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One Bulge No Drums

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The duel between Bulkeley and Castro alone is reason enough to read this book.

Completion of this assignment eventually brought him the appointment as head of the Board of Inspection and Survey. Bulkeley's revival of this moribund group is fascinating. He became almost as famous in this role as Admiral Rickover was in his. Perhaps Bulkeley's contribution to the readiness of the navy and the improvements in the design process fathered by Bulkeley were as important as the advent of nuclear power. Like Rickover, Bulkeley was found to be so essential to the success of this important work that he was kept on to the age of 80, long after his official retirement.

This biography is vibrantly written and so well-organized that the reader does not lose interest. It is a book which needed to be written to preserve the exploits of a naval officer who looked danger in the face many times and won, both at sea and in the shore-bound bureaucracy of government.

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Hopkins, William B. *One Bulge No Drums*. Chapel Hill: Algonquin Books, 1986. 274pp. \$19.95

The author served in the Korean War as company commander, H & S Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, during the epic withdrawal

of the 1st Marine Division from the Chosin Reservoir in 1950.

The book which combines history with autobiographical memoir, is a critical examination of American strategy in Korea. There are, however, recurring expressions of bitterness toward General MacArthur and his failed and costly strategy in North Korea.

Beginning with the departure of his Marine Corps Reserve unit from Roanoke, Virginia, in August 1950, Hopkins narrates his personal view of the war until he was wounded at Uisong, four months later. He includes affectionate and amusing recollections of his comrades (officer and enlisted), as well as a graphic account of the withdrawal from Chosin, with emphasis on the role that his battalion played to insure the success of the final move to safety—a tale worth remembering.

The division withdrew from Chosin, facing twenty-five-degree below zero cold and innumerable Chinese Communist formations. As the Marine column trudged down the only road from Koto-ri on the last leg of their journey, the bridge ahead, spanning a 1,000-foot gorge at Funchilin Pass, was blown up by the enemy. The Marines were not overly discouraged, because the Air Force had dropped them replacement bridge sections. However, the Chinese occupied the high ground beyond—south of the gorge—whence they covered the approaches to the bridge site with fire. This proved a dilemma for General Smith

and his men as they plodded southward toward the sea.

But one battalion had remained south of the blown bridge: The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, who guarded the division ammunition dump at Chinhung-ni. This battalion's march north, and its valiant attack, led by Captain Robert Barrow and "A" Company, is the climax of the book.

We can be grateful to the author for reminding us of this tense sequence of events, drama rarely matched in American military history, and of the sacrifices in wounded and dead in North Korea. We are reminded of the steady competence of the Marine leaders under stress and of the failed strategy which made the desperate operation necessary in the first place.

During the Korean War, the author was there. His credentials for describing the Marines in action in Korea are excellent. But his qualifications for analysis and criticism of American strategy are no greater than those of the average participant in the war.

Although he lists an impressive bibliography, Hopkins' failure to use notes forces the reader to rely on him for accuracy of statements and quotations from higher authorities. He does not miss an opportunity to criticize the area commander and his staff: An understandable attitude for a Marine company commander who served at that time and at that place.

To my knowledge, no one from the 1st Marine Division has had a good word for General MacArthur. They believe that he caused them

unnecessary casualties and suffering and, even more important, that he deprived them of the victory that was their due.

Perhaps a more balanced view would conclude that MacArthur recognized the capability of the Marines and insisted that a full-strength Marine division be sent to him. Otherwise, the Marine participation in the Korean War might have been small. In 1950 they had few friends in Washington. MacArthur understood and exploited our amphibious skills at Inchon, where America won a startling victory that led to the breakup of the North Korean Army. In the heat of debate over the flawed policy of advancing to the Yalu River, these earlier accomplishments are often overlooked. Too bad the American Caesar could not have quit when he was ahead.

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Liston, Robert A. *The Pueblo Surrender*. New York: M. Evans & Co., 1988. 294pp. \$18.95

Would you believe that the USS *Pueblo* (AGER 2) was seized by the Chinese, fired on by the Soviets and then turned over to the North Koreans, all within 12 miles of Wonsan? Well, neither do I. This is the silliest book on naval affairs I have ever read. About 75 pages into it, I turned to see who the publisher was. I had never heard of them and