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Sword over Richmond: An Eyewitness History of McClellan's Peninsula Campaign.

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tionary War. At the end the author forgets about the realities of diplomacy and takes the Americans to task for double-crossing the French at the peace talks before the French could double-cross the Americans.

Sylvia R. Frey paints a standard picture of the King's army during the American Revolutionary War. Only her colors are new. Mary B. Wickwire is simply in over her head on the role of naval warfare. For example, she takes Admiral Lord Howe to task for failing to effectively blockade the rebellious American colonies in the first years of the war. The admiral's instructions called for him to support operations ashore and to blockade the ports. If one counts the number and type of ships under his command, and how and why they were deployed, it becomes clear that the admiral did not have enough ships of the right type to do both tasks.

More important than their individual qualities or shortcomings, the reason the essays in *The World Turned Upside Down* do not achieve the editor's objective of showing why the Americans won the Revolution is that nothing in the book addresses the strategic problems confronting Britain after 1778 when the conflict exploded into a worldwide naval war. The American Revolutionary War after 1778 can be understood only if the strategic and political objectives of France, Spain and Holland are taken into account along with those of the Americans and British. It is the absence of any work on such matters that, despite some

good parts, dooms this book to failure.

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Wheeler, Richard. *Sword over Richmond: An Eyewitness History of McClellan's Peninsula Campaign*. New York: Harper & Row, 1986. 354pp. \$21.95

Few generals in the Union Army in the spring of 1862 had the opportunity to potentially end the Civil War in a single short campaign. George McClellan, however, was given that chance. The Peninsula Campaign of 1862 and McClellan's failure to take advantage of the opportunity presented him is the subject of this book. Wheeler has crafted an interesting and informative account of the Peninsula Campaign from his use of representative writings and diaries of Union and Confederate politicians, officers and soldiers.

The author provides a useful appraisal of why the campaign failed, and the reader is given an analysis of the manner in which the events of this campaign impacted on the ultimate course of the war.

Despite the title, Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign is included, as well as the naval actions between the *Monitor* and the *Merrimack*. It is interesting reading, but it is the selections dealing with McClellan that merit the reader's attention.

Wheeler has woven a skillful tale of McClellan's behavior during the campaign, providing ample evidence of McClellan's inability to understand the political nature of the war. He did not comprehend the problems that faced his commander-in-chief, nor did he appreciate what a military opportunity the campaign was for him. The fears he expressed in his correspondence to his wife and the War Department exemplify this.

McClellan's failure to move quickly and engage the Confederate armies enabled the southern forces to regroup in defense of Richmond, and his defeat at the hands of Robert E. Lee during the Seven Days Battle crushed all hope for a quick end to the rebellion. The author's analysis of how and why McClellan failed to administer a stunning defeat to the Confederate forces is provocative reading.

However, such behavior leaves the reader wondering not why McClellan failed, but rather why he was left to continue in command? Not until the Battle of Antietam did McClellan totally display his ineptitude. President Lincoln was then able to remove him from command.

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Turner, John, ed. *Britain and the First World War* (Collection of essays). London: Unwin Hyman, 1988. 165pp.

This small volume of essays, edited by John Turner of the University of London, will be useful to those with only a surface understanding of the complexities of World War I, as well as to those with a scholarly interest in the war.

The essays are successful in two ways. As an overview, they succeed in synthesizing a huge volume of data, covering virtually every aspect of the war. Secondly, specialists—with very different perspectives concerning the consequences of the war—are called upon to examine the different elements of the war. The book justifies the editor's belief that the Great War was not part of an immutable "march of progress" as some recent historians have claimed.

At first, the organization of the work into separately grouped analyses appears disjointed. However, the arrangement of material is useful for this kind of short textbook, largely composed from recent secondary sources.

Of particular note may be Bryan Ranft's contribution on "The Royal Navy and the War at Sea." It explains convincingly how the British Navy, contrary to popular opinion, succeeded at the task for which it had been preparing for decades.

A.J. Stockwell's work on the Imperial consequences of global struggle in "War and the British Empire" helps make clear why decisions, otherwise inexplicable, were taken by the central government. Any decision involving Imperial resources, and particularly