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Generals in International Politics: NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

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and others, such as they, credit for being on the "cutting edge" of the new technology.

If *Navy Gray* has a weakness, it is its cursory coverage of the impact of the Federal blockade on the civilian population. True, Turner includes letters and reports to show how military operations affected the people and the area. Unfortunately, she never develops the connection, and fails to analyze fully the relationship between the fall of Apalachicola and the activities at Columbus. Such shortcomings, however, do not detract from the overall effort. The appendices of employment and financial records and correspondence, and the extensive use of the manuscript collections at the Confederate Naval Museum in Columbus ensure that *Navy Gray* will aid others interested in studying the Confederate Navy's operations in Georgia and Florida.

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Jordan, Robert S., ed. *Generals in International Politics: NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe*. Lexington: The Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1987. 229pp. \$24

This thoughtful collection of essays, edited and contributed to by Robert Jordan while he was a member of the Naval War College faculty, describes the evolution of that unique military/political institution, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), by

characterizing the first seven incumbents, Eisenhower to Haig, and the manner in which they approached the strategic and political problems of their tenures.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established in 1949 when the twelve signatories pledged that an attack on one was an attack on all. Though the treaty provided a governing political body, the North Atlantic Council, no supporting military infrastructure was provided until the outbreak of the Korean war, then perceived as part of a worldwide Soviet military offensive. At that point, provisions were made for a Supreme Commander along with his supporting staff, SHAPE. Though the Council itself was intentionally multinational in its decisionmaking, from the outset SHAPE was an international staff; that is to say, the officers assigned to SHAPE by the member nations no longer represented their countries but rather the Supreme Commander, who was considered an international official and whose strategic guidance came from the Council.

Eisenhower, the symbol of allied victory in Europe in World War II, was a logical choice for the first Supreme Commander. As the chapter on Ike points out, his chief tasks were to develop an alliance awareness among the sovereign members of NATO and to encourage their willingness to provide the military forces necessary to defend Western Europe against the perceived Soviet threat. He accomplished his mission, but left to assume the U.S.

Presidency before the bills for supporting the forces were due. Provision of resources by the member nations to support the evolving strategy of NATO has been a problem from then to now.

The high priest of all SACEURs was Lauris Norstad, selected for the post by Ike in 1956 and fired by Kennedy in 1962. Since the SACEUR has always been an American, Washington politics, rather than Council approval, is the key factor in the assignment and departure of Supreme Commanders. The Norstad chapter is ably handled by Jordan and is probably the most interesting in the book. It illustrates the problem of being an American (USCinC Europe) and an Allied official at the same time. Norstad was impaled on the question of nuclear control: Kennedy and McNamara felt his Medium Range Ballistic Missiles initiative involving potential alliance control of nuclear weapons was far too risky. In addition, McNamara could never accept the notion that the Allied commander answered to the North Atlantic Council, not to him.

In the concluding chapter Jordan elaborates issues developed in the study which are faced by each SACEUR, albeit in somewhat differing contexts. In particular, each Supreme Commander must serve as a symbol of allied unity while at the same time providing strategic direction to bridge differing national perceptions of both the threat and the optimum strategy to counter it.

The central strategic problem in NATO has always been one of arriving at the proper mix of conventional forces, which are expensive, and nuclear forces in order to provide a deterrent adequate to meet the agreed-upon threat. There has been a tendency, however unrealistic, on the part of NATO toward overreliance on nuclear weapons, which tends to strain the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent strategy. In recent years this has been complicated by arms control initiatives such as the 1988 INF agreement between the United States and the Soviets.

This book, long overdue, is perceptively written by an able group of scholars as well as two former Supreme Commanders and is highly recommended to those interested in the problems of our most successful alliance and the first ever in peacetime. It should be especially useful to potential and practicing policymakers. Like it or not, multinational alliances, both new and old, are going to be with us for the foreseeable future—inevitably, even with nations who are today considered adversaries.

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Gorbachev, Mikhail. *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*. New York: Harper & Row, 1987. 254pp. \$19.95