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The Armed Forces of New Zealand and the ANZUS Split: Costs and Consequences

Thomas-Durell Young

Peter Jennings

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tion year. The second highest were in congressional election years.

Some of Mintz's results do not conform to expectations. He finds that international crises have a significant impact on increases in RDT&E spending, but only a relatively weak effect on other spending categories. This is contrary to the hypothesis of international crises causing the share of RDT&E to fall as resources are reallocated from long-term programs to budgetary categories more closely related to readiness, i.e. personnel, O&M, and procurement. Failure to observe the expected result may be due to the way Mintz related the variables in his statistical models. International crises were lagged by one year in their effects on spending, i.e. the effects of a crisis in 1961 were determined by analyzing spending in 1962. For military personnel and O&M spending, this lag may be too long to show much of the effects of the crisis. The Berlin crisis of 1961 probably had a bigger budgetary effect on the accounts in the year of the crisis than in the following year, when the crisis had cooled off. And a one-year lag may not be long enough to show the full effect of the crisis on accounts like RDT&E and procurement, which take longer to plan and implement (e.g. shipbuilding outlays are spread over several years).

Mintz does not carry the test of his budgetary model through the Reagan years, but he does comment on the Reagan defense program in light of the model's results. The Reagan

defense budgets were consistent with elements in the Mintz model favoring increased defense spending, especially in the areas of RDT&E and procurement. Notable influences were the growing gap between Soviet and U.S. military spending in the 1970s, and public opinion favoring greater defense spending. The weight given to the neo-Marxian variables of industry profits and unemployment is questionable.

This book is brief but has material which should interest students of defense budgeting. However, potential readers should be warned that the book is a revised doctoral dissertation, with all the weaknesses of that form of writing.

JOHN A. WALGREEN
Wheaton College

Jennings, Peter. *The Armed Forces of New Zealand and the ANZUS Split: Costs and Consequences*. Occasional Paper No. 4. Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1988. 108pp.

A surprising characteristic of the 1985 diplomatic rift and downgrading in defense cooperation between the United States and New Zealand has been the singular lack of serious analysis of the implications for Wellington of the break in this previously close peacetime alliance. Given the importance the American alliance had in New Zealand defense policy formulation since the early 1950s, one would have assumed that there would have been greater

attention paid to this important issue. Yet, outside of defense circles, there has been little concern generated in New Zealand by this fundamental alteration in that country's security posture.

This above-mentioned lacuna has been rectified recently in a monograph written by Peter Jennings, a teaching fellow at the newly opened Australian Defence Force Academy. Jennings brings to this subject a wealth of primary-source material and rigorous analysis. The work, in short, extensively documents and assesses the extent of the break in the United States-New Zealand defense relationship. The author then argues convincingly that the defense policy of the fourth New Zealand Labour Government, led by David Lange, has been an abject failure, and not only for ending the bilateral American alliance. The arguments Jennings uses are that the Labour government's attempts to effect greater defense self-reliance are simply unrealistic, in addition to the fact that Australia is incapable, and most importantly, unwilling to assume the role previously played by the United States in New Zealand's defense planning. Indeed, he is, in my opinion, deadly accurate in his foreboding assessment about the likely future "Trans-Tasman" security relationship: "In time, it may be shown to be the case that Australia is a harsher taskmaster to New Zealand than ever was the United States." Clearly, closer ANZAC defense cooperation is not the panacea for New Zealand's

defense problems, as it has been made out to be by the Labour government and its supporters.

Of course, as in any work, this reviewer did find a number of issues on which he disagrees. For instance, in describing the important but little-known standardization and interoperability fora which exist between the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and (surprisingly still) New Zealand (commonly known as the ABCA programs), Jennings' states that all were an outgrowth of the ABCA Armies program. In actuality, these programs were initiated in 1948 by the defense ministries of the United States, United Kingdom and Canada. Also, my own study of war planning in ANZUS does not support Jennings' contention that this activity was largely conducted on a bilateral basis. Declassified information clearly points to the fact that trilateral planning and the coordination of national contingency plans were the norm under the ANZUS defense relationship prior to February 1985.

Despite these rather limited observations, I have no doubt that Jennings' monograph will shortly be recognized as *the* standard analysis of the implications for New Zealand's security caused by the downgrading in Wellington's defense ties with Washington. New Zealand defense policy, unfortunately, has traditionally not engendered great academic interest; this work has now substantially changed this poor state of affairs. Jennings is to be com-

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mended for the immense amount of primary-source research and careful documentation used in his work. The author's undertakings would be richly rewarded if members of the current Labour government in Wellington would carefully study his work so that they might finally appraise themselves of the havoc they have wrought on New Zealand's defense posture, which has been the result of their misguided conception of national security.

THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG
U.S. Army War College

Starr, Richard F., ed. *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1988*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1988. 598pp. \$49.95

This definitive work is an annual compilation of the organization, strength, and activities of communist parties and revolutionary fronts. It provides worldwide coverage of communist parties, arranged alphabetically by country within six world regions, and includes an essay about each country's communist party organization. The essays include the number of individuals in each country's communist party, names of the party's officers, party legality, its publications, and a brief history of the party's interaction with the country's body politic. These overviews are exceptionally well done. Tables showing party congresses and a brief register of the

status of communism in each country are extremely useful.

Because of its simple arrangement and wealth of information concerning each country's communist party or revolutionary front, the volume is a worthwhile annual addition to defense institutional libraries. Although price may prohibit individual annual purchase, many professionals in the field would benefit from a onetime purchase.

MURRAY L. BRADLEY
Naval War College

Morgan, Charles. *The Gunroom*. New York: Ballantine Books, 1988. 242pp. \$3.95

"A young sailor," says the publisher's blurb on the cover of this short novel, "struggles to withstand the harsh mental and physical brutalities of service in the British Navy in the years before World War I." "Charles Morgan's first and most controversial novel," it continues, "appeared in 1919 only to disappear immediately. . . . Morgan and his publishers believe the British Admiralty to be responsible. . . ."

I was thus prepared for a fairly lurid exposé of the twilight world of the midshipman and of the gunroom in which he lived, of corporal punishment and the abuse of power, and of the captains who tolerated it because things had always been done that way. And indeed these themes are certainly present; the author himself describes the book as being "written in blood." But it commands