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## Origins and Development of West German Military Thought: Vol. 2, 1966-1986

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to the Enlightenment. However, the drawback to using convenient historical packaging, like "revolution" in this case, is primarily semantic. This set of published lectures, like Roberts', remains a major contribution to the literature of war, to be read with profit by military professionals and historians alike who are interested in understanding the pace of continuity and change in the art of war.

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Lider, Julian. *Origins and Development of West German Military Thought: Vol. 2, 1966-1986: Swedish Studies in International Relations*, 21. Brookfield, Vt.: Gower Publishing, 1988. 637pp. \$113.95

The first volume in this series dealt with the Konrad Adenauer era (1949-66); the present volume takes the story from there to 1986. It is much better written than the first, devoid of the sociological jargon that plagued its predecessor. The bibliography is exhaustive, citing virtually every article and book on the topic in the major European languages. Archival sources are absent owing to the current nature of the investigation.

Lider investigates German military thinking through the various stages initiated in 1967 by Nato's decision to combine the military policy of defense by deterrence with the political policy of detente (or as the West Germans term it, *ostpolitik*):

the strategy of flexible response, the new interpretation of forward strategy and the principle of incalculable risk, and the notion of military equilibrium in place of the erstwhile reliance upon American nuclear superiority. The book balances the position of the conservatives, who regained power in 1982, with that of the peace researchers, who question much of the present military doctrine of Nato. Both camps converge, at least physically, insofar as they operate mainly out of government-supported universities and research institutes.

The heart of the book deals with what Lider perceives to be the contradictory development of Nato's doctrine and force posture as well as the paradox that while the Federal Republic returned to the ranks of political and economic powers, it had severe limitations placed upon its military power. As a result, German military thinkers remain in a state of flux, apparently unable to determine how the strategies of deterrence and flexible response should actually be implemented. Moreover, there remains the historical baggage of the past. Neither allies nor adversaries want the *Bundeswehr* to become too strong. The West can hardly demand that it acquire offensive capabilities—which, at least in theory, are forbidden by the Basic Law of 1949. And no one could accept a German call for nuclear weapons. Therefore, German strategists are limited to being sideline commentators in discussions concerning the use of

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nuclear weapons—first or second, counterforce or countervalue, massive or selective. In any event, German military thinkers are severely hampered by two factors: their armed forces lack a national command and a national military doctrine. Neither condition is likely to change in the near future.

In the final analysis, West German military thought is bound to remain squarely in the political arena. The Social Democrats and the Greens will continue to press for detente in Europe and will urge the new United States administration to push ahead with arms limitations with the Soviets. Neither of these opposition parties supports forward deployment of conventional forces or of American-controlled nuclear weapons. And even the Christian Democrats are not at ease with any policy that could result in the destruction of the other German state as the opening stage in any future war in Central Europe. Check and checkmate.

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Emerson, Steve. *Secret Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of The Reagan Era*. New York: G.P. Putman's Sons, 1988. 256pp. \$17.95

Steve Emerson's *Secret Warriors* explores the military and intelligence aspects of covert operations with the objective of producing "newsworthy" revelations. He

describes both actual and proposed covert operations, as well as the individual units assigned to carry out the missions.

Some of the operations are discussed in great detail: the preparations for the second Iranian rescue mission, when infrared reflective tape was used on the roofs of rescue vehicles to allow orbiting gunships to identify them in the streets of Tehran; covert flights into Central America; the insertion of U.S. military personnel into Lebanon to gather intelligence and coordinate a hostage rescue mission; the rescue plans for the passengers on the *Achille Lauro* and TWA flight 847.

Emerson's central theme is the potential for abuse arising from covert special operations forces. Because of their need to remain secret, few in the command structure are even aware of their existence. Since conventional means of supervision is absent, the individuals in these groups gain considerable freedom of action. There is also very little accountability for money spent. Emerson mentions Yellow Fruit as an example of a unit that eventually outgrew itself and could no longer hide behind its secret cover. A series of court-martials ensued, ruining several careers and resulting in an investigation by the Army that ultimately triggered a major reorganization of its special operations forces.

Similarly, Emerson examines the "special sense of mission" mentality that develops in these small, highly secret groups and sometimes leads to