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Third World Strategy

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Waters—An American View,” tells us that by 1986 Canada and Norway had agreed on full CAST Brigade training in Norway, but it is in Clive Archer’s chapter on “The Nordic Response to Soviet Presence,” that we find mention of the 1987 Canadian White Paper canceling the CAST commitment.

Finn Sollie, Robin Churchill and Uwe Jenisch discuss the issue of the Svalbard Archipelago. They show that the previous long-term Nordic (specifically Norwegian) attempts to ensure a stable, low-tension area in the European Arctic are now evolving in the direction of a “mixed policy” toward growing Soviet activity evidenced by military as well as resource-extractive measures. The Svalbard debate exemplifies the complexities of existing treaty provisions overlaid by intra-Nordic disputes (fisheries protection zones and exclusive economic zones) and diverse interpretations of the continental shelf and “boundary establishment” concepts within Nato.

In light of then-General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech in Murmansk on 1 October 1987, that emphasized a “radical lowering of the level of military confrontation in the region,” followed by the sinking of the Soviet “Mike” attack submarine in international waters between North Norway and Bear Island on 7 April 1989, *Northern Waters* is indeed timely.

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Rubinstein, Alvin Z. *Moscow’s Third World Strategy*. New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1988. 311pp. \$29.95

This book surprised me. I had not realized that my understanding of Moscow’s Third World strategy was so limited and deficient. I suspect, unfortunately, that many others within the defense and policy communities are similarly unenlightened.

Rubinstein demonstrates convincingly that a discernible pattern with seven distinct characteristics has evolved in Soviet dealings with the Third World since the Second World War. First, Soviet intervention has been in response to existing regional tensions; the U.S.S.R. has not “manufactured” targets for the purpose of exploitation, except in the case of Afghanistan. Second, the Third World countries have determined the level and character of intervention—the Soviet Union has seldom bullied its clients. Third, in general, the Soviet Union has proven itself to be a reliable and effective patron-protector.

Fourth, forces that Moscow has committed have been relevant to the challenges faced by its clients, showing sensitivity to regional and global political considerations. The Soviet Union has found that military and security assistance are of greater value than economic assistance to its clients. Fifth, the most prominent thread running through the fabric of Soviet interventions has been the anti-American bent of the clients’ outlooks or policies, and Moscow’s acceptance of this significant diver-

sity in its clients' ideology. The simplistic idea of Moscow orchestrating these countries as ideologue puppet states is fantasy, not fact. Sixth, Soviet intervention has generally enhanced its prestige among nonaligned nations. And finally, Soviet leadership has often been willing to intervene significantly in the Third World, irrespective of possible adverse effects on its relationship with the United States, often to the consternation of U.S. officials who want to believe that the Soviet Union places the same importance as the United States does on mutual, good relations.

Soviet activities in the Third World are neither mindlessly adventurous and troublemaking as some imagine, nor are they always successful. But its involvements there have impacted on U.S. foreign policy in three major ways: It has limited U.S. options; raised the cost of safeguarding U.S. interests; and intensified anti-Americanism. One aim of the Soviet strategy appears to be to elicit U.S. responses that are disproportionately costly compared both to Soviet outlays and to the intrinsic importance of the region, the crisis, or the protagonist(s).

Moscow's involvement in the Third World has a reputation for credibility based upon a demonstrable record of dependability, consistency, and capability. Once it unequivocally committed itself, Moscow stayed the course, irrespective of military or economic costs, or adverse effects on its relationship with the United States.

Most of us need to know more about Moscow's strategy in the Third World. Rubinstein, a Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, offers us a readable, challenging book that provides a great deal of insight into this important subject. I recommend it strongly.

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Gibert, Stephen P., ed. *Security in Northeast Asia: Approaching the Pacific Century*. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1987. 193pp. \$19

Simon, Sheldon. *The Future of Asian-Pacific Security Collaboration*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988. 177pp. \$29

"U.S. policy toward Japan is so confused and uncoordinated that many U.S. officials say they cannot figure out how it is made or why economic concerns are regularly subordinated to military and political objectives." Thus read a *New York Times News Service* article on one aspect of our foreign policy towards Asia.

Stephen Gibert, Director of National Security Studies, states that we are approaching a "Pacific Century." To prove his point he has presented eight papers that attempt to provide a comprehensive and integrated discussion of Northeast Asia and its relationship to the United States and world security concerns. Two sections on diplo-