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Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties.

R. Lynn Rylander

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a very likely arena for the start of a war.

The final section discusses what Keegan and Wheatcroft call the ligaments of strategy. By this term they mean the strategic flow of oil, potential choke points, submarine defiles, and major U.S. and U.S.S.R. military units located abroad. They close with a map of geographic constants which locates mountains, forests, polar regions, and so on. While that is nothing new, the authors present their material in a refreshingly clear manner.

It is true that a picture is worth a thousand words. By effective use of maps and resource graphics, the authors have succeeded in leaving the reader with an exceptionally clear view of those areas of human interaction that are most likely to result in conflict. In doing this, Keegan and Wheatcroft have also managed to avoid conveying that they have the "school house answers" to the world's problems. This book is highly recommended as an addition to the library of anyone truly interested in world events. It is a good focus or refresher for experts, and a good "Cook's tour" for the novice.

The final sentence of the book aptly sums up its content and thrust: "It is where real assets, political instability, and lack of secure borders meet that trouble, present and future, will occur and recur."

ROBERT HILLERY
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Klare, Michael T. and Kornbluh, Peter, eds. *Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1988. 250pp. \$19.95

"Yankee Go Home" might have been a better title for this book given its premise that our government's response to the threat of low-intensity conflict (LIC) is nothing more than resurgent Yankee imperialism.

Today, one out of every four countries around the world is engaged in some form of conflict; there are nine active insurgencies in our own hemisphere. Terrorism continues to take a grisly toll in lives and property (including American lives and property), and drug traffickers simultaneously tear at our social fabric while contributing to instability and corruption in Third World countries. It does not take much imagination to see the collective, cumulative impact if all of this is allowed to fester: isolation from allies and trading partners, weakened Free World political and economic institutions, loss of bases, accommodation with adversaries and, perhaps most importantly, erosion of the rule of law and respect for human rights. The authors do not seem to find all this particularly troubling. They essentially argue against any U.S. attempt to defend its national interests against these threats without offering an alternative beyond letting the "progressive" forces of the world do their thing.

Low Intensity Warfare is a curious blend of good research and unsupported opinion. Chapter 4, "The Warriors and Their Weapons," for example, provides a fairly accurate picture of the revitalization of Special Operations Forces (SOF) that has been undertaken over the last seven years, but then out of the woodwork pops the assertion that "the SOF buildup *could* lead to a new wave of U.S. military operations—*especially covert operations*—in the Third World." (Emphasis added.) Similarly, the discussion of Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs) is punctuated by the statement that "the major problem with LIDs may be simply the fact that they *exist*."

This odd juxtaposition carries through the case studies. With regard to El Salvador, for example, we are told that "a made-in-the-U.S.A. counterinsurgency is unlikely to contain or roll back a genuine historical movement struggling for equity and independence," the "new democratic consciousness of our age." Amid glowing reports about the communist government in Kabul, the book tells us that U.S. support for the Freedom Fighters in Afghanistan not only "invites grave risks of a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union" but could even lead to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. While the authors state categorically that "the Soviet Union is ideologically opposed to terrorism as a strategy of revolution. . . ." (Surprisingly, they appear not to have read Lenin), they equate U.S. LIC strategy with mobilizing our

armed forces "to plant land mines that blow up schoolchildren, to plot assassinations, or to bomb the countryside of desperately poor countries. . . ."

The concluding chapter, "The Costs And Perils Of Intervention," paints U.S. LIC strategy merely as an effort to make the U.S. military relevant by unleashing it against "indigenous nationalist movements." The "costs" go on for pages: loss of credibility, prestige, and influence; reckless disregard for international law; undermining democratic institutions in the United States; and, of course, the ever present NUCLEAR WAR.

Low Intensity Warfare is a disturbing book because it uses the vehicle of extensive research and factual information to carry an extreme message. The danger is that a reader who comes to this book lacking a solid understanding of the issues may assume that because the facts are right, the opinions must be right, too. In fact, one has to read carefully to discern where fact leaves off and supposition takes up.

I would recommend this book only to those with a professional interest in LIC and only for the purpose of understanding how the other side thinks.

R. LYNN RYLANDER
Department of Defense

Weinberger, Naomi Joy. *Syrian Intervention in Lebanon: The 1975-76*