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Isotriya voyennogo iskussiva [History of Military Art]

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approach. The second article, "The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901-2001," Lautenschläger traces the dramatic evolution in submarine missions since 1900. Along the way he notes enough mistakes and capability shortfalls to warm a surface warfare officers heart (but not give him cause to put away his life jacket).

The final part of this collection is titled "Naval Operations: Controlling the Risks." Here Desmond Ball looks at the various ways nuclear war at sea might arise, and how the potential causes of such conflict might be avoided. Barry Posen's "Inadvertent Nuclear War?" explores the risk of escalation that would arise if, during a conventional war, U.S. submarines attacked Soviet SSNs in ways that also led to Soviet SSBN destruction. (Editor Von Evera notes that Posen's article led to Navy acknowledgment that in a conventional war, it will deliberately search out Soviet SSBNs. If such operations create risk, Van Evera says, that risk will arise deliberately, not inadvertently.)

Like most collections, *Naval Strategy and National Security* has something for every interest. But in this case, I would add "even more so," because both the quality of the articles and the authors' credentials are impeccable.

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Zhilin, P.A. *Isotriya voyennogo iskussiva* [History of Military Art]. Moscow: Voennoye Izdatel'stvo, 1986.

The Soviet military work with the uninspiring title, *History of Military Art*, warrants examination by those seeking evidence of recent change in Soviet military thought—or the lack thereof. The main thrust of the book centers around what Soviet military writers term "periodization." In a broad sense, periodization, as used by General Lieutenant Zhilin, correlates military art to the economic and technological growth of society. In a narrower sense he attempts to fit the events of a particular war into what Soviet military art defines as war's four periods. Neither of these exercises is of much interest, however, to anyone who is not a committed Marxist-Leninist.

The book was prepared under the editorial direction of the now-deceased General-Lieutenant P.A. Zhilin, Director of the Institute of Military History of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Defense. It was actually written by a "collective" of nine authors, including M.M. Kir'yan (identified as leader of the authors' collective), and Yu.V. Plotnikov (identified as deputy leader). All nine authors appear to be military officers associated with the Institute of Military History.

Such team efforts are not uncommon in Soviet military writing. Generally they indicate either an authoritative summary of established doctrine, or an equally authoritative statement of a change in doctrine.

Over half of the book is devoted to the Second World War, while 94 pages deal with the Russian Civil War and developments in military art leading up to the Second World War. The first 60 pages of text are devoted to an encapsulation of all recorded military history prior to the end of the First World War. The developments since the Second World War are summarized in the last 40 pages.

Of particular interest is whether the book indicates any discernable change in the central role nuclear weapons play in Soviet military thought, as they have since it took its current form in the late 1950s.

The answer to this question must be a qualified "no." The work is replete with references to nuclear weapons and their continuing importance, not for deterrence, but for actual military hostilities; it reaffirms all the major points of Soviet military strategy as expressed in the classic Soviet military works of the 1960s and 1970s. For example, on p. 406 it is stated that the fundamental reorganization of Soviet military art undertaken in the 1950s was due to the mass introduction of nuclear weapons. On the next page the preeminent role of surprise in initiating a war is stressed, because of the importance of destroying the opponent's strategic forces at the outset.

Even if they are not employed in actual combat, nuclear weapons maintain an overriding importance: "operations without the employment of nuclear weapons will be

carried out with a constant threat of the enemy's employment of weapons of mass destruction" ("weapons of mass destruction" could be chemical or biological as well as nuclear).

However, there is a small, but possibly significant indicator that the policy of nuclear emphasis may be under review. Since 1962 there has been a universally used Soviet term that signified the reason for the thorough-going change made in Soviet military theory since the 1950s: Revolution in Military Affairs. It was a key term because it tied the introduction of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems to Marxist-Leninist dialectics. Nuclear weapons had fundamentally altered military affairs.

This book does not use the term Revolution in Military Affairs. It discusses two periods in postwar Soviet military thought and specifically ties them to the introduction of modern nuclear forces. It emphasizes that nuclear weapons have made a "fundamental change in military art." But the key phrase is not in evidence.

The book has one final tidbit for naval readers. On p. 416 it states: "The fundamental missions of the Navy have come to be the destruction of the naval forces of the enemy, disruption and disorganization of their communications, inflicting strikes on important enemy land targets, joint actions with the Ground Forces, carrying out transport, and protecting our own seaplanes." This is a very different list of missions than has been published in

Soviet naval writings, particularly in the primacy it gives to combatting enemy forces and to interdiction of shipping. It should be noted that some of the excitement this list has generated is due to a misunderstanding. Other Soviet naval mission lists do not separate strategic and operational missions, whereas this list applies to operational missions only. Still, the fuller implications of this and other Soviet naval mission lists is worthy of further study.

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Wardak, Ghulam D. and Turbiville, Graham H. *The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy: Volume I, Issues of Soviet Military Strategy*. Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1989. 411pp.

In World War II General George S. Patton, Jr. told a staff officer that he had spent years preparing himself to meet General Erwin Rommel by reading Rommel's books and studying his campaigns.

These translations of lectures presented to students of the Voroshilov General Staff Academy in Moscow, are, to students of Soviet military thought, what Rommel's books were to Patton. They are an in-depth look at the way the Soviet military leadership is taught to view war, strategy, and operations.

The source of these lectures is Ghulam Wardak, a former lieutenant colonel and general staff officer

of the Afghan armed forces, who attended the two-year course at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy in 1973-75. A Russian linguist and army field commander of considerable experience, Wardak was able to get his transcribed notes and copies of the Voroshilov lectures safely back to Afghanistan on his return. After the communist coup in 1978, Wardak was imprisoned several times by the new Afghan regime, but was finally allowed to retire. From 1979-1980, Wardak functioned as a successful commander of Mujahedeen forces until a serious wound forced his evacuation into Pakistan. Wardak came to the United States in 1981, bringing with him the lecture materials that he had safeguarded since leaving the Soviet Union. We owe this dedicated military professional gratitude and admiration.

The materials collected by Wardak have been compiled and edited by Graham Turbiville, a senior analyst at the U.S. Army's Soviet Army Studies Office in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Working with Wardak, Turbiville assembled into this first volume eight lectures that were given on strategic issues during Wardak's attendance at the Voroshilov Academy. Eight more lectures will be published in a second volume.

The introductory chapter, written by Wardak and Dr. John Yurechko from the Defense Intelligence Agency, describes the setting where these lectures took place; the milieu of the General Staff Academy—the students, the faculty, the procedures and the curriculum of this important