Man in his power of reasoning is essentially historical. The similes, metaphors and analogies by which he interprets and seeks to understand the world are at root based on an understanding of the past. Beginning with Sun Tzu's aphoristic *Art of War* and Thucydides' critical history of *The Peloponnesian War*, it has been a characteristic feature of military theories and doctrines that they have asserted an instrumental claim on past experience. The use made of history by military thinkers has not been uniform, however. It is useful, therefore, to compare how two seminal thinkers, Jomini and Clausewitz, sought to employ the experience of the past to create a theory for the future.

Antoine-Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz are often described as two opposing interpreters of Napoleon. Although the greatest influence on their motivation for writing about war was their own experience in the Napoleonic era, neither set out simply to interpret the history of the Emperor of France. Moreover, direct comparison of their greatest works—Jomini's *Treatise on Grand Military Operations* and *Precis of the Art of War*, and Clausewitz's *On War*—can be extraordinarily misleading. In the first place, their purposes were different; the works simply are not comparable on equal terms. In the second, their beliefs about the nature and use of theory and their views about the nature of knowledge, particularly historical knowledge, differed profoundly.

Jomini and Clausewitz were contemporaries. Jomini was born in Vaud, Switzerland in 1779, and Clausewitz the following year in Berg, Prussia.¹ Jomini lived until 1869 and died well respected, the premier military theorist of his era. Clausewitz died much earlier, in 1831, from complications of cholera or simply some sort of stroke or heart attack brought on by illness and overwork. Jomini began his professional life in commercial pursuits in Switzerland and Paris. He was involved with the Revolutionary Swiss

Colonel Swain is the Director of the Combat Studies Institute, the history department of the Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is a graduate of the Military Academy at West Point and holds a Ph.D. from Duke University.

Republic in 1798 as secretary to the Swiss minister of war, but he moved to Paris in 1802. There he began writing his first didactic essay, which he presented first to the secretary of the Russian legation and then to Napoleon's lieutenant, Marshal Ney, who was to become Jomini's entree into French military circles. In 1805 Jomini became a colonel on Ney's staff, and in 1806 he was attached to the Emperor's staff for the Jena campaign. He returned to Ney as chief of staff in 1807 and accompanied the marshal to Spain. In 1810 he was appointed *general de brigade*. During the Russian campaign Jomini did not serve with the field forces; he was governor first of Vilna and then Smolensk. He rejoined Ney in 1813 and fought at Lutzen and Bautzen, where he distinguished himself, but in August, either consequent to a final falling-out with Berthier, Napoleon's chief of staff, or simply because he was an opportunist and saw the wind was shifting, Jomini went over to the Russians. He was appointed a lieutenant general, and he served the tsar until he retired in 1847.

Jomini was always an outsider—a Swiss in the French army and later in the service of Russia. Clausewitz was also an outsider of sorts, but in his case it was because of his birth. He was the son of a Frederician officer of doubtful, indeed, spurious nobility. His father was forced to leave the military service after the Seven Years' War, when Frederick no longer required the services of non-noble officers, and he lived out his life as a minor civil servant. Fortunately Clausewitz's mother remarried after his father's death, this time to an officer of unquestioned nobility who was able to gain access to officer's status for her sons. Whereas one gets a sense of Clausewitz as intense, proud and reflective, Jomini comes across as quarrelsome and vain.

Clausewitz entered the Prussian service at the age of twelve and served in the Rhine campaign of 1793-94. This was followed by several years of regimental duty. Then he entered the *Kriegsakademie* in Berlin, where he came into the orbit of Gerhard von Scharnhorst. His student years in Berlin were followed by assignment as tutor to a Prussian prince, with whom he was captured and interned by the French after the battle at Jena in 1806. Upon his return to Prussia he assisted Scharnhorst and the reform party in Berlin, taught in the *Kriegsakademie*, and was again a tutor, this time to the crown prince of Prussia. In 1812, rather than serve the purposes of the French, he resigned from the Prussian army and took service with the tsar. If this were not enough to confirm his status as an outsider in court circles, he was a principal in the negotiation of the Treaty of Tauroggen in December 1812, the agreement which took the Prussian army over to the Allies before the king of Prussia was prepared to make that move. Clausewitz was not permitted to reenter the Prussian army until 1815, when he served as chief of staff to the Third Corps and consequently was not present at Waterloo. From 1815 until his death he held a number of staff postings, the longest of which was as director of the *Kriegsakademie* from 1819 to 1830. He rose to

the rank of major general, but his patent of nobility was not "confirmed" until 1827.

Both Jomini and Clausewitz wrote historical studies all their adult lives. Their later works, Jomini's *Precis* and Clausewitz's *On War*, rested upon a foundation built over long years of active service and study. Indeed, Professor Peter Paret has identified ideas in *On War* dating back as early as 1804.²

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The Jominian work best known by contemporary American officers is his *Precis of the Art of War*, begun in 1829, completed and published in 1837, and translated at West Point in 1854 and again in 1862.³ This work is often compared to Clausewitz's *On War*, but the comparison is invidious. Clausewitz's clear intention in *On War* was philosophic speculation. Jomini's declared purpose was to write a handbook summarizing principles he had discovered in his earlier historical studies, particularly the *Treatise of Grand Military Operations*, written between 1803 and 1810.⁴ Jomini's *Precis* is a manual; it is intended to be taken to the field. Indeed, Jomini claimed in a letter to the tsar that "notwithstanding its small compass, this Summary now contains all the combinations which the general of an army and the statesman can make for the conduct of a war: never was so important a subject treated within limits at the same time more compact and more in the reach of all readers."⁵ Clausewitz had written such a work, though on much smaller scale, in 1812, a memorandum titled "The Most Important Principles For the Conduct of War to Complete My Course of Instruction of His Royal Highness The Crown Prince."⁶ By the time he put away his draft treatise in 1830, Clausewitz would reject out of hand the idea of a positive theory of war, writing, "It is only analytically that these attempts at theory can be called advances in the realm of truth; synthetically, in the rules and regulations they offer, they are absolutely useless."⁷ It is apparent that by the time of his death, Clausewitz differed fundamentally with Jomini about the purpose of theory.

Although there is no recorded debate between Jomini and Clausewitz nor any known correspondence between the two, their respective works were known to each other, and each recorded his criticism of the other and his defense of his own propositions—Jomini in his introduction to the *Precis*, and Clausewitz in Book II of *On War*. Clausewitz accused authors of positive doctrinal systems of oversimplification, arguing that wars were too variable to capture in any synthetic system. He argued that such systems aim at fixed values, ignore moral forces, and consider only unilateral action. "They exclude genius from the rule," Clausewitz complained, noting that, in fact, "what genius does is the best rule, and theory can do no better than show how and why this should be the case."⁸ In short, the purpose of theory is explanation, not prescription. True theory must account for moral forces,

a reactive enemy of independent will, and uncertainty. Because tactics were determined largely by material factors, Clausewitz believed it much easier for the theorist to address tactics than strategy.

Jomini was clearly stung by criticism from Clausewitz and others who claimed his theories omitted moral forces in war. With what is clearly a tone of injury he wrote, "For an officer [Jomini himself], after having assisted in a dozen campaigns, ought to know that war is a great drama, in which a thousand physical or moral causes operate more or less powerfully, and which cannot be reduced to mathematical calculations."⁹ Furthermore, Jomini was critical of Clausewitz's skepticism. In the introduction to the *Precis* he wrote: "One cannot deny to General Clausewitz great learning and a facile pen; but this pen, at times a little vagrant, is above all too pretentious for a didactic discussion, the simplicity and clearness of which ought to be its first merit. Besides that, the author shows himself by far too skeptical in point of military science; his first volume is but a declamation against all theory of war, whilst the two succeeding volumes, full of theoretic maxims, proves that the author believes in the efficacy of his own doctrines, if he does not believe in those of others."¹⁰

Jomini called *On War* a "learned labyrinth" and noted that "no work would have contributed more . . . to make me feel the necessity and utility of good theories," but he qualified his own purpose by citing the need to establish limits on application and to distinguish between "a theory of principles and a theory of systems."¹¹ Jomini had acknowledged in his *Treatise on Grand Military Operations* that while principles were timeless, their application varied according to circumstances. In the *Precis* he wrote: "If the principles of strategy are always the same, it is different with the political part of war, which is modified by the tone of communities, by localities, and by the characters of men at the head of states and armies. The fact of these modifications has been used to prove that war knows no rules. Military science rests upon principles which can never be safely violated in the presence of an active and skillful enemy, while the moral and political part of war presents these variations. Plans of operations are made as circumstances may demand; to execute these plans, the great principles of war must be observed."¹²

It is notable that for Jomini it was the principles of strategy which were timeless. Tactics change, he believed, as material means of battle evolve.

In spite of the difficulties with the development of a positive theory which Clausewitz had noted, the Prussian philosopher did not reject the idea that war was a phenomenon capable of mastery through study. "This subject, like any other that does not surpass man's intellectual capacity," he wrote, "can be elucidated by an inquiring mind, and its internal structure can to some degree be revealed."¹³ What he did demand was a change of purpose and focus. For Jomini the end of theory was a set of principles to serve as a guide for action. For Clausewitz the purpose of theory was the education of the

mind, the achievement of understanding: "It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self education, not to accompany him to the battlefield."¹⁴ Theory's purpose was the understanding of the constituent elements of war, particularly the relationship of ends to means.

In addition to their differences on the purpose of theory, Clausewitz and Jomini differed dramatically on the utility of history as a means for the distillation of theory. Jomini reflected the classical eighteenth-century view that history was a body of empirical data from which one could, by dispassionate observation, derive timeless principles that governed human behavior much in the same way that Newton had derived principles governing the physical world. In short, his method of using history was inductive. Indeed, Jomini asserted that "a series of ten campaigns is amply sufficient for presenting the application of all the possible maxims of war."¹⁵ This was the basis for his *Treatise of Grand Military Operations*, a critical study of the wars of Frederick the Great and the pre-Napoleonic revolutionary wars. Jomini induced his principles of war from his study of Frederick.¹⁶ He only confirmed them, at least to his own satisfaction, in his studies of the revolutionary and Napoleonic struggles written after his assertion of the central framework. Indeed, he was to write in 1837 that he had induced from Frederick's battle of Leuthen the key to *all the science of war*.¹⁷

In Chapter XXXV of the *Treatise on Grand Military Operations*, "Exposition of the General Principles of the Art of War," Jomini expressed his belief that the principles governing military operations could be separated from the political part of war. "It is not necessary," he wrote, "to remind our readers that we have here merely treated of those principles which relate to the employment of troops, or to *the purely military part* of the art of war; other combinations not less important are absolutely necessary in conducting a great war, but they pertain more to the government of empires than the commanding of armies."¹⁸ This chapter was first published in December 1806.¹⁹ When he wrote the *Precis*, years later, Jomini would devote a chapter to the consideration of "The Relation of Diplomacy to War," without giving up his faith in the essential separability of the two fields of action.

What then does the *Precis* contain? It is divided into seven chapters: the first addresses the relation of diplomacy to war, the second military policy, the third and by far the longest, strategy; the fourth chapter addresses grand tactics and battles, the fifth what Jomini called operations of mixed character, the sixth logistics, and the last tactical formations. This organization corresponds more or less with Jomini's division of the art of war in terms of activity. Curiously enough, although Jomini stated his intention in the first chapter to omit discussion of minor tactics, he devoted a chapter to them nonetheless.²⁰

In an essay in the *London Review of Books*, John Sommerville observed that “how war is fought depends, at least in part, on the concepts of war held by those who participate in it: ‘the idea of war itself is a major factor in the way in which it is waged.’ ”²¹ Perhaps Jomini’s most enduring legacy is a way to look at the conduct of war prescribed not only by his clear belief that the military side of war could be separated from the political, but also within a definitional structure suited to the wars of his day and, to a great extent, to those at least through 1945, when land armies remained an effective strategic weapon. It remains to be seen whether that day is past.

Jomini defined such concepts as theater of war, theater of operations, zones of operations, lines of operations, strategic lines, and interior lines. Indeed, he was perhaps the first to assert that the relationship of interior lines is temporal rather than spatial. He separated military activities into three categories—strategy, grand tactics, and logistics—observing that “strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of the troops.”²² If he went somewhat overboard with his definitional structure, particularly with subcategories of lines of operations, he at least provided a framework for thinking about the operations of large armies in the field.

While Jomini is often regarded as having been obsessed with the idea of interior lines, it was the principle of concentration that most attracted his attention. In the *Treatise* he had concluded that the science of war could be divided into three general combinations:

The first of these . . . is the art of arranging the lines of operations in the most advantageous manner; which is what is commonly but improperly called the plan of campaign.

The second branch is the art of transferring our masses, with the greatest possible expedition, to the decisive point of either the primitive or accidental line of operation. This is what is ordinarily understood by strategy.

The third branch is the art of combining the simultaneous employment of the greatest mass upon the most important point of the field of battle; that is properly the art of combat [tactics].²³

The principles developed by Jomini from his study of Frederick are all summarized in what to him was the “Fundamental Principle of War.” In the *Treatise* he wrote that from the battle of Leuthen he had induced “the principle of all combinations in war, which consists in putting in action, upon the most important point of the line of operations, or of an attack, more forces than the enemy.”²⁴ He would restate this finding in the *Precis* as “The Fundamental Principle.”²⁵ He went on to summarize the “whole science of great military combinations in . . . two fundamental truths.” The first was that “the science of strategy consists, in the first place in knowing how to choose well a theater of war and to estimate correctly . . . the enemy.” The second explained the art of war as the employment of troops according to two principles:

The first being, to obtain by free and rapid movements the advantage of bringing the mass of the troops against fractions of the enemy;

The second, to strike in the most decisive direction.²⁶

The *Precis* is generally concerned with giving instruction about how to accomplish this.

While it is normal to point to differences between Clausewitz and Jomini, it is useful here to remember that Clausewitz too recognized the importance of superiority of numbers. He wrote in Book III that "in tactics, *as in strategy*, superiority of numbers is the most common element in victory," and that "forces available must be employed with such skill that even in the absence of absolute superiority relative superiority is attained at the decisive point."²⁷

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As has been noted, Clausewitz's purpose was to master the phenomenon of war, *Das ding an sich*. *On War* is a very different kind of book than the *Precis*, aside from the fact that, by the author's own well-known admission, it is complete only in its first chapter. The structure of *On War* is rather like a telescoping camp cup. Its first chapter, the one acknowledged complete, comprehends the entire work; its title, "What is War?" Its parent book, Book I, addresses "The Nature of War." Book II is the epistemological testament, "On the Theory of War." Books III through VII address major subdivisions of war: "Strategy," "The Engagement," "Military Forces," "Defense" (the longest and in some ways the most important chapter after the first), then, "The Attack." Book VIII was clearly intended to bring all these explorations back together in practical synthesis with a discussion of "War Plans."

Whereas Jomini viewed history as raw data from which he could draw broad generalizations (induction), Clausewitz began with broad generalizations and deduced further refinements from his general propositions. He used history as a normative check on theory, discarding the products of abstract reason when they did not accord with experience. He urged this as a method in Book II,²⁸ and gave one of its finest illustrations in Book I, in which he developed his definition of war.

This process reflects Clausewitz's method of philosophic inquiry, which Professor Peter Paret describes as phenomenological abstraction.²⁹ Dr. Paret explains Clausewitz's philosophic method this way: "Basically . . . he took a single phenomenon, varied it in imagination to see what properties were essential to it and what properties could be removed in thought without affecting its essence."³⁰ In this way he examined war itself in Chapter 1 of Book I. First he established a theoretical and "pure" definition of war: "*War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.*"³¹ From this beginning he *deduced* that, left only to its own internal logic, war must rise inevitably to extremes. Then, in section 6 of Chapter 1, he laid this deductive conclusion against reality and found it did not accord with experience. He spent the

final twenty-two sections of the chapter explaining why this was so, arriving in the end at the well-known “trinitarian definition of war,”³² that war, “as a total phenomenon . . . [is] a remarkable trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.”³³ These aspects he assigned to the people, the commander and army, and the government respectively, noting their variability according to circumstances. His task, he observed, was “to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.”³⁴

As Professor Raymond Aron shows, this conclusion, which is fundamental to Clausewitz’s legacy and current relevance, was the product of growing dissatisfaction with his original draft of *On War*, a dissatisfaction with the fact that history did not accord with theory, a dissatisfaction that came to a head only in 1827, eleven years after Clausewitz began his great treatise.³⁵ Clausewitz laid out his conclusion in his “Note of 10 July 1827,” observing first that war could be of two kinds: one marked by the overthrow of the enemy, and the other leading only to negotiations. “This distinction between the two kinds of war is a matter of actual fact,” he wrote. “But no less practical is the importance of another point that must be made absolutely clear, namely that *war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means.*”³⁶ This he would reiterate in a letter to a friend, Captain Roeder, in December of the same year, referring to the “so-called science of strategy,” and arguing that unless the political relations of belligerents were clearly laid down, “a plan can be nothing more than a combination of temporal and spatial relationships, directed toward some arbitrary goal.”³⁷

Clausewitz argued that policy will affect the conduct of war throughout its course. Jomini, in contrast, pointed out that the first act of a general when war is declared “should be to agree with the head of state upon the character of the war,” after which he selects a base and proceeds with the conduct of the campaign, apparently basing his actions on military considerations alone.³⁸ Curiously, Jomini implies that the general and the head of state are different persons, whereas Clausewitz, in his famous and oft quoted statement that “the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have [sic] to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they [sic] are embarking,” uses a singular verb [*der Staatsmann und Feldherr ausubt*], thus implying identity.³⁹ Jomini does note that the system of operations to be adopted will be determined by circumstances, the nature of the enemy army, the character of the nations and their leaders, and “the moral and material means of attack or defense which the enemy may be able to bring into action.”⁴⁰

Although Clausewitz recognized many ends in war, from destruction of the enemy army, through occupation of border regions, even to passively awaiting attack, he acknowledged only one means: combat.⁴¹ In the unrevised portion of *On War* (Book IV), he wrote that "we are not interested in generals who win victories without bloodshed. The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take war more seriously, but not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity. Sooner or later someone will come along with a sharp sword and hack off our arms."⁴² In a similar vein, Jomini, having reflected upon Napoleon's favoring of operations directed at the destruction of an enemy's army rather than occupation of any particular piece of terrain, observed that this is likely to continue to be the nature of war for some time: "For the first to renounce it in the presence of an active and capable enemy would probably be a victim to his indiscretion."⁴³

Clausewitz called the relationship between attack and defense "the distinction that dominates the whole of war."⁴⁴ It was the defense which called war into being, for the attacker would always prefer to take without resistance.⁴⁵ Both Clausewitz and Jomini appear to favor the defensive as the strongest form of war *when it incorporates a strong riposte*. Both recognize the defense as a means of buying time to await a more favorable balance of forces. Indeed, it is Jomini who writes, "It seems plain that one of the greatest talents of a general is to know how to use . . . these two systems [attack and defense], and particularly to be able to take the initiative during the progress of a defensive war."⁴⁶

Two other comparisons of Jomini and Clausewitz shed light on their different views of the role and nature of theory. The first concerns the idea of culmination, which is taken from astronomy. It refers to an army (or commander) overreaching itself. Clausewitz devoted two chapters of his book to a discussion of this phenomenon in both tactics and strategy.⁴⁷ Jomini recognized its effect and consequence but simply passed over it as obvious.⁴⁸ More to the point is their respective treatment of the concepts of friction and chance. Clausewitz wrote that "friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper,"⁴⁹ acknowledging thereby the obligation to include consideration of friction in his theory. Jomini, on the other hand, acknowledged the presence of chance: "An order misunderstood, a fortuitous event, may throw into the hands of the enemy all the chances of success which a skillful general had prepared himself by his maneuvers."⁵⁰ But he then places consideration of such events outside theory: "These are risks which cannot be foreseen nor avoided. Would it be fair on that account to deny the influence of science and principles in ordinary affairs?" Jomini concluded that "a general's science consists in providing for his side all the chances possible to be foreseen, and of course cannot extend to the caprices of destiny."⁵¹

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Sir Isaiah Berlin titled his essay about Tolstoy's view of history, *The Hedgehog and the Fox*, after a classical Greek epigram by the poet Archilochus which says, "The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing."⁵² The hedgehog "relate[s] everything to a single central vision"; the fox "pursue[s] many ends, often unrelated and even contradictory."⁵³ This literary model fits Clausewitz and Jomini. Clausewitz was a "hedgehog." Late in his career, he related everything in war to a central political purpose. Jomini, who observed many regularities in the history of war, possessed no unifying vision. His theory was organized largely on spatial and temporal lines and, as a consequence, Jominian theory is never greater than the sum of its parts. It is not "wrong" so much as limited. Clausewitz's theory, on the other hand, is transcendent so long as the central proposition remains valid.

Based upon his study, Jomini concluded that history was governed by a finite number of principles which, like laws of nature, were timeless. Clausewitz demurred. He too saw regularities in history, but in his case they were phenomenological relationships.⁵⁴ He did not deny the possibility that an equation relating all the factors that determined outcomes was conceivable in the abstract. What he believed was that the relationships were far too numerous to deal with in any exact way. This is at the heart of his quotation of Bonaparte that "many of the decisions faced by the commander-in-chief resemble mathematical problems worthy of the gifts of a *Newton* or an *Euler*."⁵⁵

In the *Treatise on Grand Military Operations*, Jomini wrote, "The idea of reducing the theory of war to some natural combinations; to a simple and exact theory, has many advantages. It renders instruction more easy; the judgement of the operations more just, and consequently, faults less frequent; since it will direct all generals in their conduct."⁵⁶ This reads very much like the introduction to an American army training text. In his day, Jomini's works satisfied the need filled by doctrine today. Jomini has been superseded not by more modern theorists, but by contemporary doctrine writers. Clausewitz sought to fill another need, one like that Jacob Burkhardt saw for history: "Not to make men clever for next time; . . . to make them wise forever."⁵⁷

Notes

1. For Jomini the best biographical study is John Shy's "Jomini," Ch. 6 of *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Peter Paret, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 143-185. For Clausewitz see Raymond Aron's sympathetic biographical chapter in Raymond Aron, *Clausewitz: Philosopher of War*, trans. by Christine Booker and Norman Stone (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), pp. 11-40. Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976 & 1985) is a lengthy intellectual biography of the Prussian. Colonel John Alger's *Antoine-Henri Jomini: A Bibliographical Survey*, United States Military Academy Library Occasional Paper Number Three (West Point: United States Military Academy Library, 1975) is also very useful.

2. Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, p. 78, and Alger, *Jomini*, pp. 1-2. Alger considers Jomini's initial didactic essay the beginning of the *Treatise*.

3. Baron Jomini, *Summary of the Art of War, or A New Analytical Compend of the Principal Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy*, trans. by Major O.F. Winship and Lieut. E.E. McLean (New York: G.P. Putnam & Co, 1854), hereinafter referred to as *Summary of the Art of War*, 1854, to distinguish it from Baron de Jomini, *The Art of War*, trans. by Capt. G.H. Mendell and Lieut. W.P. Craighill (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1862; reprint by Greenwood Press, n.d.), hereinafter referred to as *Jomini, Art of War*, 1862. These are two separate translations of Jomini's *Precis of the Art of War*, the latter of which does not contain Jomini's introductory essay.

4. See "Notice of the Present Theory of War and of Its Utility" in Jomini, *Summary of the Art of War*, 1854, pp. 13-14. *Treatise* is Baron Jomini, *Treatise on Grand Military Operations or a Critical and Military History of the Wars of Frederick the Great, as Contrasted with the Modern System*, 2 Vols., trans. by Col. S.B. Holabird (New York: D. van Nostrand, 1865), hereinafter referred to as *Jomini, Treatise on Grand Military Operations*. For dates, see Alger, *Jomini*, pp. 2-5.

5. "Letter to His Majesty, The Emperor of all the Russias," 6th March, 1837, reprinted in Jomini, *Summary of the Art of War*, 1854, p. 1.

6. Carl von Clausewitz, *Principles of War*, trans. by Hans W. Gatzke (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Division of The Stackpole Company, 1960).

7. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 136.

8. *Ibid.*

9. Jomini, "Notice of the Present Theory of War and of Its Utility," in *Summary of the Art of War*, 1854, pp. 17-18. See also Jomini's comment in the "Conclusion" in which he acknowledges "war in its ensemble is not a science, but an art. Strategy . . . may indeed be regulated by fixed laws resembling those of the positive sciences, but this is not true of war viewed as a whole." *Ibid.*, p. 325.

10. "Notice," in *ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

12. Jomini, *Art of War*, 1862, p. 15.

13. Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 149-150.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 141.

15. Jomini, "Notice of the Present Theory of War and of Its Utility," in *Summary of the Art of War*, 1854, pp. 12-13. For Jomini's classical view of the use of history, see *Ibid.*, p. 18.

16. Alger, *Jomini*, p. 6.

17. Jomini, "Notice of the Present Theory of War and of Its Utility", in *Summary of the Art of War*, 1854, p. 12.

18. Jomini, *Treatise on Grand Military Operations*, II, p. 460. (Emphasis added.)

19. Alger, *Jomini*, p. 6.

20. Jomini, *The Art of War*, 1862, p. 11.

21. John Sommerville, "Ideas of War," *The London Review of Books*, 27 October 1988, p. 21.

22. Jomini, *The Art of War*, 1862, p. 62.

23. Jomini, *Treatise on Grand Military Operations*, II, pp. 459-460.

24. Jomini, *Treatise on Grand Military Operations*, I, p. 252.

25. Jomini, *The Art of War*, 1862, p. 63.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 299.

27. Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 194. (Emphasis added.)

28. *Ibid.*, p. 144.

29. Paret, *Clausewitz and the State*, p. 357.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 358.

31. Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 75.

32. The term is from Aron, *Clausewitz*, p. 2.

33. Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 89.

34. *Ibid.*

35. See Aron, *Clausewitz*, Ch. 3, "The Final Synthesis and the Strategic Debate," pp. 61-70.

36. Clausewitz, "Note of 10 July 1827," in *On War*, p. 69.


37. Letter of Carl von Clausewitz to Captain Roeder, December 22, 1827, in *Carl von Clausewitz: Two Letters on Strategy*, trans. by Peter Paret and Daniel Moran (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College Art of War Colloquium, November 1984), p. 9.

38. Jomini, *The Art of War*, 1862, p. 59.

39. Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 88. For the German text, see Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege: Hinterlassenes Werk Des Generals Carl von Clausewitz* (Bonn: Ferd. Dummlers Verlag, 1980), p. 212.

40. Jomini, *The Art of War*, 1862, p. 45.

41. Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 95.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 260.
43. Jomini, *The Art of War*, 1862, p. 126.
44. Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 94.
45. *Ibid.* pp. 377, 370.
46. Jomini, *The Art of War*, 1862, pp. 66-67; Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 360-366.
47. Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 528, 566-573.
48. Jomini, *The Art of War*, 1862, p. 20.
49. Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 119.
50. Jomini, *The Art of War*, 1862, p. 38. For Jomini on friction see *ibid.*, pp. 178-179.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
52. Isaiah Berlin, *The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy's View of History* (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1953), p. 1. I owe to Dr. Roger Spiller both my introduction to and understanding of Berlin's essay.
53. *Ibid.*
54. Clausewitz, "Unfinished Note, Presumably Written in 1830," in *On War*, p. 71.
55. Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 112.
56. Jomini, *Treatise on Grand Military Operations*, I, p. 254.
57. Quoted by Sir Michael Howard in "The Use and Abuse of Military History," *The Royal United Service Institution Journal* (RUSI), February 1962, p. 8.



. . . Clausewitz, has therefore immediately to qualify his maxim, thus:

“When we say that defense is a stronger form of war, *that is, that it requires a smaller force, if soundly designed*, we are speaking, of course, only of one certain line of operations. If we do not know the general line of operation on which the enemy intends to attack, and so cannot mass our force upon it, then defense is weak, because we are compelled to distribute our force so as to be strong enough to stop the enemy on any line of operations he may adopt.”

Manifestly, however, a force capable of being strong enough on several lines of operation to stop an enemy possesses a superiority that should take the offensive.

Naval Strategy

A. T. Mahan (1911)

Little, Brown (1918), p. 279