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
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PROFESSIONAL READING



A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge with reason and consistency.

Admiral H.G. Rickover

Rear Admiral S. A. Swarztrauber, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Matthews, Lloyd J. and Brown, Dale E., eds. *Assessing the Vietnam War*. New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987. 254pp. \$16.95

Grinter, Lawrence E. and Dunn, Peter M., eds. *The American War in Vietnam*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1987. 165pp. \$37.95

Having spent 18 months fighting on the coasts, rivers, and in the jungles of Vietnam and another five years "administering" the war from close to the throne in Washington, I find it very difficult—close to impossible—to read, think, or write about that war dispassionately. Yet, I will try.

These two books, which I will refer to as *Assessing* and *American War* respectively, attempt to criticize the war, years later, in an objective, dispassionate way. Why did we get involved? Why did we fail? What have we learned?

There is no agreement on answers to these questions. Both books are collections of short papers by experts, military and non-military, domestic and foreign, and most illuminatingly, Vietnamese. *Assessing* includes 19 articles by 21 editors and contributors; *American War* includes 15 pieces by 9 editors and contributors. Both books cover the full spectrum of opinion from the so-called hawk view to the so-called dove view.

The classic-in-its-own-time book by Army Colonel Harry Summers, *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context* (1981), triggered the debate that rages in these two volumes, and which is referred to as the "new Vietnam scholarship." Summers stands on the right and has articulated the hawk view

that we could have won the war had we followed the time-honored teachings of Clausewitz: First, ascertain clearly what kind of war it is you are undertaking and second, concentrate your effort against the enemy's center of gravity. We failed to recognize that the war after 1959 was a conventional war of aggression by North Vietnam. Duped by a clever strategic deception by the North, we mistook the war as an insurgency. We wasted our efforts against the Vietcong "symptom" in the South, rather than against the "disease"—the enemy's center of gravity in Hanoi. In Summer's eyes, there is enough blame to go around. Not only was the military stabbed in the back by the Administration, but it also shot itself in the foot.

Nearly all the authors of *Assessing and American War* lean towards the "dove" point of view and the prevailing theme attempts to discredit Summer's thesis, while at the same time crediting him with having fathered the new Vietnam scholarship. John M. Gates, among others, makes the case that it was a revolutionary, not a conventional, war. Peter Dunn argues very convincingly that Clausewitz was irrelevant to the Vietnam war. "Had Clausewitz been alive in our time and serving as an American general officer, he too probably would have lost this war. His theory demands a target, an enemy army to destroy; and the Communists would not have offered him such a target." A majority of the authors believe the war was not winnable.

There are numerous interesting views between these two poles. Air Force Colonel Alan Gropman: "we could have won had we not misused our air power." Hung P. Nguyen: "we lost because our large combat unit strategy was inappropriate." Peter Dunn: "it would have made more sense for the United States to have applied the teachings of the Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu, given the nature of the war."

One can draw some conclusions from this potpourri. Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy got us into the war because a euphoric America was riding high at the time having successfully contained communism in Berlin, Greece, Turkey, and to an acceptable extent, in Korea and Cuba. Those Presidents were confident we could also contain communism in Vietnam with a minimum of national expenditure. Once it became apparent that this was not true, no President wished to be "tarred domestically with the brush of having lost another round to communism." (Paul M. Kattenburg). Johnson, hawkish at first, committed combat troops in 1965 but then lost his stomach for the war, allowing himself to be convinced by his State and Defense Secretaries that an all-out attack on Hanoi would bring in the Chinese. For that reason, Johnson made a conscious decision *not* to mobilize the Nation's resources and will to win, and then stepped down. The "hawk" authors chastise Johnson for this stab in the back while the "dove" authors say he had no reasonable alternative because the war was unwinnable.

Where did this leave the American fighting man? While the enemy was fighting a patriotic war with revolutionary passion, we fought the war in cold blood. Remember the fervently patriotic Gregory Peck movies of World War II that ended with "Buy Bonds in this Theater"? Of the thousands of men I spoke with in Vietnam, I never encountered one who felt he was fighting to defend his homeland or to preserve America's freedoms. It was simply kill or be killed; do your duty the best you can and count the days until FIGMO. (Anyone ever in Vietnam will know this little obscene acronym as having to do with orders home.)

These two books become somewhat mired down debating what kind of a war it was: conventional? national liberation? revolutionary? civil? insurgency? conflict? limited war? struggle? etc. This is quite silly; it was all of these things. We know now that it was conventional, as Summers says. In 1959 the North Vietnamese made a decision to overpower and subjugate the South by whatever means necessary and for however long it might take: first by insurgency and guerrilla tactics; later by small regular units from the North; and finally by *coup de grace* with a large-scale armored invasion. There are plenty of historical examples showing that revolutionary wars have a tendency to turn into conventional wars.

It was certainly a civil war inasmuch as Vietnamese were fighting Vietnamese. It was also a "war of national liberation" in the sense that communist governments were supporting an insurgency on foreign soil. And it was a revolutionary war both before and after 1959. For years, nationalistic Vietnamese in both North and South wished to unite and end foreign domination and influence. First it had been the Chinese, then French, Japanese, French again, and finally the Americans.

Peter Dunn curiously steps into a semantic trap. He labels the war revolutionary because, among other reasons, the North Vietnamese have said it was. That is meaningless because in Leninist-Marxist dogma, any war between communists and non-communists is by definition part of the world revolutionary process.

By any yardstick, however, this was a revolutionary war every bit as much as our own Revolutionary War. I agree with Summers that we could have won a victory over the North had we concentrated against Hanoi. Unfortunately, it would have been a temporal victory, necessarily to be followed by a long-term uncomfortable and unpopular occupation. Likewise, the British could have defeated the American colonies with a massive effort had they not lost their stomach for the war. Then, they too could have "sat" on the colonies with garrisons. But for how long? Two years? Ten? Indefinitely, probably, because in either case the revolution would have gone on, underground. Noel C. Eggleston says it nicely, quoting Charles Andrews: "You cannot fight or beat revolutions as you can fight and beat nations. You can kill a man, but you simply can't kill a

rebel. . . . And the reason why no revolution . . . has ever been beaten is that rebels die for something worth dying for. . . .”

In the final analysis, it is probably far better for Vietnam that its revolution to unite and throw off foreign domination succeeded when it did, even as costly and bloody as it was for all concerned. The two Germanies and the two Koreas still have this problem ahead of them. Reunification is inevitable, and human nature being what it is, it will more likely be revolutionary than evolutionary. The unanswerables are when? and how much blood?

America's mistakes in Vietnam are clearer in hindsight. Had we backed Ho Chi Minh, we probably would have a reasonably prosperous and stable Vietnam, which, like Yugoslavia, would have been communist but benevolently neutral towards the United States. Ho Chi Minh had no more admiration for the Chinese than Tito did for the Russians. There are more ways than one to contain communism.

In fairness, I must reveal where I am coming from on this. Some months before the U.S. 1965 invasion, there was a fierce debate over the issue in the Pentagon, Foggy Bottom, and the White House. I wrote a paper proposing we not invade, but tilted towards Ho Chi Minh for just the reasons cited. My paper was squelched “for my own good”; we invaded, and a year later I became a part of that invasion.

Have we learned anything? The authors in these books are not sanguine—from learning little, to learning nothing, and to learning wrong and dangerous lessons. Some authors see a shell-shocked, “stabbed-in-the-back” military emerging, so timid and conservative that they will shrink from any involvement in limited conflicts that do not have ironclad guarantees of full public and congressional support. Other authors view with alarm the fact that the Armed Forces have virtually dismantled and discarded their unconventional and counterinsurgency units because they wish to put the “anomaly” of Vietnam behind them. The services are seen preparing for what they are more comfortable with—a NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional war with big high-tech combat units and equipment. These authors feel sure that future wars will be like Vietnam and that a reluctant military will have to relearn the lessons of that war all over again. One author, David Petraeus, quotes Stanley Hoffman: “Of all the disasters of Vietnam, the worst could be our unwillingness to learn enough from them.” There is one note of optimism expressed in *American War*: that no nation ever achieves its full potential until after losing a war.

Both books plow essentially the same ground and one need read only one of them to get the gist. In fact, the first chapter of *American War* could be aptly described as an executive summary of the debate. *Assessing*, a little more comprehensive, contains an outstanding bibliographical essay (Joe P. Dunn) on almost everything in print and on film about the war, plus a paper

by W. W. Rostow on the larger diplomatic consequences of the war. Both books are well-written and edited, provocative and revealing.

There is one point which cannot stand unchallenged. The role of the U.S. Navy is simply ignored. It is as if we were not there. These books, like too many others, focus on ground and air matters. The Navy is mentioned—only in passing—by Alan Gropman as having participated with the Air Force in the air war. Nothing is said of what the Navy did to stop infiltration by sea or to wrest control of South Vietnam's water transportation system. Sailors accomplished every mission assigned and won significant battles. They are largely, still, unsung heroes.

Cable, Larry E. *Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counter-insurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War*. New York and London: New York Univ. Press, 1986. 307pp. \$30

This is an intriguing and iconoclastic attempt to address the root of America's failure in the Vietnam war. Cable opens with a damning indictment of American military doctrine for such wars, which he defines as "the officially sanctioned theory of victory outlining the conduct of war on all levels." He asserts that "A powerful but unspoken assumption [before Vietnam] . . . consisted simply of the belief that the United States was a successful, experienced, warlike power whose vast military competence comprised a capability in guerrilla warfare," whereas in fact "the United States was a rank amateur in the arena of unconventional low-intensity conflict. . . ."

According to Cable, the U.S. military in general committed two major errors: it assumed incorrectly that all guerrillas were in fact

partisan adjuncts to a hostile regular army, and it misunderstood the lessons of history that could have been drawn from those conflicts in which the United States should have acquired some experience.

In the development of this thesis, Cable divides *Conflict of Myths* into three parts. The first part outlines the author's basic argument and provides critical case studies of five conflicts: the Greek Civil War, South Korea (1948-1954), the Philippines (1946-1954), the Malayan Emergency, and the Marine involvement in the so-called Banana Wars in Central America (1915-1934). Each could have been instructive, in his opinion. For example, the Greek experience demonstrated the near-impossibility of building a local army in the American image while it was engaged against "an able and motivated adversary." Korea's "Pohang Guerrilla Hunt" in 1951 provided a grim foretaste of later "search and destroy" operations in its cost and inconclusiveness. And Malaya showed that

“Overall [force] ratios are meaningless exercises in statistical thaumaturgy,” and that “The only [force] ratios that matter are those that are achieved locally,” thereby invalidating before the fact the quasi-mystical “ten-to-one ratio of victory” that so captivated American planners and critics in Vietnam.

The second and third parts of this book deal with the doctrine that evolved from what Cable describes as a “highly selective [and inaccurate] historical interpretation” of those conflicts that ignored virtually all lessons from the Philippines and the Banana Wars that were not “narrowly tactical in focus,” and the application of that doctrine to the Vietnam war. Errors abounded, he believes, but perhaps the most pervasive flaw in the U.S. approach to counterinsurgency doctrine was an institutional preoccupation with a “Clausewitzian priority upon destruction [of the enemy’s armed forces]” that failed to appreciate the fact that “The formulations of Clausewitz are often quite irrelevant to the realities of . . . insurgent conflict,” however useful they may be in the conventional arena.

Doctrine based on inappropriate principles and a misleading interpretation of previous wars “combined to assure that the very nature of the war in Vietnam would not be recognized.” The Marines, in Cable’s view, did somewhat better than the Army, at least at the margins. As he put it, “The marines had a more viable counter-

insurgency doctrine . . . [and] contemplated protracted low-intensity conflict with equanimity, but the Johnson aides, advisors and Secretaries could not do likewise.” All of this made the outcome in Vietnam unexceptional. As Cable put it, “ignorance, not malice, as was later charged by opponents of the war, was at the root of both the American escalation and the ultimate American failure.” What is needed in the future, he believes, is an approach that appreciates better the character of insurgencies in general, the specific attributes and requirements of a given situation, and the crucial importance therein of centralized command and control, as well as effective local leadership.

In general, although Cable does overstate his case, and therefore his indictment, his argument is largely on the mark. There are errors in some places, to be sure. Contrary to his allegations, for example, the writers of the late 1950s and early 1960s understood very well the distinction among guerrillas, partisans, and insurgents, and drew extensively on both the Marines’ *Small Wars Manual* and the British *Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya* manual. Overall, however, this book is a much needed antidote to much contemporary nonsense in the literature on low-intensity conflict, and particularly on counterinsurgency operations. It should be required reading for all who have acquired a blind affinity for Clausewitz, if only to help them think anew about this type of warfare. It

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is a useful addition to any professional library.

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Chen, King C. *China's War with Vietnam, 1979—Issues, Decisions, and Implications*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1987. 234pp. \$18.95

This fascinating and well-written study of China's 16-day "punitive" war against Vietnam in February 1979 has special relevance today as recent Chinese and Vietnamese naval interactions in the vicinity of the Spratly Islands have threatened once again to draw both countries into open conflict. These contemporary clashes have their roots in the same issues as the 1979 war: historic Sino-Vietnamese territorial disputes; deteriorating Sino-Vietnamese relations caused by Vietnamese treatment of its large Chinese ethnic population; the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea (Cambodia); and expanding political and military ties between Vietnam and the Soviet Union, China's principal ideological adversary and military threat. Improving relations between China and the West, particularly the United States, also had an impact on the increasing confidence shown by the government of the People's Republic of China in aggressively pursuing their foreign policy goals with Vietnam. This assessment seems equally valid today.

In examining the causes of the 1979 conflict, Chen concisely outlines the historic claims and counterclaims of China and Vietnam concerning the various island groupings in the South China Sea, including the Spratly complex. This background relates directly to current events in the region.

Of equal relevance is Chen's discussion of the deterioration of the Sino-Vietnamese relations in the period between the "liberation" of Vietnam by the North Vietnamese in 1975 and the military clashes of early 1979. His account of the monetary and economic policies of the Vietnamese Communist Government and the impact of these policies on the relatively affluent Chinese and Vietnamese merchant and professional communities is particularly chilling. Through the seizure of personal property and a series of currency reforms and tax regulations, the predominantly Chinese business class was virtually destroyed by 1978. Soon "There were no more wealthy Chinese or Vietnamese businessmen in southern Vietnam."

Such conditions led to the flight of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam that began in the late 1970s and continues through the present. These refugees from Vietnam seek to emigrate to any country that will accept them. The plight of these "boat people" has been likened to that of the Jews during the 1930s and 1940s. While the refugee problem is still a major issue for ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) members, the

nation that has suffered most from this exodus has been Vietnam. By wiping out their merchant and professional class, the Vietnamese lost any hope they may have had for economic growth.

The issue of Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea is fairly complex, but the general conflict lies in Vietnam's desire for hegemony over all of Indochina, including Laos and Kampuchea, and China's desire for independent states in the region. Once again Chen has been able to describe the historic background and underlying issues in a concise way. Of interest at present, the Vietnamese are currently proposing to remove their troops from Kampuchea, possibly under pressure from their primary ally, the Soviet Union.

Chen views the Soviet Union as the third principal ingredient in China's decision to go to war against Vietnam. He recounts the development of Soviet-Vietnamese political and military ties that culminated in the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, concluded on 3 November 1978, which essentially formalized Vietnam's position in the Soviet camp vis-à-vis China.

Following an examination of the background of, and reasons for, the Chinese attack, Chen describes the decision-making process in Beijing that led to the war and develops a model of the process which may also be useful today. His analysis leads him to the conclusion that the decision to conduct a "punitive" war

against Vietnam was made by Deng Xiaoping and appeared to be a classic example of a limited war for limited objectives. Deng knew the risks, including the possibility that the Soviet Union might become involved, but felt that Vietnam needed to be taught a lesson.

"According to Deng, the nature of the war was as a self-defensive counterattack. It was limited in time and space, and also limited to ground fighting, similar to the Sino-Indian war of 1962. No naval or air forces would be used. . . . The main objective . . . was to give Vietnam a lesson. . . . Apart from invading Cambodia and expelling Chinese residents, Vietnam had made repeated border incursions and killed Chinese soldiers as well as civilians. China had to fight back but would not take one inch of Vietnamese territory. As soon as Chinese forces had achieved the objectives, they would unilaterally withdraw."

This is precisely what occurred. The Chinese Army moved across the border into Vietnam on 17 February 1979 and began to withdraw back into China on 5 March, 16 days later, after moving 30 to 80 miles inside Vietnamese territory and taking control of several Vietnamese border villages. While the numbers are uncertain, Chen indicates that both sides suffered about 60,000 casualties, either killed or wounded—a significant rate for such a short period of time. Both sides claimed victory: Vietnam in stopping a large-scale Chinese assault and China in "punishing" Vietnamese regular military

forces and teaching Vietnam a lesson. While China's actions did not force a change in Vietnam's position on Kampuchea or its treatment of ethnic Chinese, Chen points out that the war must have raised doubts in Hanoi about the utility of the Soviet Union as an ally against China. We may be seeing a resurgence of these doubts today as the Soviets attempt to improve relations with Beijing, possibly at the expense of their Vietnamese ally.

The remainder of this book concerns itself with the "lessons learned" by both belligerents and the consequences of the war for the international community. It is evident that the Chinese were not pleased with the performance of their fighting units. Chen makes the case that "Beijing's military authorities must have reached the conclusion that the PLA is incapable of fighting a modern war before it is modernized in both weaponry and strategy."

Chen contends that even though the war was over by April 1979, the problems that led to the war have not yet been resolved, and China did not achieve its major political objectives. Many of these issues are no longer simply bilateral concerns between China and Vietnam. The refugees, the continued Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, and Soviet military, particularly naval, developments in Vietnam are regional concerns being addressed by international organizations such as ASEAN and the United Nations. Whether

these problems can be solved remains to be seen.

Chen concludes with his assessment that the Chinese war against Vietnam has established the pattern for future Chinese military actions: low risk operations at low cost. It will be interesting to watch the current Spratly Islands interaction with that assessment in mind. In many respects, a Chinese military option to destroy Vietnamese naval forces and force the withdrawal of the Vietnamese garrisons in the Spratlys can be considered a soft, inexpensive venture since the PRC's navy is vastly superior to that of Vietnam, and the Soviet Union probably would not want to be involved directly.

This is an interesting and timely work that concisely summarizes and clarifies the complex issues involving China and Vietnam. The next episode of the story is currently being acted out in the South China Sea. It is vitally important that we in the United States understand the historic ties and conflicts between these two communist nations if we are to remain a maritime power in the region. Professor Chen's book is an excellent source for this.

E. D. SMITH
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Keegan, John and Wheatcroft, Andrew. *Zones of Conflict: An Atlas of Future Wars*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986. 158pp. \$10.95

Keegan and Wheatcroft have created a superb compendium of contemporary geopolitical fact. This is not a fanciful exposition on the future shock of warfare, nor is it intended to predict the scenario or outcome of the next war. Instead, it is a thoughtful discussion of those aspects of the world that tend to remain relatively constant, such as geography, population distribution, and natural resources.

The authors believe the "where" of wars can be predicted and have divided the world into six major regions of probable future wars: Europe, Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, the Far East, and the Americas. As support for their arguments, they discuss climatology, physical geography, vegetation and resource maps, population maps, and transportation network maps. Their premise is that people fight wars and despite modern technology it is still roads and railways that carry them to each other for battle.

This is a simple and very effective approach, yet the authors readily admit that there are other factors that must be examined to ensure a reasonable analysis. These factors are political stability, military capability, and objective discontent. The first two are easily understood. It is the authors' opinion that some countries are so large (the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada) that their interiors can be considered essentially non-military regions. They also contend that it is highly

unlikely that Nepal would invade China.

Their third factor merits some discussion. Ideology, religion, race or language, envy of resources (oil), and historical reflex (the areas of Iraq and what is presently Iran have been at each others throats for about 3,500 years) can be the fuels that fan a spark of discontent into the flames of war.

The book contains many very useful and informative charts and maps that detail the military and geopolitical conditions present when the book was written (1985) and reflect quite accurately today's trouble spots around the world.

Each regional chapter gives the reader a comprehensive yet concise analysis of the area and the key points of contention among the players. Such things as the antagonisms the Kurds have felt for millennia towards outsiders in their lands, be they Turk, Armenian, Russian, or Arab (especially Arab) are well explained.

Considerable attention is paid to South and Southeastern Africa. An excellent explanation of the many factions involved in the guerrilla movements of Zimbabwe, Angola, and Mozambique provides the sort of background which, when coupled with the maps, enables the reader to better comprehend deeper research in areas of interest or simply to gain a greater understanding of daily news reports. The authors even provide several paragraphs on the potential for war in Antarctica or in space, neither of which they think is

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a very likely arena for the start of a war.

The final section discusses what Keegan and Wheatcroft call the ligaments of strategy. By this term they mean the strategic flow of oil, potential choke points, submarine defiles, and major U.S. and U.S.S.R. military units located abroad. They close with a map of geographic constants which locates mountains, forests, polar regions, and so on. While that is nothing new, the authors present their material in a refreshingly clear manner.

It is true that a picture is worth a thousand words. By effective use of maps and resource graphics, the authors have succeeded in leaving the reader with an exceptionally clear view of those areas of human interaction that are most likely to result in conflict. In doing this, Keegan and Wheatcroft have also managed to avoid conveying that they have the "school house answers" to the world's problems. This book is highly recommended as an addition to the library of anyone truly interested in world events. It is a good focus or refresher for experts, and a good "Cook's tour" for the novice.

The final sentence of the book aptly sums up its content and thrust: "It is where real assets, political instability, and lack of secure borders meet that trouble, present and future, will occur and recur."

ROBERT HILLERY
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Klare, Michael T. and Kornbluh, Peter, eds. *Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1988. 250pp. \$19.95

"Yankee Go Home" might have been a better title for this book given its premise that our government's response to the threat of low-intensity conflict (LIC) is nothing more than resurgent Yankee imperialism.

Today, one out of every four countries around the world is engaged in some form of conflict; there are nine active insurgencies in our own hemisphere. Terrorism continues to take a grisly toll in lives and property (including American lives and property), and drug traffickers simultaneously tear at our social fabric while contributing to instability and corruption in Third World countries. It does not take much imagination to see the collective, cumulative impact if all of this is allowed to fester: isolation from allies and trading partners, weakened Free World political and economic institutions, loss of bases, accommodation with adversaries and, perhaps most importantly, erosion of the rule of law and respect for human rights. The authors do not seem to find all this particularly troubling. They essentially argue against any U.S. attempt to defend its national interests against these threats without offering an alternative beyond letting the "progressive" forces of the world do their thing.

Low Intensity Warfare is a curious blend of good research and unsupported opinion. Chapter 4, "The Warriors and Their Weapons," for example, provides a fairly accurate picture of the revitalization of Special Operations Forces (SOF) that has been undertaken over the last seven years, but then out of the woodwork pops the assertion that "the SOF buildup *could* lead to a new wave of U.S. military operations—*especially covert operations*—in the Third World." (Emphasis added.) Similarly, the discussion of Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs) is punctuated by the statement that "the major problem with LIDs may be simply the fact that they *exist*."

This odd juxtaposition carries through the case studies. With regard to El Salvador, for example, we are told that "a made-in-the-U.S.A. counterinsurgency is unlikely to contain or roll back a genuine historical movement struggling for equity and independence," the "new democratic consciousness of our age." Amid glowing reports about the communist government in Kabul, the book tells us that U.S. support for the Freedom Fighters in Afghanistan not only "invites grave risks of a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union" but could even lead to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. While the authors state categorically that "the Soviet Union is ideologically opposed to terrorism as a strategy of revolution. . . ." (Surprisingly, they appear not to have read Lenin), they equate U.S. LIC strategy with mobilizing our

armed forces "to plant land mines that blow up schoolchildren, to plot assassinations, or to bomb the countryside of desperately poor countries. . . ."

The concluding chapter, "The Costs And Perils Of Intervention," paints U.S. LIC strategy merely as an effort to make the U.S. military relevant by unleashing it against "indigenous nationalist movements." The "costs" go on for pages: loss of credibility, prestige, and influence; reckless disregard for international law; undermining democratic institutions in the United States; and, of course, the ever present NUCLEAR WAR.

Low Intensity Warfare is a disturbing book because it uses the vehicle of extensive research and factual information to carry an extreme message. The danger is that a reader who comes to this book lacking a solid understanding of the issues may assume that because the facts are right, the opinions must be right, too. In fact, one has to read carefully to discern where fact leaves off and supposition takes up.

I would recommend this book only to those with a professional interest in LIC and only for the purpose of understanding how the other side thinks.

R. LYNN RYLANDER
Department of Defense

Weinberger, Naomi Joy. *Syrian Intervention in Lebanon: The 1975-76*

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Civil War. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986. 367pp. \$29.95

Naomi Joy Weinberger has written a masterful account of the Syrian intervention in the Lebanese crisis of 1975-76. In the opening chapters of this study, the author presents the long cavalcade of both Lebanese and Syrian history and traces the origins of such poorly understood political topics as Lebanese "Confessionalism" and Syrian *Ba'ath* party government.

This book is a study in both Arab political science and history, and the author has analyzed the Syrian intervention in terms of "client-proxy-agent" relationships, often showing that Syrian strategy was designed to insulate its own mosaic society from the type of political violence which characterized the Lebanese crisis; in fact, her concluding chapter is practically the only published analysis of this intervention in academic terms. It is indeed this dichotomy of client-proxy relationships on both the international and regional levels which has helped transform the Syrian intervention in the Lebanese crisis from a temporary military adventure into a geopolitical nightmare for all concerned.

Although this scholarly treatment may not appeal to those readers whose interests concern military or diplomatic events, Weinberger presents enough historical data surrounding both the Lebanese crisis and the subsequent Syrian intervention to impress any reader. The author accurately illustrates that

Syrian society is in fact an ethnic mirror of its Lebanese contemporary, and she further proves that Syria's President, Hafiz al-Asad, was indeed anxious to contain the neighboring political violence before it ignited his own mosaic nation into such disorder. Weinberger's account is among the best works of the past decade to appear on this subject, and it is comparable to such early analytical works as *Crossroads to Civil War* by Kamal S. Salibi. In light of the American paranoia about obscure—but key—nations such as Syria, Weinberger's book deserves serious consideration by specialists and generalists alike.

W. D. WRIGLEY
Silver Spring, Maryland

Appleman, Roy E. *East of Chosin*. College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 1987. 399pp. \$22.50

Roy E. Appleman turns military history into high drama in *East of Chosin*, a historical analysis of the annihilation of the Army's 31st Regimental Combat Team on the frozen eastern shores of North Korea's Chosin Reservoir in November 1950. The author analyzes the failures of command and leadership that abandoned a 3,000-man composite unit of the 7th Infantry Division in subzero Siberian winter, compelling the men to fend for themselves as best they could against overwhelming opposing forces. The only survivors were the 3 officers, 76 enlisted men, and 96 South Korean

soldiers who somehow traversed the frozen reservoir to the sanctuary of the First Marine Division's perimeter, west of the reservoir. The fate of the 31st RCT must rank as one of the U.S. Army's greatest tragedies.

The debacle that befell the 31st RCT seems even more intolerable when contrasted to the successful breakout to the Korean coast by the First Marine Division (5th and 7th Marines), who were then operating on the western side of the reservoir, and who were equally plagued by the abysmal weather and ferocious Chinese and North Korean armies.

That the Marines succeeded so brilliantly where the Army failed so utterly has been known for more than 35 years. The significance of *East of Chosin* is that it cogently distills the reasons for those results. Among them:

- The 31st RCT was saddled with a contingency of unimpressive South Korean soldiers; the Marines had none.

- The Army failed to stockpile ammunition, food, and supplies during its advance from the coast to the reservoir. The Marines stockpiled at strongpoints along their route of march; these stockpiles became key factors during the breakout and movement back to the coast.

- The 31st RCT was effectively without any internal or external radio communications; a Marine forward air controller attached to the 31st, and his pack radio linking him to the First Marine Air Wing, provided the 31st's only link to the

rest of the world. The Marines, by comparison, had excellent communications nets.

- The 31st was strung out in seven different, non-supporting groups along a line of more than 20 miles. The Marines were concentrated with artillery and supporting arms.

- The 31st received no close air support from the Air Force. The First Marine Air Wing provided massive support for the Marine ground forces and, as best it could while the Forward Air Controller's radio was operational, covered the 31st.

- While the 31st was reasonably well-served by several of its officers and NCO's, small-unit leadership effectively collapsed and its rank-and-file troops were no match for the better trained and more highly disciplined Marines.

Readers who deem maps essential to military history will not be disappointed by *East of Chosin*. Maps are well-drawn and annotated and appear at the most appropriate places in the text. They are made especially informative by numerous photographs of the terrain represented in the maps. The ruggedness of North Korea and its harsh winters are starkly revealed.

The author's research is excellent. Appleman blends published, archival, and original source materials into a suspenseful, enlightening history lesson of this military tragedy.

The Army's Chosin Reservoir operations have received scant historical attention. Not surpris-

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ingly, there are no official reports chronicling the tragedy. *East of Chosin* thoroughly fills this void and is the definitive history of that bleak November on the eastern shore of Chosin Reservoir. I give it my highest personal recommendation as an essential element of your professional library.

ARLEN B. COYLE
Captain, U.S. Naval Reserve

Goralski, Robert and Freeburg, Russell W. *Oil and War: How the Deadly Struggle for Fuel in World War II Meant Victory or Defeat*. New York: William Morrow, 1987. 384pp. \$19.95

Military planners are well aware of the need for calculating adequate fuel resources into any equation of offense and defense. Too often, however, the weight given this factor is not emphasized as much as it should be. If there is one lesson that can be learned from *Oil and War*, it is that under the circumstances of modern warfare, fuel is one of the ultimate arbiters of any conflict. In a highly readable and informative volume, Goralski and Freeburg trace the course of World War II from the perspective of oil supply and consumption. Emphasizing the geographic realities of oil production and its role for the various European powers and Japan, they focus their attention on its chronologic ramifications for the war effort on the part of both the Axis and Allied powers.

The authors set the pre-war stage with a discussion of Germany's oil import requirements and its consequent impetus for the construction of a large synthetic fuels industry. It is remarkable reading: fifty years after the German debate on the merits of synthetic fuels versus imported oil, the United States, once a world treasure house of oil, is pursuing the same debate. Even the Germans' use of methanol and ethanol as additives for motoring fuels during World War II has a thoroughly modern ring to it. Goralski and Freeburg note that in 1936, through conservation and use of fuel additives, per capita use of fuel in Germany was one-third of that used in Britain—and only one-eleventh of that used by the profligate Americans.

The authors trace the role of oil in the various campaigns of World War II beginning with the initial German *blitzkriegs* and the early Japanese successes in locating oil in Southeast Asia to the last days of the war. A final chapter appropriately addresses the impact of oil in future wars. Throughout the book attention is equally divided between oil production and the role of petroleum refining. Each chapter of the book is replete with facts, and the 26 maps, graphs, and charts assist the reader in following the narrative. The word narrative is important, for unlike many other books filled with facts, *Oil and War* remains highly readable and entertaining.

This book would be an excellent addition to a personal library. The chapters can be read separately or

out of sequence if an individual is interested only in a particular campaign of World War II, but they are best read in the context of the entire volume. Indeed, the most important lesson of *Oil and War* is that the fuel oil clock is ticking for the United States right now. America needs to address its own energy future and, in the absence of a national energy policy, decide how best to meet the needs of presently increasing oil demands and dwindling domestic oil resources. Avoiding the debate now may have tragic results later.

SANFORD S. KAPLAN
Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve

Fitzroy, Andre Baptiste. *War, Cooperation, and Conflict: The European Possessions in the Caribbean, 1939-1945*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1988. 351pp. \$39.95

Unfortunately, F. A. Baptiste's *War, Cooperation, and Conflict* is largely an account of U.S. policy toward the European colonial possessions in the Caribbean during World War II. While the book is well-researched and sound in its judgments, it adds little that is new to a subject which has been treated many times by a variety of scholars. In comparison to *War, Cooperation, and Conflict*, Langer and Gleason's *The Challenge to Isolation* and *The Undeclared War* and Langer's *Our Vichy Gamble* are still fine books on diplomacy; on the Army's role, Stetson Conn's volumes on

hemispheric defense in the Army's famed Green Book series are better; Goodhart's *Fifty Ships That Saved the World* and Abbazia's *Mr. Roosevelt's Navy* offer better perspectives of the naval aspects of World War II in the Caribbean.

Essentially, the focus of the book is wrong. Instead of trying to produce just another work on U.S. policy toward colonialism in the Caribbean during World War II, the author, a West Indian scholar, should have focused on the ramifications of the increased U.S. presence on the Caribbean people and their islands. It is a truism to state that World War II loosened the hold of all traditional colonial powers on their empires. Although we tended to think of this process mostly in connection with far-off Asia and Africa, much of the same process was taking place in the Caribbean at the same time.

So, precisely how did the increased U.S. presence in the islands work to help undermine traditional colonial rule and stimulate nationalism in the black populations of the Caribbean? It is a pity that the author did not approach this subject from the fresh perspective of the Caribbean islands and their peoples, rather than from the stale perspective of U.S. policy.

There are other flaws in the book. It is not appealing visually, having been reproduced in typescript rather than print, and there are many errors, some embarrassing, which are either typos or reflect the author's limited knowledge of technical naval nomenclature and U.S.

geography. Hence, the famous Navy-Marine Corps Fleet Landing Exercises of the 1930s are called "Fleet Handling Exercises," reference is made to "aircraft of Destroyer Squadron" and "one ordinance of enlisted men." Similarly, U.S. geography is butchered. There are references to "Mobile, Florida" and "West Palm Beach, Miami." Does anyone at Greenwood proof-read? Such egregious errors weaken the author's general credibility.

But the fundamental problem with *War, Cooperation, and Conflict* is that the author has written the wrong book. We do not need another book about U.S. policy toward the European colonial possessions in the Caribbean in World War II, even one that is diligently researched and sound in its judgments; we do need a book about the impact of that policy upon nationalism and anticolonialism in the Caribbean. This is not it.

PATRICK ABBAZIA
Kingsborough Community College and
The Graduate Center of The City
University of New York

Townsend, Peter. *The Odds Against Us*. New York: William Morrow & Co., 1987. 240pp. \$16.95

On a tropical evening in the Singapore of 1936, a young RAF pilot made his first solo night flight in a Vildebeest—a great ark of a biplane fighter now mercifully forgotten. This was Peter Townsend's introduction to night flying and the

beginning of a path that led him to command night fighting squadrons against the Germans during the London blitz.

In *The Odds Against Us*, Townsend tells us of his own action in the night skies above Britain and the experiences of those who had to fight what Churchill called "this hellish invention" (bombing) on the ground. His new book is a sequel to his earlier work on the Battle of Britain, *Duel of Eagles*, and has much the same scope.

After losing the Battle of Britain the Germans turned to night bombing raids on London, but night fighting was a new and untried business for the RAF. Prior to that time, fighter pilots just did not fly at night. The development of a night interception began with "cat's-eye" fighters vectored by ground radar but dependent on the pilots eyes to find and kill the bomber. At first Hurricanes were used, and later Defiants. Their four-gun turrets improved the lethality once the target had been seen. Finally, Douglas Havocs with airborne radar were brought into service, which greatly improved the chances of the vectored pilot finding the target. The quad guns in the nose of the Havoc finished the job.

The story of night interception is intimately connected to what Townsend calls the "Wizard War," the development of radar, aircraft radio, and the first of what we now call electronic countermeasures warfare. In this war, scientists—"boffins" as the British called them—played a

role as important as, though less glamorous than, the pilots. Townsend skillfully weaves in the parallel story of the discovery of the German Knickebein navigational and blind bombing system (a precursor to today's VOR system) with the development, by British scientists, of countermeasures such as Headache and Aspirin which, with the development of radar, was so critical to the outcome of this first "Wizard War." These were so successful in some cases that German aircraft landed at British airfields thinking that they were in France.

Townsend also tells the story of the people on the ground, the citizens of London who bore the worst of the casualties with nothing but their indomitable spirit to sustain them. London families such as the Cal-lows—father, mother, four daughters, and two sons—worked through the blitz in the Woolwich arsenal and served as auxiliary firefighters. In Townsend's words, "They were the mainstay of Britain's night defenses."

As the Second World War recedes in memory and the last of the distinguished veterans, such as Peter Townsend, write their memoirs, the tone of these memoirs changes. There is little enthusiasm for the glamour of war in this book. Townsend's work reflects the destructive futility of the bombing campaigns of which so much had been expected by their proponents, Douhet, Mitchell, and Trenchard, during the decades before the war. He does have some professional regard for the skill and

courage of the German airmen and notes the cruel anomaly that led sober young men of courage to rain bombs upon innocents on the ground.

FRANK C. MAHNCKE
The Naval Surface Weapons Center
Silver Spring, Maryland

Y'Blood, William T. *The Little Giants*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1987. 468pp. \$28.95

This book is an excellent follow-on to the author's fine work, *Hunter-Killer*. One may well ask what William T. Y'Blood, a post-World War II Air Force B-47 flier and later a commercial 727 pilot, is doing writing about a segment of naval aviation as highly specialized as the CVEs. Currently a military historian for the U.S. Air Force, Dr. Y'Blood's book reveals his intense interest in, and deep understanding of, carrier warfare.

The saga of the Navy's escort carrier operations in the Pacific is narrated in a chronological fashion that some readers without aircraft carrier experience may find a bit laborious. Those who do have such a background probably will find *Little Giants* revealing and exciting. No attempt was made by the author to discuss in detail such points as the standards of construction used in the building of the CVEs, or the merits of the manner in which these little giants were employed in combat. Such judgments are left to the reader who, if so inclined, must be careful to stay in the context of the period

the book covers. The volume includes an unusually complete documentation with notes, index, photographs, maps, and bibliography.

The account of the *Liscome Bay* in the prologue is a case in point. Launched in April and commissioned in August 1943, the ship was sunk in November of that same year by a single Japanese torpedo which hit "in the worst possible spot—the bomb storage area. This most combustible area had no protection against a torpedo hit or fragment damage." The resulting detonation of the ship's own bombs blew it apart, and it sank in 23 minutes. Five hundred and forty-four souls were lost, including Admiral Henry M. Mullinnix, commander of the escort carrier group, and Captain Irving D. Wiltsie, the ship's skipper. Thus, the elation one feels over the ability of American industry to turn out 50 such complex ships so rapidly is tempered quickly by this loss of life, which leaves a question about the wisdom of constructing a combat ship of such vulnerability even under the extreme wartime pressures existing at the time.

In the discussion of the Battle off Samar, the reader is left to challenge the decision of the commander of Task Force 38 to withdraw from covering the amphibious landing on Leyte and, with all of the task force, to pursue the Japanese decoy carriers, leaving the vulnerable amphibious units inadequately protected. This battle also reveals the deceptive ingenuity of the Japanese as well as,

in this particular case, their lack of tenacity that allowed the American forces to escape with a distressing rather than a catastrophic loss of ships and sailors.

Showing a fine sensitivity to the individual human element in the CVE Pacific operations, Dr. Y'Blood's account does not limit itself only to the upper echelons of command or rank. Rather, he reveals a deep insight into the all too often overlooked valor of the men in the lower ranks with specific examples. It required uncommon courage for the sailors in these "Combustible, Vulnerable, Expendable" ships to face down the enemy, especially the kamikazes. But, confront the enemy they did, all the while showing pride in their "baby flattops." One example of such feeling is clearly shown by the men of the *Gambier Bay* who, after abandoning ship, cheered in salute as their ship slowly sank into the depths of the sea, even while at the same time the attacking Japanese ships were bearing down on their positions in the water.

The reader, especially if he happens to have had CVE experience in the Korean war, may wonder why the author did not add another chapter to include those operations. I had, and I do. Nevertheless, *The Little Giants* is well worth reading, for it brings to light a little known, almost forgotten part of the U.S. Navy's operations in the Pacific during World War II. Dr. Y'Blood is to be congratulated for capturing the essence of the activities of the escort aircraft carriers. "Little"

though they were, they were veritable "Giants" in action.

DALE L. WARD
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Nichols, David, ed. *Ernie's War: The Best of Ernie Pyle's World War II Dispatches*. New York: Random House, 1986. 432pp. \$19.95

If anyone told the story of the American soldier in the front lines, it was Ernie Pyle. Born in Indiana, he attended the journalism school at Indiana University and eventually settled in New Mexico. Pyle, like millions of other Americans, went off to war in 1941, but unlike most Americans, he had a choice of where he wanted to go, and he chose the center of action, wherever that might be. First it was the blitz in London and later up front where "The danger comes in spurts. The discomfort is perpetual. You're always cold and almost always dirty. Outside of food and cigarettes you have absolutely none of the little things that made life normal back home. You don't have chairs, lights, floors or tables. You don't have any place to set anything, or any store to buy things from. There are no newspapers, milk, beds, sheets, radiators, beer, ice cream, or hot water. You just sort of exist, either standing up working or lying down asleep. There is no pleasant in-between. The velvet is all gone from living."

As David Nichols shows us, Pyle would write about his days in the

U.S.S. *Cabot* when that carrier and others struck the heartland of Japan, and about the XXth Air Force with its B-29s making the long haul from Saipan to Japan, and about the support troops so necessary for the rapid, mechanized warfare in the West. But, his heart was with the man on the ground at the front.

Nichols shows Pyle to be both fascinated by war and repelled by it. But there is nothing new or unusual about that. Often he wrote of wanting to get away from the front, the hardship of it, and the death that continually stalked those whose lot it was to be there. He worried about his marriage that had gone bad and needed his attention. Pyle appeared not to know just what to do about any of his dilemmas. Problems unsolved, he died on Le Shima while reporting on the 77th Infantry Division. His former wife would later commit suicide.

The editor has included some of Pyle's best known works. His articles supporting combat pay, later called the Pyle Act, are there. So is "The Death of Captain Waskow." This piece also was a part of *Here is Your War: The Story of G. I. Joe* and was the poignant ending to the movie, *The Story of G. I. Joe*. Ernie had written it while in Algiers. The Battle of San Pietro would be immortalized by that piece.

Pyle's writings today are as interesting and "lively," as they must have been during the war. There is that human touch and you quickly begin to know the men he writes about. (There also were

women serving near the front and Pyle wrote of them too!) His subjects come to life with their stories and hopes of the future. Where are you today Percy Gill, Gordon Uttech and Alvin Tolliver? Did your dreams come true? So alive and vital did Pyle make the people who fought World War II that you cannot help but wonder where these people are and what they are doing now.

For those who read Ernie Pyle and those who have never had the opportunity, it's here now. *Ernie's War* is a chance to gain or renew that opportunity. David Nichols has done us all a favor.

PETER C. UNSINGER
San Jose State University

Travers, Tim. *The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare 1900-1918*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1987. 309pp.

Tim Travers, professor of history at the University of Calgary, has reassessed British grand strategy not merely at the tactical or the political level, but rather along the entire spectrum by working his way up from tactics and operations to strategy. Specifically, he has evaluated the British performance at the Somme in 1916 and at Passchendaele in 1917 from the ground up, and has offered comments upon the reliability of the British *Official History* of the Great War.

Travers' thesis is that Douglas Haig and the Edwardian army really

fought two wars in France. The external, or what Liddell Hart termed the "real war," is well-known. The second, or "hidden internal war," constitutes Travers' unique contribution. He shows that men such as Haig fought a "war" that pitted prewar ideas (cult of the offensive, the psychological battlefield) and prewar army structure against the demands of modern technological warfare. Rather than echoing the sterile conundrums as to whether Haig was brilliant (John Terraine) or plain stupid (David Lloyd George), Travers suggests instead that Haig was too rooted in prewar Staff College training, in Edwardian upper and middle-class moral certainties and social structure to be able to adapt to the leveling nature of modern warfare. Attitudes that were rooted primarily in the British social system (especially the personalized system of protector and protégé) tended to prevail over the "remorseless evolution" of modern, mass, industrial warfare. To be sure, the result was a certain paradox: while British army officers were perfectly willing and able to accept the new weapons of war such as the tank, they proved strangely unable to understand the tactical and command changes necessitated by the new technological warfare. Their view of warfare, like British society in general, remained strangely ordered, centralized, and rigid.

Travers' second major contribution is toward our understanding of the writing of the *Official History*, especially by General Sir James

Edmonds. In meticulously worked-out detail, Travers shows that much of that history was an artificial collage of what British officers in the 1920s and 1930s wished that contribution to look like to future generations. Not history *wie es geschehen* (Ranke), but rather as it ought to have been. Travers' work here is solid, refreshing, and convincing.

The author has combed the major archives and libraries of the United Kingdom to piece together his story. Apart from the official War Office records that he consulted at the Public Record Office, Travers also has gleaned valuable materials from the files of the British Library, the National Library of Scotland, the Imperial War Museum, the National Army Museum, the West Sussex Record Office, Churchill College at Cambridge, the Liddell Hart Center at London, and the Staff College at Camberley as well as the Royal Artillery Institution at Woolwich. In short, the research is massive, and the book will long remain a standard against which future work in the field will be measured.

HOLGER H. HERWIG
Vanderbilt University

Turner, Maxine. *Navy Gray: The Story of the Confederate Navy on the Chattahoochee and Apalachicola Rivers*. Tuscaloosa: Univ. of Alabama Press, 1987. 357pp. \$24.95

Navy Gray by Maxine Turner is a solid addition to the literature on the

Confederate Navy. Each part of Turner's book deals with some aspect of Confederate shipbuilding and ironclad construction in southwest Georgia and northwest Florida. She provides clear introductory chapters on the local historical background and delves into the nature of naval activities in Columbus, Georgia, the site of an extensive Confederate shipbuilding complex, and Apalachicola, Florida. Turner focuses first on Apalachicola, one of the first ports to fall to the Union Navy's Gulf Blockading Squadron. She explores briefly the impact of the blockade on the port, the way the tightened Union cordon forced the suspension of operations, and the flight of Confederate military personnel and civilians to safer inland points.

But Turner devotes the greater part of her book to the "business of war" at Columbus, Georgia. This is perhaps the best part of the study, as she centers attention on Chief Engineer James H. Warner, CSN, and Lieutenant Augustus McLaughlin, CSN, and their attempt to create an ironclad fleet from scratch. Using local pay vouchers, labor reports, and official and unofficial correspondence, Turner chronicles the operations of the Columbus Navy Yard and the Columbus Iron Works. She concludes, as have other naval historians, that the Confederate Navy's activities in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee area consisted "of frustrated efforts and potential never realized." Still, she rightly gives Warner, McLaughlin,

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and others, such as they, credit for being on the "cutting edge" of the new technology.

If *Navy Gray* has a weakness, it is its cursory coverage of the impact of the Federal blockade on the civilian population. True, Turner includes letters and reports to show how military operations affected the people and the area. Unfortunately, she never develops the connection, and fails to analyze fully the relationship between the fall of Apalachicola and the activities at Columbus. Such shortcomings, however, do not detract from the overall effort. The appendices of employment and financial records and correspondence, and the extensive use of the manuscript collections at the Confederate Naval Museum in Columbus ensure that *Navy Gray* will aid others interested in studying the Confederate Navy's operations in Georgia and Florida.

MARY A. DECREDICO
U.S. Naval Academy

Jordan, Robert S., ed. *Generals in International Politics: NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe*. Lexington: The Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1987. 229pp. \$24

This thoughtful collection of essays, edited and contributed to by Robert Jordan while he was a member of the Naval War College faculty, describes the evolution of that unique military/political institution, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), by

characterizing the first seven incumbents, Eisenhower to Haig, and the manner in which they approached the strategic and political problems of their tenures.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established in 1949 when the twelve signatories pledged that an attack on one was an attack on all. Though the treaty provided a governing political body, the North Atlantic Council, no supporting military infrastructure was provided until the outbreak of the Korean war, then perceived as part of a worldwide Soviet military offensive. At that point, provisions were made for a Supreme Commander along with his supporting staff, SHAPE. Though the Council itself was intentionally multinational in its decisionmaking, from the outset SHAPE was an international staff; that is to say, the officers assigned to SHAPE by the member nations no longer represented their countries but rather the Supreme Commander, who was considered an international official and whose strategic guidance came from the Council.

Eisenhower, the symbol of allied victory in Europe in World War II, was a logical choice for the first Supreme Commander. As the chapter on Ike points out, his chief tasks were to develop an alliance awareness among the sovereign members of NATO and to encourage their willingness to provide the military forces necessary to defend Western Europe against the perceived Soviet threat. He accomplished his mission, but left to assume the U.S.

Presidency before the bills for supporting the forces were due. Provision of resources by the member nations to support the evolving strategy of NATO has been a problem from then to now.

The high priest of all SACEURs was Lauris Norstad, selected for the post by Ike in 1956 and fired by Kennedy in 1962. Since the SACEUR has always been an American, Washington politics, rather than Council approval, is the key factor in the assignment and departure of Supreme Commanders. The Norstad chapter is ably handled by Jordan and is probably the most interesting in the book. It illustrates the problem of being an American (USCinC Europe) and an Allied official at the same time. Norstad was impaled on the question of nuclear control: Kennedy and McNamara felt his Medium Range Ballistic Missiles initiative involving potential alliance control of nuclear weapons was far too risky. In addition, McNamara could never accept the notion that the Allied commander answered to the North Atlantic Council, not to him.

In the concluding chapter Jordan elaborates issues developed in the study which are faced by each SACEUR, albeit in somewhat differing contexts. In particular, each Supreme Commander must serve as a symbol of allied unity while at the same time providing strategic direction to bridge differing national perceptions of both the threat and the optimum strategy to counter it.

The central strategic problem in NATO has always been one of arriving at the proper mix of conventional forces, which are expensive, and nuclear forces in order to provide a deterrent adequate to meet the agreed-upon threat. There has been a tendency, however unrealistic, on the part of NATO toward overreliance on nuclear weapons, which tends to strain the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent strategy. In recent years this has been complicated by arms control initiatives such as the 1988 INF agreement between the United States and the Soviets.

This book, long overdue, is perceptively written by an able group of scholars as well as two former Supreme Commanders and is highly recommended to those interested in the problems of our most successful alliance and the first ever in peacetime. It should be especially useful to potential and practicing policymakers. Like it or not, multinational alliances, both new and old, are going to be with us for the foreseeable future—inevitably, even with nations who are today considered adversaries.

DOUGLAS KINNARD
University of Oklahoma

Gorbachev, Mikhail. *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*. New York: Harper & Row, 1987. 254pp. \$19.95

This is, without a doubt, the most significant book in the final period of the 20th century.

Why would a review begin with those words? Because Americans who have become complacent in their belief that they have everything, that they live in the freest society on earth, and that economic prosperity accompanied by the respect of nations is theirs by divine right are about to be shaken badly. George Frost Kennan, writing as "X" in 1947 stated: "The issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test of the over-all worth of the United States as a nation among nations. To avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation."

In writing *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, Mikhail Gorbachev has nailed the "95 Theses of Soviet Reformation" to the door; it would be foolhardy to ignore this book. It is a first-person, present-tense account of what the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) thinks and upon which he says he wants the domestic and world audience, to whom he addresses his book, to be able to rely.

Immediately, the reader will see that it is not in the tradition of a cautious politician sending up a trial balloon by an intentional leak. *Perestroika* (restructuring) is a dive from the rail, right into the churning waters. It is performed in full view of all. This demonstrates the princi-

ple of *glasnost* (openness) which is essential to the success of *perestroika*.

General Secretary Gorbachev directly controls one-sixth of the world's landmass and influences every nation on the globe. When he calls his *perestroika* a revolution and says that it is a direct descendant of Lenin's principles, we must take him at his word. He is starkly critical of the ways in which he says the Party and various programs went off the track in the fifties and sixties; he attributes the failures of economic production and social advance during the past three decades to deviation from strict Marxist/Leninist principles. *Perestroika* is the means of self-correcting the system: "A revolution should be constantly developed. There must be no marking time. Our own past illustrates this. We still feel the aftermath of slowing down."

Perestroika was introduced at the April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the Communist Party Central Committee as a means to overcome "economic deadlock and stagnation." Gorbachev further contends, "I think we had every reason to declare at the January 1987 Plenary Meeting: in its essence, in its Bolshevik daring and in its humane social thrust the present course is a direct sequel to the great accomplishments started by the Leninist Party in the October days of 1917. And not merely a sequel, but an extension and a development of the main ideas of the Revolution. We must impart a new dynamism to the October Revolution's historical

impulse and further advance all that was commenced by it in our society."

The General Secretary warns that *perestroika* will hit hardest those who have become comfortable with the old ways. He also warns that everyone will have to be prepared to make sacrifices during the advent of *perestroika* because reforms require that some "give up for good the privileges and prerogatives which they do not deserve and which they have acquired illegitimately. . . ." No wonder so many oppose the concept and resist its effects.

Gorbachev begins his open letter to the world (his own term) by saying *perestroika* is not a whim on the part of ambitious individuals or a group of leaders, but an urgent necessity arising from the profound processes of development in socialist society. He distills its effect into one phrase: working an extra bit harder.

Perestroika is wide-ranging and fascinating to read. Gorbachev examines every aspect of Soviet life and the relationship between the individual and the Party. He cites Marx and Lenin to demonstrate the purity of his precepts, to ground them solidly in pre-Stalinist thought. This is wise because it avoids arguments with living persons and the philosophical heirs of those not now alive—for whatever reason—who might have disagreed.

He explains the origin of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's angry comment, "We will bury you!" which was taken during the 1958-1964 period as direct evidence of the

U.S.S.R.'s belligerence and willingness to engage in war with the United States. Gorbachev says "We will bury you!" was an expression used in the late 1920s and 1930s in an ongoing argument between farming experts and scientists.

Gorbachev is adamant that "people in the West must stop exploiting those few words by one who is no longer among the living, and must not present them as our position." He says, in what appears to be a candid comment, "Khrushchev was an emotional man, and took it very much to heart that his sincere efforts and specific proposals to improve the international situation came up against a brick wall of incomprehension and resistance."

The optimism and obvious intellectual strength of the Soviet leader are demonstrated on every page. Who else could explain the theory of scientific socialism so amicably? Society passes through certain stages in its development, from primitive to slave-owning states, to feudal systems, to capitalism, and finally, so Gorbachev thinks, to socialism, "blending public ownership and personal interest," which did not evolve until the 20th century. "Let the West think that Capitalism is the highest achievement of civilization. It's their prerogative to think so. We simply do not agree with this. And let history decide who is right."

CAROL FORD BENSON
San Bruno, California

Thakur, Ramesh and Thayer, Carlyle A., eds. *The Soviet Union as an Asian Pacific Power: Implications of Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostok Initiative*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987. 236pp. \$31.50

What does Mikhail Gorbachev's major foreign policy address, given in Vladivostok in July 1986, imply for East Asia? Ten Australian scholars and government officials, plus a Soviet diplomat, set forth their analyses in a symposium held in March 1987 at the Australian Defence Force Academy. For Americans who desire a better understanding of how Gorbachev's new foreign policy appears from an Australian viewpoint, this book is worth reading.

The range of topics includes: Gorbachev's policy agenda; his China diplomacy; implications for Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia; the impact on Australian foreign policy and defence policy; the response to Soviet objectives in the South Pacific; and implications for Afghanistan and Kampuchea. The full text of Gorbachev's address is appended as are remarks by the Soviet Ambassador to Australia.

As with most books containing symposium papers by a diverse group of participants, this volume displays unevenness in the depth of analysis among contributors. Nevertheless, the editors have done a creditable job of producing a readable and relevant volume that should prove useful to American scholars and policymakers. U.S. Navy and other planners will find the Australians' view of

future security arrangements in the Pacific to be provocative.

Three contributions were particularly interesting to me: "Vladivostok and Australian Foreign Policy," by Stuart Harris, Secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs; "The Soviet Union and the South Pacific," by Richard Herr, Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Tasmania; and "Implications for Southeast Asia," by Robyn Lim, Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the University of New South Wales.

Stuart Harris suggests that Australia's foreign policy requires little change in the short run, at least not until the full implications of Gorbachev's initiative are clearer. He does not think a policy of rejection and possible confrontation of Soviet objectives in East Asia would be prudent: "The significant factor is that Gorbachev reasserted an already growing interest in the region. . . . Many in the region, including Australia, will accept—some more grudgingly than others—that the Soviet Union has legitimate interests as an Asian-Pacific nation." Harris concludes that Gorbachev's initiative probably means that Australia will end up "applying more, rather than fewer, foreign policy resources to the pursuit of our interests in the region."

Richard Herr believes that it will be nearly impossible for the West to deny the Soviet Union a larger role in the South Pacific: "Whether or not Gorbachev's Vladivostok Initiative can be said to have caused it

directly, the Western security posture of 'strategic denial' is now close to collapse, and there are signs that a more accommodating fallback position is being developed." Such a change will concede, he thinks, the policy of a general Pacific economic interaction that Gorbachev espoused at Vladivostok.

Robyn Lim thinks that Gorbachev's reference to "confidence-building measures and the non-use of force" in the Asian-Pacific region is certain to attract increasing attention among the ASEAN nations, which have begun a serious discussion of a regional arms control agreement known as the South East Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. She believes that "while the ASEAN countries are prepared to concede Soviet claims to 'legitimacy' as an Asian-Pacific power, they will be reluctant to devise a regional arms control regime which threatens American strategic mobility in the region." Lim observes that although growing antiforeign military bases sentiment will put pressure on the Philippine government to terminate the bases agreement with the United States, for the foreseeable future the ASEAN countries "will continue to value the 'over the horizon' American presence afforded by the Pentagon's access to bases in the Philippines."

In sum, this book challenges some conventional thinking in Washington about the U.S. ability to remain an unchallenged power in the Pacific. It suggests that President Bush will need to reexamine U.S.

security policy in East Asia in order to deal effectively with a new Soviet political challenge that is having a noticeable effect on the nations of the area.

DONALD E. NUECHTERLEIN
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Sleeper, Raymond S., ed. *Mesmerized by the Bear*. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1987. 371pp. \$22.95

The great bear is the symbol of one of the most powerful nations on earth. Is it deceiving the Western world in its every move and deed? This book attempts to put forth historical examples and current theories to provide a creditable basis for a positive answer to this question.

This work is a compilation of 19 articles, from as many authors, ranging from general condemnation of the Soviet Union and its political being to specific examples of how the Soviets have used the art of deception to overthrow governments, sway Western public opinion in the Soviets' favor, infiltrate world organizations, and achieve treaties that further their cause of world communism.

A common theme that runs throughout the book is aptly expressed in the first chapter, "The Empire of Lies," by Dr. Michael Voslensky, a former Soviet citizen and scholar. The Soviet government lies to its people, to its allies, and to the world. The reverse side of the

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dissemination of lies is the concealing of truth. Here too, the Soviet state has excelled. What other country in the world has been able to keep its own wars secret from its citizens for as long as the Soviets did with Afghanistan? Even the majority of the countryside is cloaked in a state of secrecy from foreign eyes. According to Dr. Voslensky, only the major cities and some specially prepared areas are open for international tourism. These lies and deceptions are used as political weapons and tactics to achieve the state's ultimate goals.

A major theme of the book is the Soviets' use of deception in arms control and nuclear disarmament. David Sullivan, a legislative assistant for military affairs and arms control and former CIA agent, lays out the long path of Soviet arms control treaty violations. These include violations of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement on Cuba of 1962, SALT I, SALT II, biological and chemical warfare bans, and the nuclear test ban treaty. He makes the case that the Soviets have either violated, evaded, or circumvented virtually every international security treaty they have signed since the revolution in 1917.

Sam Cohen, an authority on nuclear weapons issues, continues this idea with questions about the recently approved INF treaty. The major force behind the treaty was deployment by the Soviets of the SS-20 missile in the mid-1970s, which was countered by NATO's deployment of the Pershing II and

Ground Launched Cruise Missiles. The West knows very little about the SS-20. In fact, we know only what the Soviets have been kind enough to tell us. This includes not only its capabilities but also the number of missiles they have built. America has entered into a treaty based on information provided to us solely by the Soviets: a treaty that the Soviets desperately wanted in order to remove the Pershing II threat to their homeland. With the Soviet's history of treaty violations, how can the United States enter into such an agreement? The answer lies in the next section of the book.

The Soviets have been able to achieve success in their international efforts through the use of deception on a grand scale. They have established an entire organization to conduct operations, both internally and abroad, to sway international public opinion and actions to their cause. This has been accomplished by supporting various front organizations. Other methods have included enlisting the support of legitimate organizations in single-cause crusades while simultaneously infiltrating the organizations' infrastructures. Their most notable success has been in various peace movements.

The real message of this book is that the target of Soviet deception is the citizens of the nations around the world, especially those of the United States. The Soviets are using the age-old principle, put forth by Sun Tzu, of using all forces and means to destroy your enemy without a direct

military confrontation. If they can achieve their goals by reducing the West's capability and will to resist, they have made one more step towards achieving their goal of world communism.

While this book may lean too far to the political right for some, I highly recommend it for those who want another perspective on East-West relations. Americans have always been a generous, naive people. Maybe it is time we woke up and faced the real world. This book is a step in that direction.

C. A. FLEISCHMAN
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Ninkovich, Frank A. *Germany and the United States: The Transformation of the German Question Since 1945*. Boston, Mass.: Twayne Publishers, 1988. 201pp. \$24.95

This engaging work traces the evolution of modern Germany, stressing the political processes that shaped events and institutions. It is a social, cultural, and diplomatic history. While academically sound, it is highly interpretive and explores the personalities and motives behind the consequences.

Beginning with a solid foundation laid in the ruins of the two World Wars, *Germany and the United States* carefully analyzes the complex relationship that has developed between the two countries. In its examination of the German side of the equation, the book stresses German culture, Germany's tradi-

tional ties with other nations, and its enduring strategic significance.

A detailed account of the occupation after World War II is particularly useful in understanding the motives of the men, both German and American, who shaped our unique bilateral relationship. The legacy of that harsh, abnormal environment is a love-hate relationship that has profoundly affected dealings between the two nations ever since.

Author Frank Ninkovich painstakingly traces the reconstruction process through the forties and fifties. He highlights the forces and mechanisms that laid the groundwork for the modern German system of government. The reader comes away with a clearer appreciation of German domestic and international politics.

One of the book's greatest strengths is its analysis of the obstacles which prevented the reunification of the two Germanies. This balanced account examines the "German Problem" in its broadest context at several milestones on the road to the status quo. It portrays the disparate policy goals, not only of the East and West, but within the Western bloc itself, that doomed reunification plans over the years. Both scholars and statesmen could benefit from this "past as prologue" to the Federal Republic's evolving international policy.

DAVID V. MILLER
Commander, U.S. Navy

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Friedman, Norman. *U.S. Small Combatants: An Illustrated Design History*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1987. 500pp. \$46.95

In a 1968 *Naval Review* article on the subject of "Fighting Boats of the U.S.," the reviewer noted that "Ours is a blue water navy. From its earliest days frigates, ships-of-the-line, battleships, cruisers, and aircraft carriers have provided [the Navy] its prestige commands, its sources of leadership, and its monuments to engineering genius. Yet, the little craft—privateers, torpedo boats, patrol boats, and dozens of other specialized types—have proved every bit the equal of the big ships as breeders of sailors and taxers of naval architectural ingenuity." Norman Friedman, in his fascinating book *U.S. Small Combatants*, also notes that these craft lie outside the mainstream of U.S. naval strategy, outside the balanced fleet of capital ships, escorts, and submarines designed to project U.S. power abroad. His work thoroughly illustrates the reviewer's thesis that small craft have consistently taxed the ingenuity of naval architects; and his own thesis that their development has been driven by technology, particularly the technology of high speed—and by extemporized national strategy. Hence they generally have been developed in wartime haste only to be discarded in peacetime.

Utilizing the Navy's files, Mr. Friedman has been able to present richly detailed descriptions of the discussions between naval operators

and the material bureaus, and between private contractors and the Navy as real and perceived operational requirements evolved into characteristic requirements; conceptual, preliminary, and contract designs; and operational craft. He also presents detailed descriptions of the influence of foreign developments on the evolution of U.S. ship types—this is particularly true of PTs. The book offers thorough discussions of the engineering development of high-powered, lightweight propulsion engines for speed, lightweight guns and rockets for increased firepower, and hydrofoils for increased sea-keeping capability which made the development of many of these craft feasible.

As one who has been closely involved in much of the naval architectural development and construction of these craft, from a 1939-40 thesis PT design based on the Bureau of Construction and Repair's 1938 requirements, through the preliminary design of *Asheville* (PG-84), the design of Bell's SKMR-1 Hovercraft, and the design competition which resulted in *Plainview* (AGEH-1), the reviewer was particularly interested in the author's presentation of the interplay between the potential users and the developers of these craft—and at least one omission of an interesting story. Negotiations between Henry Sutphen and Irwin Chase of Elco and British Power Boats to obtain rights to build the Hubert Scott-Paine designed 70-foot PT are treated at some length. However, only one

brief sentence mentions that plans for British Vosper PTs were circulated to several builders in June 1941 for lend-lease procurement. Those plans had been purchased from Peter Du Cane of Vospers Ltd. by Chris Nelson of the Annapolis Yacht Yard with the same expectation as Elco, of selling boats to the British. When the passage of Lend-Lease thwarted those plans, Nelson relinquished his rights to the Bureau of Ships, and Annapolis became the lead yard, responsible for the complete redesign of all structural, mechanical, and electrical details of the boat for production in American yards.

The book is filled with nearly a hundred excellent inboard, outboard, and plan drawings, and some two hundred photographs to illustrate the craft discussed. Only the absence of hull line drawings prevents it from being a perfect source of information for model builders. The scope of Mr. Friedman's canvas, stretching as it does from pre-World War I years to the present, and covering some dozen categories of combatant craft, leads inevitably to the one criticism the reviewer might offer. The detailed discussions of developments sometimes are difficult to follow, and occasionally appear circular in nature. The fact that minesweepers, which surely are among the most essential of small combatants, are not included is regretted. However, the author promises their coverage in a future volume.

This book is the most comprehensive reference available on the

subject of subchasers, PT boats, gunboats, PHMs (hydrofoils), patrol boats, and the numerous classes of counterinsurgency and brown-water Navy craft developed for export and to serve the needs of the Vietnam war. Numerous tables list significant data on all of the craft; and a final appendix lists all commissioned U.S. small combatants (including PTs lend-leased to Great Britain and the U.S.S.R.) and their fates. It will appeal to naval architects, naval historians, and all who have served on, or who have a consuming interest in, small naval combatants.

RICHARDS T. MILLER
Captain, U.S. Navy, Retired

English, John. *The Hunts*. Cumbria, England: The World Ship Society, 1987. 108pp.

Ship monographs usually describe a single ship, class, or type of warship, emphasizing design history and technical details, and devote only a small amount of space to ships' histories. However, in this neat little book the emphasis is on the individual histories of each of the 86 vessels that comprised the "Hunt" class escort destroyers. It is an unusual tribute, one that has not been paid to this numerically large class of warship.

A total of 86 Hunts were constructed in England between 1939 and 1943. Officially classed as "escort destroyers," the Hunt class was conceived as vessels "suitable for both fleet and convoy duties."

The Hunts comprised ships of four groups or types: Type I through Type IV. In appearance and employment the Hunts were sawed-off destroyers without torpedo armament—an omission that was rectified in later types.

The American destroyer escorts (DEs) can be considered as being the U.S. Navy's near equivalents to the Hunts, except that the main gun armament consisted of only 3-inch dual purpose guns against the Hunts 4-inch guns. Later, the modified-Buckley type DEs, the Rudderows, carried two 5-inch, 38-caliber single guns. Also, the Hunts all had steam turbines and could maintain about 25 knots, while the American DEs adopted various types of machinery such as turboelectric drive or diesels. Their sea speed was usually less than that of the Hunts. The American destroyer escorts were originally designed to meet British requirements for an escort vessel to be provided under lend-lease during the Second World War. American-built DEs in British service were classed as frigates: escort vessels with extensive antisubmarine weapons for use against German U-boats.

For the first time, newly constructed British destroyers (albeit "escort" destroyers) were armed with a dual-purpose main gun armament, the Mark XVI 4-inch gun in the Mark XIX twin mounting. This gun in its twin mounting was introduced in the Royal Navy about 1935 and was in use throughout the British Fleet. The 4-inch gun and mountings could be produced more

quickly than regular destroyer 4.7-inch guns with their complicated mountings and shell-handling machinery which were similar to those produced for the large "L" class fleet destroyers then being built in England. Production of 4.7-inch guns and mounts for these fleet destroyers was delayed, and four of the eight "L" class received an extemporized armament of four twin 4-inch mountings as used in the Hunts. These four destroyers were considered by many officers to be the best of their type. It also should be noted that the British "Weapons" class destroyers, under construction at war's end, were to be armed with six 4-inch guns as in the Hunts, as well as a full torpedo outfit.

The original group of Hunts—the Type I ships—were supposed to mount three twin 4-inch mounts, but too little time had been spent in their initial design and miscalculations resulted. These miscalculations necessitated a reduction to two mounts to maintain stability. All later ships of Types II through IV were larger, beamier ships and could ship three of the 4-inch twin mountings. However, the operational need for torpedoes resulted in the Type III vessels receiving a twin 21-inch torpedo mount in lieu of the third 4-inch gun twin mount. The last group of Hunts (Type IV)—only two ships—received the full gun armament of six 4-inch guns and a triple torpedo tube mounting. The design of the Type IV ships was a departure from usual British destroyer appearance: their modern hull design

with a long shelter deck, by Thornycroft's, previewed the modern postwar British antisubmarine frigates.

The design history of the Hunts presented by John English is detailed and informative. It rounds out information published in earlier books and monographs, such as the classic on the subject, *British Destroyers* by Edgar J. March (London: Seely Service, 1966). Tables are provided, giving dates of laying down of keels, launch, and completion; pennant numbers; a table showing the building program by numbers only (date ordered, laid down, and launched); wartime deployment; and analyses of losses and damage. To help the reader understand the status of inactivated Hunts, the author has provided the most thorough explanation of the categories of reserve vessels between 1944 and 1958 that this reviewer has seen in print. There is further commentary on losses, proposed conversions of Hunts to antisubmarine escorts postwar, and postwar service of the class. Also discussed are plans made in 1942 to build further Hunts in addition to the 86 in progress or completed at that time and plans for an armored version of the Hunts.

Photo coverage is impressive. There are 124 photos showing 82 of the 86 Hunts, most of which have never been published before. Only the *Exmoor* (i), *Grove*, *Southwold*, and *Hursley* were omitted from photo coverage. In this regard it should be noted that, with the exception of the last named, these Hunts were lost

after very brief wartime careers. *Hursley* served in the Greek Navy until 1958. There is complete photo coverage of all four Hunt types, yet it seems logical that the author or publishers would have included a page of drawings comparing the four Hunt designs, but only one fold-out plan, a poor tracing from builder's plans, of a Type I Hunt is included. For those interested, there are illustrations of the four Hunt types in camouflage colors in Alan Raven and John Roberts, *Man O' War 4: HUNT Class Escort Destroyers* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1980), pp. 25-30. The U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence publication ONI 200 of 1 July 1950 has nicely drawn profile and plan views of all four types.

WILLIAM H. CROFT
San Diego, California

Brown, Neville. *The Future of Air Power*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986. 300pp. \$49.50

No one seriously interested in the future of military aviation should miss this book. Given the price, owning it is another question.

The author is a professor of international security affairs at the University of Birmingham, England. His approach to the subject reflects his keen and continuing interest in military aviation and is simultaneously academic and eminently practical. The book is both broad-ranging and insightful; historically analytical and anticipatory.

Professor Brown's themes include:

- "... [T]he crux of the matter with airpower will always be the ability to sortie into enemy air space for purposes of attack and surveillance."

- "... [I]t is never possible neatly to distinguish between airpower and other modes of military force."

- "... [T]he whole debate about military aerospace these days boils down to the question of where various balances are to be struck between . . . human factors and the electronic."

- "Perhaps the most vexing question . . . about the future of warplanes is their susceptibility to immobilization on the ground."

- "... [I]n all situations short of heavy nuclear exchange political constraints will continue to supervene."

Although some experts might consider the foregoing statements banal and others may argue with them on their face, the strength of the book lies not in its simplification but in its amplification of arguments about such things as single-purpose versus multi-purpose aircraft, manned versus unmanned aircraft, and quantity versus quality. Evidence is drawn from a wide variety of sources. Arguments are based on insights gained from a range of disciplines including geography, geometry, econometrics, human engineering, meteorology, physics, and probabilistic statistics. The arguments presented are per-

suasive both because of their internal logic and because they are multifaceted.

If there are general faults in the book, they are few. Two omissions are worthy of note. The first is the absence of attention to lighter-than-air systems, especially in their role as platforms for electronics. The second is the total lack of attention to the Achilles' heel in strategic airlift in these days of force projection and uncertain basing rights, *viz.*, refueling capability. Both omissions have important ramifications throughout the discussion.

The chapter on airpower at sea contains insights about mines and missiles which have proved prescient in light of recent events in the Persian Gulf. The treatment of carriers is a balanced discourse on a variety of controversial issues. Professor Brown's careful discussion of carrier vulnerability leads him to suspect "... [E]ven one missile homing onto a key radar, say, might turn so magnificent a vessel into more of an obligation than an asset." Once again, however, his intellectual journey to that suspicion is more valuable than the suspicion itself.

Overall, the book is highly rewarding. It can be read as a series of essays. It can be read as a *tour d'horizon* or *tour de force*. In any of those modes, the author has succeeded in combining description and argumentation to help a careful analyst draw on the history of military aviation while working to

understand its present state and its potential in the near future.

MICHAEL A. FRENEY
Naval War College

Hartcup, Guy. *The War of Invention: Scientific Developments, 1914-1918*. Brassey's Defense Publishers, Ltd., 1988. 226pp. \$43

The reader may ask, "Why do I want to know about old technology and the first generation of what may be considered *standard* weapons?" The answer lies in the aphorism that President Harry S. Truman was so fond of quoting, "The only thing new is the history that you don't know." Throughout this generally readable book are depicted problems and solutions that may rise again should the world ever again be plunged into prolonged military and economic warfare. I find the lessons particularly interesting in light of my association with the Global War Games at the Naval War College, and as a result of my long-held belief that technology can be a strategically decisive element.

Technology is the application of scientific, technical, and industrial principles. Guy Hartcup recounts the ways that talented individuals on both sides used initiative and imagination under the extreme urgencies of war to solve operational problems. The author takes pains to point out that each idea was tested and reduced to industrial practice so that the fruits of the inventions were available in quantity and in time. In

several of the vignettes, the "inventor" is seen as triumphing over mindless military bureaucracies that were unable to grasp the technical dimensions of either problems or their solutions. The more things change, the more they stay the same.

World War I is often ignored in the education of the modern military or civilian national security professional. This is a mistake in my opinion. There are myriads of traps and pitfalls just waiting for the most powerful industrialized countries in the world to step into in 1989. For example, in recounting the unsatisfactory state of British naval gun-laying at Jutland and in other encounters, part of the difficulty was the quality of optical glass for range finders. The author notes, "The British glass industry had become so dependent upon German and French imports that it had declined into a comatose condition and was absolutely stagnant. . . ." The reader may want to ponder the similar state of American computer chip, steel, and automobile manufacture.

Parenthetically I might add that the impact of the concatenation of shortfalls in naval weapons led to missed opportunities to inflict serious losses on the German Fleet at Jutland. Such shortcomings did not end then: remember the U.S. submarine torpedoes that failed to explode in World War II.

Those of us who were educated in science and engineering in the immediate post-World War II epoch will find interesting Hartcup's accounts of contributions to World

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War I made by the authors of our textbooks and leaders of the atomic age. Bohr, Summerfeld, Haldane, J. J. Thompson, Weizmann, Lindeman, Lanchester, and dozens of others march through these pages.

Those of us who have worked in the international defense research and development arena may also find interesting these portrayals of World War I activities of the National Research Council in the United States and several of the British laboratories and "stone frigates" such as H.M.S. *Vernon*.

In his concluding statements, Hartcup states that "by 1918 there were few weapons or instruments of war, including remedies for wounds and disease that had not been the concern of civilian scientists or technologists in or out of uniform. The value of civilian collaboration lay far less in *inventions* than in the extension of the boundaries of science for specific applications." He goes on to quote an American, J. S. Ames: "The knowledge required . . . is that of the scientific investigator, the man who by his own laboratory investigations has added to our store of knowledge." This is as true in 1989 as it was in 1918.

Another point that I hope we do not lose sight of in peacetime budget battles is the necessity for operational ties and mutual respect between scientists and the military. In World War I, it was said that much scientific work was rendered futile by the lack of interest of the naval authorities. There is also the observation that "the process of

appointing someone who *knows nothing* to supervise the work of someone who *does* seems to have been at the bottom of a great many of our misfortunes. . . ." Where have we heard that before?

The War of Invention is a useful adjunct to the library of one concerned with mobilization in an industrial and economic sense. The examples from World War I have altogether too many analogues in 1989 to be disregarded as dated. In all honesty, the author does not give equal treatment to the French, American, Russian, or German industrial scientific efforts. Comparing and contrasting the German and Austrian industrial organizations and processes would have been useful. However, I think there is enough data for us to conclude that the spirit of scientific and intellectual freedom that is the hallmark of American, British, and French science and engineering is the prerequisite to successfully apply science, industry, and technology to meet wartime needs in a timely way and in sufficient quantities.

ALBERT M. BOTTOMS
George Washington University

Vano, Gerard S. *Canada: The Strategic and Military Pawn*. New York: Praeger, 1988. 163pp. \$35.95

The dominion of the north, according to Gerard Vano, was not so much part of a North Atlantic triangle as a British-Canadian axis, and it did not so much evolve from

colony to nation as from a tool of British to a tool of American imperialism. Do not be deceived by appearances: this is no Marxist tract. The author writes in the tradition of what the intellectual historian Carl C. Berger, in *The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1971), identified as central Canadian imperialists.

Vano surveys Canadian history from the French regime to the present day. The nub of his argument is that Canada has always been deferential to extraterritorial direction (I use his favorite words), that Canadian political institutions have become truncated and fragmented because French Canada's accommodation with English Canada has not worked, while global confrontation between the superpowers—like previous confrontations between France and Britain, or Britain and the United States—“virtually obviates” purely Canadian concerns “by its sheer totality.” He pursues this line of thought logically enough, but his premises rest on some questionable assumptions, his scholarly references are idiosyncratic—he simply ignores most of the latest studies in Canadian military history, and shows no awareness of new work in intellectual, social, and diplomatic history—and the evidence does not support many of his conclusions.

There is no arguing that geography makes Canada unique. Does this mean that the country, “despite the opinions of historians to the con-

trary, developed outside of the Western historical experience?”

The author maintains that the geographic similarities to Eurasia, the “interaction between capital and space” which made Canada more like Europe than like America or Russia, and the political dependence on a dominant foreign power for technology, had a fundamental influence on Canada's development. Unlike European countries, Vano argues, Canada never established a church with political primacy (the first estate), military institutions which exercised political and social leadership (the second estate), or a political culture dependent on the interplay of the first and second estates (the third estate). Canada is therefore an incomplete society. An American “time bias” (as opposed to the “space bias” governing Canadian affairs) has impregnated Canadians “who mostly live within 200 miles of the American border” with “the American sense of emancipatory promise, destiny and futurity.” “The collision between durable spatiality and temporal mutability resolves itself directly into a north-south continuum,” and consequently the American time bias has eroded the power of the central government in Ottawa.

“Confederation” writes Vano “was an unsuccessful experiment in protouniversality and political monolithism.” I find it interesting that he does not once refer in this book to D.G. Creighton or Harold Innis, whose Laurentian interpretation of Canadian history provides the

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basis for such a remark. Indeed, Vano's understanding of Canadian history is not unlike Donald Creighton's deterministic view of the Empire of the St. Lawrence and the role of commerce in developing Canada, and the subsequent gloomy conclusion that Canada has taken the American fork in the road, one that will lead to a dead end. Vano simply sees the beginning of the slide—what he terms “Canada Fade”—at a much earlier stage in the country's history.

That pre-Confederation and pre-Loyalist Canada established the particularisms that are to be found in the country, particularisms which Vano attributes to political and constitutional developments of the 19th century, has been argued successfully by a number of leading intellectual and social historians. S. F. Wise, in his 1974 presidential address to the Canadian Historical Association, “Liberal Consensus or Ideological Battleground: Some Reflections on the Hartz Thesis,” effectively destroyed a number of the arguments on which Vano rests his case. Indeed, the innovative approach Vano takes to discussing the problem of Canada's military and diplomatic role in the world rests on a curiously old-fashioned concept of the country. Canada's maritime provinces appear hardly to exist, while its military role in the 19th century is portrayed rather like the notional scenario that might have been imagined by Canadian military planners in the absence of a definable military threat in the 1920s: “. . . a deferential—and possibly sacrifici-

cial—projection of Europe (or, by extension, of Japan between 1902 and 1922), directed against the United States. . . .” British designs on Canada, by this account, were Machiavellian. Whitehall never wanted the country to develop true autonomy or war-making capability; Canada was simply to be a source of cannon fodder, as she is, Vano suggests, under American domination.

Canadian military doctrine, in Vano's view, has never evolved as such, nor has Canadian capacity to evolve technology been suitable to the country's own requirements. This is a tenable argument. There have been few military innovators in Canada. The political scientist James Eayrs (whose five volume series *In Defence of Canada* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1964-1986) is not noted anywhere in this book), made the same point; he ascribes the paucity of independent Canadian military thought before the Second World War to the relatively short history and small size of the Canadian Armed Forces and the limited education of their officers. Vano ascribes it to the absence of a “military culture.” Perhaps there is not much difference in these two interpretations. Yet there have been military innovators in Canada, and there is evidence for arguing that there is, in fact, a distinct Canadian military culture.

C. P. Stacey's extensive writings on Canadian military history, the work of Desmond Morton, R.A. Preston's detailed studies of pre-

commissioning education in Canada's armed forces, and the recent study of military professionalism in Canada by Stephen Harris, *Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1988) are cases in point. In addition, recent scholarship has traced the origins of the Canadian Navy to Canadian 19th century imperatives rather than imperial requirements of the 20th century. There was a vacuum left by the Royal Navy in the last decades of the 19th century, one that had to be filled. In other words, the Naval Service Act of 1910 was not just a response to the German naval menace. True, that menace forced Wilfrid Laurier and Robert Borden to change the remarkably similar views each of them held on the kind of navy Canada needed, but the circumstances of two World Wars resulted in a naval establishment very much along the lines first conceived.

Without denying many of the weaknesses in Canadian defense policy described by Vano, it must be said he tailors events to his theory without adequately considering the growing and distinguished literature on the history of Canadian military institutions, or comparing Canadian military situations to those of other countries. The armed forces suffered from retrenchment—much as American military institutions have done (something that Vano does not dwell on) at various points in U.S. history—after both World Wars and in periods when détente or the

absence of a clear military threat have influenced the holders of the purse strings. In the 20th century, Canada has responded generously when a need for military contributions has been perceived, has consciously related military contributions in alliance warfare to the influence the country will have in international councils (the so-called functional principal adopted by Prime Minister Mackenzie King in 1943), and has been at pains to prevent others from invading Canadian sovereignty for their own strategic purposes. It is remarkable, in view of the thesis Vano is advancing, that he makes no mention of Roger Swanson's seminal article, "The United States as a Security Threat to Canada," published in *Behind the Headlines* in 1970, nor of the intelligent discussion of that thesis in Colin S. Gray's *Canadian Defence Priorities: A Question of Relevance* (Vancouver, 1972). Vano has also overlooked C. P. Stacey's *Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-45* (Ottawa, 1970), which opened up this whole question and demands consideration by anyone writing in the field.

Generally speaking it must be admitted that Canadian uniformed services do not receive the kind of adulation that the military gets in many other countries. But Canada has always been jealous of her military prerogatives. Political control of forces in combat zones has, in fact, been the principal hallmark of Canadian military policy in time of war, as British and U.S.

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strategic planners and theater commanders have found to their cost. There is some similarity here to the Australian situation, both in relation to British and American military cooperation. A comparison with Australia is noticeably absent in this book.

Vano points to Canada's unsuccessful attempt to develop its own fighter, the AVRO Arrow interceptor, as the prime technological example of failure to be militarily independent. He might with equal force have mentioned similar failures, the Bobcat personnel carrier and the Hydrofoil. It is interesting to note, however, that in spite of the cutbacks of the Trudeau years, Canada continued to develop its own naval technology in the form of Tribal-class frigates, ships integrated processing and data systems (SHINPADS), helicopter hold down systems, and variable depth sonar. Destabilizing influences like reorganization of the armed forces (unification), civilianization in the headquarters, and bilingualism, have been weathered with remarkable success: the ability to adapt to change is usually a sign of strength.

I have to admit that I am one of those people condescendingly described in this book as "raised in the tradition of Canadian history that perceives Britain as a benevolent motherland. . . ." Acquaintance with the documents has modified those views, but nothing Gerard

Vano has written persuades me that Canada has been the victim of Machiavellian manipulation by either British or American policymakers. What is missing from this book is the "friction" in human affairs—in war and peace—that governs events. Arrogance and superciliousness, and from time to time stupidity (British, American and Canadian alike), undoubtedly had a lot to do with the decisions that resulted in unacceptable use of Canadian military forces. There is ample evidence to counter Vano's assertions of a successful exploitation of Canada for strategic and military ends. What Canada has done in the world of diplomacy and strategy has indeed been very much in its own self-interest—as demonstrated by mainstream Canadian historians and political scientists like C. P. Stacey and John Holmes (see especially his *The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1979 and 1982). Sir Wilfrid Laurier may not have been exactly right when he forecast that the 20th century would belong to Canada, but in its first 125 years, as many British and American diplomats and military professionals would have to agree, the country has more often been a thorn in the side of its allies than a pawn in their hands.

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