

1989

Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since World War Two.

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Recommended Citation

Rhys-Jones, G. (1989) "Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since World War Two.," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 42 : No. 3 , Article 14.

Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol42/iss3/14>

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within the naval communities in Britain and the United States over roles and missions for the respective services, as well as for individual weapons systems, is well done. As usual, Friedman's research is first-rate, although this book, like his others, lacks citations. And some readers may find the detailed discussions of ship designs within the various chapters more a useful reference than a good read.

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Grove, Eric J. *Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since World War Two*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987. 399pp. \$34.95

This is not, as its title implies, a history of British warship construction. Rather, it is a tale of the protracted bureaucratic war waged by the Royal Navy's leadership since the 1940s to preserve a balanced blue-water surface fleet. It is a tale that will fascinate force planners on both sides of the Atlantic.

Against the constant background of a vulnerable economy that has never quite succeeded in providing a stable framework for long-range planning, Eric Grove shows us the effect of both liberal-leftist administrations distrustful of all things military and governments of the right with eccentric and equally damaging views on the usefulness of sea power in the nuclear age. He reveals the machinations of interser-

vice rivalry at their worst and he shows how, repeatedly, the shortage of manpower has arisen to dampen incipient delusions of naval grandeur. He makes clear how real combat (Korea, Suez, the Falklands) has obtruded to confound the plans and predictions of politicians and naval officers alike.

The development of naval policy during this period of radical change, as Britain painfully adjusted herself to a post-Imperial role, makes an epic tale, and Eric Grove tells it well. He begins in the immediate postwar era with a Board of Admiralty striving to protect its wartime investment against the forces of economic instability and shifting strategic consensus. He describes how Mountbatten (First Sea Lord 1955-59 and Chief of Defense Staff 1959-65) began to set the navy on a new course, emphasizing quality rather than quantity, and basing his case for a balanced fleet on an East of Suez intervention role. He shows how a Labour administration, a prey to economic and ideological forces it could not control, exploited both service disunity and inadequacies within the naval staff to demolish the central pillar of the Mountbatten navy (the fixed-wing carrier program) and, ultimately, to settle for a defense role in Europe and the Eastern Atlantic.

The author also examines the political, diplomatic, and economic pressures which continue to drive Britain toward a continental strategy. This, he implies, is the next intellectual challenge for those who

wish to keep the torch of sea power alight.

Although his primary focus is on policy issues in the corridors of Whitehall, Grove provides a fairly full description of naval operations in peace, crisis, and war throughout the period. Sparing us no detail, he also describes the various classes of ship by which staff officers have sought to meet the strategic requirements of the day, and some classes which (thankfully) never progressed beyond the drawing board. Some readers will find this technical detail excessive, blurring the clarity of the main theme.

There will be an inevitable quibble about the quality of his sources. In Great Britain, the "Thirty Year Rule" is alive and well. When dealing with the period up to 1954, therefore, the author is on firm ground and has access to authoritative documents in the public record. Thereafter he relies inevitably on biography, interview (not always impartial), and anecdote. Nevertheless, as a two-term Whitehall warrior during the late seventies and early eighties and witness of the infamous John Nott Defense Review, I found his treatment of the issues convincing. He captures exactly the atmosphere of crisis, the shooting from the hip, the far-reaching decisions required overnight, and the shifting bureaucratic alliances from which "policy" emerges.

Where does the post-Falklands Royal Navy go from here? Eric Grove takes the conventional and

pessimistic viewpoint. He sees little scope for any increase in general defense spending, and he views Britain's pattern of trade and interest as increasingly Eurocentric. In this context Grove believes Britain's continental commitment, the Army of the Rhine and RAF Germany, to be sacrosanct, leaving maritime forces exposed and vulnerable to the Treasury axe. At the same time, he argues, institutional changes within the Ministry of Defense, and particularly the concentration of power in the hands of the Central (Joint) Staff will tend to dilute the expression of the naval viewpoint.

This book is required reading for anyone starting a career in the Ministry of Defense. Despite its British setting (and the author presupposes more than average knowledge of British governmental administrative practice) any U.S. Navy officer destined for the Pentagon should read it too. You have been warned.

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Hyde, Harlow A. *Scraps of Paper: The Disarmament Treaties between the World Wars*. Lincoln, Neb.: Media Publishing, 1988. 456pp. \$18.95

At a time when the United States and the Soviet Union seem to be moving toward important arms control agreements, Harlow A. Hyde has produced this provocative book on the efforts of the great