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# PROFESSIONAL READING



A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge with reason and consistency.

Admiral H.G. Rickover

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## One Man, One Book, Two Views

Lehman, John F., Jr. *Command of the Seas: Building the 600 Ship Navy*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988. 464pp. $21.95

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Rear Admiral C. E. Armstrong, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

From the tales of the rich and famous to thoughtful discourses on national and maritime strategy, the defense acquisition system, and recent military operations, the richly anecdotal *Command of the Seas* by John F. Lehman, Jr. is an interesting and valuable, if somewhat uneven, account of his six years as Secretary of the Navy during the Reagan administration. His book clearly illustrates how one man with will and determination can make a difference, even in as hidebound an organization as the navy, and as Byzantine an environment as the Pentagon.

On 28 January 1981, the Congress approved President Reagan's appointment of John F. Lehman, Jr. as the Secretary of the Navy. It was a position the 39-year-old Lehman had avidly and aggressively sought, and one to which he brought several unique qualifications, including his experience on the National Security Council and his continuing reserve duty stints as bombardier navigator with active duty carrier squadrons. The central goal of Secretary Lehman's agenda was no less than to rebuild and reenergize the post-Vietnam navy. It was a navy that had shrunk from 950 ships in 1969 to 479 ships in 1979 and a navy with too few officers and men

(many of whom were not up to their job), poor morale, low retention, and severe drug problems—all exacerbated by a perceived lack of esteem from the American public, low pay, and long deployments away from homeport.

When Lehman resigned in 1987, he bequeathed a different navy to his successor. His oft-stated goal of rebuilding the navy to 600 ships was within reach. The very best of our young men and women were once again serving their country with pride and distinction, essentially free of drug influences, and now a force with which to be reckoned. He also left behind loyal friends and bitter enemies. It is a strange paradox that this man, who did so much to lead the navy back to a position of strength and pride, should continue to be the source of so much resentment by many, both in and out of the navy.

The upper levels of the navy were not quite ready for John Lehman. He knew what he wanted, and to achieve his goals he was willing to test the legal limits of civilian control over the military. In carrying out his ever-expanding agenda, he wandered repeatedly and with full awareness into the minefields of traditional uniformed prerogative. An accomplished infighter, he was awed by neither title nor crusty gold striping. In his tilts with the top levels in the office of the Secretary of Defense, as well as in the navy, one senses that he took as much satisfaction from the battle, for which he was always prepared, as he did from the victory, which he usually won.

Lehman moved back and forth with remarkable ease between his status as reserve officer on active duty and that as Secretary of the Navy. During his active duty periods and frequent whirlwind trips as Secretary to ships and installations around the world, he related remarkably well with the operators—the people doing the work. His charm and wit, his willingness to listen, and his demonstrated qualifications to perform as a combat-ready crew member of a carrier jet, all made him a welcome visitor, enabling him to hear, unvarnished, the concerns of the fleet. These trips provided him with invaluable ammunition for the battles he fought within the Pentagon.

Lehman's background, education and experience brought him into conflict with the "systems analysts," whom he felt gave far too much credence to technical quantitative assessments and far too little to conceptual context. This conflict extended more broadly to the nuclear submarine community, which had been led by Admiral Hyman G. Rickover for more than 30 years. Chosen from only the best and brightest talent within the navy, with promotional quotas higher than those of all other warfare areas, it is not surprising that the ensuing years have witnessed a high percentage of Rickover-trained officers rising rapidly to the topmost positions in the navy. Lehman believed—and he was not alone—that Rickover's single-minded concentration on the technical disciplines, coupled with his increasing influence on school and training curricula, were creating an

officer corps unprepared to think tactically and strategically. Early in his tour as Secretary, Lehman succeeded in bringing about Admiral Rickover's retirement, but he was less successful in limiting the pervasive strength of the nuclear submarine community.

Lehman's assessment that the national security apparatus lacked the effectiveness to properly plan and execute military operations is well supported. He used the military operations of the late 1970s and early 1980s to point out specific shortcomings in planning, training, command and control, and tactics. He did more than identify problems. Naval aviation did not like hearing from Lehman that it was "broke" after the unsuccessful 1983 Lebanon air strikes, but Lehman was right, and he took immediate action to correct the situation. With the support of the CNO, in a remarkably short period of time he constructed a strike-warfare training center at Fallon, Nevada. He selected the best operational talent in the navy to develop the tactics and do the training, provided realistic and responsive training ranges and equipment, and then made the training mandatory for every carrier air wing preparing for deployment. Credit Lehman's initiative with today's stronger, more professional at-sea striking force. One wishes that the command and control structure—from the commander in chief to the on-scene commander—were similarly improved.

Lehman takes credit for bringing much needed reforms to the defense acquisition system, and, indeed, his policy changes and bully boy tactics focused attention and got results. His successes in terms of lower unit costs and improved delivery schedules are impressive, and a significant number of the reforms he imposed on the navy acquisition process and on navy contractors have been adopted throughout the defense acquisition system. Heady as these successes were, there were indications, even before Lehman's departure, that many defense companies were finding it increasingly difficult to struggle with the growing number of restrictive, often confusing, and frequently contradictory regulations that have increased risks, constrained allowed profits, and created a counterproductive adversarial environment. Condemning the entire industry for the greed and mismanagement of the few has been a bitter pill to swallow. It has not been made easier by the revelation that the Defense Department also had a few willing contributors to the problem.

By his own admission, Lehman pays "scant attention" to his "mistakes and bad calls." He also makes no apology for promoting and placing in key billets those officers who supported his actions and policies, or for ignoring or crushing those who did not. He is vindictive toward those few who were successful in thwarting him. His unnecessary parting shot in this book, directed at the current CNO, Admiral Carl A. H. Trost, is a case in point.

John Lehman is now working in the financial world, presumably recharging both his batteries and his coffers in preparation for a return to

government service. He has much to offer, not the least of which is the self-confidence that he can persuade the other 89,999 ants on the log who think they are steering to answer John Lehman's orders to the helm.

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Albert M. Bottoms

Rarely does one have the opportunity to share the thoughts, events, and motivations that surround a major national leader. Lehman's *apologia* provides a form of instant history that is all the more fascinating for his articulate presentation of the forces that he perceived to be impinging on the navy. To be sure, there is a distinctly defensive tone in his remarks that at times approaches paranoia. Whether he actually believes the things he says or whether he applies his perceptions in a tactical fashion are matters left to the reader to decide.

This reviewer is a practicing systems analyst. Mr. Lehman leaves no doubt as to his opinion of that genre. He does not sugarcoat his criticism and disdain for those who would have the temerity to analyze his policies or his concepts of strategy. What galls me is that he is more right than wrong in his assessments. He correctly alludes to the atrophy in conceptual thinking that he found upon taking the navy's helm.

Unfortunately for the navy and the country, Mr. Lehman, the political scientist, was and apparently remains blissfully unaware of the powerful and sometimes inconvenient concept of opportunity costs. The landscape is littered with the carcasses of naval economists who attempted to discuss these matters prior to the headlong rush to 600 ships. Not only was the orderly development of analytical methods consigned to the trash heap, but emergent technological development was also cut. Mr. Lehman's management initiative that eliminated the Naval Material Command and reorganized the navy's research and development processes had the effect of straining to the breaking point the developer-user relationship that had been the hallmark of the navy's successful exploitation of the fruits of research and development.

There are some fascinating parts in Mr. Lehman's book. His account of his struggle to have Admiral Rickover retire gracefully and his description of the powerful influences that opposed his efforts are revealing and instructive for the future. His wars and battles with peers and superiors who opposed the Lehman version of naval strategy are equally instructive, as are the revelations of character and purpose in this largely autobiographical account. But the reader must continuously ask whether the stated views of his opponents are real or strawmen. My contacts with the same people and

institutions that Mr. Lehman describes as so "Army-oriented" show about the same distribution as one would find elsewhere in informed societies, including the Army.

This book belongs on the navy bookshelf. It has much fuel for discussion and—perish the thought—analysis. Inevitably there will be the temptation to second-guess many of the force level and platform decisions. When that process starts, it is only fair that we take into account the environment and the implicit and explicit assumptions that Mr. Lehman made in his quest to rebuild the navy.

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Smith, Hedrick. *The Power Game: How Washington Works*. New York: Random House, 1987. 793pp. $24.95

Hedrick Smith is an imaginative and insightful journalist. His earlier volume, *The Russians*, based upon his experience as a *New York Times* Moscow correspondent, is the best of its kind. It manages to capture both the personal and the bureaucratic, the official and the very unofficial facets of life in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Smith's latest book sadly lacks the crispness and freedom from cant which marked his first volume. It is difficult to determine whether Mr. Smith was overcome by his subject or whether his editor and publisher let him down. This reviewer is inclined to choose the latter as more likely.

True enough, *The Power Game* is full of interesting insights on the changing nature of politics "inside the Beltway." There are fascinating quick analyses of the impact of money, television, public opinion polling, incumbency in the House of Representatives and the destruction of its seniority system, the maladies and false victories within the old Reagan White House, the agonies and exasperations of a cabinet poorly led, and the corrosive impact of right-wing orthodoxy on programs throughout the last two presidential terms. Unfortunately, the heavy emphasis upon bungling, pettiness, and the cult of the Reagan personality compels one to wonder why the United States has not proceeded along the path of the Roman Empire long before now.

Surely the opportunity to observe the process of government "inside the Beltway" and the process of electioneering "outside" does not bring joy and relief to the idealistic observer. Mr. Smith observes that the Founding Fathers built our system to be inefficient, and it is indeed, in many respects, exactly that. Despite occasional bows in the direction of honest men's differences, however, Mr. Smith identifies so few successes in public life as to leave a very bad taste for nearly everything and everyone involved in

trying to make this great nation function.

Were all that not bad enough, Mr. Smith has managed to pack into nearly 800 pages at least 300 pages worth of material. Example after example is repeated. Add to that such literary gratuities as multiple use of the verb "to limn," stir in immense irritation to the reader caused by footnotes arranged chapter by chapter in the rear of a book in which chapter headings appear only once, and one has a classic case of poor editing and publishing.

Smith's last chapter is called "What Is To Be Done?" How about a second edition of *The Power Game*, shorter by half, using all of the current material and adding some solid recognition for a few more of those "inside the Beltway" struggling on our behalf?

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Friedman, Norman. *The Postwar Naval Revolution*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1986, 240pp. $21.95

Friedman's study is an examination of "the revolution in naval affairs" that occurred during the "decade following World War II." He focuses on the navies which "defined" that revolution, those of Great Britain and the United States. These two nations confronted the global challenge posed by the Soviet Union, the breakup of the old European-dominated colonial order (what we now call the Third World), the advent of new technology, financial constraints, and rivalry among the services. Having previously written at length on the U.S. Navy, Friedman here concentrates on the Royal Navy, although the Americans are not ignored. And he addresses the progress of other European navies, the French and Dutch, for example, in chapters that cover politics and strategy, the shape of the fleets, new technology, and the various classes of ships, including those used for mine and inshore warfare.

The postwar dilemmas of British naval leaders were always drawn more clearly, if less dramatically, than those facing their American cousins. For Britain, World War II was a Pyrrhic victory. The nation was bankrupt and its empire was slipping away. The cost of maintaining a land force on the Continent could only come at the expense of the Royal Navy. And for several years after the war, British leaders faced the prospect of having to confront the Soviets in Europe and the Middle East without any guarantee of American assistance.

Moreover, the forces that Britain and the United States needed to police an increasingly unstable world differed from those required to fight a major conflict with the Soviets. Because the British judged such a "hot" war unlikely before 1957, they cancelled many of the projects begun during the war, allowed their existing forces to run down, and

concentrated on research and development of new technology.

In the interim, Britain, armed with obsolescent equipment, faced new challenges from advanced submarines, jet aircraft, and missiles developed by the Germans and assumed to be in Russian hands. The inability to counter such weapons at the target led to the development of an early postwar naval strategy in both Britain and the United States that focused on "attack at source." For example, the ineffectiveness of convoy escorts in the face of the German Type XXI submarine technology fostered a strategy that called for Anglo-American carrier battle groups to attack Soviet submarine bases.

The promises of the postwar naval revolution were initially left unfulfilled. Before the technological problems could be worked out on either side of the Atlantic, atomic weaponry came to dominate strategy, and deterrence became the means of avoiding the massive expenditures needed to build up a credible conventional force. By the mid-1950s, concepts such as Massive Retaliation and the New Look made the prospect of conventional war between the superpowers seem remote.

Most of the technological breakthroughs of the immediate postwar period, Friedman writes, are just now being fully exploited. Only in the 1980s, with the prospect of global conventional conflict once again considered a possibility, have the British and United States navies begun to realize the technological promises of the 1940s. And it should come as no surprise that the underlying strategy that shapes today's navies is once again "attack at source." As Friedman writes: "Their roots [current strategic and tactical ideas] go all the way back to the immediate postwar period." Indeed, the outlines of American postwar naval strategy, as well as early Nato strategy, foreshadow the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s. In Friedman's view, the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy is a logical response to the challenges of the postwar period, a philosophy to guide a navy capable of making full use of electronic technology in a flexible force capable of meeting challenges in the Third World, in the Cold War, or in a hot conflict, be it conventional or atomic.

Friedman ends his work on a positive note, suggesting that the postwar naval revolution that has finally borne fruit is likely to continue to do so given current technological trends. He concludes: "These considerations suggest that increased levels of ocean surveillance will tend to change the shape of navies (mainly in the directions of stealth, cover, and deception) but not to abolish them. World trade must still move over the surface of the sea, because the laws of nature which make that movement efficient are unlikely to be repealed. Navies will move with it, to protect it in peace and in (probably non-nuclear) war."

The author's discussion of the turmoil of the late 1940s and 1950s

within the naval communities in Britain and the United States over roles and missions for the respective services, as well as for individual weapons systems, is well done. As usual, Friedman's research is first-rate, although this book, like his others, lacks citations. And some readers may find the detailed discussions of ship designs within the various chapters more a useful reference than a good read.

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Grove, Eric J. *Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since World War Two.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987. 399pp. $34.95

This is not, as its title implies, a history of British warship construction. Rather, it is a tale of the protracted bureaucratic war waged by the Royal Navy's leadership since the 1940s to preserve a balanced blue-water surface fleet. It is a tale that will fascinate force planners on both sides of the Atlantic.

Against the constant background of a vulnerable economy that has never quite succeeded in providing a stable framework for long-range planning, Eric Grove shows us the effect of both liberal-leftist administrations distrustful of all things military and governments of the right with eccentric and equally damaging views on the usefulness of sea power in the nuclear age. He reveals the machinations of interservice rivalry at their worst and he shows how, repeatedly, the shortage of manpower has arisen to dampen incipient delusions of naval grandeur. He makes clear how real combat (Korea, Suez, the Falklands) has obtruded to confound the plans and predictions of politicians and naval officers alike.

The development of naval policy during this period of radical change, as Britain painfully adjusted herself to a post-Imperial role, makes an epic tale, and Eric Grove tells it well. He begins in the immediate postwar era with a Board of Admiralty striving to protect its wartime investment against the forces of economic instability and shifting strategic consensus. He describes how Mountbatten (First Sea Lord 1955-59 and Chief of Defense Staff 1959-65) began to set the navy on a new course, emphasizing quality rather than quantity, and basing his case for a balanced fleet on an East of Suez intervention role. He shows how a Labour administration, a prey to economic and ideological forces it could not control, exploited both service disunity and inadequacies within the naval staff to demolish the central pillar of the Mountbatten navy (the fixed-wing carrier program) and, ultimately, to settle for a defense role in Europe and the Eastern Atlantic.

The author also examines the political, diplomatic, and economic pressures which continue to drive Britain toward a continental strategy. This, he implies, is the next intellectual challenge for those who

wish to keep the torch of sea power alight.

Although his primary focus is on policy issues in the corridors of Whitehall, Grove provides a fairly full description of naval operations in peace, crisis, and war throughout the period. Sparing us no detail, he also describes the various classes of ship by which staff officers have sought to meet the strategic requirements of the day, and some classes which (thankfully) never progressed beyond the drawing board. Some readers will find this technical detail excessive, blurring the clarity of the main theme.

There will be an inevitable quibble about the quality of his sources. In Great Britain, the "Thirty Year Rule" is alive and well. When dealing with the period up to 1954, therefore, the author is on firm ground and has access to authoritative documents in the public record. Thereafter he relies inevitably on biography, interview (not always impartial), and anecdote. Nevertheless, as a two-term Whitehall warrior during the late seventies and early eighties and witness of the infamous John Nott Defense Review, I found his treatment of the issues convincing. He captures exactly the atmosphere of crisis, the shooting from the hip, the far-reaching decisions required overnight, and the shifting bureaucratic alliances from which "policy" emerges.

Where does the post-Falklands Royal Navy go from here? Eric Grove takes the conventional and pessimistic viewpoint. He sees little scope for any increase in general defense spending, and he views Britain's pattern of trade and interest as increasingly Eurocentric. In this context Grove believes Britain's continental commitment, the Army of the Rhine and RAF Germany, to be sacrosanct, leaving maritime forces exposed and vulnerable to the Treasury axe. At the same time, he argues, institutional changes within the Ministry of Defense, and particularly the concentration of power in the hands of the Central (Joint) Staff will tend to dilute the expression of the naval viewpoint.

This book is required reading for anyone starting a career in the Ministry of Defense. Despite its British setting (and the author presupposes more than average knowledge of British governmental administrative practice) any U.S. Navy officer destined for the Pentagon should read it too. You have been warned.

G. RHYS-JONES
Commander, Royal Navy
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Hyde, Harlow A. *Scraps of Paper: The Disarmament Treaties between the World Wars*. Lincoln, Neb.: Media Publishing, 1988. 456pp. $18.95

At a time when the United States and the Soviet Union seem to be moving toward important arms control agreements, Harlow A. Hyde has produced this provocative book on the efforts of the great

powers during the interwar years (1919-1939) to limit naval armaments. Hyde's book is not footnoted, but it is clear from his text and bibliography that he has read extensively in the basic published materials and has achieved a considerable command of factual information.

Hyde's *Scraps of Paper* are the Washington Five Power Naval Treaty of 1922, the London Naval Treaties of 1930 and 1936, and the other basic treaties and agreements that the major powers concluded during these years to promote peace and understanding. The innocents in this book are the Americans, who accepted and honestly observed the treaties that, in the author's view, may actually have contributed to the breakout of World War II. Hyde describes the Japanese as the leading villains, to whom he attributes lying and deceit in almost every one of their recorded actions. He delights in recounting the alleged "dirty tricks" by which Japan emerged to become the terror of East Asia. He fails to note, however, that practically every "aggressive" action by Japan found a precedent in the actions of the enlightened powers of the West during the Age of Imperialism.

He dismisses the Four Power Pact of 1921-22, relating to the Pacific, as a "miserable excuse for a treaty" that arose from the inability of Britain and Japan to end the equally miserable Anglo-Japanese Alliance without, "in effect," having the United States join it. The Nine Power Pact in support of the Open Door to an independent China is one of those bad treaties that proved worse than no treaty, according to Hyde. He suggests that by the Five Power Naval Treaty, the United States surrendered to Japan military supremacy in the Western Pacific, a supremacy that the Japanese could not otherwise have achieved short of fighting for it. This naval treaty included the infamous Article XIX by which the United States gave up its right to build up bases and fortifications in Guam and the Philippines in return for comparable pledges from Britain and Japan that governed their Pacific island holdings.

Having thus dismissed the achievements of the Washington Conference, Hyde turns to the "miserable" 1930 London Naval Treaty that, he regrets, actually left Japan with 70 percent of the cruiser tonnage allowed the United States, and parity in submarines. The 1936 London Naval Treaty, which was confined to setting limits on tonnages and guns for various classes of ships, is seen by the author as a futile exercise of the democracies to limit armament by example.

Hyde describes in some detail Japan's programs to build "gyp cruisers" that initially were about 10 percent heavier than the 10,000 ton limit allowed under the Washington naval treaty. This reviewer does not believe, however, that Japanese cruiser building was as significant as does Hyde in sparking heavy cruiser construction by Britain and the United States. The Japanese throughout the twenties were model

participants at the naval conferences when the French and British were at odds over submarines and the Americans and British confronted each other on cruisers.

Without volunteering evidence other than an item from the *New York Times* in 1945 and rumors noted by Ambassador Joseph C. Grew in his diary of 1933, Hyde claims that beginning with a naval base at Truk in 1930, the Japanese built fortifications in the Mandated Islands that cost the lives of thousands of young Americans during World War II. In April 1955, 10 years after Japan's surrender, Thomas Wilds published a very factual report in the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* in which he stated that Japan had scrupulously observed her nonfortification agreements until about 1934, the year she gave notice of her intent to abrogate the naval treaties. For five years thereafter, the Imperial Navy undertook harbor, airfield, and other development useful for either civilian or military purposes. Apparently, Japan began to build strictly military facilities in the islands only about two years before Pearl Harbor.

The author also denounces Japan for refusing entry to U.S. naval ships into the Mandated Islands in alleged violation of the American-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1911, which was extended to include the islands in a bilateral agreement between the United States and Japan in 1922. The 1911 treaty did permit free entry of American ships into Japanese ports that were open to foreign commerce. For a good part of the interwar period, Japan agreed to permit American naval ships to visit ports in the Mandates that she herself had opened, but she did not agree that American naval ships could freely call at any island or atoll that the United States for its own purposes might select. Hyde suggests that the Mandates problem could have been resolved in 1935 by a surgical strike to relieve Japan of the islands on the grounds that she had stolen them from the League of Nations!

The author insists that he would approve arms control agreements providing they satisfy four requirements: that all types of "strategic" weapons be limited, that the agreements be verifiable, that they be verified, and that they be subject to review and updating at periodic intervals. To demonstrate his acceptance of arms control, he commends the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 by which the boundary between the United States and Canada has been demilitarized for over 160 years. That agreement today would not meet Hyde's four basic requirements.

WILLIAM R. BRAISTED
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Halpern, Paul G. *The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1914-1918*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1987. 631pp. $29.95

Historians of the war at sea from 1914-1918 traditionally focus on the activities of the major belligerents,

on the high drama of Anglo-German fleet actions and on the 1917 convoy crisis. This pattern has left its imprint on general works of the war as well. Much of our understanding of the lesser theaters and the smaller navies has been shaped by the condescending—if not downright contemptuous—contemporary opinions of the larger navies. Arguably, British and German disdain for "less aggressive" and "less efficient" allies has skewed the whole historiography. Happily we now have a powerful corrective in the form of Halpern's excellent work.

The strength and importance of Halpern's account of the Mediterranean naval war transcend cliched superlatives. Building on his previous work on the prewar years, the present book is a definitive single volume account of the war years based on exhaustive research not only in British, German and American archives but, more importantly, in French, Italian and Austro-Hungarian archives as well. Not surprisingly, what emerges is a strikingly different picture than we have had of the stress and strain of war in those narrow seas. With considerable skill and remarkable clarity Halpern reviews the strategic, tactical and technological impediments to "decisive" naval activity in the Mediterranean from 1914 to 1918. For example, his discussion of the Austro-Hungarian dilemma over sending aid first to the *Goeben* and then to the Turks in the Dardenelles is a deft presentation of the constraints imposed by coal-fired warships dependent upon bases and faced with the new threats from mines, submarines, long-range gunfire and aerial reconnaissance. Far from lacking the aggressive spirit, the Mediterranean fleets were virtually crippled by it in the same way that the search for a decisive battle under favorable circumstances inhibited the Anglo-German fleets. For example, in true Mahanist style the Italians held their battlefleet in readiness for the decisive naval battle which, after they switched camps in 1915, the vastly outnumbered Austrians would not chance.

As Halpern points out, the confined nature of Mediterranean sea routes, the constant danger from new weapons and the overwhelming strength of the Entente Powers quickly reduced naval action to that between small ships and to jockeying for postwar positions. As a work on the broader issues of Mediterranean geopolitics, this is a hard source to beat. But making sense of the area's rivalries is only one strong suit in a book which is laced with them. Halpern's tightly packed pages of text and notes contain a whole world of names, events, and historical problems new to us: a marvellous potion for scholars who have watched more familiar fields undergo continuous microscopic dissection. And despite this surfeit of newness, Halpern had to shorten his final manuscript for publication. Clearly, much of what fell by the wayside was context and, perhaps understandably, the book makes

little effort to set the story into the already familiar pattern of the war.

It is tempting to label Halpern "The Marder of the Med," itself no mean accolade and one which does invite some comparisons. Both clearly have produced work of consummate scholarship. Marder gave us his in smaller packages, and he enjoyed the benefits of a much clearer and more limited focus. Halpern could have benefited from these advantages, but that was clearly impossible. Perhaps for that reason Halpern lacks the easy familiarity with his subject, the colorful character sketches and the pithy judgements which were so much a part of Marder's work. Marder, of course, enjoyed the tremendous advantage of being able to interview many of the principal actors in his drama. Halpern, writing a generation later, could not be so fortunate. If it is true that he fails to breathe life into his story in the same way Marder did, Halpern can be credited for the clarity and candor of his style. Whatever the subtle differences in approach and writing, there is little to choose between them.

Halpern fits well into the new wave of historians who seek to fill that enormous void in the historiography of the First World War we have come to describe euphemistically as "peripheral theaters." With this book he has plugged a huge hole, and all scholars and students interested in naval history generally, and the First World War owe Professor Halpern an enormous debt of gratitude. It will doubtless be some time before the impact of his scholarship is felt in general accounts of the war, but there can be little doubt that that impact will be profound.

MARC MILNER
University of New Brunswick
Canada

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Pack, James. *The Man Who Burned the White House, Admiral Sir George Cockburn*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1987. 288pp. $21.95

This is history imitating art. A young boy from a "good" family joins the navy on the eve of the Napoleonic Wars. He serves well in every post to which he is assigned and is rewarded with rapid promotion. This is George Cockburn (or is it Horatio Hornblower?). What Pack has given us in this biography is the life of a man in which there is virtually no fault, no sin and no blame. Pack has mined the papers of Cockburn and come up with pure ore; no imperfections here.

Pack's one dimensional view of Cockburn may well be the result of confining so much of his research to the Cockburn papers alone. Aside from that treasure he seems to have paid little attention to other unpublished sources. The result is that we see the world through the prism of Sir George Cockburn, not always, one might suggest, an entirely undistorted view. In dealing with the War of 1812, however, and Cockburn's attack on Washington (the

high point of the Admiral's career), Pack is careful to take a balanced view. Indeed, in his description and analysis of the "burning" of the capital, Pack provides a long overdue corrective to the distortions of that event so often found on this side of the Atlantic.

Most naval historians will find little that is new in Pack's description of the wars with France and America. The detailed account of affairs in the Chesapeake provides some insight, from the British viewpoint, of that part of the War of 1812. By far, however, the most interesting portion of the biography are the two chapters detailing Cockburn's role as "Napoleon's Keeper." To Cockburn fell the honor and burden of transporting the fallen emperor (a title by which he could not be addressed—he was called General) to his exile at St. Helena, remaining with him until his relief arrived. Oftentimes sullen, moody and petulant, Napoleon could on the other hand be a most fascinating dinner companion and raconteur. Nevertheless, whatever the pleasure of his company might have been, it soon wore thin and Cockburn was delighted when he was able to put St. Helena over his stern.

If the plot resembles Hornblower, the prose does not. Pack's style relies heavily on quotes, and unfortunately the publisher elected to print them; some of them are quite long. One needs to read carefully to discern between Pack and a quoted source.

Perhaps Cockburn was as good as the author makes him out to be. He did have a distinguished career and his accomplishments speak for themselves, but this sort of biographical approach verges on hagiography. Instead of a human being, Pack has presented us with an icon.

WILLIAM M. FOWLER, JR.
The New England Quarterly

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Fairbank, John King. *The Great Chinese Revolution, 1800-1985*. New York: Harper & Row, 1986. 396pp. $19.95

John King Fairbank has been the dean of American China scholars since World War II. Now 80 years old and emeritus at Harvard, he has turned out this book as an "ex-professor who is not up for tenure and who doesn't care about reputation." The book has neither footnotes nor bibliography, and it is written in a style neither stuffy nor unsophisticated. Hence, Professor Fairbank has irritated scholars and pedants in much the fashion that his learned but practical advice has irritated national administrations for over four decades.

This may possibly be the best book on China since the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949. Certainly, if an American had only one book with which to brief himself on the Chinese revolution, this is that book.

Fairbank recounts the dramatic history of China over 185 years. Each event he describes might as justly be considered the real beginning of the Chinese revolution as 1 October 1949, when Mao announced that

China had "stood up": the first Opium War of 1839-42; the Taiping Rebellion (1850-64), with its emphasis on land reform, women's rights and anti-Confucianism; the shock of defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895; the 1898 Hundred Days of reform; the reaction to the Boxers' failure in 1900; the abolition of the Civil Service examinations in 1905 (the basis of both Chinese government and literate society); the abolition of the empire in 1911; and unification under the Kuomintang in 1927.

All of these and other mileposts are described by Professor Fairbank with detachment, wit, and yet, sympathy. He acknowledges that his job has been made easier by the many learned contributions his colleagues made to the six-volume *Cambridge History of China* of which he was coeditor.

Aside from academic noses out of joint, there has been criticism of Fairbank's book because in some instances he seems to strain to demonstrate analogies that may not be complete between present day and historical China.

One point, however, is beyond argument. After reading this book one may be amazed, baffled or discomfited by events in China, but no one will be fooled, particularly by politicians or propagandists. This alone would put us deep in Professor Fairbank's debt.

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Rapoport, Vitaly and Alexeev, Yuri. *High Treason: Essays on the History of the Red Army, 1918-1938.* Treml, Vladimir G. and Adams, Bruce, eds. Translated by Bruce Adams. Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1985. 436pp. $35

The enormous struggle between the Soviet Union and Germany has long fascinated historians and professional students of World War II. Perhaps no phase of this conflict has received more attention in the West than this campaign's opening: the deep German penetration, the massive Soviet losses, and the great battles at the gates of Moscow. One of the most interesting questions concerning these operations relates to the performance of the Red Army. Why was it caught so unprepared and savaged so mercilessly by the Wehrmacht?

*High Treason* is one of the first books to explore this tragic episode in detail. What emerges from this riveting account is a portrait of the destruction of the "old" Red Army by Stalin and his regime on such a scale that, as the text notes, by 1938 "all that was left of the Red Army was its name." This episode was all the more ironic because it followed a brief, but intense period of intellectual ferment and openness that could have moved the army into the forefront of interwar tactical innovation, and almost certainly could have precluded the disasters of 1941. Instead, Stalin and his party bureaucracy struck. Sixteen pages of tables are needed to list the principal victims. In addition to its detailed, if

at times eclectic account of the military purges, the book is also important because it is an example of the *samizdat* literature that has been smuggled into the West.

Vitaly Rapoport is a Red Army veteran now living in New York City, while Yuri Alexeev is the pseudonym for a writer still living in the Soviet Union. Both are Russian patriots, indignant at the defeats and outraged by the horrifying casualties their country suffered in 1941. They are sympathetic to the Red Army, reserving their ire for Stalin and the political leadership that they hold expressly responsible for the debacle of 1941.

The book is not without flaw. The very nature of *samizdat* makes documentation sketchy. The condemnation of Stalin and the Party will scarcely startle the Western reader, yet the details of the army purges and the character portraits of the victims and the perpetrators cancel out the volume's shortcomings. This is an important book, both for understanding the decisive front of the Second World War, and for analyzing the complex relationship between Party and army that plays so crucial a role in the modern Soviet state.

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Leiken, Robert S. and Rubin, Barry, eds. *The Central American Crisis Reader*. New York: Summit Books, 1987. 718pp. $24.95

Wiarda, Howard J. *Finding Our Way? Toward Maturity in U.S.-Latin American Relations*. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1987. 286pp. $27.50

Wiarda, Howard J. and Falcoff, Mark. *The Communist Challenge in the Caribbean and Central America*. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1987. 249pp. $24.75

Three cheers for three outstanding books! For the informed public policy or international relations professional who has for the past decade or so avoided the seeming quagmire of obscure history and confusing relationships that the Central American crises represent, this collection of volumes will go a long way toward easing anxieties. The authors and editors of these books provide a sober and balanced evaluation of the proximate causes of today's strife, without losing sight of their audience: foreign policy specialists in the United States. As a result, they have skillfully avoided the increasing pitch and downright "clientelism" to which Latin Americanists frequently fall prey as they offer policy prescriptions that ignore American political realities.

Messrs. Leiken and Rubin have provided us with the most comprehensive collection of relevant documents and articles available. Their dense volume is divided thematically, with chapters such as

"The Revolution in Nicaragua" and "The War in El Salvador," and appropriate subheadings that provide the reader with a variety of useful perspectives for examining the current crises. It is not difficult, for example, to understand the traditional Nicaraguan disdain for American policy in the region when we read Henry Stimson's words that "in no way have we transgressed upon the sovereignty and independence of the government of our sister nation," even as U.S. Marines occupied Nicaragua for the third time in 15 years.

Similarly, the editors treat us to a most convincing sequence of documents that should make it clear to all but the most close-minded idealists that in 1979 the Sandinistas had much more in mind than a "mixed economy" with an "open political system," as they had assured the Organization of American States in exchange for formal recognition.

Admirably, the editors have refrained from excessive embellishment of the documents and articles, attempting instead something all too unusual in foreign relations literature: to let history speak for itself.

For analysis and policy prescriptions, there are few books better than Wiarda's *Finding Our Way*? The thesis of his work is that despite the harsh rhetoric of President Reagan and his key advisors on Latin America, U.S. policy since 1981 has gradually become more pragmatic, sophisticated and nuanced than the media and foreign policy elite have dared acknowledge. As one of the professional staff members of the bipartisan Kissinger Commission on Central America (to which he devotes one chapter), Dr. Wiarda is well-placed to comment on the successes and failures of Reagan administration policy in the region, and he is evenhanded in his approach. The first half of his book is overview material, which draws on his previous and well-respected body of scholarship; the book's real value is its latter half, in which he offers a tantalizing peek into how American foreign policy is made in the late 20th century. The roles of "think tanks," the media (which, in the author's words, "tend to share the countercultural view that the United States is among the major causes of the world's problems"), and bureaucratic politics are presented alongside those of more traditionally accepted players, such as Congress and public opinion, to show how foreign policy paralysis has become the rule rather than the exception. In Dr. Wiarda's opinion, though, the Reagan administration was remarkably successful at overcoming this paralysis with regard to Central America. He credits "the increased military preparedness . . . the restored economy, the renewed confidence and faith in ourselves and our system" that President Reagan ushered in.

From this assessment of recent American policy, one moves in the third book to an equally sober analysis of the challenge that has driven that policy from the start: the perceived communist threat to the

Caribbean and Central America. In this volume, Dr. Wiarda teams with Mark Falcoff to provide a collection of essays which consider the Moscow-Havana role in communist expansion in the region. Among their contributors are Jiri and Virginia Valenta, who have provided the best analysis available of Grenada in 1979-1983. Their chapter is particularly useful in its breakdown of Soviet policy into its component parts: policy toward revolutionary regimes (Cuba and Nicaragua), progressive regimes (Mexico and Panama), "bourgeois-liberal" regimes (Venezuela and Costa Rica) and reactionary regimes (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras). Described here is a more systematic and sophisticated foreign policy approach, with different means to achieve different ends throughout the region, than that suggested by more traditional analyses of Soviet western hemisphere policy.

Chapters by Marc Falcoff on Cuba's policy of revolution-for-export and an excellent offering by Ernest Evans on the changing strategies of revolutionary movements in Central America round out this important study, perhaps the best in a fairly recent explosion of literature on the subject.

These three books provide ready access to a most comprehensive span of documentation and analysis. Indeed, if the reader is not an expert on the region but a generalist in foreign policy, this collection is really all he needs.

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Lowenthal, Abraham F. *Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1987. 240pp. $10.95

Economic and demographic changes in Latin America's major nations have altered U.S. interests in the region. Especially, argues Professor Lowenthal, with respect to Mexico, Brazil, and the Caribbean Basin, whose current roles in both hemispheric and world economic affairs have simply bypassed North American policy thinking.

Professor Lowenthal offers details on trade, production, finance, and development in these three subregions. In clear, restrained passages, he reviews the recent history of U.S. policies toward Latin America which presidents since Franklin D. Roosevelt have offered as foreign policy centerpieces. These policies, he concludes, barely survived their authors' terms in the White House. He believes that they were couched in corrective-reformist terms and failed to address the emergence of several Latin American nations as important world economies. A corollary theme is the long-standing debate between those who favor Uncle Sam in the activist or interventionist mode, and those who

advocate the passive or hands-off stance toward Latin America. Both camps, says Lowenthal, are missing the point.

What has really happened, he argues, is that Latin America is no longer the region it once was, or the one we once thought it was. The parade of presidential policy cliches no longer apply, however sincerely they may have been conceived. Instead of the interventionist-neutrality dichotomy, Lowenthal advocates flexible partnership. The long-term interests of both the United States and Latin America, he believes, are served by policies which foster economic development.

Refusing to duck the regional thornbushes, Lowenthal (writing in 1987) wades into the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua and the old U.S. policy of arming its opposition. He takes a well-reasoned jab at both the doves and the hawks. The Sandinistas really are, he affirms, a regional destabilizer and a genuine military threat; but the Reagan policy of arming an opposition which could not generate the popular support needed to overthrow the Sandinistas tended to push the United States to the brink of an armed showdown to avoid diplomatic humiliation. Such an intervention, he concludes, would have been condemned throughout Latin America and much of the western world.

According to Lowenthal, the Central American solution is to resurrect the Contadora Plan of 1982, which the United States quietly scuttled in the mistaken notion that the Contras could achieve a military victory in Managua. The regional solution is for the United States and Latin America to drop trade barriers, share economic success, and seek a basis for genuine partnership. The old Washington notion of U.S. regional hegemony must go. Professor Lowenthal's arguments are trenchant, factually supported, and perhaps still in need of a significant political champion in Washington, D.C.

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Chiliand, Gerard and Rageau, Jeanne-Pierre. *A Strategic Atlas: Comparative Geopolitics of the World's Powers*. 2nd ed., translated from the French by Tony Berrett. New York: Harper and Row, 1985. 224pp. $26.95

The authors of *Strategic Atlas* claim that theirs is the first book of its kind. They note in the preface a break from the traditional and long outdated Mercator projection "with its horizontal and almost pre-Galilean world in which the land masses appear to cover a larger area than the seas;" and they address a subject not often treated in an atlas: the perceptions held by states regarding their own security (including not only those of the United States and U.S.S.R., but also the lesser known regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Brazil, India, South Africa, Japan and Israel). A section on physical resources, demographic

data, and suchlike seeks to promote a better grasp of North-South relations. Rounding out the study is a final section on the military balance, which centers partly on nuclear questions. In short, the authors' conception of strategy attempts to embrace all human, material, and cultural factors that make up the global balance of forces.

So far so good. One soon finds, however, that the reach generally exceeds the grasp. Mercator projections *are* used on several important world area charts including some framed in an oval to suggest that they are not Mercator. The "circular projection" used elsewhere is helpful in polar areas; other charts seem to be azimuthal equidistant projections but are not identified as such. The section on geopoliticians is sketchy, offering only a starting point for further study. This is surprising since the atlas is dedicated to, among others, two geopoliticians, Halford Mackinder and Friedrich Ratzel.

The treatment of natural resource constraints, economic factors, population data, North-South problems, and the Mideast, South Asia and Japan is quite good. Data on European population and wealth, French overseas interests, *et al.*, are excellent—undoubtedly a consequence of the French authorship.

The "Military Balance" section covers 22 pages, but includes very little statistical data. Statistics, the authors claim, are useful but are measured by experts, whereas "strategies are won with peoples and leaders . . . Figures are quickly out of date." However, among the few statistical tables offered is a very important one that is rarely seen in U.S. compilations: the relative tonnages of the Soviet and American fleets. Few American planners seem aware of the great superiority of the Atlantic Alliance over the Warsaw Pact in gross fleet tonnages (for a great many decades the true measure of relative fleet strength). Other interesting charts show the deployment of U.S. and Soviet navies, overseas bases, U.S. and Soviet missile sites, the deployment of U.S. and allied forces in western Europe, and of particular interest, world charts of American aggressiveness as viewed by the U.S.S.R., and Soviet aggressiveness as viewed by the United States. Although the information is far less detailed than that found in typical western compilations of the military balance, the authors have designed a useful reference for the policymaker or strategist who is not an expert.

*Strategic Atlas* is valuable for its world view, its grand conception of what is required. The average student of strategy will find it useful as a handbook in picking his way through some of the international hot spots. It offers much less of the overconcentration on the U.S.S.R. to which Americans are prone, and even though limited by the rather amateurish cartography, it may frequently prove worthwhile.

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Holmes, Richard. *The World Atlas of Warfare: Military Innovations that Changed the Course of History*. New York: Viking Studio Books, 1988. 304pp. $40

Richard Holmes has set out to chart the history of the art of war and its impact upon our world. His central theme is stated to be the evolution of technology applied to war, but he does not address technological developments in detail and leaves many fundamental ones unmentioned. On the other hand, he gives significant attention to the important interplay between military events and social, economic, and political institutions; and he illustrates these events vividly with maps, graphics, and fascinating photographs. His atlas reaches back several thousand years in its coverage of warfare, but appropriately devotes more than half the book to events of the 20th century.

Holmes is a military historian of international standing. A senior lecturer at the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst, England, and a serving officer in the British Territorial Army, he addresses his book to readers with a general interest in the history of the art of war. Most of the text will be familiar to those well-grounded in military history, although the manner in which Holmes and his contributors present their material may be of interest to many already intimate with the subject. In particular, because of the worldwide geographical scope of its long historical view, many will find it a convenient source of illustrations for speeches and articles.

The atlas concentrates on conflicts of primary interest to Great Britain. Military events in South America, except for the few direct interactions with Great Britain, are largely ignored, and the entire military history of the Orient (Indo-Persia, China, Japan) prior to this century is allotted less than 20 pages. The concluding chapters of the book address guerrilla warfare and terrorism, nuclear warfare capabilities of the superpowers (including a discussion of Star Wars), and the multitude of conflicts in the four decades since the close of World War II, bringing its coverage to the middle of this decade.

The book succeeds in identifying clearly the factors that caused the wars and examining those factors that shaped them. It also demonstrates how, in a number of cases, strategic expectations of military and political leadership failed to be realized in conflict. For example, "strategic" bombardment, whether employed by the Germans against England or by the Allies against Germany and Japan, failed to destroy the morale of the civilian population, as had been expected by proponents of such bombing. In candidly drawing these insights from the past, the treatment is balanced and focuses upon only the most significant aspects of warfare.

Eric Grove, currently associate director of the Foundation for International Security, wrote the chapter on the Pacific in World War

II. The key events are adroitly summarized, and technical issues affecting battle outcomes as well as the strategy involved are addressed. Because the book is directed toward a British audience, it includes some aspects of the Pacific war that are not always emphasized in American histories.

Throughout the book there are brief profiles of key military leaders, including Yamamoto and Spruance. These vignettes are a definite asset to this work.

In sum, *The World Atlas of Warfare* is well written and interesting, and its index and bibliography are well-organized and useful. I expect that I will refer to this book a number of times in the future.

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Saward, Dudley. *Victory Denied.* New York: Franklin Watts, 1987. 376pp. $18.95

In 1697, Father Francesco Lama described an aerial ship of war, but concluded that: "There is one small difficulty that cannot be solved; God will never allow man to construct such a machine since it would create many disturbances in the civil and political governments of mankind." So much for medieval prophecy in matters of technology and warfare.

By the end of the First World War, aerial ships of war capable of dropping bombs well behind the battle lines had been built and used, albeit with little strategic consequence. These machines did, however, inspire great prophecies of future military victory, most notably by Giulio Douhet in Europe and Billy Mitchell in America. Of the world's air forces, the Royal Air Force was most influenced by these optimistic prophecies of easy victory through aerial supremacy and the bombing of the enemy's military, industrial and economic base.

Dudley Saward's book (first published in 1985 in the United Kingdom) is an account of the rise of the RAF's air power from 1920 to the defeat of Germany in 1945. While he has taken up an ambitious and important task—to relate the role of the RAF and "strategic" air power to the outcome of the war in Europe—the book is oddly flawed in that it contains no mention of the influence of either Douhet or Mitchell nor of the prewar roles of "Boom" Trenchard or "Bomber" Harris. Saward's book fails to make any connection between the earlier prophecies of victory through "strategic" air power and the realities of the European theater. "Strategic" air power did play an important role in the Second World War, but not quite as expected by its proponents before the war.

Nevertheless, Saward's book is an important contribution to the history of that form of air power. He was graduated from RAF Cranwell in 1934 and served in the RAF throughout the war, working on the development of electronic aids for precision night bombing. This perspective

and his personal experience provide valuable insights for the historian of the period.

The first half of the book is a series of chapters which alternate between the early growth of the RAF and the rise of Hitler. This odd juxtaposition does not work well, for there is no new or relevant material in the chapters on Hitler. However, the material on the RAF is valuable, covering as it does the leadership of Trenchard, the establishment of Cranwell, the role of the RAF in the Middle East and the Northwest Frontier of India, and advances in aircraft design. Although Saward's biases are evident, his account of the struggle during the 1930s to build, train and equip an adequate number of squadrons of both offensive and defensive aircraft is a useful historical contribution.

Perhaps the best chapter in this section is Saward's commentary on the development of air defense in Britain during the late 1930s. He focuses on the great debates in the Air Defense Committee between Tizard and Lindemann. While C. P. Snow's work on this era is often considered definitive, Saward brings out more of the fundamental technical issues. He is particularly good at relating the new technical capabilities of the early radar systems to the tactics for air defense.

The second portion of the book covers the RAF bombing campaigns in Europe. Here Saward's perspective is valuable to the American reader who has been exposed primarily to the daylight bombing campaign of the U.S. Army Air Forces. The British campaign was quite different. The RAF relied on night action rather than escort fighters for defense and on electronic rather than optical bomb aiming.

The author's coverage of the development of electronic methods for improving bombing accuracy profits from his personal knowledge. When the night bombing campaign began, the initial results were dismal because the bombers had to find their targets by dead reckoning and visual identification. In the weather-plagued nighttime skies of Europe, this method proved inadequate. In clear, nontechnical terms, Saward explains the development of the electronic navigation and radar bombing aids, including Gee, H2S, G-W and Oboe, and relates their significance to the bombing tactics. For the historian concerned with the impact of technology on tactics and strategy, this is valuable new material. Its significance has often been overlooked in previous works on the RAF bombing campaign.

Throughout that campaign, one of the key strategic issues was the selection and prioritization of targets. The doctrine of "strategic" air war called for the resources to be concentrated, in Harris' words, on "attacking the kernel of the problem at the center." This meant that the bombing should be concentrated on the enemy's internal war-making capability. If this were destroyed, then surely the enemy's war-fighting capability at the battle front would collapse.

As the Bomber Command's strength grew in 1942, high debates resulted concerning its best use. Harris argued passionately for focusing solely on the industrial kernel. In June 1942 he wrote to Churchill: "We are free, if we will, to employ our rapidly increasing air strength in the proper manner. In such a manner as would avail to knock Germany out of the war in a matter of months, if we decide on the right course." Churchill was cool to this grand promise: "I do not however think Air bombing is going to bring the war to an end by itself, and still less that anything that could be done with our existing resources could produce decisive results in the next twelve months."

Churchill's view prevailed, and Bomber Command's squadrons were used in a number of ways to support the many facets of the war against Germany. Saward does not criticize Churchill's decision directly but does seek to demonstrate that this was a mistake. He bases his case on postwar interviews with Albert Speer (the German minister of production), which indicate that the Allied bombing did impede German military production by 10 to 20 percent (at its peak) and did result in the reallocation of fighting forces from the front to homeland defense. The absolute impact of this on the pace and duration of the war remains unclear.

Saward's detailed account of the wartime debates over the use of Britain's heavy bombers contains a number of historically important insights, especially his use of Harris' and Churchill's correspondence. However, his material from Speer and his vast statistics on tonnage of bombs dropped do not resolve the debate over the effective use of big bombers. Saward's book should be read for its source material on the rise and use of air power, but not for its implicit conclusion: that air power, if used as Harris wished, would have ended the war with less pain.

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Parker, Geoffrey. *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800.* New York and Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988. 234pp. $27.95

Taking his cue from Michael Roberts' important 1955 lecture, "The Military Revolution 1560-1660," Professor Geoffrey Parker of the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champagne, delivered these superb Lees Knowles lectures at Cambridge University's Trinity College in 1984. They are a model of synthesis, clarity, and comparative strategic history, and are drawn from primary and secondary sources in over a half-dozen languages to provide new and revealing information to English-language students of military history. What the author lacked in knowledge and sources, he elicited from scholars of many lands, all of whom he justly acknowledges.

The book is a major treatise on the role of military innovation in the rise of Western European civilization over the rest of Europe and indeed over Asia, Africa, the Middle East and the Americas during the early modern period: 1500 to sometime between 1750 and 1800 (the author properly avoids a precise and thus artificial date).

Although Parker accepts Roberts' general thesis, he projects it over a much longer period of time. The emergence of the new imperial powers "depended precisely upon those improvements in the ability to wage war," namely, a new system of defensive fortifications (the *trace italienne*) with the attendant siege artillery, increased reliance upon massed infantry firepower, and a dramatic growth in the size of armies. He examines each in detail and with relation to the course of European and world history.

Of particular note are his treatment of overland logistics (drawn from his first book, the excellent *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659*) and his treatment of strategic manpower needs. For example, although Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden had 183,000 troops available in 1632, all but the 20,000 of his main army were tied down in "sideshows." It might be added that tactical control reached its limit at that size, which was about that of both armies at First Bull Run in 1861. Parker's attention to the key contribution of the Netherlands in late 16th and 17th century warfare, especially early tactics based on Roman examples, is noteworthy. His use of statistical examples and original archival illustrations is especially judicious.

As land warfare became stalemated, "the leading states sought a decision through naval power," certainly after 1650. To the author's credit, he devotes almost as much attention to navies as he does to armies—Mediterranean galleys, Atlantic sailers, and even Far Eastern warship types. What we now regard as the Third World—India, China, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East—receives its own chapter and reveals that, often as not, lack of genuine need by these armies accounted for their slow adoption or adaptation of European weapons and tactical techniques.

But did all these changes constitute a "revolution"? Revolutions, including the Industrial one, do not encompass centuries; such lengthy change is generally accepted as an "evolution," i.e., gradual, which is one reason that Michael Roberts confined his original hypothesis to 100 years. Even in this book, Parker notes "a further" military revolution after 1800, heralded by the appearance of light infantry and cavalry, mobile artillery, and the division organization. And, on the final page, he even hints at yet another revolution on land and sea—that of machine weapons.

What Parker and Roberts saw was not a revolution but was instead one dramatic component of the emergence of European civilization, the gradual change from the Renaissance

to the Enlightenment. However, the drawback to using convenient historical packaging, like "revolution" in this case, is primarily semantic. This set of published lectures, like Roberts', remains a major contribution to the literature of war, to be read with profit by military professionals and historians alike who are interested in understanding the pace of continuity and change in the art of war.

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Lider, Julian. *Origins and Development of West German Military Thought: Vol. 2, 1966-1986: Swedish Studies in International Relations, 21*. Brookfield, Vt.: Gower Publishing, 1988. 637pp. $113.95

The first volume in this series dealt with the Konrad Adenauer era (1949-66); the present volume takes the story from there to 1986. It is much better written than the first, devoid of the sociological jargon that plagued its predecessor. The bibliography is exhaustive, citing virtually every article and book on the topic in the major European languages. Archival sources are absent owing to the current nature of the investigation.

Lider investigates German military thinking through the various stages initiated in 1967 by Nato's decision to combine the military policy of defense by deterrence with the political policy of detente (or as the West Germans term it, *ostpolitik*): the strategy of flexible response, the new interpretation of forward strategy and the principle of incalculable risk, and the notion of military equilibrium in place of the erstwhile reliance upon American nuclear superiority. The book balances the position of the conservatives, who regained power in 1982, with that of the peace researchers, who question much of the present military doctrine of Nato. Both camps converge, at least physically, insofar as they operate mainly out of government-supported universities and research institutes.

The heart of the book deals with what Lider perceives to be the contradictory development of Nato's doctrine and force posture as well as the paradox that while the Federal Republic returned to the ranks of political and economic powers, it had severe limitations placed upon its military power. As a result, German military thinkers remain in a state of flux, apparently unable to determine how the strategies of deterrence and flexible response should actually be implemented. Moreover, there remains the historical baggage of the past. Neither allies nor adversaries want the *Bundeswehr* to become too strong. The West can hardly demand that it acquire offensive capabilities—which, at least in theory, are forbidden by the Basic Law of 1949. And no one could accept a German call for nuclear weapons. Therefore, German strategists are limited to being sideline commentators in discussions concerning the use of

nuclear weapons—first or second, counterforce or countervalue, massive or selective. In any event, German military thinkers are severely hampered by two factors: their armed forces lack a national command and a national military doctrine. Neither condition is likely to change in the near future.

In the final analysis, West German military thought is bound to remain squarely in the political arena. The Social Democrats and the Greens will continue to press for detente in Europe and will urge the new United States administration to push ahead with arms limitations with the Soviets. Neither of these opposition parties supports forward deployment of conventional forces or of American-controlled nuclear weapons. And even the Christian Democrats are not at ease with any policy that could result in the destruction of the other German state as the opening stage in any future war in Central Europe. Check and checkmate.

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Emerson, Steve. *Secret Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of The Reagan Era*. New York: G.P. Putman's Sons, 1988. 256pp. $17.95

Steve Emerson's *Secret Warriors* explores the military and intelligence aspects of covert operations with the objective of producing "newsworthy" revelations. He describes both actual and proposed covert operations, as well as the individual units assigned to carry out the missions.

Some of the operations are discussed in great detail: the preparations for the second Iranian rescue mission, when infrared reflective tape was used on the roofs of rescue vehicles to allow orbiting gunships to identify them in the streets of Tehran; covert flights into Central America; the insertion of U.S. military personnel into Lebanon to gather intelligence and coordinate a hostage rescue mission; the rescue plans for the passengers on the *Achille Lauro* and TWA flight 847.

Emerson's central theme is the potential for abuse arising from covert special operations forces. Because of their need to remain secret, few in the command structure are even aware of their existence. Since conventional means of supervision is absent, the individuals in these groups gain considerable freedom of action. There is also very little accountability for money spent. Emerson mentions Yellow Fruit as an example of a unit that eventually outgrew itself and could no longer hide behind its secret cover. A series of court-martials ensued, ruining several careers and resulting in an investigation by the Army that ultimately triggered a major reorganization of its special operations forces.

Similarly, Emerson examines the "special sense of mission" mentality that develops in these small, highly secret groups and sometimes leads to

an approach that puts the mission above legal and moral concerns. While unit "esprit" is very valuable, carried to the extreme it becomes dangerous. Closely linked to this concern is the ego problem, whereby the practitioners of special operations become so caught up in their own self-importance that cooperation with others is virtually impossible for them. The ultimate result of such a mentality is a series of bitter turf wars as each secret "empire" seeks to preserve and advance its own interests. Another problem is the sharing of the resources and information developed by these small groups in light of the need for secrecy. Several instances in the book highlight situations where one group had information invaluable to other groups or to higher authority, but did not pass it on for fear of compromise.

Given that these special units, in some form, will remain a necessary national security tool for the immediate future, the issues raised must be addressed if our nation is to conduct effective special operations. Foremost among these issues is the question of control. How is the necessary control maintained without crippling the effort? Normal bureaucratic procedures and lengthy chains of command rob the units of the two things they need most to respond to terrorists: speed and decisiveness. Yet too much freedom, as this book details, invites abuse.

The solutions to these problems are not easy. *Secret Warriors* does a service by presenting clear illustrations of the need to address them. But the work would be of much greater value if Mr. Emerson spent more time discussing issues and less on telling anecdotes. Such an approach would have produced a far more balanced and usable book. As it now stands, it is an entertaining newsmagazine with a hard cover.

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Godson, Roy, ed. *Comparing Foreign Intelligence*. New York: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Pub., 1988. 157pp. $17.95

Intelligence has been recognized as a legitimate subject for academic research and teaching only in the last ten years. Early seminars brought together scholars from a variety of universities and disciplines, but most were political scientists from American institutions. These seminars, and writings by former intelligence officers, journalists, and politicians specializing in intelligence, soon brought realization of the necessity for a multidisciplinary approach to the vastly increasing body of information available. It was also recognized that study has centered mainly on U.S. intelligence after 1940 (since more information was available on that topic than any other) and that explicit comparative research was needed on intelligence experiences of countries with diverse historical, political, and cultural backgrounds. Accordingly, this book consists of six

essays intended to highlight differences and peculiarities that need to be understood.

The preface and first essay, by Roy Godson, describe the short history of the academic study of intelligence and provide overviews of the other contributing authors' essays. He stresses throughout the still embryonic state of the entire subject.

Kenneth G. Robertson, a member of the British Study Group on Intelligence, writes on "The Study of Intelligence in the United States." He contends that the United States is the most influential center for intelligence study because of its strategic importance in the Western Alliance, the sheer quantity of information concerning U.S. intelligence, and the variety of conceptual approaches to the study. Robertson identifies and discusses four approaches: an early series of books and articles endeavoring to establish intelligence work as a respectable profession; the "liberal" approach, which considers as central the contrasts between intelligence activities and the values and systems of a democracy; the "surprise" school, which focuses on how intelligence can contribute to successful crisis management; and the "realist" approach. In the last of these, the defense of democratic values from threats to national security is considered more important than any tension between those values and the necessary intelligence activities. The emphasis is on developing efficient and effective intelligence practices through such methods as identifying threats and opportunities, and establishing intelligence requirements.

The third essay, by Christopher Andrew of Cambridge, concerns historical research on the British intelligence community. He makes some interesting observations on the relationships that have occurred between British and U.S. intelligence, and closes with a caution against presuming U.S. intelligence to be a pattern reflected in all other communities. This point is greatly expanded upon in later essays.

John J. Dziak, a defense intelligence officer at DIA, writes on "The Study of the Soviet Intelligence and Security System." His description of the Soviet system as the "counterintelligence state" sheds light on the extreme differences that national or cultural philosophies can cause between one intelligence system and another. A dominant concern with "enemies" drives the Soviet Union and various satellites toward making the security service and foreign intelligence the same organ of state. Dziak describes historically how the Soviet system came to be what it is.

Dale F. Eickelman, a professor of anthropology at New York University, addresses "Intelligence in an Arab Gulf State." The state he examines is Oman. He concentrates on one period: from the creation of a modern intelligence service (1957) to a palace coup (1970). The special cultural and political influences highlight differences in circumstances and therefore in objectives, obstacles, and conduct of activities between efforts in Oman and those

in other places, such as the United States. Among these influences are regional politics (where family or tribal loyalties may sometimes conflict with loyalty to the state), shifting popular ideas of security "threats," rapidly and greatly changing economic conditions (here affected by oil), and the participation of foreigners in the process. Eickelman points out the value of understanding how perceptions of political activities in different cultures shape the knowledge their intelligence communities generate (what is reported and how it is reported), and how this can affect the policies formed as a result of that knowledge. The small scale of the intelligence apparatus in Oman allows a full exploration and understanding of how various pressures and assumptions helped shape the reporting, analysis, and contributions to policy.

The final piece, by Adda Bozeman of Sarah Lawrence College in New York, is entitled "Political Intelligence in Non-Western Societies: Suggestions for Comparative Research." Bozeman begins with an explanation of the need to explore the history, culture, theology, and other aspects of the peoples one wishes to understand. The emphasis is that the "other" must be understood on its own terms, rather than from a framework of one's own values. She presents several case studies, mostly of Europeans in Africa and Asia, to illustrate successes and failures which hinged on this concept. She also offers observations on American approaches to foreign societies and shows why we have not done as well in winning friends as we might have due to our indisposition to look at circumstances from the viewpoint of the "other."

National interests increasingly revolve around places and peoples different from America and Americans in varying, sometimes drastic, degrees. Learning how the decisions and actions of other nations are influenced may be considered the very essence of foreign intelligence.

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Richelson, Jeffrey. *Foreign Intelligence Organizations.* Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988. 330pp. $89.95

As someone who has worked most of his professional life on the periphery of the intelligence community, I feel some reluctance to reveal one of its greatest and best-kept secrets: no matter what the conclusions are (or how they are packaged), the intelligence process itself is usually boring. The intelligence community is made up of thousands of bright, dedicated, and, frequently, very interesting and serious people who may spend their working hours poring over obscure newspapers or satellite photos; the field operative, trying to convert the distracted midnight comments of a source into something coherent and meaningful for the home office, feels

far removed from the wonders of the Tom Clancy hero or the James Bond operative whose only concern about cover is who or what he finds under it.

The latest intelligence survey by Professor Jeffrey Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Organizations*, demonstrates at length the same painstaking review of available sources which is characteristic of the intelligence community analyst. The book appears to review just about everything available in the public domain (with an occasional comment from the author's own sources) on the intelligence organizations of the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Israel, Japan and China. Each chapter follows a similar formula for each country: a section on the history of intelligence collection, details on the structure of the intelligence community, and a concluding section on recent intelligence-related incidents.

Although no new avenues are opened, the concluding items are the most interesting: the failure of British intelligence to anticipate the Argentine invasion of the Falklands; the response of Canadian military intelligence to Soviet under-ice missile firing capabilities in the Arctic; the Italian P-2 affair, and the alleged role of rogue intelligence units; a brief commentary on West German airborne collection capabilities over the Baltic; the French government's misguided attempt to divert protesters from its Pacific nuclear testing range by sinking the *Rainbow Warrior* in Auckland harbor; various Israeli intelligence successes and failures, including the infamous Pollard spy case; the Japanese maritime collecting organization whose extensive structure was revealed by the U.S. Government when it decided to exploit public indignation over the Soviet downing of *KAL 007*; and lastly, the almost incredible story of the long-term Chinese Communist "mole" in the CIA, Larry Wu-Tai Chin.

Diplomats and military commanders look at intelligence from widely divergent perspectives. The military commander, always Clausewitzean when combat looms, no doubt expects intelligence to provide clear conclusions that can help in battlefield tactics; modern technology ensures that what he gets is a cloud of information that adds to the fog of war. In contrast, the diplomat delights in the usual lack of clarity and options which intelligence provides; diplomatic careers are made in the ability to exploit these unclear zones. This tension between civilian and military leaders on the goals of intelligence is implicit in all policy determinations in the intelligence field. Unfortunately, these fundamental elements of the intelligence culture are not addressed in the various case studies in the Richelson book.

Professor Richelson has placed at least one reference on every paragraph in the book, for a total of 889 footnotes, distributed at the end of each chapter. It may seem strange to complain about sourcing in the face

of such a flood of references; however, in most case studies in the book, the author shows over-dependence on single sources, sometimes quoting the same book more than a dozen consecutive times. Of course, governments, with rare exception, publish little about their intelligence operations. For that reason, Professor Richelson must remain a prisoner to the books that refer to his subject and to newspaper articles on more recent matters. There is no separate bibliography, but such is clearly unnecessary.

Despite its shortcomings, Richelson has written one of the most comprehensive books available on the various intelligence services. One hopes that he eventually addresses such emerging Third World powers as Brazil, India, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. Each one has been in the press for one intelligence problem or another.

Military officers who deal with any of the countries covered will find the book of considerable value, but intelligence professionals will find it of only marginal utility. The intelligence buff will find it interesting, but will probably be looking for the latest Clancy volume before too long.

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# Recent Books

Barnett, Correlli. *The Pride and the Fall: The Dream and the Illusion of Britain as a Great Power.* New York: The Free Press, 1987. 359pp. $22.95

In 1986, Correlli Barnett published this book in Britain under the title *The Audit of War.* In this fully documented study, he explains Britain's fall from status as a great power since the Second World War. He focuses on the weakness of British industrial resources and financial capabilities, which was evident during the war. Barnett attacks Britain's failure to reconstruct her industrial base, reconstitute and retrain her work force, and reinvest her capital. The author's criticism of Britain is reminiscent of many of the points made by those who suggest that America is now a declining power.

Bowker, Captain Francis E. *Atlantic Four Master: The Story of the Schooner Herbert L. Rawding, 1919-1947.* Mystic, Conn.: Mystic Seaport Museum, 1986. 96pp. $22 (hardcover) $12 (paper)

American deep water commercial sail lasted until the Second World War. The former master of Mystic Seaport's two-masted schooner *Brilliant*, who was bosun aboard the *Herbert L. Rawding* in 1940-42, tells the story of the