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## Book Reviews

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
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# PROFESSIONAL READING



A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge with reason and consistency.

Admiral H.G. Rickover

## 1588: An Armada of Books

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John B. Hattendorf

- Corbett, Julian S. *Drake and the Tudor Navy with a History of the Rise of England as a Maritime Power*, with an introduction by R. B. Wernham. London: Temple Smith and Brookfield, Vt.: Gower Publishing, 1988. 2 volumes in 1, 415pp, and 462pp. \$107.50
- Corbett, Julian S., ed. *Papers Relating to the Navy during the Spanish War 1585-1587*. London: Temple Smith for the Navy Records Society; Brookfield, Vt.: Gower Publishing, 1987. 363pp. \$65.95
- Fernandez-Armesto, Felipe. *The Spanish Armada: The Experience of War in 1588*. York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1988. 300pp. \$24.95
- Kemp, Peter. *The Campaign of the Spanish Armada*. New York and Oxford: Facts on File Publications, 1988. 159pp. \$24.95
- Laughton, John Knox, ed. *State Papers Relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada Anno 1588*, 2nd ed. London: Temple Smith for Navy Records Society; Brookfield, Vt.: Gower Publishing, 1987. 2 volumes in 1, 365pp. and 418pp. \$93.95
- Martin, Colin and Parker, Geoffrey. *The Spanish Armada*. New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1988. 296pp. \$27.50
- Mattingly, Garrett. *The Armada*. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1988. 443pp. \$24.95

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Dr. Hattendorf is the Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History at the Naval War College.

- Padfield, Peter. *Armada*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988. 192pp. \$24.95
- Rodger, N.A.M. *The Armada in the Public Records*. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1988. 76pp. \$7.50
- Rodriguez-Salgado, M. J. and the staff of the National Maritime Museum. *Armada 1588-1988*. London: Penguin Books in association with the National Maritime Museum, 1988. 295pp. \$20
- Rowse, A. L., ed. *Froude's "Spanish Story of the Armada" and Other Essays*. Gloucester: Sutton, 1988. 262pp. \$7.50
- Whiting, Roger. *The Enterprise of England: The Spanish Armada*. New York: St. Martin's, 1988. 248pp. \$29.95
- Wernham, R.B., ed. *The Expedition of Sir John Norris and Sir Francis Drake to Spain and Portugal, 1589*. London: Temple Smith for the Navy Records Society; Brookfield, Vt.: Gower Publishing, 1988. 380pp.

Of all the anniversaries in 1988, most lavishly celebrated was that of the Spanish Armada. Bonfires and ceremonies are but memories now. What remains is a solid contribution to scholarship and to our understanding of late 16th century naval history. A host of authors and publishers joined in the fray to compete for the public's attention, and this list of a dozen is one reviewer's choice of the most memorable.

The publications which appeared in 1988 created a wealth of printed pages that outline the fashion in which Armada historiography has changed during the past century. They fall into three general categories: those that reprint standard works long out of print; those that provide new evidence and insights, advancing scholarship; and those designed to attract the general reader. Each, in its way, makes a contribution.

Among English scholars, interest in the Spanish Armada dates from the work of Professor J. A. Froude. As regius professor of history at Oxford, Froude revised his earlier view of the Armada in an essay written in 1892. It is this which A. L. Rowse uses as the title for his edition of Froude's essays. It is a much revised version of the story originally told in Froude's 1870 *History of England* and is based on Captain C. Fernandez Duro's two-volume collection of documents from the Spanish archives, *La Armada Invencible* (Madrid, 1884-85). To Froude, the five-day battle in the Channel during August 1588 was an epic fought between gallant and noble men. Although marred by a number of factual errors, the general outline of the story is that which we today hold to be authentic.

While Froude's work marked the beginning of serious English scholarship, the next major step was taken by the Navy Records Society. Established in 1893 to print unpublished manuscripts and rare works of naval interest, it continues today as the most important organization promoting the scholarly study of naval history. Its very first volume, published in 1894, was Sir John

Knox Laughton's *State Papers Relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada*. In 1988 the Society reprinted the second edition of that work (1895) which corrected "a few trifling errors or misprints." Designed as the English counterpart to Fernandez Duro's collection, it made available for the first time the most important official papers for the English side of the battle, drawing primarily from State Papers, Domestic, in the Public Record Office, as well as a few from the British Museum and one at Hatfield House. It remains the most important collection of documents on the English side.

In 1898, the Navy Records Society followed up this subject with a volume of papers devoted to the English Navy in the years leading up to the battle—Sir Julian Corbett's *Papers Relating to the Navy during the Spanish War 1585-1587*. The Navy Records Society reprinted this volume in 1988 and, complementing both Laughton's and Corbett's collections, it issued a new volume edited by Professor R. B. Wernham on *The Expedition of Sir John Norris and Sir Francis Drake to Spain and Portugal, 1589*. Wernham's volume documents England's reaction to the failure of the Spanish campaign, the strategic choices which England faced, and the subsequent action planned for making use of the opportunities England had. The story of the expedition, however, is one of disobeyed orders, botched operations, great expense and lost opportunity. Together, these volumes of documents from the Navy Records Society provide a permanent and authoritative source for study of the Royal Navy in the years 1585-1589. The only other significant group of documents which the Navy Records Society has published (but which were not reviewed for this occasion) are George Naish's edition of a collection of Spanish documents in the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich. This small collection appeared in Christopher Lloyd, ed., *The Naval Miscellany, Volume 4* (Navy Records Society, 1952).

Upon completing his collection of documents, Sir Julian Corbett published two interpretative studies. In 1898, he published *Drake and the Tudor Navy*, which has remained the classic account and analysis of the Armada battles. Gower Publishing reprinted this two-volume work for the Armada anniversary, with an introduction by Professor R. B. Wernham, and also Michael Oppenheim's 1896 study of *A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy from 1509 to 1660*, with an introduction by Professor K. R. Andrews.

In 1959, Garrett Mattingly wrote his great narrative *The Armada*, setting the battle in the broad context of European politics. Immediately recognized as a masterpiece of historical writing, Mattingly superseded the general aspects of Corbett's account, but failed to match the depth of his understanding in naval tactics. However, for the past thirty years, Mattingly's book has remained the best and most readable, general account. In 1988, it reappeared, unaltered.

During the years since Mattingly wrote, a number of important monographs have appeared which have broadened understanding of the

general context of European politics and naval affairs in this period. Most important among them are M. F. Keeler, ed., *Sir Francis Drake's West Indian Voyage* (Hakluyt Society, 1981); Kenneth Andrews' works, including his edition of documents on *The Last Voyage of Drake and Hawkins [1595-96]* (1972) and his interpretive studies of *Drake's Voyages* (1967) and *Elizabethan Privateering* (1964); Charles Cruickshank's *Elizabethan Army* (1966); Geoffrey Parker's important studies using Spanish, Dutch and Belgian archives, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road* (1972), *The Dutch Revolt* (1977), *Philip II* (1978), and *Spain and the Netherlands* (1979); and Professor R. B. Wernham's two magnificent studies of English affairs, *Before The Armada: The Growth of English Foreign Policy 1485-1588* (1966) and *After the Armada: Elizabethan England and the Struggle for Western Europe 1588-1595* (1984).

Parallel to these studies based on archival sources, a whole new range of information has become available through underwater archaeology. Researchers have identified more than twenty Spanish Armada wrecks off the coast of Ireland. Over the years, collectors have recovered a number of artifacts from the wrecked ships, but it was not until the late 1960s that marine archaeologists began a series of systematic investigations. Their work continues to produce new insights into the particular circumstances of each ship and life on board Spanish warships in that period. As their information accumulates, archaeologists produce interim reports and studies. Notable among them are R. Stenuit, *Treasures of the Armada* (1972) and Colin M. Martin, *Full Fathom Five: Wrecks of the Spanish Armada* (1975).

Complementing the Spanish contributions is Margaret Rule's *The Mary Rose* (1983). This is the story of the excavation and recovery of an English warship that sank in an action with the French in 1545. The data that it furnishes about shipboard life in the Tudor period have also been applied to conditions during the Armada campaign some 40 years later.

In combination with the standard accounts that have been published in connection with the Armada anniversary, this new archival and archaeological work provides the basis for new writing on the subject. It informs the works that are intended for the general reader and provides the bases for new research work.

Most of the remaining books that introduce this essay are designed for the general reader. Roger Whiting's *The Enterprise of England*, which is readable and objective, includes information on the shipwrecks as well as the background to, and events of, the Armada campaign. Peter Kemp's *The Campaign of the Spanish Armada* and Peter Padfield's *Armada* are similar to each other in appearance and valuable for their differing, but fine selection of illustrations. Of the two, the book by Padfield is larger, more richly illustrated and includes insights from scholarship that are new since Mattingly's 1959 book. Recent scholarship has also been brought to general attention in another way—through the three valuable articles by Simon Adams, Geoffrey Parker

and Felix Barker that appeared in the May 1988 issue of *History Today*. Altogether, they provide a useful summary of recent trends in scholarship.

The subtitle to Felipe Fernandez-Armesto's book gives the clue to his approach. While he uses already published source material, *The Spanish Armada: The Experience of War in 1588* has a much different emphasis than the other books that have appeared. Following, although not acknowledging, John Keegan's example in *The Face of Battle*, Fernandez-Armesto turns to personal accounts to examine the individual in warfare. Unlike Froude, he sees the Armada not as a great epic, but as a typical event of 16th century warfare. He emphasizes war experiences common to both sides, and he argues that the Armada campaign was not a defeat for Spain, or at least only a very qualified victory for England. Although his book is designed for a wide audience, using standard sources, Fernandez-Armesto's different focus and new interpretation make an important contribution to scholarship.

Of the recent writings that provide both new evidence and new insights on the naval and maritime history of this period, the previously mentioned Professor Wernham's volume of documents for The Navy Records Society is the only book-length undertaking which follows a traditional, scholarly approach. There have also been articles written in scholarly journals, notable among which are those that appear in the special Armada issue of the *Revista de Historia Naval* (1988, vol. 6, no. 23) by Simon Adams, Mia Rodriguez-Salgado and Jonathan Israel, three scholars in Britain, writing in Spanish. Like Wernham's book, these articles are most valuable and take a traditional scholarly approach. Some works have been remarkably successful in combining both the presentation of new scholarly evidence and interpretations with an approach to reach the general reading public.

In this regard, one very useful small booklet is N.A.M. Rodger's *The Armada in the Public Records*. The special value of this work is the photo reproduction of seventeen representative documents, with a careful transcription of each one. Chosen because they illustrate the flavor of the rich stock of documents on this subject in the Public Record Office in London, their contribution is heightened by the side-by-side presentation of facsimiles and the transcripts. Not only can one learn about the type and range of source materials on the English Navy in this period, but this illustrated selection can serve as a practical teaching device for learning the intricacies and peculiarities of late 16th-century English handwriting.

The official catalogue of the international exhibition to commemorate the Spanish Armada, written by M.J. Rodriguez-Salgado and the staff of The National Maritime Museum at Greenwich, is more than just a catalogue. It is a major contribution to scholarship. The exhibition, held at Greenwich from April to September 1988 and at the Ulster Museum in Belfast from October 1988 to January 1989, is the largest ever to commemorate the Armada. It brought together, for the first time, materials from all over the United

Kingdom, Spain, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, Austria and the United States. Dr. Rodriguez-Salgado of the London School of Economics was the research historian and consultant during the four years of preparation for the exhibit. Her introductory essay to *The Armada 1588-1988* summarizes the ideas presented by the exhibit. She also provides a valuable reassessment of the diplomatic situation leading up to the Armada, adding new insights beyond the information which Garrett Mattingly provided 30 years ago. In addition, she wrote several of the introductory sections to the exhibit themes, which included topics ranging from the courts of Elizabeth and Philip II, life on board ship, navigation, rival armies, commanders, and detailed descriptions of the battle at sea.

Colin Martin and Geoffrey Parker's book, *The Spanish Armada* (1988), is the most important recent book to use new evidence and provide new insights. While featured in a BBC television series, the authors have produced more than a television text. Their book is the product of 13 years of research when the authors were both at the University of St. Andrews. The results of Martin's archaeological work are placed within the context of Parker's work in previously unused material in Spanish and Dutch archives. Breaking down the intellectual barriers between these two research approaches, the authors have produced an exciting and vivid account of the events surrounding the Armada. They deal evenhandedly with the historical controversies surrounding the events. Among their key points, they conclude that Spanish gunnery was inferior to English, but the English had much to learn about how to use their guns effectively.

While observers at the time failed to understand its broad significance, in looking back we can see that the Armada marked a turning point for some major trends. It was not an apocalyptic event as some used to say, yet it marked the point where Spain's imperial power began to decline. Spain did not achieve the immediate objectives she had set out to accomplish in 1588, and in that sense the Armada was a failure. Yet, if the Armada's messengers had made contact with the Army, and if it had been able to reform and return to the Channel to embark troops, it might have been successful while English shot-lockers were still empty. If that had happened, the results and our judgment of them would have been far different. It was still a remarkable achievement.

This Armada of books published in 1988 is the fruit of a century of scholarship. Clearly they evidence a change of emphasis in the English language literature. While the general outline of events was clear in Froude's work, we now have a greater appreciation for the broad context of international relations and the details of the Armada story. We no longer see the Armada as a great epic fought between heroic men, but rather as an event which we can use to mark slow changes in the continuum of human history and as a point to search for insight into the life of ordinary men and

women. In contrast to the historians of the 1880s and 1890s, today we are reluctant to declare victory or defeat, but, instead, have sought to use various forms of evidence in trying to understand a range of human activities in the complex world of the 16th century.

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Ferling, John, ed. *The World Turned Upside Down: The American Victory in the War of Independence*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1988. 250pp. \$39.95

In this book, eleven essayists—ten Americans and a Canadian—attempt to answer the question “Why did America win the Revolutionary War?” They fail.

True enough, there are some good pieces. Fred Anderson traces very well the development of American military institutions and shows how they diverged from their British forebears at the beginning of the American Revolutionary War. James Kirby Martin shows how and why the Continental Army was formed and then goes on to show that the Army not only produced victory on the battlefield, but it also broke down the “localist-oriented horizon” of many Americans. It was a truly national institution and set a standard for civil-military relations for America.

In a well-written and well-researched essay, Paul David Nelson tries to answer why the American soldier fought despite the conditions, which at times were awful. This essay is a study of what makes soldiers carry on to the bitter end despite lack of food, equipment,

clothing, and everything else required to keep body and soul together.

With skill, Mark Edward Lender’s essay on the army’s logistical support shows how the Americans—standing on a legal and monetary sand castle—were able, just barely, to procure the supplies needed, and managed to keep their forces in the field. James H. O’Donnell’s excellent essay on frontier warfare portrays the complexity and savage nature of war on the frontier.

John Ferling’s essay, “Washington and American Victory,” hits all the usual points but adds nothing to our knowledge of Washington. Neither do Hugh F. Rankin’s thumbnail sketches of Generals Charles Lee, Horatio Gates, Nathanael Greene, the Marquis de Lafayette, and Henry Knox add much to what we already know about these men. Jonathan G. Rossie’s “Politics and American Victory” should be entitled “The Politics of Who Commands What.” There is nothing new here. The author published this information in book form in 1975.

W.J. Eccles’ “The French Alliance and American Victory” is an account of how, for reasons of *realpolitik*, the French became involved in the American Revolu-



tionary War. At the end the author forgets about the realities of diplomacy and takes the Americans to task for double-crossing the French at the peace talks before the French could double-cross the Americans.

Sylvia R. Frey paints a standard picture of the King's army during the American Revolutionary War. Only her colors are new. Mary B. Wickwire is simply in over her head on the role of naval warfare. For example, she takes Admiral Lord Howe to task for failing to effectively blockade the rebellious American colonies in the first years of the war. The admiral's instructions called for him to support operations ashore and to blockade the ports. If one counts the number and type of ships under his command, and how and why they were deployed, it becomes clear that the admiral did not have enough ships of the right type to do both tasks.

More important than their individual qualities or shortcomings, the reason the essays in *The World Turned Upside Down* do not achieve the editor's objective of showing why the Americans won the Revolution is that nothing in the book addresses the strategic problems confronting Britain after 1778 when the conflict exploded into a worldwide naval war. The American Revolutionary War after 1778 can be understood only if the strategic and political objectives of France, Spain and Holland are taken into account along with those of the Americans and British. It is the absence of any work on such matters that, despite some

good parts, dooms this book to failure.

DAVID SYRETT  
Queens College  
New York

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Wheeler, Richard. *Sword over Richmond: An Eyewitness History of McClellan's Peninsula Campaign*. New York: Harper & Row, 1986. 354pp. \$21.95

Few generals in the Union Army in the spring of 1862 had the opportunity to potentially end the Civil War in a single short campaign. George McClellan, however, was given that chance. The Peninsula Campaign of 1862 and McClellan's failure to take advantage of the opportunity presented him is the subject of this book. Wheeler has crafted an interesting and informative account of the Peninsula Campaign from his use of representative writings and diaries of Union and Confederate politicians, officers and soldiers.

The author provides a useful appraisal of why the campaign failed, and the reader is given an analysis of the manner in which the events of this campaign impacted on the ultimate course of the war.

Despite the title, Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign is included, as well as the naval actions between the *Monitor* and the *Merrimack*. It is interesting reading, but it is the selections dealing with McClellan that merit the reader's attention.

Wheeler has woven a skillful tale of McClellan's behavior during the campaign, providing ample evidence of McClellan's inability to understand the political nature of the war. He did not comprehend the problems that faced his commander-in-chief, nor did he appreciate what a military opportunity the campaign was for him. The fears he expressed in his correspondence to his wife and the War Department exemplify this.

McClellan's failure to move quickly and engage the Confederate armies enabled the southern forces to regroup in defense of Richmond, and his defeat at the hands of Robert E. Lee during the Seven Days Battle crushed all hope for a quick end to the rebellion. The author's analysis of how and why McClellan failed to administer a stunning defeat to the Confederate forces is provocative reading.

However, such behavior leaves the reader wondering not why McClellan failed, but rather why he was left to continue in command? Not until the Battle of Antietam did McClellan totally display his ineptitude. President Lincoln was then able to remove him from command.

B. J. PARKER  
 Captain, U.S. Navy  
 Springfield, Virginia

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Turner, John, ed. *Britain and the First World War* (Collection of essays). London: Unwin Hyman, 1988. 165pp.

This small volume of essays, edited by John Turner of the University of London, will be useful to those with only a surface understanding of the complexities of World War I, as well as to those with a scholarly interest in the war.

The essays are successful in two ways. As an overview, they succeed in synthesizing a huge volume of data, covering virtually every aspect of the war. Secondly, specialists—with very different perspectives concerning the consequences of the war—are called upon to examine the different elements of the war. The book justifies the editor's belief that the Great War was not part of an immutable "march of progress" as some recent historians have claimed.

At first, the organization of the work into separately grouped analyses appears disjointed. However, the arrangement of material is useful for this kind of short textbook, largely composed from recent secondary sources.

Of particular note may be Bryan Ranft's contribution on "The Royal Navy and the War at Sea." It explains convincingly how the British Navy, contrary to popular opinion, succeeded at the task for which it had been preparing for decades.

A.J. Stockwell's work on the Imperial consequences of global struggle in "War and the British Empire" helps make clear why decisions, otherwise inexplicable, were taken by the central government. Any decision involving Imperial resources, and particularly

Indian resources, was necessarily a carefully considered one. As Stockwell shows, there was a continuous attempt to balance carefully what could safely be withdrawn from Imperial funds, men and materiel, against the amount of goodwill needed to maintain the Imperial connexion, which agreement, rather than force of arms, had always sustained. The demand was far too heavy—as for example when Lord Chelmsford noted “Public opinion in India will not tolerate any longer a system under which our [Indian] troops are [used] . . . to suit the fluctuating requirements of His Majesty’s Government.” The goodwill perceptibly deteriorated and the Imperial agreement was clearly on the verge of either collapse or violent renegotiation.

Such a breakdown of authority was not nearly as likely within the army. According to Ian Beckett’s “The British Army 1914-18: The Illusion of Change”—as an institution the army was “not noticeably any different in 1921 from what it had been in 1912 or 1913.” Noel Whiteside’s “The British Population at War” documents that many obvious symptoms of urban poverty, including disease, societal paternalism and institutional ignorance were ameliorated by the growth of trade unionism and the extension of the franchise, directly traceable to wartime labour shortages and imperatives. However, she also concludes that domestic British life was by no means as radically affected as we had been led to believe. Since

the nation was not as debilitated, during or after the war, as either its opponents or allies, Great Britain’s internal societal dislocation was not further exacerbated by popular want or unbearable financial strictures.

Peter Dewey’s “The New Warfare and Economic Mobilization” argues that England had moved off a monetary economy during the war, switching to “command of physical resources” relying on good credit and counting on moving the actual debt to postwar taxpayers, which tends to support Whiteside’s argument that during the war itself, the British were to a degree cushioned financially in ways that other, less financially resourceful nations at war were not.

Perhaps the most striking result of the war was one that previously had been dealt with at some length within the more traditional histories of the period: the collapse of the Liberal party and the consequent shift in political representation. John Turner’s “British Politics and the Great War” makes it very plain how the concessions inherent in maintaining the nation at war led to the collapse, since the Liberals, in coalition with Labour and the Irish Nationalists, were unable to sustain the *quid pro quo* on which they had based their strength since 1906. Particularly notable was the withdrawal of the Irish Nationalists from the coalition, as a direct result of Irish conscription and the secret negotiations concerning the separation of Northern and Southern Ireland.

Although most of its material is not new, the volume remains useful. Because of the abundance of references, recommended reading and citations, *Britain and the First World War* provides a worthwhile introduction to current scholarship regarding a most difficult period, a period of domestic and international conflict with almost too apt a relevance for the present.

A.J. PLOTKE  
Cornell University

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Messimer, Dwight R. *The Merchant U-Boat: Adventures of the Deutschland, 1916-1918*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988. 234pp. \$24.95

The *Deutschland*, the world's first and only merchant submarine, was the subject of widespread rumor, hysteria, paranoid secrecy, and exaggerated claims during her brief commercial career during the First World War. Dwight Messimer has done a workmanlike job of tracking down and documenting the facts and providing an interesting account of her real achievements. Originally conceived as a means of breaking Britain's sea blockade, which by 1916 was slowly strangling Germany's war effort as well as her civilian economy, the *Deutschland* was the prototype of a projected class of eight unarmed cargo-carrying submarines designed to transport 750 tons of high-priority materials between Germany and the then-neutral United States. In two trips,

first to Baltimore and then to New London, she evaded British hunters and brought dyestuffs and chemicals to America and returned to her homeland with rubber, nickel and tin. The value of her cargoes is said to have far exceeded the cost of her construction.

Actually, the *Deutschland* never really was a merchant ship. The program was always under naval control, and her crew was made up of naval submarine personnel, poorly disguised as merchant seamen. Strangely, her captain and that of her sister, the *Bremen*, although reserve naval officers, had no previous submarine experience. Their lack of expertise undoubtedly contributed to the accidents suffered by the *Deutschland* and the mysterious loss of the *Bremen*, which disappeared shortly after leaving Helgoland on her maiden voyage. Since no likely Allied attack has ever come to light, an operational casualty was probably her undoing.

Tubby, slow, and unwieldy, both surfaced and submerged, the *Deutschland* was no model for a successful warship, but in the end, she and her surviving sisters were armed and converted into submarine cruisers. Redesignated *U-155*, she made three long war patrols and was credited with sinking 43 Allied ships totaling 121,673 tons—no mean record for any submarine. She ended her career in a British scrapyard, taking final revenge on her captors by blowing up five apprentice workers who inadver-

tently cut into a fuel tank with their torches.

The author, a police officer and naval history buff, has made a few slips that should have been caught in the editing. At one point he identifies the *Deutschland* and *Bremen* as *U-200* and *U-201*; these were merely code names for the merchant submarine project. Later subs actually carried these numbers. Elsewhere he describes Captain Hansen of the Norwegian SS *Benguela* as a "British merchant officer" and refers to the "transport" *Lucia* as both SS and USS. (The *Lucia* was a cargo ship operated by the U.S. Army and taken over by the Navy, but sunk by the *U-155* before being commissioned.) Some of Messimer's technical descriptions are a bit weak, and on page 189 he misidentifies a UC-type minelayer as a UB-class boat. There are also a few gaps and loose ends in the narrative. Some information, such as the exact nature of the *Deutschland's* cargo on her voyage to New London, may not be available, but the details of her second war patrol as *U-155* could easily have been provided. The reader may also question whether some of the conversations (quoted verbatim) actually occurred, although they seem realistic enough in context. These are all minor flaws that do not detract from the basic quality of the book. The only serious omission is the failure to include outline drawings showing the ship's internal layout as either a cargo carrier or a warship. In all other respects the book is a useful and informative

history of one of the most unusual submarine developments of World War I.

JOHN D. ALDEN  
Commander, U.S. Navy (Retired)  
Pleasantville, New York

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Douglas, W.A.B., ed. *The RCN in Transition, 1910-1985*. Vancouver, B.C.: The University of British Columbia Press, 1988. 411pp.

Edited by W. A. B. Douglas, official historian of the Department of National Defence in Ottawa, this collection of essays was published to mark the Canadian Navy's 75th birthday that occurred in 1985. The essays were written on time—but publishing is a slow process.

The period under review was a time of considerable change and naval development in the midst of intermittent political controversy—controversy which initially gave birth to the Royal Canadian Navy. Such controversy, at times, still appears to pursue that navy (now called the "Maritime Command" of the Canadian Armed Forces).

Dealing with the principal theme of "The Canadian Navy in the Modern World," the essays examine the importance of naval considerations to Canadian and North American national security interests. The close interplay of Canadian and American naval concerns, and Canada's "special relationship" with the United States is clearly demonstrated in most of the essays. The books also describe how Canada's

various military alliances have in turn influenced the development of Canadian naval forces.

Though military historians have made us aware of the outstanding calibre of the Canadian troops in the field who fought with such tenacity and courage at Vimy Ridge and in the 1918 offensives, the importance, quality and impact of Canada's naval forces are not well known. This book is, therefore, a welcome counterweight to a tendency, all too common among some Canadians, to underplay their own international significance. For example, Roger Sarty, in his essay, points out that during World War II, because of the effort made by the Canadians, Britain was not required to divert even one major antisubmarine warship from the strategically critical eastern Atlantic to protect either Canada's east coast or the shores off Newfoundland. Also, over the years, Canada has made her own contributions to the exercise of naval power in North American waters, as Professor Paul Kennedy of Yale University describes in his essay on the question of naval mastery.

Donald M. Schurman, formerly of the Royal Military College, Kingston, Ontario, suggests how the study of naval history can improve strategic military planning. He stresses in particular the wisdom of having and recognizing alternatives and of making the most of what is available and possible. In a time of economic restraint and doing more with less by all governments, this

advice seems especially appropriate in any decision-making context.

This collection is a useful, readable and welcome addition to the study of the Canadian Navy.

KAREN D. LOGAN  
Ottawa, Canada

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Stewart, Richard A. *Sunrise at Abadan: The British and Soviet Invasion of Iran, 1941*. New York: Praeger, 1988. 291pp. \$42.95

This is a thorough look at the tactical, strategic and political aspects of the jointly planned Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran in August 1941.

Richard Stewart first tells us about outsiders' efforts since the 18th century to gain influence in Iran, about Iran's gradual establishment of ties to Nazi Germany, and about the effect of the April 1941 Arab revolt which hardened British attitudes toward the region. However, most of the book is dedicated, detailed accounts of Reza Shah Pahlavi's attempt to preserve his Axis tie, while forestalling an invasion, to the Anglo-Soviet invasions which came anyway, and to their aftereffects. Stewart also includes some thoughts on the strategic and moral issues involved in neutral rights.

There was a four-way tug over the future of Iran. First, the Shah tried to balance the Soviets against the British, and then tried to balance both against Nazi Germany. He failed. Second, the Germans attempted to undermine the British South-

west Asian position through political intrigue and revolts, notably in Iraq in 1941. They, too, failed. Third, the Soviets sought to achieve their long-standing ambition to seize at least the northern part of Iran. They succeeded, at least for five years.

Some fourteen months prior to the German invasion of the U.S.S.R., Stalin directed his general staff to prepare a campaign plan against Iran. That staff positioned 1,000 tanks and 200,000 troops in the Caucasus for such a campaign. Soviet intentions become quite clear when one recalls the startling success of the Nazi invasion of the U.S.S.R. During a period when vast tracts of the Soviet Union were being laid waste by the *Wehrmacht*, Stalin still committed 120,000 first-rate troops and 1,000 tanks to partition Iran.

Mr. Stewart illustrates that Soviet efforts in northern Iran during the war were pointed toward insuring a permanent Soviet presence, particularly in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. It was only due to a combination of Iranian wiles and U.S. and British pressure that the Soviets ultimately withdrew in 1946.

The fourth and final force then playing with Iran's future was of course Great Britain. The author shows the Empire under stress, not only by the aforementioned Soviet positioning in 1939 and 1940, but also by Rommel's actions in North Africa and the Arab revolt in Iraq in 1941. British motives toward Iran proper evolved during this period. Britain had, at first, to forestall a Soviet move into Iran; to protect oil

resources in Iraq; to protect communications to India; and, after June 1941, to prevent the collapse of their new Soviet ally.

Things changed swiftly. Only one month after the German attack on the Soviet Union, the British were moving toward joint planning with the Soviets for the wartime partitioning and control of Iran. The main reasons were to kill or capture an estimated 2,000 Axis agents in Iran and to open up a more secure supply line to the U.S.S.R. than that through the Barents Sea and Murmansk. British strategic planners also saw a move into Iran as a means of forestalling the expected Nazi drive into the Caucasus.

It is clear from Mr. Stewart's account that the British intended to keep the Shah in power. But when he refused to remove the German agents, both British and Soviet attitudes hardened, and in September 1941 the Shah was replaced by his son Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi. Then the Axis agents were removed. The supply route was built and by November 1942 over 400,000 U.S. and British trucks and 28,000 tanks had been shipped to the U.S.S.R. via Iran.

For today's Iranian analysts, several interesting points emerge from this account. One has to do with bases and access. Although Britain in 1941 was hard pressed in terms of global requirements, at least in Southwest Asia, by virtue of her imperial holding, she had numerous bases from which first to stage forces to, and then conduct extensive

operations. Today the United States has nothing comparable. Another point that emerges is the difficulties that terrain and distance imposed upon the fairly extensive Soviet campaign plan.

Moreover, while generally uneven and unsuccessful, hampered by totally ineffective command direction from Teheran, there was an Iranian resistance. Iranian troops in 1941 did reasonably well when they were well-led and in defensive positions. Yet, they could not hold when subjected to artillery and air strikes. In any event, there were not enough of them to make a difference. There also appeared to be no real attempt—based on a fairly widespread dislike of both the Shah's government and his officer corps—to conduct a guerilla resistance movement against the occupying powers. Additionally, one is struck by the very careful and coordinated British political and military moves, including discussions with the U.S. government before they launched their seaborne invasion.

A final point Stewart examines is the role and rights of neutral states in time of war. With his Nazi ties, the Shah was playing a very dangerous game. By 1939 Germany controlled 41 percent of Iran's foreign trade, and whether the agents really were a threat or not, they were seen as such by both Britain and the Soviet Union. For a time these ties may have been effective in keeping Britain and the U.S.S.R. out of Iran. However, as we have seen, it appears as a result of their 1939 pact that the Nazis

would have permitted the Soviets to act in their agreed sphere of interest toward the Persian Gulf. But after June 1941 the Iranian tie to Nazi Germany gave the Soviets the pretext to intervene under the 1921 Iranian-Soviet treaty of nonaggression and it certainly helped motivate an already jittery imperial Great Britain to move to protect India.

This is a well-researched text. The narrative of the military campaign and the political and strategic rationale is rich in detail, especially about British operations and the Iranian reaction to them. Soviet operations are laid out effectively but—probably due to the lack of access to sources—have nowhere near the detail of British operations.

The book is not flawless. Sometimes it is confusing when one has to jump from British to Iranian to Soviet operations and back again. Though, happily, there are several maps, as well as some interesting photographs. Given the level of detail on British operations, a few more on the tactical level would have been useful.

For those interested in World War II history, operations in Southwest Asia, studies in *realpolitik*, and current campaign planning, it is worth the read.

D. B. DISNEY, JR.  
Commander, U.S. Navy  
Naval War College



Irving, David. *The Destruction of Convoy PQ-17*. New York: St. Martins, 1987. 367pp. \$4.95

This first-rate history is an updated version of a best-selling narrative that was published first in 1967 and subsequently involved in a bitter litigation. Legal action led to the book being banned, the author was ordered to pay heavy damages, and the British publishing firm was forced out of business.

For the professional, *The Destruction of Convoy PQ-17* offers a study of political expediency overriding military judgment, faulty command and control, operational intelligence failure, and poor communication. For the historical buff, it is a narration of the best and the worst of ordinary men when faced with certain disaster and probable death.

Thirty-five allied cargo ships departed Iceland with vital war materiel on 27 June 1942, bound for northern Soviet ports. They were accompanied by 19 assorted escorts and were also covered by two separate naval groups, a cruiser force and major elements of the Home Fleet. German land-based air and submarines constituted the major threat for the northern convoys, but for PQ-17 there was the added danger of heavy German surface units, notably the *Tirpitz*, lurking in the fjords of northern Norway. Thinking that the *Tirpitz* had put to sea, the Admiralty ordered the convoy and its escorts to "scatter." Scatter they did and without the benefit of an overall, on-scene

commander, each vessel was on her own, virtually defenseless.

Over the following fortnight there was hell to pay as the convoy's cargo numbers were reduced from 35 to 11. The hopelessness of it all reminds one of the battle of the Somme. Rather than infantry waves, it was cargo ships and their crews, plodding the Barents Sea, being destroyed by enemy aircraft and submarines. There was one exception. Lieutenant Leo Gradwell, skipper of the antisubmarine Trawler, *Ayrshire*, gathered three merchant ships, steamed them into the ice pack, and had the starboard side of each ship painted white to camouflage them from the German Air Force. Waiting out the worst of it, Lieutenant Gradwell then negotiated his charges down the coast of Novaya Zemlya to Matochkin Strait. There, a covering force was dispatched to escort them to Archangel.

Well researched and certainly readable, PQ-17 is an indictment of command. It should be considered a "must" reading for naval officers.

R. M. LASKE  
Middletown, R.I.

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Sigal, Leon V. *Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ., 1988. 335pp. \$39.95

On 5 June 1988, a large advertisement for men's wear for Father's Day appeared on page six of the *New York Times*. At the left margin was

a report on the eight-year-old war between Iran and Iraq, stating that the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had given complete control of the armed forces to Speaker of the House, Hojatolislam Hashem Rafsanjani, known as a moderate of sorts in Western circles. Although the headline emphasized the supposition that this action augured a downturn in the Ayatollah's health, much of the article dealt with the setbacks Iran had suffered during the year and the loss of public confidence caused by Iraqi missile attacks on Iranian cities.

Perhaps the Ayatollah had tired of the inconclusive results of the courses of action advocated by various hardline factions. He had recently replaced his Army Chief of Staff after the rout on the Fao peninsula. The American forces in the Gulf were brooking no nonsense from either regular naval or air units or the *pasdaran* of the Revolutionary Guards. His navy sunk, his air force decimated and the army demoralized, the Ayatollah needed to regain control of the *pasdaran* and make a move to end the war. The first step was to try Rafsanjani, a man who had proven effective in dealing with the outside world. Within months, the ceasefire was history.

Readers of Leon Sigal's *Fighting to a Finish* will recognize the analogy between this war and the process of ending World War II in the Pacific. The death of Emperor Hirohito last year focused world attention on his role in the great conflict, and Sigal's

treatment sheds a refreshing perspective on the subject.

Sigal takes issue with the rational-choice approach to war termination. Articulated by such luminaries as Carl von Clausewitz, Paul Keckemeter and Fred Ikle, the now-traditional view of the process assumes that national interests determine the behavior of states engaged in ending a war. Sigal reviews the "Pacific endgame" from the rational-choice perspective and concludes that it leaves too many questions unanswered. "Implicit in Ikle's hawk-dove dichotomy are two premises: first, that officials were divided by philosophical differences . . . or disparities in priorities . . . and [that they] . . . held consistent beliefs. Yet few, if any, senior officials in Washington or Tokyo were so motivated. Most showed little consistency in their orientation toward international relations in general or toward war termination in particular. Neither hawks nor doves, they behaved like politicians and bureaucrats."

Sigal's central contention is "that the approaches of internal politics and organizational process [i.e., bureaucratic concerns] help clear up many of the anomalies in rational-choice accounts of the end of the war between the United States and Japan. [They] may also prove . . . of value in thinking about war termination in general and limited nuclear war in particular." As a former Brookings scholar (*Alliance Security: Nato and the Non-First Use Question*, and *Nuclear*

*Forces in Europe*), he has something to say about both.

Sigal follows a straightforward outline to make his case. He does not need to plot a historical thriller: most readers know the story. It holds their interest without his "painting the sunset." He traces in some detail the steps that the Japanese leader took in reaching the decision to accept the terms of the Potsdam declaration. Relying on postwar testimony and both official and personal records, he reports the public debates, private misgivings and secret end-runs on the President and the Emperor by bureaucrats frustrated by the superiors' position on the war.

Sigal pulls no punches in describing behavior and attitudes that might have earned war crimes trials for some of the victors. He levies no accusations, but draws out lessons for the present age. For example, he comments on General Curtis LeMay's arbitrary method of estimating when the end of the war would come. " 'So we felt that if there were no targets left in Japan, certainly there wouldn't be much war left.' "

"Such habits of mind do more than reinforce interservice rivalry, however. They identify war termination with the physical destruction of the other side and ignore the political nature of a decision to sue for peace. It is a confusion that could make nuclear war termination impossible."

More than once he reminds the reader that "Armies do not end wars, states do." He shows that "states"

are not the vague non-persons we call "they," but living, fumbling human beings injecting their best and worst features into the fray.

The lessons are timeless. We can expect that the same sort of people who struggled to end the last nuclear war will have to end the next one. I hope they read *Fighting to a Finish* by then.

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JONATHAN T. HINE, JR.  
Lieutenant Commander  
U.S. Navy (Retired)

Halder, Franz. *The Halder War Diary 1939-1942*. Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf and Burdick, Charles, eds. Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1988. 716pp. \$35

Since their initial publication, the war diaries of Franz Halder have been an essential source documenting both the planning and execution of the *Wehrmacht's* initial victories and the eventual eclipsing of the German high command by Adolf Hitler. Their bulk—three volumes in the German original, two in a translation published by Trevor Dupuy in 1976—and the corresponding cost have until now essentially confined them to libraries and to the private collections of a limited number of specialists. Now Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Charles Burdick have successfully collaborated in a general circulation edition. Jacobsen worked closely with Halder in preparing the initial version of the diaries for publication a quarter-century ago. Burdick is a leading

U.S. authority on the German military in World War II. They have condensed Halder's work into a single volume by eliminating the personal details and unimportant daily exchanges that Halder carefully recorded. Ellipses indicate deletions within a given entry, but scholars concerned with precision will find that nothing of any significance has been omitted. It is moderately priced by today's standards.

The editing, indeed, sharpens reader images of Franz Halder, and of the system he served. Halder succeeded Ludwig Beck as Chief of the General Staff in August 1938. Morally opposed to national socialism, sharply critical of Nazi interference in military affairs, Halder periodically entertained thoughts of a coup against Hitler. Ultimately, however, Franz Halder was a technician of war rather than a military statesman. He epitomized the German General Staff's acceptance of genius, having an infinite capacity for attention to detail. If he lacked the imagination and the force of character demanded of first-rank strategists, Halder was more than competent in the fine points of his craft. Germany's successes in 1939-1940 were achieved with improvised armed forces whose operational efficiency depended, far more than is generally recognized, on planning and organization. Halder commanded particular respect among colleagues and subordinates for his skill in those areas. The *War Diary* demonstrates beyond question his

direct contribution to Germany's successes in the European phase of its war against the world.

Halder's proven ability to execute and maximize opportunities and advantages, arguably weakened the force of his repeated arguments against what he considered Hitler's tendency to take excessive risks. As the Chief of Staff, after Munich he became increasingly convinced that an offensive in the west would not only succeed operationally, but would permanently secure Germany's status as the dominant European power. After the collapse of France, when Britain remained a belligerent, Halder warned consistently of Germany's shortcomings which were obscured by Hitler's unbroken run of successes. However, instead of emphasizing Germany's objective weaknesses at the grand-strategic level, Halder once again sought refuge in the lesser world of operational performance. The army would carry out orders of the political leadership and bring victory to Germany in spite of the Nazis. In Halder's world view, professionalism triumphed over principle.

It was not professionalism as Moltke the Elder understood the concept. Functioning as part of a symbiotic, military-diplomatic relationship in the Age of Bismarck, the army under the Third Reich had instead become a work tool of the political authorities—ultimately obedient, if not always entirely pliant.

The process of adaptation to Germany's New Order was by no

means a simple one. Halder's diary entries show that Hitler's often-cited direct interference generated less confusion on an everyday basis than did Nazi Germany's complex and haphazard institutional structure. Halder spent a disproportionate amount of effort coordinating strategic, operational, and logistical problems among the Third Reich's numerous and overlapping jurisdictions. Interservice rivalry as well reached levels of intensity unknown in Britain or the United States, with corresponding drains on mental and physical resources. No regime waging even a European war with the limited reserves of Hitler's Germany could long afford this kind of inefficiency. Bills drawn up in Poland, Norway, and France in 1940 came due with interest a year later in front of Moscow. Their payment was in good part the price of Franz Halder's limitations. Their existence highlights the distinction between subordination and submission—a distinction the Third Reich's generals proved unable to sustain.

D. E. SHOWALTER  
The Colorado College

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Simpson, B. Mitchell III. *Admiral Harold R. Stark: Architect of Victory, 1939-1945*. Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1989. 326pp. \$24.95

A half century after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, a friendly advocate has finally emerged to present the case for Admiral Harold

R. Stark, who was then serving as Chief of Naval Operations. Stark himself maintained a dignified silence regarding his role at the time, apparently unwilling to risk injury to others by publicly defending himself. Without going into Stark's earlier career, Simpson is chiefly concerned with the admiral's record as CNO during the two years before Pearl Harbor and as Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe (ComNavEu) during World War II. Simpson clearly believes that Stark's fine record in these high commands is proof of error by the Naval Court of Inquiry, which affirmed that prior to Pearl Harbor the admiral "failed to display the sound judgment expected of him." Nor does Simpson accept the cruel admonition by Admiral King—Stark's successor as CNO—that Stark be relegated to a position in which he would not be required to exercise superior judgment. King later retreated from this harsh affront against his former chief.

The author refers to two specific achievements by Stark as CNO as evidence that the admiral was indeed an "Architect of Victory." In Simpson's view, it was Stark as much as Congressman Carl Vinson who in 1939-1940 drew up the building programs that led to the construction of a two-ocean navy. He also calls attention to Stark as having successfully won adoption of an Atlantic first strategy as outlined in his famous Plan Dog memorandum that was subsequently developed in Anglo-American naval conversations and in the Rainbow 5 War Plan.

However, he all but ignores the contributions by the Navy's General Board and Stark's own War Plans Division. Simpson, of course, cites Stark's messages before Pearl Harbor as evidence that the admiral had sent ample warnings to the Pacific commanders, avoiding any further inquiry into the charges that Stark failed to transmit vital intelligence. Simpson also relieves Stark and the Navy of any responsibility for Pearl Harbor by pointing out that the Army was responsible for the defense of naval bases under the 1935 policy known as Joint Action of the Army and Navy.

As ComNavEu from April 1942 to August 1945, Stark held the title first assigned to Admiral Sims during World War I. Whereas the post in Sims' day was clearly an operational command, Stark's responsibilities were more administrative and diplomatic. His duties involved the delicate handling of General Charles de Gaulle, serving as liaison between the Admiralty in London and the Navy Department in Washington, supervising the American naval buildup in the United Kingdom (before the Normandy landings) and recommending antisubmarine strategies. In all of these undertakings, Stark apparently demonstrated extraordinary energy, tact, and patience. Indeed, Stark ended his career far more appreciated by his British hosts than by his own countrymen. Simpson is partisan for Stark, but his partisanship is justified.

Historians will rejoice that with the completion of Stark's biography,

his personal papers are now available for research at the Naval Historical Center in Washington.

WILLIAM R. BRAISTED  
Naval Historical Center

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Schratz, Paul R. *Submarine Commander*. Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1988, 344pp. \$24 paperback \$4.95

Captain Paul Schratz has written an engrossing memoir of his submarine duty from the time of Pearl Harbor through the Korean War.

After submarine school and a tour in a training boat, the author joined the new submarine *Scorpion* in Portsmouth Naval Shipyard where, as torpedo and gunnery officer and torpedo data computer operator, he dealt with the myriad details of preparing his boat for war. The complexities of dealing with the wonderful people who built our boats are well described.

Alert to reports from the Pacific about torpedo failures, he went to the heart of the problem in the Newport, Rhode Island Torpedo Station where a long-ensconced bureaucracy refused to face its failures or to accept solutions. Paul came up with an important solution which helped his submarines achieve a much higher torpedo success rate than other boats. He also adopted and promulgated an improved use of sonar information in attacks of all kinds. The wonderfully human bond among shipmates, in the wardroom, and among the families is described

with grace and warmth. We see the development of a challenging and inspiring leader who gives great credit to his many friends, shipmates, and supporters.

As the center of the attack party during war patrols, Paul practically commanded the attacks and was deeply critical of any lack of audacity on the part of his seniors, some of whom still carried a touch of peacetime conservatism and conformity.

Tragedy struck early and close when the *Scorpion's* executive officer, Reggie Raymond, whom the author greatly admired, was killed in a gun fight at the end of the first patrol. It struck again when the *Scorpion* was lost during the patrol after Schratz left for the *Sterlet*, in which he served as executive officer.

In the *Sterlet* he experienced a couple of hair-raising patrols. His demand for audacity was not met. After helping rescue and escort to Saipan the battle-damaged *Salmon*, he suddenly became executive officer of the *Atule*, under the outstanding Jason Maurer.

The war patrols in the *Atule* were his most satisfying. But because there were few Japanese ships left to sink, ship attacks took a back seat to rescuing aviators and sinking mines. Even so, every patrol was judged "successful" by ComSubPac. As the war ended, Schratz found himself involved in the occupation and disarming of Japan. Finally, the command for which he hungered turned out to be one of the big Japanese *I-203*-class submarines,

which he took to Pearl Harbor. Even this cranky, ill-designed, experimental high-speed boat was not without its fun.

Later he gained command of the Navy's newest and best submarine, the *Pickeral*. The peacetime ASW exercises showed how high submarine speed can confound the foe. Then the Korean War came along just in time to demonstrate what the *Pickeral* could do as she monitored Russian traffic along the Korean coast and entered mined waters to reconnoiter and photograph the coast for later covert raids by underwater demolition teams.

As a leader, he took good care of his people; many who served with him went on to distinguished careers. He was diligent and energetic. What stands out about this submarine CO is his successful audacity. This indeed characterizes many of the junior officers who saw the early failures of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific. His adopted credo was later formulated by Admiral Burke: "Any commander who fails to exceed his authority is not of much use to his subordinates." And General Marshall: "If one can't disobey an order, he'll never amount to much as a leader."

His audacity went past the grim needs of the attack and into making submarining fun for himself and the crews. He would divert from his planned and reported tracks to explore interesting places, or in the Korean War, to increase coverage to forbidden areas. Frequently, he exceeded his ship's test depth,

overloaded her diesel engines, once surfaced the *Pickrel* with a 72-degree angle, and made the first 5,000-mile snorkel trip. Captain Schratz demonstrated the kind of audacity that can contribute to victory and expand the operational envelope of the submarine.

While technology has changed enormously since this officer served afloat, there can be no doubt that any future war will be extremely hazardous and it will require audacious commanding officers of great ability. Those who command, or hope to command, one of our fine new submarines can gain their own fun, and profit, from reading *Submarine Commander*.

RICHARD B. LANING  
 Captain, U.S. Navy (Retired)  
 Orlando, Florida

Breuer, William B. *Seawolf*. California: Presidio, 1989. 318pp. \$18.95

*Seawolf* is the biography of an unusual naval officer, John D. Bulkeley. The author devotes only three pages to the early, formative years of his subject, but this is just as well. Bulkeley lived through enough real life adventure to fill the rest of the book.

Breuer wraps his story around quotes from Bulkeley, friends and associates. The statements by Bulkeley help to reveal his essentially strong, though sometimes obstinate character.

Bulkeley early announced that he was going to sea and to the Naval

Academy, even though at that time he had no prospect of an appointment. Characteristic of the way he was later to do everything else, Bulkeley attacked the problem by studying day and night for several months. Then he visited the offices of every congressman who would see him. When all seemed lost, Bulkeley found one who served his need with an appointment.

The studies and the hazing at the Naval Academy presented no problem for Bulkeley, but after graduation, he encountered a problem that even his determination could not solve: The depression navy had been forced to deny commissions to the lower half of the graduating class, the half in which Bulkeley found himself. Still determined, he tried life as a flying cadet in the Army Air Force. After walking away from several crashes, he was delighted to hear that the navy would, belatedly, give him a commission.

Then began a series of unbelievable incidents. The first involved Bulkeley's decision to steal a briefcase from a traveling Japanese ambassador. Naval Intelligence did not appreciate this embarrassing show of initiative and arranged to have Bulkeley shipped off to the Asiatic Station. This early experience on the China station was later to be of great value to Bulkeley and indirectly to the Asiatic Fleet.

Shortly after returning to the States, Bulkeley began his long association with the U.S. Navy's new motor torpedo, or, PT boats.



Early in December 1941, Bulkeley arrived back at Manila with six boats of his squadron. (The other six still at Pearl Harbor when war broke, never arrived.)

The morning of 8 December, (7 December Hawaii time) found Lieutenant Bulkeley's PT boats barely ready for war. The attack on Clark Field later that day, when the Japanese found most of our aircraft on the ground, resulted in the destruction of the Army Air Force in the Philippines. This action affected the surface ships of the Asiatic Fleet because, mostly old ships built for an earlier war, they had little anti-aircraft firepower. Now, with no air protection of any sort, most had to go south to Java. There, many of them perished in action against more modern and more powerful forces.

Meanwhile, General MacArthur's army, beaten on the beaches, quickly abandoned its supplies in the Lingayen Plain and retreated to the Bataan Peninsula where, hungry and disease-ridden, it hung on for months. At the same time, the torpedoes, with which the Asiatic Fleet's numerous submarines were armed, proved defective. Then, with their base on Manila Bay destroyed, the submarines, too, went south.

The PT boats were the only offensive naval weapon left in the Philippines. Thus began a long, close, and loyal relationship between Bulkeley and MacArthur.

Bulkeley's small force attacked the Japanese at every opportunity, though they accomplished less than General MacArthur's public affairs

barrage claimed. To Bulkeley's credit, he never personally claimed many sinkings.

Mr. Breuer offers fresh insight into General MacArthur's famous escape in Bulkeley's PT boats, with some of the members of his staff. At Mindanao, Bulkeley's passengers transferred to B-17 bombers which took them to Australia. After the demise of the last of his boats, Bulkeley, too, was flown to Australia. Following a brief reunion with his new patron, Bulkeley returned to the United States to a tumultuous welcome and a prolonged series of trips around the country on tours to promote the sale of war bonds. In October 1942 Bulkeley accompanied a new group of PTs to New Guinea, where he led a series of daring assaults on Japanese ships and bases. However, though the Japanese could not bring him down, malaria did, and he was sent home in November 1943.

Upon his recovery, he went to Europe and a tour of introducing OSS spies into France, using the old familiar PT boats. After protecting the main force of the Normandy invasion, Bulkeley was promoted to command of the new destroyer *Endicott*, which took part in the invasion of southern France. Then, with the war over, he was involved in the production of the film *They Were Expendable*. But the jobs were dull in comparison to his previous duties.

A promotion to rear admiral and assignment to command the American naval base at Guantánamo brought a new series of challenges.

The duel between Bulkeley and Castro alone is reason enough to read this book.

Completion of this assignment eventually brought him the appointment as head of the Board of Inspection and Survey. Bulkeley's revival of this moribund group is fascinating. He became almost as famous in this role as Admiral Rickover was in his. Perhaps Bulkeley's contribution to the readiness of the navy and the improvements in the design process fathered by Bulkeley were as important as the advent of nuclear power. Like Rickover, Bulkeley was found to be so essential to the success of this important work that he was kept on to the age of 80, long after his official retirement.

This biography is vibrantly written and so well-organized that the reader does not lose interest. It is a book which needed to be written to preserve the exploits of a naval officer who looked danger in the face many times and won, both at sea and in the shore-bound bureaucracy of government.

WILLIAM P. MACK  
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)  
Annapolis, Maryland

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Hopkins, William B. *One Bugle No Drums*. Chapel Hill: Algonquin Books, 1986. 274pp. \$19.95

The author served in the Korean War as company commander, H & S Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, during the epic withdrawal

of the 1st Marine Division from the Chosin Reservoir in 1950.

The book which combines history with autobiographical memoir, is a critical examination of American strategy in Korea. There are, however, recurring expressions of bitterness toward General MacArthur and his failed and costly strategy in North Korea.

Beginning with the departure of his Marine Corps Reserve unit from Roanoke, Virginia, in August 1950, Hopkins narrates his personal view of the war until he was wounded at Uisong, four months later. He includes affectionate and amusing recollections of his comrades (officer and enlisted), as well as a graphic account of the withdrawal from Chosin, with emphasis on the role that his battalion played to insure the success of the final move to safety—a tale worth remembering.

The division withdrew from Chosin, facing twenty-five-degree below zero cold and innumerable Chinese Communist formations. As the Marine column trudged down the only road from Koto-ri on the last leg of their journey, the bridge ahead, spanning a 1,000-foot gorge at Funchilin Pass, was blown up by the enemy. The Marines were not overly discouraged, because the Air Force had dropped them replacement bridge sections. However, the Chinese occupied the high ground beyond—south of the gorge—whence they covered the approaches to the bridge site with fire. This proved a dilemma for General Smith

and his men as they plodded southward toward the sea.

But one battalion had remained south of the blown bridge: The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, who guarded the division ammunition dump at Chinhung-ni. This battalion's march north, and its valiant attack, led by Captain Robert Barrow and "A" Company, is the climax of the book.

We can be grateful to the author for reminding us of this tense sequence of events, drama rarely matched in American military history, and of the sacrifices in wounded and dead in North Korea. We are reminded of the steady competence of the Marine leaders under stress and of the failed strategy which made the desperate operation necessary in the first place.

During the Korean War, the author was there. His credentials for describing the Marines in action in Korea are excellent. But his qualifications for analysis and criticism of American strategy are no greater than those of the average participant in the war.

Although he lists an impressive bibliography, Hopkins' failure to use notes forces the reader to rely on him for accuracy of statements and quotations from higher authorities. He does not miss an opportunity to criticize the area commander and his staff: An understandable attitude for a Marine company commander who served at that time and at that place.

To my knowledge, no one from the 1st Marine Division has had a good word for General MacArthur. They believe that he caused them

unnecessary casualties and suffering and, even more important, that he deprived them of the victory that was their due.

Perhaps a more balanced view would conclude that MacArthur recognized the capability of the Marines and insisted that a full-strength Marine division be sent to him. Otherwise, the Marine participation in the Korean War might have been small. In 1950 they had few friends in Washington. MacArthur understood and exploited our amphibious skills at Inchon, where America won a startling victory that led to the breakup of the North Korean Army. In the heat of debate over the flawed policy of advancing to the Yalu River, these earlier accomplishments are often overlooked. Too bad the American Caesar could not have quit when he was ahead.

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ANTHONY WALKER  
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)  
Middletown, Rhode Island

Liston, Robert A. *The Pueblo Surrender*. New York: M. Evans & Co., 1988. 294pp. \$18.95

Would you believe that the USS *Pueblo* (AGER 2) was seized by the Chinese, fired on by the Soviets and then turned over to the North Koreans, all within 12 miles of Wonsan? Well, neither do I. This is the silliest book on naval affairs I have ever read. About 75 pages into it, I turned to see who the publisher was. I had never heard of them and

I suspect that if this is a representative sample of what they publish, I never will again.

Mr. Liston would have us believe that the National Security Agency—which he maintains really controls this country through the manipulation of information—put a trick code machine on board the *Pueblo* and then arranged for the machine's capture. Their purpose, he says, was to defeat the North Vietnamese by breaking their codes when they started using the doctored machine. He would also have us believe that the *Pueblo's* crew was held incommunicado by the National Security Agency until they all agreed to tell the world that the Koreans had seized the ship and not to mention the Sino-Soviet confrontation or their participation in the seizure. His story begins with the crew members' accounts of the *Pueblo's* capture, and then tries to illustrate how they contradict each other. In fact, many of the "contradictions" can easily be explained by the various positions of the viewers and time of the report. A classic example of that is Liston's concern with the "conflicting" stories of the boarding. One man related that the captors approached from the port quarter, another reported that they came from astern and a third that they tied up to the starboard quarter. He offers this as evidence of doctored accounts of the seizure. However, anyone who has been to sea can easily imagine that all three accounts could be accurate. Ships do maneuver and relative position can change very quickly. Liston also reports that

there is a *Soviet* submarine base in Yonghung Bay, just north of Wonsan: something I am sure U.S. intelligence will be surprised to know. The author also states that the Japanese have no destroyer-sized warships. The editor of *Jane's Fighting Ships* will be distressed to learn this, because for many years he has been reporting that the Japanese do have such ships.

Liston may well be the victim of tall tales. There is internal evidence in the book that someone who was tangentially aware of the cryptologic technician's work in the USS *Jamestown* off Vietnam in the mid-1960s has filled Mr. Liston full of the kind of stories that CTs like to tell ship's clerks and boatswain mates.

Unless you are looking for a laugh, do not waste your time reading this book.

GUY THOMAS  
Commander, U.S. Navy (Retired)  
Greenville, Texas

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Francillon, Rene J. *Tonkin Gulf Yacht Club: U.S. Carrier Operations off Vietnam*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1988. 214pp. \$24.59

Everyone who was on a carrier operating off Yankee Point and vicinity during the Vietnam War should have a copy of this book. It names every participating carrier, lists every deployment and, above all, specifies the squadrons, their aircraft type and their flyers. To his surprise, the reviewer discovered the

name of a former neighbor who was shot down, rescued, then, in turn, shot down a MiG 21. If you know of someone who downed a MiG, who was shot down or taken prisoner, you will find his name in this book.

*Tonkin Gulf Yacht Club* opens with a summary of the status of carrier aviation into the early sixties. The main narrative, covering the carrier operations, is well-illustrated with photographs and describes the numerous and changing political restrictions placed on military targets that could be attacked. A 26-page monograph on the *Coral Sea* (CVA-43) primarily focuses on her seven Vietnam cruises. The author is openly partial to this old ship: she spent more time on the line (875 days) than any other carrier. Similar statistics are available for all 21 carriers which were part of Task Force 77 at various times during the ten-year conflict.

Appendix I is an alphabetical summary, by carrier, of their Vietnam cruises. There are line drawings of each carrier, photographs, and plenty of operational statistics. Appendix II addresses the aircraft of Task Force 77 by type, squadron, tail letters and 100 series number. The index includes a glossary and abbreviations.

The book emphasizes that ground fire downed significantly more U.S. carrier aircraft than air combat (436 lost to AA fire, 91 to SAMs and 15 to MiGs). U.S. carrier forces shot down 62 enemy aircraft, all by missiles, none by cannon alone. Due to security restrictions, the author

admittedly uses incomplete statistics to show relative aircraft survivability as a function of days on the line, an imperfect measure. In this light, the F-4 and F-8 come out best, the A-1 and A-4 the worst.

One concern is that available statistics emphasize the negative—aircraft and personnel losses, ship casualties, extended time on station—without comparable detailed information on the positive: strike planning, fleet objectives and so on. More data on the degree of mission success from the standpoint of TF-77 would have been helpful, along with details obtained from those higher up the chain of command than squadron commanders. (Some of this information is still classified and some remains the exclusive property of North Vietnam).

Over the long period of the Vietnam conflict the Tonkin Gulf Yacht Club acquired many members. The author says: “. . . for most of the war, targets assigned to Naval Aviators and their Air Force brethren were seldom worth the price paid in terms of ordnance expended and aircraft lost. The human toll was even more tragic.”

Francillon has accomplished an impressive piece of research. He presents a tremendous amount of interrelated information data in very few pages.

RICHARD F. CROSS  
Alexandria, Virginia

Mrozek, Donald J. *The U.S. Air Force after Vietnam: Postwar Challenges and Potential for Responses*. Air University Press, 1988. 126pp.

Che Guevara's prediction that the United States would soon face several Vietnams has come true in a way he never intended. As a result of Vietnam, the United States has refrained from direct involvement in any new Third World insurgencies since 1975, but the war has proved to be a multifaceted experience with varied and sometimes contradictory meanings for different constituencies. For the nation's traumatized military services, the war set in motion a process of perhaps unprecedented self-evaluation. This travail of reexamination is the subject of Donald J. Mrozek's *The U.S. Air Force after Vietnam*. The title is misleading. A professor of history at Kansas State University, with an interest in the cultural roots of defense policy, Mrozek has produced a work that goes beyond the Air Force, equally encompassing the postwar reactions of the Army, the Navy, and Congress.

The text traces the evolution of responses to the war from initial rejection to hesitant assimilation, from dismissal of the conflict as an aberration to a nuanced appraisal from which a few generally accepted lessons can be drawn. At first, military leaders tended to disregard the war, seeing it as a freak failure that resulted either from the misapplication of sound military principles or from the irrelevance of those principles to an eccentric case.

Mrozek aptly calls this "validating doctrine by invalidating experience." Its effect on military planners was to produce a "back-to-basics" conservatism that neglected counterinsurgency for a renewed emphasis on conventional war. Recent years, however, have witnessed an increased interest in Vietnam and a greater willingness to confront its ambiguous meanings. From these soul-searchings, a tentative, limited consensus has emerged (that includes both "Hawks" and "Doves"), that stresses the need for open, explicit public support in future conflicts, matching clearly designated ends to equally specific means; and the necessity to view each potential conflict in its unique context with due regard for the peculiarities of the regions and issues involved.

The most original portion of Mrozek's study is a survey of congressional opinion on national security policy under the Reagan administration. Some of the results of his survey are underwhelming. Supporters of Reagan policies, for example, see Russia and Cuba as aggressors in Central America and elsewhere, while opponents are much concerned with adhering to the War Powers Act. But at a more sophisticated level, the survey's respondents provide further evidence of the limited agreement on the proper approach to foreign policy formation that our efforts to understand Vietnam may at last be producing. Although administration proponents and opponents were quick to craft Vietnam metaphors

with meanings to meet their divergent needs, both "Hawks" and "Doves" evinced a concern for caution, limits, a proper sense of context, and an awareness of inseparability of means and ends.

Some of the company grade officers who served in Vietnam are now arriving at the highest levels of command and the lessons that they have learned in Southeast Asia will be institutionalized in the structure and doctrine of our armed services. In this sense Vietnam will continue to exert an influence, perhaps unrecognized, on the future generations of military leaders.

LAWRENCE J. KILBOURNE  
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base  
Ohio

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Hooper Edwin Bickford. *United States Naval Power in a Changing World*. New York: Praeger, 1988. 294pp. \$47.95

Few writers of the history of the U.S. Navy have attempted to cover this subject in one volume. One who has, in a most capable fashion, is the late Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, U.S. Navy. His book begins in the year 1775 when Rhode Island's sloop *Katy* sailed from our Narragansett Bay to become the *Providence* in the first squadron of the new Continental Navy forming at Philadelphia. It ends in the year 1986 when the keel of Aegis cruiser *Normandy* (CG-60) was laid down at Bath, Maine. This most sophisticated of cruisers was

commissioned in Newport, Rhode Island in December 1989.

Admiral Hooper, a distinguished surface warfare officer, whose 45 years of active service concluded with six years as Director of Naval History (1970-1976), has produced a scholarly and readable work that emphasizes the importance of the Navy in the birth and growth of the United States. His background at sea included assignments in all types of surface combatants; four of these were command tours. Ashore he earned a master's degree in engineering from M.I.T. and attended the National War College. He was the first head of the Long Range Studies project at the Naval War College. As vice admiral he commanded the Pacific Fleet's Service Force and later was Senior Navy Member of the Joint Logistics Review Board in the Pentagon. Director of History for the Navy, he was able to review in-depth the role of the Navy in U.S. history.

In his book he concludes that in recent years there has often been an imbalance between consideration of technological improvements in forces afloat and lessons of the past regarding U.S. actions that involved the use of sea power. Unfortunately, the author died suddenly in September 1986, just after his first draft had been accepted for publication. Further editing and footnoting was then undertaken and done, most capably, by his sons, William and Edwin, Jr., along with Dr. Dean Allard, Senior Historian of the Naval Historical Center.

Chronologically the book is divided into five parts: early years through the Barbary Wars; the transitional period from the War of 1812 through the Civil War, on into the obsolescence of the 1870s; the period of a "New Navy" from 1884 until the beginning of World War I; the rise to the most powerful navy during the period of the two World Wars, concluding with the nuclear age from 1945 to the present. Each section contains a discussion that compares naval capabilities with the improvements in weaponry and propulsion, also showing how the Navy was used, often in support of the major land campaigns. Organizational charts are included to show the chain of command in the Navy Department, demonstrating clearly that with improved technology comes an evermore complicated and bureaucratic organization. Period-piece drawings and photographs remind the reader of ships and personalities of years gone by. A final chapter, entitled "The Past is Prologue" summarizes the book and the author's emphasis that despite many predictions after the first atomic bomb, there is need for a navy. The traditional role of the Navy remains vital in national defense, and the basic principals of the use of naval power in the past remain valid in the world of today.

*United States Naval Power in a Changing World* logically and systematically expands on its title. It should serve college-level and graduate students an excellent introduction to the role of our Navy in national and

world history. Recent emphasis in the Department of Defense on "Joint" planning and operations make this a most readable textbook for officers of the other services as they study today's Navy. The bibliography and footnotes provide a greater depth of information.

Written by a historian who worked in and with the Navy for the last half-century, Edwin Hooper's book is a lasting contribution to our history and requirements for the future.

JOHN R. WADLEIGH  
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)  
Newport, Rhode Island

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Coletta, Paolo E. *The American Naval Heritage*. 3rd ed. Lanham, Md.: Univ. Press of America, 1987. \$29

It would be an understatement to say that the third edition of Professor Coletta's brief overview of American naval history suffers from a severe lack of proofreading. Quite frankly, the book as printed is not worthy of its author. This is particularly unfortunate since it was obviously intended to be a one-semester introductory undergraduate text about a subject rarely taught at civilian universities. The third edition will not inspire deans to authorize the course.

During his long term as professor of history at the U.S. Naval Academy, Dr. Coletta never would have accepted a paper containing such typographical and editorial errors: words are hyphenated for no apparent reason, underlines extend



through margins, the Navy's proud new destroyer class is referred to as the "Arkeugh Burke" [sic] and missing words have reversed the meaning of some paragraphs. Strange word constructions and spellings abound. Our thirty-ninth President is continuously cited as "Jimmie Carter" despite the fact that President Carter has always called himself "Jimmy." There is probably no other reference to "President Jimmie Carter" in existence.

All of these criticisms echo a recent review of Dr. Coletta's *A Survey of U.S. Naval Affairs, 1865-1917*, also from the same publisher. A pattern may be developing.

Theoretically, one should be able to appreciate the scholarly merits of the work despite such mere surface blemishes. However, the text is much too cursory for the naval historian or any "naval buff," and the general reader cannot help being disenchanted by the entire package.

The book's scholarly merits (i.e., factual information contained therein) are also hindered by its confusing organization. The author's intent is unclear; the all-too-brief introduction discusses continuing themes within America's naval heritage, yet the text plods through chronologically without extensive development of these themes. The introduction ends by posing the sort of rote final exam question that midshipmen have written thousands of blue books on: "Given the current international situation and knowledge of the military forces available to the West and to the Soviet Bloc, a rewarding exercise is to

determine what kind of Navy the United States should have in order to carry out its functions." Unfortunately, the book neither answers this question nor provides the tools to do so.

This third edition includes chapters on the Carter and Reagan naval and arms control policies, including Secretary Lehman's push for the 600-ship navy. However, the Maritime Strategy, presumably a vital element in current naval policy, is treated with the significance of a footnote. Better treatment of these topics may be found elsewhere.

Speaking of footnotes, there are none, giving further indication that the book was intended as an elementary text. Despite my respect for Professor Coletta, I would advise readers—especially those with no knowledge of naval history—to wait for a proofed and corrected fourth edition.

SAM J. TANGREDI  
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy  
Coronado, California

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Cogar, William B. *Naval History: The Seventh Symposium of the U.S. Naval Academy*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1988. 302pp. \$50

This is a typical conference volume, a mixed bag. The collection includes examples of minor pedantry. But there are also a dozen that propose fresh interpretations of the naval past and these are of lasting value. Three papers discuss the design and engineering challenges of reconstructing a Greek trireme, and its accomplish-

ment as a success for naval history and experimental archaeology. Four authors discuss the USS *Monitor* project, the importance of the ship and the establishment of a national marine sanctuary over its remains. Among the authors who offer important reassessments, Bruce Collins discusses naval power in the Maori, Ashanti, and Boer wars and calls for better recognition of naval power as a feature of British imperial expansion. Edward Miller explains that War Plan Orange was not simple at all, but complex and adaptable. "War Plan Orange persevered for forty years and eventually won the war. What more can one ask of a great plan?" Marc Milner directs us to the contribution—and unexpected consequence—of the Royal Canadian Navy in the battle of the Atlantic, above all in shipping control and naval intelligence. During this campaign, undertaken in close coordination with the United States Navy, the RCN found "its north American roots." Lawrence Allin writes an arresting argument for truth-in-labelling for the battleship. The mystique of the battle-line was little tested in war, and battleship doctrine became a parochial shibboleth. Putting purposefulness back in its rightful place, Allin says of the battleship's role in the post-atomic age: "It must be seen and used for what it is: a weapon of high cost and great power and one of discrete and limited abilities."

GEORGE BAER  
Naval War College  
Newport, Rhode Island

Martin, David C. and Walcott, John.

*Best Laid Plans*. New York: Harper & Row, 1988. 392pp. \$22.50

*Best Laid Plans* is a tightly written tale of treachery, heroism, and Washington intrigue—a real page turner. It could also be a history of national security affairs during the Reagan administration. It covers the major headline-capturing events of the 1980s, from the hostage rescue attempt in Iran, to the bombings of the U.S. Embassy and Marine compound in Beirut, air strikes on Libya, and arms-for-hostages deals.

*Best Laid Plans* is the best study yet written of contemporary terrorism and our nation's response. CBS Pentagon correspondent David Martin and *Wall Street Journal* national security correspondent John Walcott have teamed to produce an exhaustively researched, comprehensive look at a problem that both threatens our security and vexes our response mechanisms. The book excels on two planes.

First, the authors have captured the human impact of terrorism, ranging from the ordeal of U.S. hostages held in Lebanon to the fears and triumphs of the operators at Desert One, the pilots who forced down the Egyptian plane carrying the hijackers of the *Achille Lauro* and the crews who participated in the retaliatory bombing of Libya. They delve into the emotional and political pressures that defined the conflicts among, and crucial decisions made by, the White House, State Department, Defense Department, and Central Intelligence Agency. This

approach makes *Best Laid Plans* a fascinating study in the human condition. More importantly, however, understanding the strengths and frailties of the human race in the face of terrorism is essential to understanding the book's principal message.

The second plane explores the dynamics of the U.S. government's response to terrorism and, in the process, shows why it is so difficult for us to "win" the war.

The fundamental premises are well understood. Death and destruction inflicted by terrorism are not an end in themselves. Rather, they bring into question the ability of civilized nations to keep their citizens secure and ultimately to govern themselves effectively. Terrorism is more akin to garden variety crime than invasion, and the response resembles police work more than military activity. Terrorists hold the initiative in choice of time, place, target, and type of act. Terrorist tactics evolve as response mechanisms improve—hostage-taking (with the exception of Lebanon) is no longer in vogue because it is an act susceptible to resolution by assault (as the SAS demonstrated in securing the Iranian Embassy in London in 1980). Overlaying these confounding factors is the moral fiber of the United States that abhors loss of life among innocents in the course of retaliating against our antagonists, and draws the line at assassination.

All of this influenced the Reagan response to terrorism, but above and beyond, the administration found its

efforts undercut by structural weakness. The gutting of the intelligence community in the 1970s left us nearly devoid of the assets we needed to provide the uniquely precise (and difficult to obtain) intelligence essential to dealing with terrorism: prior to, during, and after the fact. Political imperatives inevitably intervened in military planning to produce suboptimal results. Conventional military preparedness proved unequal to terrorist attack. The Marines in Beirut were not necessarily mentally or physically prepared for a car bomb. Neither was the aircraft carrier USS *John F. Kennedy*, one of the most powerful warships in the world, until .50-caliber machine guns were mounted on her catwalks.

Most troubling in Martin and Walcott's tale, however, is the course of interagency friction that treated an issue of undisputed national importance with the same bureaucratic rivalry properly reserved for lesser matters. The resulting frustration and inaction led Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North to attempt other, unorthodox solutions.

In short, *Best Laid Plans* convincingly shows why there are no easy answers. Certainly, U.S. capabilities have improved, in antiterrorism (protection), counterterrorism (resolution and retaliation) and intelligence. Concurrently, however, terrorism has grown more sophisticated, as the bombing of Pan Am 103 demonstrated. The bottom line is that terrorism and our response will remain a game of cat-and-mouse.

Recognizing this, Martin and Walcott argue that the law may be the best weapon in the war against terrorism. In their words, "The law treats terrorists as criminals and helps strip the veneer of martyrdom and heroism from their crimes." If, indeed, justice is the key, the conviction of Fawaz Yunis in a U.S. Federal Court for the 1985 hijacking of a Jordan Air airliner may be the first, albeit small, step in turning the corner in this war.

Buy the book. It's excellent.

R. LYNN RYLANDER  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D.C.

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Scott, Harriet Fast and Scott, William F. *Soviet Military Doctrine: Continuity, Formulation, and Dissemination*. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1988. 315pp. \$45

Harriet and William Scott's latest book on the Soviet military traces the development and impact of the doctrine of the armed forces of the U.S.S.R. since 1917. In doing so, it clearly distinguishes doctrine in Soviet terms from what has been commonly discussed in the West. Soviet doctrine is divided into two parts—political and military technical. The Scotts demonstrate that the offensive has been a central feature of Soviet military doctrine from its very beginning, following the revolution in 1917. Consequently, their analysis suggests that the Soviet military at least is wedded to a scientific/dialectical approach to the

study of doctrine, and they are skeptical of current pronouncements by the leaders of the U.S.S.R. that their doctrine is now purely defensive. Although the Soviet analysis of war changed dramatically following the advent of nuclear weapons, the primary motivation was to insure that the overall correlation of forces (composed of economics, science/technical, moral, and military) remain in their favor.

In political terms the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) plays a leading role in the formulation of doctrine. As such, the party demands that the following key questions be continuously reexamined in the context of the Laws of War in developing military doctrine and corresponding military forces. What will be the nature of future war? What kind of armed forces will be needed? How should the nation prepare? What methods will be best in prosecuting future conflict? The Scotts also review the various organs of the government and party that play key roles in answering these questions and formulating doctrine. This includes a useful discussion of the Council of Defense which is little known in the West. Political change such as *glasnost* and *perestroika*, therefore, are interpreted by the authors merely as an effort to keep the Laws of War and, therefore, correlation of forces of the U.S.S.R.

As with their previous contributions on the armed forces of the U.S.S.R., this book clearly expands our understanding of Soviet military thought and organization. It is,

however, a book for the serious student of the Soviet military, with a significant background in this field of study. It is a useful authoritative reference tool of doctrinal analysis, from primarily Soviet sources, that discusses the various methods by which Soviet doctrine is disseminated, and includes useful tables of information such as the military officers on the Central Committee, members of the Politburo, military holidays, official military books, officer's library, Frunze Prize winners, etc.

It is unfortunate that this book was released prior to President Gorbachev's initiatives in the military field; these pronouncements, coupled with unilateral reductions and the restructuring of Soviet forces, are not analyzed. Still, with "new thinking" and "reasonable sufficiency" in fashion, it is valuable for us all to understand the basis from which the doctrinal changes suggested by Gorbachev will be taken, as well as the framework in which doctrine is developed in the Soviet Union.

D. MC CAUSLAND  
Major, U.S. Army  
Springfield, Virginia

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Archer, Clive, ed. *The Soviet Union and Northern Waters*. London: Routledge, 1988. 261pp. \$35

In 1979 the Northern Waters Study Group was organized by the Scottish branch of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. As a result

of its 1980 International Colloquium on Northern Waters at the University of Aberdeen, editors Clive Archer and David Scrivener produced *Northern Waters: Security and Resource Issues*, 1986. A second colloquium was convened in 1985 to examine the obvious Soviet interest and expanded activity in the Arctic, as well as the response by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization members, individually and collectively. *The Soviet Union and Northern Waters* originated from that meeting. For this discussion, "northern waters" comprise the area between 80°N and 60°N latitude and from longitude 90°W to 40°E.

The ten contributors to this 261-page volume are from the United Kingdom, Norway, The Federal Republic of Germany, and the United States. Although the topic is the Soviet presence in northern waters, no Soviet authors are included. There are, however, frequent references to Soviet official statements, negotiating the record on boundaries and resources, and naval doctrine in text and footnote locations throughout the book.

This very useful collection has something in it for nearly everyone: questions of jurisdictional boundaries, resource access and management, maritime policies and interpretations, and possible conflict scenarios. Most of the chapters continue through 1987, but there is an unevenness found in a compilation of this kind. For example, Douglas Norton, in "Responding to the Soviet Presence in Northern

Waters—An American View,” tells us that by 1986 Canada and Norway had agreed on full CAST Brigade training in Norway, but it is in Clive Archer’s chapter on “The Nordic Response to Soviet Presence,” that we find mention of the 1987 Canadian White Paper canceling the CAST commitment.

Finn Sollie, Robin Churchill and Uwe Jenisch discuss the issue of the Svalbard Archipelago. They show that the previous long-term Nordic (specifically Norwegian) attempts to ensure a stable, low-tension area in the European Arctic are now evolving in the direction of a “mixed policy” toward growing Soviet activity evidenced by military as well as resource-extractive measures. The Svalbard debate exemplifies the complexities of existing treaty provisions overlaid by intra-Nordic disputes (fisheries protection zones and exclusive economic zones) and diverse interpretations of the continental shelf and “boundary establishment” concepts within Nato.

In light of then-General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech in Murmansk on 1 October 1987, that emphasized a “radical lowering of the level of military confrontation in the region,” followed by the sinking of the Soviet “Mike” attack submarine in international waters between North Norway and Bear Island on 7 April 1989, *Northern Waters* is indeed timely.

ELEN C. SINGH  
Itta Bena, Mississippi

Rubinstein, Alvin Z. *Moscow’s Third World Strategy*. New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1988. 311pp. \$29.95

This book surprised me. I had not realized that my understanding of Moscow’s Third World strategy was so limited and deficient. I suspect, unfortunately, that many others within the defense and policy communities are similarly unenlightened.

Rubinstein demonstrates convincingly that a discernible pattern with seven distinct characteristics has evolved in Soviet dealings with the Third World since the Second World War. First, Soviet intervention has been in response to existing regional tensions; the U.S.S.R. has not “manufactured” targets for the purpose of exploitation, except in the case of Afghanistan. Second, the Third World countries have determined the level and character of intervention—the Soviet Union has seldom bullied its clients. Third, in general, the Soviet Union has proven itself to be a reliable and effective patron-protector.

Fourth, forces that Moscow has committed have been relevant to the challenges faced by its clients, showing sensitivity to regional and global political considerations. The Soviet Union has found that military and security assistance are of greater value than economic assistance to its clients. Fifth, the most prominent thread running through the fabric of Soviet interventions has been the anti-American bent of the clients’ outlooks or policies, and Moscow’s acceptance of this significant diver-

sity in its clients' ideology. The simplistic idea of Moscow orchestrating these countries as ideologue puppet states is fantasy, not fact. Sixth, Soviet intervention has generally enhanced its prestige among nonaligned nations. And finally, Soviet leadership has often been willing to intervene significantly in the Third World, irrespective of possible adverse effects on its relationship with the United States, often to the consternation of U.S. officials who want to believe that the Soviet Union places the same importance as the United States does on mutual, good relations.

Soviet activities in the Third World are neither mindlessly adventurous and troublemaking as some imagine, nor are they always successful. But its involvements there have impacted on U.S. foreign policy in three major ways: It has limited U.S. options; raised the cost of safeguarding U.S. interests; and intensified anti-Americanism. One aim of the Soviet strategy appears to be to elicit U.S. responses that are disproportionately costly compared both to Soviet outlays and to the intrinsic importance of the region, the crisis, or the protagonist(s).

Moscow's involvement in the Third World has a reputation for credibility based upon a demonstrable record of dependability, consistency, and capability. Once it unequivocally committed itself, Moscow stayed the course, irrespective of military or economic costs, or adverse effects on its relationship with the United States.

Most of us need to know more about Moscow's strategy in the Third World. Rubinstein, a Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, offers us a readable, challenging book that provides a great deal of insight into this important subject. I recommend it strongly.

D. K. PACE  
Johns Hopkins University  
Applied Physics Laboratory

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Gibert, Stephen P., ed. *Security in Northeast Asia: Approaching the Pacific Century*. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1987. 193pp. \$19

Simon, Sheldon. *The Future of Asian-Pacific Security Collaboration*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988. 177pp. \$29

"U.S. policy toward Japan is so confused and uncoordinated that many U.S. officials say they cannot figure out how it is made or why economic concerns are regularly subordinated to military and political objectives." Thus read a *New York Times News Service* article on one aspect of our foreign policy towards Asia.

Stephen Gibert, Director of National Security Studies, states that we are approaching a "Pacific Century." To prove his point he has presented eight papers that attempt to provide a comprehensive and integrated discussion of Northeast Asia and its relationship to the United States and world security concerns. Two sections on diplo-

macy and power contain discussions that center on the Sino-Soviet-U.S. triangle, Japan and the Soviet Union, the politics of Japanese defense, prospects for Korean security, the Philippines after Marcos and the isolation of island China—a varied and daunting agenda. This followed by an excellent summary of military balances in Northeast Asia and an overview of Chinese military modernization. The latter article is a graphic reminder of the distance China has to go to join the ranks of military superpowers.

Editor Gibert opens and closes “Security in Northeast Asia” and contributes a chapter on U.S.-Taiwan relations. Like most collections, there are uneven spots, but the sum of the book’s parts is worthwhile reading. Professor Gibert echoes the *New York Times* report that “The United States currently does not have a coherent policy with regard to Japan. Somehow it has been forgotten that a country needs a national security strategy for friends as well as enemies. Devising a strategy toward Japan, with regard to both trade and defense, is the single most important task confronting the United States in Northeast Asia.” Parenthetically, Gibert also suggests the possibility that in another area, the Philippines, the time may come “when the United States may have to forcefully intervene. . . .”

Sheldon Simon’s book is a single-author study and therefore is slightly more focused than the Gibert volume. It also has more tables and figures and

an extended index. The author explores the prospects of developing new and stronger security relations in the Asia-Pacific region between the United States, its allies and friends, and the Soviet Union and its clients. He begins by stating that “the stage appears to be set for either a direct superpower confrontation in Asia within the next several years or a proxy conflict in which Washington and Moscow back their respective clients’ regional ambitions.” The author discusses several issues that are nicely tied together in a closing chapter on cross-regional security collaboration.

He concludes that it is time for arrangements that “would honor nationalist sentiment antithetical to exclusive foreign bases on one’s territory, and increase regional security collaborations,” and yet provide U.S. air and naval facilities in the area.

Sheldon Simon, Dr. Gibert and his contributors agree on many points, one that should be a “given”: by shifting emphasis from a Eurocentric perspective to one more Asia-oriented, the United States can, tap its enormous potential for success in the Pacific century. Contrary to the now popular notions of national decline, the rise of Asia need not mean the setting of America’s sun.

Both books are excellent examples of their respective types. Gibert’s book, in my opinion, is probably of more value to the Asia specialist, while the Simon book provides an excellent overview for the reader wishing to catch the crest



of the Pacific wave as we do indeed approach the Pacific century.

R. S. CLOWARD  
Captain, U.S. Navy  
USS *Cleveland*

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Lin, Chong-Pin. *China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition within Evolution*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988. 272pp. \$40

Wortzel, Larry M., ed. *China's Military Modernization: International Implications*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1988. 204pp. \$37.95

Godwin, Paul H. B. *The Chinese Communist Armed Forces*. Alabama: Air Univ. Press, 1988. 163pp. \$8.50

In view of China's enormous potential as a national power, its government is determined to play a major role in regional and global affairs. Therefore, the United States must carefully monitor the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) modernization and assess its impact on U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region. These three books contribute to this analysis by discussing various aspects of China's armed forces.

*China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy* examines this topic in the context of Chinese strategic tradition. The author has extensively relied upon Chinese sources not available in English, and has used unpublished Chinese materials obtained from Taiwan's archives on mainland military affairs. A national security affairs specialist, Lin is well-qualified to compare Chinese strate-

gic thinking with that of the United States and the Soviet Union.

*China's Military Modernization* is number 72 in the "Contributions in Military Science" series. It is a collection of papers presented at a conference in 1986, and subsequently amended to include some 1987 material. In addition to the editor, the authors include active duty Army officers and civilian specialists in Chinese affairs.

Topics include domestic constraints limiting the modernization of the PLA, American and Chinese strategic approaches to the use and deterrent value of strategic and battlefield nuclear weapons, modernization of the PLA under Deng, the relationship between Sino-Soviet tensions and PLA's modernization, China's response to SDI, and U.S. export control policies relating to U.S. military assistance to the PLA.

Paul Godwin's book is an excellent overview of the development of the Chinese armed forces in an effort to explain why the Chinese military establishment approaches its current problems the way it does.

Unfortunately, in all three books, much of the material is outdated due to events in 1988 and 1989. However, Lin's outstanding scholarship and thorough research is a great contribution toward the understanding of how China views its nuclear forces. Wortzel, in his choice of essays, has given us a comprehensive explanation of the domestic factors behind the PLA's modernization, and Godwin's text is unexcelled for background information.

The diversity of these books indicates that the PLA's modernization is not a subject easily treated in a single work. Together, however, they make a significant contribution to American understanding of the Chinese armed forces and the likely direction of their employment in the future.

MARTIN L. LASATER  
Naval War College

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Bittman, Ladislav, ed. *The New Image-Makers: Soviet Propaganda and Disinformation Today*. Washington D.C.: Pergamon Brassey, 1988. 262pp. \$24.95

*The New Image Makers* deals with a topic that frequently is not given the attention it merits: the Soviet Union's extensive effort to sow disinformation and influence the world's media against the United States. Mr. Bittman is no stranger to this field, having worked in this capacity for Czechoslovakian intelligence. Today he heads the Program for the Study of Disinformation at Boston University.

He brings together information from noted authorities in the field. Especially interesting are various contributors' exploration into the dilemmas and changes to the traditional Soviet approach to propaganda and the media caused by *glasnost*.

*The New Image Makers* is well worth the time it takes to read. It provides insight into an area of danger to the United States in the age of the "global

village" where, at the right moment, a distorted media picture can do greater harm to our national interests than several divisions of Soviet tanks.

CHRISTOPHER STASZAK  
Lieutenant Commander  
U.S. Naval Reserve  
Newport, Rhode Island

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Richelson, Jeffrey T. *The U.S. Intelligence Community*, 2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1989. 485pp. \$16.95

This book is meticulous in detail and thoroughly documented. It is a reprise of Richelson's first edition of four years earlier. The 1985 edition, available from the same publishing house, was a landmark work in its scope and quality of research. Nevertheless the 1989 edition manages to surpass its predecessor by a significant margin.

Second editions of any book face a special test: should those who have already read the first edition invest their valuable time and money to revisit the subject? In this case, the answer is definitely yes. Anyone with more than a passing curiosity about intelligence should read *The U.S. Intelligence Community*. Those who have a special interest should own a copy, even if they already hold the first edition.

The revised edition is one-third larger, and fully half of the book is new or rewritten material providing original information. It examines the Unified and Specified commands in much greater detail than the first

edition did, expands the sections on signals intelligence and imagery, devotes more effort to "human" and "other" sources, and almost doubles the attention paid to the military service intelligence organizations. The tables of organization provided for various intelligence organizations are in themselves an impressive improvement over the first edition.

Richelson adheres rigorously to his stated purpose—to provide a comprehensive description of the "order of battle of the U.S. intelligence community." He examines the structure, relationships, operations and management architecture of the collection and analysis organizations that comprise the American intelligence establishment.

The reader will find "intelligence" defined rather liberally—even a section of the Library of Congress receives mention. But this strengthens the work because it illuminates aspects of U.S. intelligence that many authors find too mundane to notice, but which contribute to the national effort. The discussion of counterintelligence is largely presented in support of the examination of intelligence issues, and therefore also has merit within the scope of the book. However, there is little to justify Richelson's excursion into covert operations, for that subject has no bearing on the subject.

Richelson presents three very thoughtful chapters on intelligence management. In relation to the previous chapters this section may

seem tedious, but the subject is important and worth the effort.

The final chapter refers to significant issues facing the intelligence community. It is thought-provoking without resorting to cheap sensationalism. The evolution of the role of the Director of Central Intelligence is examined in some depth, as is the structure of the community as a whole. A sharp appreciation of human nature is shown in the author's observations of both these areas. He is critical of U.S. covert operations (by now obligatory). But at least he deserves credit for achieving some degree of innovation and plausibility.

One of the most refreshing things about Richelson is that, unlike some self-styled "investigative journalists," he doesn't carry any ideological baggage into his book. *The U.S. Intelligence Community* isn't an uneven collection of hyperbole and innuendo which was written only as a vehicle to carry a harping "blame America first" theme. Rather, it is what it purports to be—an examination of the goals, organizations and mechanics of the U.S. intelligence community.

But like all works that examine this subject in-depth, Richelson's book is based on facts, which are not only *unknown* to the reader, but which are also very difficult to *verify*. However, the author has exhaustively researched his subject using declassified sources and the book is meticulously documented with informative footnotes conveniently placed at the end of each chapter. Nevertheless, the reader is

left to independently judge the accuracy of *The U.S. Intelligence Community*.

DANIEL MC DONAGH  
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy  
Naval War College

O'Toole, George J. A. *The Encyclopedia of American Intelligence and Espionage: From the Revolutionary War to the Present*. New York: Facts on File, 1988. 539pp. \$50

Kurland, Michael. *The Spymaster's Handbook*. New York: Facts On File, 1988. 177pp. \$18.95

There have been handbooks of sorts on this subject at least as early as British author Ronald Seth's *Encyclopedia of Espionage*, published in 1972. Therefore, the two titles here no longer tread a pristine path.

Mr. Kurland is a former intelligence officer and prolific detective-fiction author. His small volume reflects that flippant attitude toward his subject that characterizes the Becket title which some readers may deem inappropriate. The approach is topical, beginning in Shakespeare's time, focussing mainly on Great Britain and Western Europe. The author's intent is to prod the reader into assessing his ability to function as the "Spymaster General" of the nation of "Freedonia," with a "Self-Test for Spies" that determines that ability with some sophistication.

The book offers a lengthy glossary, a good index, and lavish use of illustrations that are mostly cartoons

and film posters. The bibliography, however, is shamefully weak. Worst of all, the footnotes are not annotated. In sum, here is a frolicsome skimming of the field.

You will not find this attitude from Mr. O'Toole, a former CIA branch chief and author of a history of the Spanish-American War. His approach is alphabetical, running from "A-Z" through "Zimmerman Telegram" and is, within its stated limits, about as exhaustive a study as one could wish. There is a list of abbreviations, and both bibliography and index are admirably inclusive. Mr. O'Toole is as lavish with illustrations (many from his own collection) as is Mr. Kurland, but finds no space for cartoons or cinema posters.

The entries offer succinct sketches of little-known intelligence personalities, and the more significant ones are given the royal treatment, such as "John Andre" or "Franz von Rintelen." His approach to such commanding topics as our Civil War or State Department Intelligence or Office of Strategic Services is magisterial. I was gratified to note that room had been found for my own little outfit, the X-2 section.

Over the years professional exploiters of this volume will inevitably encounter errors or omissions of greater or lesser magnitude. For example, the Army CIC Center is no longer at Fort Holabird in Maryland, and the author's sketch of W. Somerset Maugham might have cited his interview with the terrorist,

Boris Savinkov, in 1943. Still, this rather ponderous tome will in future stand as the criterion by which other such labors are measured.

CURTIS C. DAVIS  
Lieutenant Commander  
U.S. Navy (Retired)  
Baltimore, Maryland

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *In Quest of National Security*. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1988. 252pp. \$34.95

*In Quest of National Security* is a compact collection containing twenty-five of Brzezinski's speeches and articles that span the Carter and Reagan presidencies. Grouped into seven categories, the essays cover an extremely broad range of issues, yet they remain focused and coherent due to Brzezinski's unique ability to distill complex issues into essays that the layman can understand, but provocative enough to interest the national security professional.

The author's credentials make this a distinctly authoritative work. Dr. Brzezinski's broad experience in the National Security arena as director of the Trilateral Commission from 1973 to 1976, National Security Advisor to President Carter from 1977-1981, and counselor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies have provided him with a unique perspective on world events during the eventful decade he reports on.

Typical of works of this genre, Dr. Brzezinski moves from the

general (discussions of U.S. strategy and policy formulation) to the specific (policy statements of the Carter administration, arms control negotiations, trilateral relations and regional conflicts, particularly in the Mideast and Central America) to the prescriptive (his views on the future of U.S.-Soviet Relations). Beginning with the premise that the world is now experiencing four interrelated revolutions: political, social, economic and military, he links this concept with his general, specific and prescriptive discussions.

Brzezinski's discussion of U.S. strategy is taken primarily from the ideas presented in his 1986 book *Game Plan: How to Conduct the U.S.-Soviet Contest*. He offers a concise charting of a geostrategy for the United States, which includes predictions on trends in U.S. and Soviet military capabilities. He continues with an examination of the organization and operation of the U.S. national security policy-making apparatus and its ability to seize opportunities presented by the aforementioned "Four Revolutions." Brzezinski then deals with specific issues that are extremely broad in scope and offers some accepted and some novel ideas. Writing on defense and arms control, Dr. Brzezinski presents familiar, but strong arguments *against* banning nuclear weapons. In his section on trilateral relations he presents a proposal for a "tank-free zone" in Central Europe. Throughout, Dr. Brzezinski keeps

these seemingly diverse threads tied to his central "revolutions" theme. His treatment of U.S.-Soviet relations, his most prescriptive chapter, begins with what is now recognized as his classic description of the Soviet Union, "A world power of a new type." First presented in 1983, this short but thorough analysis presents the Soviet Union as a one-dimensional military power. If you read only one chapter, read this one! The author offers some very explicit advice to U.S. policymakers.

Perhaps the book's only weakness lies in the three chapters on the "Carter legacy," based on speeches delivered by Dr. Brzezinski in the early years of the Carter administration. They provide an excellent synopsis of that administration's policy goals and objectives, including human rights. These essays would fit well into almost any other book or anthology, but they have less contemporary relevancy in this future-oriented book. Simply stated, the book moves too fast to pause for decade-old pronouncements.

Finally, the book is almost eerily prophetic. Brzezinski's concepts on arms control and trilateral relations are the same that underlie the INF and CAFE negotiations on security in Central Europe. Additionally, his statement that "the central substance of the political revolution is the attraction of democratic ideals" rings particularly true in light of the demonstrations last year in the People's Republic of China. National security leaders who choose not to be

exposed to Dr. Brzezinski's ideas do so at great peril.

GEORGE GALDORISI  
Commander, U.S. Navy  
USS *New Orleans*

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Bok, Sissela. *A Strategy for Peace*. New York: Random House, 1989. 202pp. \$17.95

Admiral Stephen B. Luce, as recorded in *Sailors and Scholars*, founded the Naval War College on the idea that it would be "a place of original research on all questions relating to war and to statesmanship connected with war, or the prevention of war." *A Strategy for Peace* contributes to Luce's purpose by providing a blueprint for the study of war prevention.

Dr. Bok's major premise is that Clausewitz' position on the impossibility of "absolute war" is now irrelevant with the advent of nuclear weapons. While readers may or may not agree with the points she makes, most will enjoy the thoroughness and clarity with which she makes them.

Strategic study needs to shift its perspective from war *per se* to the threat of war according to Bok. The threat now is caused by excessive partisanship and irrational distrust.

Two questions arise with respect to the legacy of Clausewitz. "Would his realism, in our present crisis, require a strategy better suited to avoiding, rather than conducting war? And would it not then call for rethinking his claim that morality

has little to do with the aims and means of strategy?"

The author states the central aim for a new strategy for peace must be to map the complex, dynamic relationship between different forms of trust and distrust and recognize the pathological degrees of each, so as to break out of the spiral of aggression—actual or threatened. Professor Bok concludes her premise with the position that it is now time for war-thought and peace-thought to dovetail in a new endeavor. she writes, "The language of morality and that of strategy are both indispensable in the face of the present crisis."

The core of the book, adumbrates a strategy for peace based on Immanuel Kant's essay, "Perpetual Peace." Bok points out that to be effective a strategy for peace must: be capable of the widest possible application, be shared by religious and secular traditions, and set forth a minimal moral framework of constraints that pertain both to public and private life.

The limited moral constraints are applied to violence, deceit, and betrayal, which parallel Kant's three, positive moral principles of nonviolence, veracity, and fidelity. Bok adds to these the category of excessive secrecy, echoing themes she covers in *Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation*. Her antidote to excessive secrecy is publicity.

Does *A Strategy for Peace* present a utopian dream? No. The author took the wind out of my prejudicial sails with her balanced, well-reasoned,

and practical approach. Chapter 5 contains objections to the strategy of peace, acknowledges the danger of fanatical moralizers to the extent of saying that in some circumstances moral discourse is out of place. However, she maintains that "moral constraints are now indispensable in international relations."

This is a refreshing work in its simplicity and profundity. The clear thought makes the reading a pleasure. The footnotes will serve as a useful bibliography to someone interested in further study. *A Strategy for Peace* deserves to be read widely, at least by those charged by law with fighting to keep it. While there is no shortage of studies on war and statesmanship, little solid scholarship comes out on the prevention of war. Sissela Bok makes a unique contribution in this regard. Would it be inappropriate to consider her with others in regard to Matthew 5:9, "Blessed are the peace makers, for they shall be called sons of God."

W. B. FITCH  
Commander, CHC, U.S. Navy  
Naval Hospital  
Newport, Rhode Island

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Previdi, Robert. *Civilian Control versus Military Rule*. New York: Hippocrene Press, 1988. 188pp. \$14.95

Robert Previdi is a vice president and director of marketing communications at Citicorp, has been a New York state candidate for Congress, and has written extensively on the

military. He calls the Goldwater-Nichols Act the "most important piece of military legislation passed by Congress in the last 40 years. It is also the most dangerous. . . . [It] can lead to a situation where, at best, the country is run more and more by the military and, at worst, where the country actually becomes more vulnerable to a military takeover. . . . [We] risk the possibility that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs can become stronger in establishing policy, strategy, and operations than even our civilian leaders."

The author looks back at World War II, Korea, the Cold War, and the fundamental flaws in U.S. strategy during Vietnam in assessing civilian control over the military. He prescribes those situations when civilian control should consist of formulating overall national strategy and then allowing the military to implement it. He also effectively explains, through the example of President Kennedy's handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, just how closely civilian leaders can control the military, and the circumstances under which such tight controls are appropriate. The author also compares the tactics that other presidents (Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, and Dwight Eisenhower) employed to maintain and reinforce civilian control over U.S. military forces.

Previdi could have helped his readers if he had provided "wiring diagrams" of the national security organization structure both before and after the Goldwater-Nichols

Act. These would clearly show the chain of command and authority relationships amongst the President, National Security Council, Secretary of Defense, service secretaries, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCs, and the various operational and support commands.

While Previdi offers a multitude of credible sources to buttress his views, he gives little in the way of evaluation of the counterpart arguments for Goldwater-Nichols which led to the passage of the legislation. Several former military service chiefs, blue ribbon commissions, and congressional committees have long specifically advocated the changes brought about in, or similar to, the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Since the author is trying to make a case, the book is one-sided in its presentation of the possible dangers which could come about as a result of Goldwater-Nichols. However, he makes few attempts to assess the *likelihood* of such occurrences. Instead, many of the author's warnings of potentially extreme adverse consequences of Goldwater-Nichols are stated as definite outcomes. For example, he says that "over time the chairman's control of the chiefs will be total."

He also claims that the "new, total dominance of joint thinking created by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, will in time lead to another change. This change will have the service staffs merged into the Joint Staff reporting to the JCS Chairman. His power will then be so dominant as to insure the



demise of the individual service chiefs.”

Still another assertion: “From now on, as the JCS chairman grows in power, it will be easier and easier for a president and a chairman of the Joint Chiefs to run any American war. In time, of course, we risk a situation where the chairman alone can first run a war and then, as drastic as it sounds now, the whole country.”

As to what should be done, the author recommends among several changes, that: the Joint Chiefs become the Secretary of Defense’s military staff, with the Chairman as the military chief of staff, that the chiefs be put back in operational command of, and thus again be made responsible for, their services; that the service secretaries be made deputy secretaries of defense and constitute the civilian staff of the Secretary of Defense; and that congressional leaders and the Joint Chiefs attend National Security Council meetings which deal with decisions involving use of American military forces.

The author has made no attempt to evaluate the actual effects of Goldwater-Nichols, most likely because of the short time between the law’s passage and the writing of the manuscript. Mr. Previdi would do his readers and the nation an invaluable service if he were to make a study of the real initial impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, perhaps on its fifth anniversary. If the effects in fact appear to be of the nature forecast by the author, and

civilian control over the military is eroding, changes can still be made before we have gone too far down the wrong road.

RICHARD SLOVACEK  
Captain, U.S. Naval Reserve

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Rubin, Alfred P. *The Law of Piracy*. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1988. 444pp. \$22

*The Law of Piracy* is the latest in a long series of “Blue Books” published by the U.S. Naval War College. Blue Books are styled “international law studies” and generally are intended to grapple with international legal issues germane to the naval environment. Alfred P. Rubin is a well-known international lawyer and scholar on the faculty at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

Because both “Blue Book” and “piracy” may evoke certain images for the potential reader, it is useful to begin by describing what *The Law of Piracy* is not. First, it is not light reading. Although “piracy” summons swashbuckling images of Errol Flynn and adventure on the high seas, *The Law of Piracy* is scholarly, not flamboyant. Far from pleasurable reading, the book is frequently tedious in style and in terminology. Second, it is not so much a study of the “law” of piracy as it is a historical study of varying perceptions of “piracy” over time and the legal consequences flowing from those perceptions. Finally, this book

does not focus on international law issues relevant to the operational requirements of the naval officer. *The Law of Piracy* is primarily an academic treatise with a rigidly narrow scope of utility.

The positive aspects of this book are equally notable. *The Law of Piracy* is meticulously researched and thoroughly documented. Professor Rubin's scholarship and documentation will be a delight for those who require information from the fields he has so effectively plowed in gathering his resource data. But the information and the presentation alike are esoteric in nature. In order to appreciate the marvelous scholarship, the reader must have a scholar's knowledge of both international law and jurisprudence.

Several "quirks" serve to disconcert the reader. For example, this book is heavily dependent on Latin phraseology that rapidly becomes distracting. Undoubtedly the intent is to convey precise meaning, and in this the author succeeds. Nevertheless, the usually unnecessary use of terminology now hoary with age is all too common.

The frequent "shorthand" reference to case history and juridical writing documented in earlier pages may also vex those who failed to memorize all the preceding material. Further, the need constantly to refer to endnotes referencing text is cumbersome. And while Dr. Rubin's long sentences convey meaning precisely, they too, can irritate some readers.

Yet, the author succeeds in illustrating some crucial truths about piracy. Despite the existence of an internationally recognized definition, that definition is of little use. Piracy, it turns out, is not a subject susceptible of easy, logical or consistent explication.

Rubin clearly demonstrates that, through the centuries, nations, jurists and courts alike have treated piracy as needs of the moment dictated. *The Law of Piracy* cites numerous political uses of the term that had little, if any, relevance to "law," and frequently not even to "piracy" as it was understood at the time. Despite this, the author attempts constantly to put case histories, juridical writings and state practices regarding "piracy" into a consistent thread either of "positivist" or "naturalist" legal theory. The reason for this is paradoxical; it seems clearly at odds with the scholarship he produces.

As Professor Rubin demonstrates, piracy is not only difficult to define, it is also difficult to correct, and replete with legal and practical conundrums. Hence, the book's meager conclusions should be forgiven—even expected. Sometimes real life just doesn't get any better than so-so.

With one conclusion, however, many will disagree. The author determines that all valid international law relating to piracy is derived solely from domestic laws. His corollary is that only passive personality theory (nationality of the victim or property affected) has ever been a logical basis for jurisdiction.

These opinions yield a contentious and impractical premise.

The "bottom line" conclusion is that if a state assumes jurisdiction over piracy on other than the passive personality basis, legal complications "beyond the bounds the legal order accepts" will result. That conclusion completely misses any mark of relevancy for either the contemporary world or the historical one.

Any scholarly work will be subject to criticism for omissions, though this one less so than most. There is, however, one omission that is puzzling. For an analysis so heavily dependent on the passive personality theory of jurisdiction, the absence of the *Lotus* case (P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10 (1927), 2 Hudson, World Court Reports 20 (1935) is perplexing. That is a small matter, but a potentially important one.

In sum, *The Law of Piracy* is a treasure-trove for academics and scholars who have need of the research Professor Rubin has accomplished over many years. Interestingly, the book is both more and less than the title promises. It holds no succor for those whose mission it is to resolve practical problems. It does, however, yield an immense amount of scholarship and research data exceeding, perhaps, even the ephemeral limits of "piracy." For some, *The Law of Piracy* will be an invaluable research tool and aid. For others, particularly the naval officer who ostensibly has a part to play in eradicating piracy (whatever that term really means), the book is largely irrelevant. "Aye, there's the rub." For all its meticulous

scholarship, in the final analysis, *The Law of Piracy* does not serve its logical audience.

M. E. BOWMAN,  
Commander, JAGC, U.S. Navy  
Naval War College

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Nicholson, Nigel and Nicholson, Adam. *Two Roads to Dodge City*. New York: Harper & Row, 1987. 291pp. \$17.50

From Alexis deTocqueville's *Democracy in America* to Jonathan Raban's *Old Glory*, Americans have provided a ready and continuing market for the travel writings of Europeans in America. The why doesn't matter, the genre has often been worth the read. Such is the case with this father and son team of well-known British writers.

In the Spring of 1986, Nigel Nicholson, author of *Napoleon 1812* and the biography of Field Marshall Alexander, and his son Adam, author of several British travel books, simultaneously but separately toured the United States. Each day they wrote to one another about their impressions, sights and visits. Their letters make up the book. Nigel the father, as befitting an elderly British Tory, toured the eastern part of the country visiting a number of established people known to him from his previous works. Adam, the son, toured the new West from Los Angeles to the Pacific northwest, down through the mountain, desert and the high Plains states. The people he met were new to him and from

a newer strata of American society. Both Nigel and Adam have that most important attribute of a first-rate travel writer—a knack for meeting interesting people, drawing them out and relating them to the country around them. The people they met contributed much to their feel for America and to the book. After 20,000 miles each, father and son met in Dodge City and hence the title, *Two Roads to Dodge City*.

Nigel began with a deep self-confessed love for the people, history, landscape and culture of the United States. Through his travels, his affection is unwavering. Initially, Nigel is the more interesting. Adam's reservations seem at first to be only a foil for his cleverness. Adam "didn't like the idea of America too much at the beginning. Now I can find nothing wrong." As

the book and their travels progress, Adam's transformation into an Americophile becomes the focus. To his unexpected pleasure (and ours), he got hooked on ranches, ranchers, cutting horses, rodeos and lots of open space. The American West—the newest and most open part of the country—captivated this conservative young Englishman as it did so many of his predecessors in the 19th century.

One of the many pleasures in this book is reading the portion that deals with "your" part of the United States to see if they got it right. For this reviewer, Nigel's and Adam's observations of two treasured places were dead on!

FRANK C. MAHNCKE  
Naval Surface Warfare Center  
Silver Spring, Maryland

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. . . in representative governments, military interests cannot without loss dispense with the backing which is supplied by a widely spread, deeply rooted, civil interest, . . .

*Naval Strategy*  
A. T. Mahan (1911)  
Little, Brown (1918), p. 447

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### Request for Contributors to *Encyclopedia of American Wars Series*

A.C. Venzon, Ph.D., seeks contributors to *The Encyclopedia of the First World War*, one of eight volumes in Garland Publishing's forthcoming series *Encyclopedia of American Wars*. The volume will include naval and marine operations, as well as biographies of key naval and marine officers. For further information, prospective participants may reach Dr. Venzon at 14509 Triple Crown Place, Darnestown, Maryland 20878.