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Civilian Control versus Military Rule

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has little to do with the aims and means of strategy?"

The author states the central aim for a new strategy for peace must be to map the complex, dynamic relationship between different forms of trust and distrust and recognize the pathological degrees of each, so as to break out of the spiral of aggression—actual or threatened. Professor Bok concludes her premise with the position that it is now time for war-thought and peace-thought to dovetail in a new endeavor. she writes, "The language of morality and that of strategy are both indispensable in the face of the present crisis."

The core of the book, adumbrates a strategy for peace based on Immanuel Kant's essay, "Perpetual Peace." Bok points out that to be effective a strategy for peace must: be capable of the widest possible application, be shared by religious and secular traditions, and set forth a minimal moral framework of constraints that pertain both to public and private life.

The limited moral constraints are applied to violence, deceit, and betrayal, which parallel Kant's three, positive moral principles of nonviolence, veracity, and fidelity. Bok adds to these the category of excessive secrecy, echoing themes she covers in *Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation*. Her antidote to excessive secrecy is publicity.

Does *A Strategy for Peace* present a utopian dream? No. The author took the wind out of my prejudicial sails with her balanced, well-reasoned,

and practical approach. Chapter 5 contains objections to the strategy of peace, acknowledges the danger of fanatical moralizers to the extent of saying that in some circumstances moral discourse is out of place. However, she maintains that "moral constraints are now indispensable in international relations."

This is a refreshing work in its simplicity and profundity. The clear thought makes the reading a pleasure. The footnotes will serve as a useful bibliography to someone interested in further study. *A Strategy for Peace* deserves to be read widely, at least by those charged by law with fighting to keep it. While there is no shortage of studies on war and statesmanship, little solid scholarship comes out on the prevention of war. Sissela Bok makes a unique contribution in this regard. Would it be inappropriate to consider her with others in regard to Matthew 5:9, "Blessed are the peace makers, for they shall be called sons of God."

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Previdi, Robert. *Civilian Control versus Military Rule*. New York: Hippocrene Press, 1988. 188pp. \$14.95

Robert Previdi is a vice president and director of marketing communications at Citicorp, has been a New York state candidate for Congress, and has written extensively on the

military. He calls the Goldwater-Nichols Act the "most important piece of military legislation passed by Congress in the last 40 years. It is also the most dangerous. . . . [It] can lead to a situation where, at best, the country is run more and more by the military and, at worst, where the country actually becomes more vulnerable to a military takeover. . . . [We] risk the possibility that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs can become stronger in establishing policy, strategy, and operations than even our civilian leaders."

The author looks back at World War II, Korea, the Cold War, and the fundamental flaws in U.S. strategy during Vietnam in assessing civilian control over the military. He prescribes those situations when civilian control should consist of formulating overall national strategy and then allowing the military to implement it. He also effectively explains, through the example of President Kennedy's handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, just how closely civilian leaders can control the military, and the circumstances under which such tight controls are appropriate. The author also compares the tactics that other presidents (Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, and Dwight Eisenhower) employed to maintain and reinforce civilian control over U.S. military forces.

Previdi could have helped his readers if he had provided "wiring diagrams" of the national security organization structure both before and after the Goldwater-Nichols

Act. These would clearly show the chain of command and authority relationships amongst the President, National Security Council, Secretary of Defense, service secretaries, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCs, and the various operational and support commands.

While Previdi offers a multitude of credible sources to buttress his views, he gives little in the way of evaluation of the counterpart arguments for Goldwater-Nichols which led to the passage of the legislation. Several former military service chiefs, blue ribbon commissions, and congressional committees have long specifically advocated the changes brought about in, or similar to, the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Since the author is trying to make a case, the book is one-sided in its presentation of the possible dangers which could come about as a result of Goldwater-Nichols. However, he makes few attempts to assess the *likelihood* of such occurrences. Instead, many of the author's warnings of potentially extreme adverse consequences of Goldwater-Nichols are stated as definite outcomes. For example, he says that "over time the chairman's control of the chiefs will be total."

He also claims that the "new, total dominance of joint thinking created by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, will in time lead to another change. This change will have the service staffs merged into the Joint Staff reporting to the JCS Chairman. His power will then be so dominant as to insure the

demise of the individual service chiefs.”

Still another assertion: “From now on, as the JCS chairman grows in power, it will be easier and easier for a president and a chairman of the Joint Chiefs to run any American war. In time, of course, we risk a situation where the chairman alone can first run a war and then, as drastic as it sounds now, the whole country.”

As to what should be done, the author recommends among several changes, that: the Joint Chiefs become the Secretary of Defense’s military staff, with the Chairman as the military chief of staff, that the chiefs be put back in operational command of, and thus again be made responsible for, their services; that the service secretaries be made deputy secretaries of defense and constitute the civilian staff of the Secretary of Defense; and that congressional leaders and the Joint Chiefs attend National Security Council meetings which deal with decisions involving use of American military forces.

The author has made no attempt to evaluate the actual effects of Goldwater-Nichols, most likely because of the short time between the law’s passage and the writing of the manuscript. Mr. Previdi would do his readers and the nation an invaluable service if he were to make a study of the real initial impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, perhaps on its fifth anniversary. If the effects in fact appear to be of the nature forecast by the author, and

civilian control over the military is eroding, changes can still be made before we have gone too far down the wrong road.

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Rubin, Alfred P. *The Law of Piracy*. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1988. 444pp. \$22

The Law of Piracy is the latest in a long series of “Blue Books” published by the U.S. Naval War College. Blue Books are styled “international law studies” and generally are intended to grapple with international legal issues germane to the naval environment. Alfred P. Rubin is a well-known international lawyer and scholar on the faculty at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

Because both “Blue Book” and “piracy” may evoke certain images for the potential reader, it is useful to begin by describing what *The Law of Piracy* is not. First, it is not light reading. Although “piracy” summons swashbuckling images of Errol Flynn and adventure on the high seas, *The Law of Piracy* is scholarly, not flamboyant. Far from pleasurable reading, the book is frequently tedious in style and in terminology. Second, it is not so much a study of the “law” of piracy as it is a historical study of varying perceptions of “piracy” over time and the legal consequences flowing from those perceptions. Finally, this book