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Secret Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of The Reagan Era

Christopher C. Staszak

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nuclear weapons—first or second, counterforce or countervalue, massive or selective. In any event, German military thinkers are severely hampered by two factors: their armed forces lack a national command and a national military doctrine. Neither condition is likely to change in the near future.

In the final analysis, West German military thought is bound to remain squarely in the political arena. The Social Democrats and the Greens will continue to press for detente in Europe and will urge the new United States administration to push ahead with arms limitations with the Soviets. Neither of these opposition parties supports forward deployment of conventional forces or of American-controlled nuclear weapons. And even the Christian Democrats are not at ease with any policy that could result in the destruction of the other German state as the opening stage in any future war in Central Europe. Check and checkmate.

HOLGER H. HERWIG
Vanderbilt University

Emerson, Steve. *Secret Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of The Reagan Era*. New York: G.P. Putman's Sons, 1988. 256pp. \$17.95

Steve Emerson's *Secret Warriors* explores the military and intelligence aspects of covert operations with the objective of producing "newsworthy" revelations. He

describes both actual and proposed covert operations, as well as the individual units assigned to carry out the missions.

Some of the operations are discussed in great detail: the preparations for the second Iranian rescue mission, when infrared reflective tape was used on the roofs of rescue vehicles to allow orbiting gunships to identify them in the streets of Tehran; covert flights into Central America; the insertion of U.S. military personnel into Lebanon to gather intelligence and coordinate a hostage rescue mission; the rescue plans for the passengers on the *Achille Lauro* and TWA flight 847.

Emerson's central theme is the potential for abuse arising from covert special operations forces. Because of their need to remain secret, few in the command structure are even aware of their existence. Since conventional means of supervision is absent, the individuals in these groups gain considerable freedom of action. There is also very little accountability for money spent. Emerson mentions Yellow Fruit as an example of a unit that eventually outgrew itself and could no longer hide behind its secret cover. A series of court-martials ensued, ruining several careers and resulting in an investigation by the Army that ultimately triggered a major reorganization of its special operations forces.

Similarly, Emerson examines the "special sense of mission" mentality that develops in these small, highly secret groups and sometimes leads to

an approach that puts the mission above legal and moral concerns. While unit "esprit" is very valuable, carried to the extreme it becomes dangerous. Closely linked to this concern is the ego problem, whereby the practitioners of special operations become so caught up in their own self-importance that cooperation with others is virtually impossible for them. The ultimate result of such a mentality is a series of bitter turf wars as each secret "empire" seeks to preserve and advance its own interests. Another problem is the sharing of the resources and information developed by these small groups in light of the need for secrecy. Several instances in the book highlight situations where one group had information invaluable to other groups or to higher authority, but did not pass it on for fear of compromise.

Given that these special units, in some form, will remain a necessary national security tool for the immediate future, the issues raised must be addressed if our nation is to conduct effective special operations. Foremost among these issues is the question of control. How is the necessary control maintained without crippling the effort? Normal bureaucratic procedures and lengthy chains of command rob the units of the two things they need most to respond to terrorists: speed and decisiveness. Yet too much freedom, as this book details, invites abuse.

The solutions to these problems are not easy. *Secret Warriors* does a service by presenting clear illustra-

tions of the need to address them. But the work would be of much greater value if Mr. Emerson spent more time discussing issues and less on telling anecdotes. Such an approach would have produced a far more balanced and usable book. As it now stands, it is an entertaining newsmagazine with a hard cover.

CHRISTOPHER C. STASZAK
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve
Naval War College

Godson, Roy, ed. *Comparing Foreign Intelligence*. New York: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Pub., 1988. 157pp. \$17.95

Intelligence has been recognized as a legitimate subject for academic research and teaching only in the last ten years. Early seminars brought together scholars from a variety of universities and disciplines, but most were political scientists from American institutions. These seminars, and writings by former intelligence officers, journalists, and politicians specializing in intelligence, soon brought realization of the necessity for a multidisciplinary approach to the vastly increasing body of information available. It was also recognized that study has centered mainly on U.S. intelligence after 1940 (since more information was available on that topic than any other) and that explicit comparative research was needed on intelligence experiences of countries with diverse historical, political, and cultural backgrounds. Accordingly, this book consists of six