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## Submarine Commander

Richard B. Laning

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However, he all but ignores the contributions by the Navy's General Board and Stark's own War Plans Division. Simpson, of course, cites Stark's messages before Pearl Harbor as evidence that the admiral had sent ample warnings to the Pacific commanders, avoiding any further inquiry into the charges that Stark failed to transmit vital intelligence. Simpson also relieves Stark and the Navy of any responsibility for Pearl Harbor by pointing out that the Army was responsible for the defense of naval bases under the 1935 policy known as Joint Action of the Army and Navy.

As ComNavEu from April 1942 to August 1945, Stark held the title first assigned to Admiral Sims during World War I. Whereas the post in Sims' day was clearly an operational command, Stark's responsibilities were more administrative and diplomatic. His duties involved the delicate handling of General Charles de Gaulle, serving as liaison between the Admiralty in London and the Navy Department in Washington, supervising the American naval buildup in the United Kingdom (before the Normandy landings) and recommending antisubmarine strategies. In all of these undertakings, Stark apparently demonstrated extraordinary energy, tact, and patience. Indeed, Stark ended his career far more appreciated by his British hosts than by his own countrymen. Simpson is partisan for Stark, but his partisanship is justified.

Historians will rejoice that with the completion of Stark's biography,

his personal papers are now available for research at the Naval Historical Center in Washington.

WILLIAM R. BRAISTED  
Naval Historical Center

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Schratz, Paul R. *Submarine Commander*. Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1988, 344pp. \$24 paperback \$4.95

Captain Paul Schratz has written an engrossing memoir of his submarine duty from the time of Pearl Harbor through the Korean War.

After submarine school and a tour in a training boat, the author joined the new submarine *Scorpion* in Portsmouth Naval Shipyard where, as torpedo and gunnery officer and torpedo data computer operator, he dealt with the myriad details of preparing his boat for war. The complexities of dealing with the wonderful people who built our boats are well described.

Alert to reports from the Pacific about torpedo failures, he went to the heart of the problem in the Newport, Rhode Island Torpedo Station where a long-ensconced bureaucracy refused to face its failures or to accept solutions. Paul came up with an important solution which helped his submarines achieve a much higher torpedo success rate than other boats. He also adopted and promulgated an improved use of sonar information in attacks of all kinds. The wonderfully human bond among shipmates, in the wardroom, and among the families is described

with grace and warmth. We see the development of a challenging and inspiring leader who gives great credit to his many friends, shipmates, and supporters.

As the center of the attack party during war patrols, Paul practically commanded the attacks and was deeply critical of any lack of audacity on the part of his seniors, some of whom still carried a touch of peacetime conservatism and conformity.

Tragedy struck early and close when the *Scorpion's* executive officer, Reggie Raymond, whom the author greatly admired, was killed in a gun fight at the end of the first patrol. It struck again when the *Scorpion* was lost during the patrol after Schratz left for the *Sterlet*, in which he served as executive officer.

In the *Sterlet* he experienced a couple of hair-raising patrols. His demand for audacity was not met. After helping rescue and escort to Saipan the battle-damaged *Salmon*, he suddenly became executive officer of the *Atule*, under the outstanding Jason Maurer.

The war patrols in the *Atule* were his most satisfying. But because there were few Japanese ships left to sink, ship attacks took a back seat to rescuing aviators and sinking mines. Even so, every patrol was judged "successful" by ComSubPac. As the war ended, Schratz found himself involved in the occupation and disarming of Japan. Finally, the command for which he hungered turned out to be one of the big Japanese *I-203*-class submarines,

which he took to Pearl Harbor. Even this cranky, ill-designed, experimental high-speed boat was not without its fun.

Later he gained command of the Navy's newest and best submarine, the *Pickeral*. The peacetime ASW exercises showed how high submarine speed can confound the foe. Then the Korean War came along just in time to demonstrate what the *Pickeral* could do as she monitored Russian traffic along the Korean coast and entered mined waters to reconnoiter and photograph the coast for later covert raids by underwater demolition teams.

As a leader, he took good care of his people; many who served with him went on to distinguished careers. He was diligent and energetic. What stands out about this submarine CO is his successful audacity. This indeed characterizes many of the junior officers who saw the early failures of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific. His adopted credo was later formulated by Admiral Burke: "Any commander who fails to exceed his authority is not of much use to his subordinates." And General Marshall: "If one can't disobey an order, he'll never amount to much as a leader."

His audacity went past the grim needs of the attack and into making submarining fun for himself and the crews. He would divert from his planned and reported tracks to explore interesting places, or in the Korean War, to increase coverage to forbidden areas. Frequently, he exceeded his ship's test depth,

overloaded her diesel engines, once surfaced the *Pickrel* with a 72-degree angle, and made the first 5,000-mile snorkel trip. Captain Schratz demonstrated the kind of audacity that can contribute to victory and expand the operational envelope of the submarine.

While technology has changed enormously since this officer served afloat, there can be no doubt that any future war will be extremely hazardous and it will require audacious commanding officers of great ability. Those who command, or hope to command, one of our fine new submarines can gain their own fun, and profit, from reading *Submarine Commander*.

RICHARD B. LANING  
 Captain, U.S. Navy (Retired)  
 Orlando, Florida

Breuer, William B. *Seawolf*. California: Presidio, 1989. 318pp. \$18.95

*Seawolf* is the biography of an unusual naval officer, John D. Bulkeley. The author devotes only three pages to the early, formative years of his subject, but this is just as well. Bulkeley lived through enough real life adventure to fill the rest of the book.

Breuer wraps his story around quotes from Bulkeley, friends and associates. The statements by Bulkeley help to reveal his essentially strong, though sometimes obstinate character.

Bulkeley early announced that he was going to sea and to the Naval

Academy, even though at that time he had no prospect of an appointment. Characteristic of the way he was later to do everything else, Bulkeley attacked the problem by studying day and night for several months. Then he visited the offices of every congressman who would see him. When all seemed lost, Bulkeley found one who served his need with an appointment.

The studies and the hazing at the Naval Academy presented no problem for Bulkeley, but after graduation, he encountered a problem that even his determination could not solve: The depression navy had been forced to deny commissions to the lower half of the graduating class, the half in which Bulkeley found himself. Still determined, he tried life as a flying cadet in the Army Air Force. After walking away from several crashes, he was delighted to hear that the navy would, belatedly, give him a commission.

Then began a series of unbelievable incidents. The first involved Bulkeley's decision to steal a briefcase from a traveling Japanese ambassador. Naval Intelligence did not appreciate this embarrassing show of initiative and arranged to have Bulkeley shipped off to the Asiatic Station. This early experience on the China station was later to be of great value to Bulkeley and indirectly to the Asiatic Fleet.

Shortly after returning to the States, Bulkeley began his long association with the U.S. Navy's new motor torpedo, or, PT boats.