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Naval Strategy and National Security

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Donald Pilling's monograph is the narrowest of the three works reviewed here. Pilling analyzes whether Pentagon policy and Congressional legislation, which mandated competition in weapons procurement, have actually generated the cost savings often claimed. Pilling shows that it cannot be demonstrated statistically that competition in procurement (generally by having a second source bid on part of a production program) has reduced program costs. The problem lies in the quality of the data available, and also in the fact that the learning-curve model used to estimate cost savings from procurement competition is inadequate for that task.

Pilling suggests an alternative model for assessing the benefits of competition in defense procurement. Pilling's model, though interesting, is still too narrow to provide an adequate way of measuring the benefits of competition. The dynamics of defense contracting are too complex to be captured by a simple, cost-based model.

The Brookings Institution program in defense policy studies continues to produce quality work. These books should be of interest to anyone concerned about the economics of national security.

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Miller, Steven E. and Van Evera, Stephen, eds. *Naval Strategy and National Security*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1988. 389pp. \$40

If you're a long-time *International Security* subscriber, the contents of this book might be familiar. All the essays in *Naval Strategy and National Security* have previously appeared in that publication. That said, the articles chosen for inclusion in this book do adequately define the title. Aspects of past and present naval technologies as well as disputes over the Maritime Strategy are discussed by the acknowledged experts: Linton Brooks, John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, Joshua Epstein, Michael McGwire and Karl Lautenschlager, to name a few.

Divided into three parts, *Naval Strategy and National Security* first examines "Naval Strategy" with a quintet of articles that describe the case for and against the Reagan administration's Maritime Strategy. Part II, "Naval Technology," looks to the past and future with four articles discussing aspects of naval technology that bear on naval policy questions. Two articles by Karl Lautenschläger are most interesting; in the first, "Technology and the Evolution of Naval Warfare," he makes a strong case that the fears of technological surprise are largely misplaced. Change can be dramatic, but it is usually evolutionary. The author warns against either projection of radical change or detailed rejection of anything but gradual change, suggesting a balanced

approach. The second article, "The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901-2001," Lautenschläger traces the dramatic evolution in submarine missions since 1900. Along the way he notes enough mistakes and capability shortfalls to warm a surface warfare officers heart (but not give him cause to put away his life jacket).

The final part of this collection is titled "Naval Operations: Controlling the Risks." Here Desmond Ball looks at the various ways nuclear war at sea might arise, and how the potential causes of such conflict might be avoided. Barry Posen's "Inadvertent Nuclear War?" explores the risk of escalation that would arise if, during a conventional war, U.S. submarines attacked Soviet SSNs in ways that also led to Soviet SSBN destruction. (Editor Von Evera notes that Posen's article led to Navy acknowledgment that in a conventional war, it will deliberately search out Soviet SSBNs. If such operations create risk, Van Evera says, that risk will arise deliberately, not inadvertently.)

Like most collections, *Naval Strategy and National Security* has something for every interest. But in this case, I would add "even more so," because both the quality of the articles and the authors' credentials are impeccable.

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Zhilin, P.A. *Isotriya voyennogo iskussiva* [History of Military Art]. Moscow: Voennoye Izdatel'Stvo, 1986.

The Soviet military work with the uninspiring title, *History of Military Art*, warrants examination by those seeking evidence of recent change in Soviet military thought—or the lack thereof. The main thrust of the book centers around what Soviet military writers term "periodization." In a broad sense, periodization, as used by General Lieutenant Zhilin, correlates military art to the economic and technological growth of society. In a narrower sense he attempts to fit the events of a particular war into what Soviet military art defines as war's four periods. Neither of these exercises is of much interest, however, to anyone who is not a committed Marxist-Leninist.

The book was prepared under the editorial direction of the now-deceased General-Lieutenant P.A. Zhilin, Director of the Institute of Military History of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Defense. It was actually written by a "collective" of nine authors, including M.M. Kir'yan (identified as leader of the authors' collective), and Yu.V. Plotnikov (identified as deputy leader). All nine authors appear to be military officers associated with the Institute of Military History.

Such team efforts are not uncommon in Soviet military writing. Generally they indicate either an authoritative summary of established doctrine, or an equally authoritative statement of a change in doctrine.