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## China's Global Presence: Economics, Politics and Security

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Mawdsley, Evan. *The Russian Civil War*. Boston, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1987. 367pp. \$45

Why did the Reds win? Why did Lenin's enemies lose? What was the human cost of the Russian Civil War? These are only a few of the enduring questions about the first phase of Soviet history that Professor Mawdsley addresses. His answers are invariably thoughtful, well documented, and persuasive.

For better or for worse, Mawdsley does not hesitate to take strong positions on hotly disputed issues, even when he is in the minority among his peers. The book is clearly a labor of love, and Mawdsley's publisher deserves special thanks for bolstering it with the best maps and the most intelligent bibliographical essay yet to see print on this period.

Mawdsley's most important thesis has to do with exactly when the Civil War started. He sees the Bolshevik seizure of power—the October Revolution of 1917—as its beginning. From this perspective, Mawdsley minimizes the importance of foreign intervention and attaches greater significance to Lenin's program for social and economic transformation than do scholars who date the Civil War from the summer of 1918.

Mawdsley finds support for this view in a broad range of Soviet, emigre, and Western literature. He tells the story of the war itself better than any single volume has done before, concluding with an incisive essay on why the war ended as it did

and what its toll in human lives may have been (seven to ten million).

Readers with a broad interest in military history will find this work unusually satisfying. Even those who specialize in current affairs will discover that Mawdsley's analysis of authentic Leninism can help to clarify what Mikhail Gorbachev is up to in Moscow today.

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David M. Lampton & Catherine H. Keyser, ed., *China's Global Presence: Economics, Politics and Security*. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1988. 237pp. \$26.50

Political repression is the hallmark of communist governments, and recent events in the People's Republic of China (PRC) prove that economic and political "reforms" remain subordinate to the imperative of communist party control. This fact seems to have been consistently overlooked by analysts of Chinese affairs, as exemplified in this book.

With one out of every five people in the world living inside its borders, China is a potential economic and political superpower. The key word is potential. This book is an attempt to analyze the PRC's potential by examining the political, economic and security trends evidenced in China today and projecting them into the future. In doing so, it demonstrates the strengths and

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weaknesses of current Chinese analysis in this country, and the extreme difficulty involved in anticipating the future of a nation and a culture whose recent history is characterized by change that is constant, rapid, and often bloody and repressive.

The book consists mainly of papers presented by leading China analysts at two conferences in 1987 that were cosponsored by the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute of South East Asian Studies. Each paper is followed by comments and discussions by other China analysts. This is both interesting and frustrating: Interesting because it provides alternative views of the topic; frustrating because it demonstrates the lack of consensus among the "experts" on where China is going. However, it is an excellent source for understanding the issues and the debates surrounding China's modernization and the background to both the recent student demonstrations and the government's seemingly anachronistic response. Though the book's conclusions have been overtaken by recent events, it is fascinating.

In many ways, political and economic analysis resembles intelligence analysis; specialists examine recent trends, develop patterns of activity, and project these patterns into the future. If recent trends have been peaceful and positive, then, barring major disrupting factors, the resulting projections will be the same.

So it is with most of the papers in this book, with each analyst basically forecasting varying degrees of continued progress in his area of expertise, i.e., political reform, economic development or security affairs. Unforeseen or unexpected events (such as the government's repressive reactions to a threat to party hegemony) often make this kind of analysis wrong. Thus optimistic, straight-line projections of China's economic growth (as in Chapter 3) make little sense if there is a good prospect for domestic political turmoil (as indicated in Chapter 1). To the editor's credit, some of these "what ifs" are addressed by the comments and discussions following each chapter.

The perceptive first chapter was written by David M. Lampton, coeditor of the book. Lampton recognizes that political stability is the key to progress. He begins by describing the likely political context in which Chinese economic and defense developments must take place. He provides a concise survey of current political reform developments within China and the political difficulties of achieving economic growth while supporting a growing and increasingly corrupt bureaucracy. His analysis of the balance that exists between conservative elements of the PRC communist party bureaucracy and the "reformers" (exemplified by former General Secretary Hu Yaobang) is very useful for putting the recent Beijing student demonstrations into perspective. But he, like other China

analysts, failed to predict either the strength and popular support of the student "political reform" movement or the government's response. Clearly, prediction is a hazardous business, but as Lampton says, "Any projections concerning China's economic and military impact in the year 2000 must be premised on certain assumptions about the political trajectory of the People's Republic of China (PRC) between then and now."

It is an interesting current phenomenon that both major communist world powers are being forced to reconcile the need for more political and economic freedom with the communist imperative to maintain party control. In China's case, the ingrained conservatism and aging leadership of the party described by Lampton suggest that the focus will be on more centralized control. This will have severe implications for reform. Unfortunately, this possibility is not adequately addressed in the book; and yet, as we have recently witnessed, this is what has occurred, with Deng Xiaoping playing a key role not as a "moderate" but as an arch-conservative concerned with preserving party control at all costs.

The later chapters examine Taiwan's economic and political developments, the potential for Sino-American trade, prospects for the PRC economy, future implications of the PRC's electronics and aircraft industry, China's role as a nuclear power and the security implications for Asia of Chinese military and economic power. All

basically project continued progress in all areas.

Specific conclusions reached by these analyses include the following:

- Taiwan's economic and political growth will slow but continue.

- In the PRC, economic and political reforms are precarious but will likely continue to evolve slowly.

- Prospects for continued Sino-American trade are good, but volume will remain a modest component of total U.S. foreign trade in the year 2000.

- In the electronics and aircraft industry, the PRC will focus on its domestic market. It is unlikely to produce advanced systems that are competitive in the global market.

- The PRC will continue to expand its nuclear forces and will play an increasingly important role in global arms reductions.

- The PRC's use of military power in the region will be cautious because of the need for a peaceful environment to achieve domestic economic and political development.

These conclusions contain no surprises. The "spice" in this potpourri of analyses is provided by the comments of other conference participants, who appeared to be more willing than the authors to raise the hard questions. Here are two examples of these insightful, even prescient comments: "... who really understands China? ... the Chinese themselves don't always understand what goes on in their own country. Those who visit China frequently can come up with as many answers to a single question as there are

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people to talk to;" and "The question does arise how China specialists could have misread the political situation so miserably. In analyzing the Chinese political scene, must we always depend on hindsight to make sense of Chinese politics? If this were the case, then the profession of China studies has not made much progress since the 1950s. . . ."

In light of recent events in China, these are interesting comments for a group of China analysts to make; and their candor makes this book especially valuable to those who want to understand the variables in the current Chinese "equation," as the communist government of that state once again demonstrates the fragility of political reform in a totalitarian dictatorship.

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Long, David F., *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activities of U.S. Naval Officers, 1798-1883*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1988. 448pp. \$32.95

For over 70 years the main source for the diplomatic role of our naval officers in the 18th and 19th centuries has been Charles O. Paullin's *Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778-1883*. Now, Professor David F. Long of the University of New Hampshire has produced this reference book that both succeeds and expands the Paullin book, although Long has chosen to have his work start 20 years

after the beginning of Paullin's on the grounds that 1798 is the beginning of an independent Navy Department. Long accepts Paullin's terminal date because it marks a dividing line between the "old" navy and the "new" navy and because Commodore Shufeldt's successful overseeing of the Korean-U.S. treaty in 1883 was "the last time that a U.S. naval officer on active duty was given such a responsible diplomatic assignment." This was also about the time that the transoceanic cable line came into being: ambassadors, proconsuls and military officers everywhere were thus put on a short leash to the home office.

The book also expands Paullin's "negotiations" to "activities," thereby encompassing other categories, some of which seem to fit the modern definition of naval presence and one which would seem to stand better by itself: "they [naval officers] acted as warriors during their nation's declared hostilities."

While Long intends this as a reference work, his introductory chapter does provide an analytical framework, particularly in his use of Secretary of State William Seward's judicious defusing in 1869 of a State/ Navy dispute over a South American war. Seward refused to declare either the minister or the admiral subordinate, saying that the government benefitted from having two points of view and that while the minister's "proceedings are approved, those of Admiral Gordon are not disapproved." Neither diplomats nor sailors would be completely happy