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## Comparing Foreign Intelligence

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an approach that puts the mission above legal and moral concerns. While unit "esprit" is very valuable, carried to the extreme it becomes dangerous. Closely linked to this concern is the ego problem, whereby the practitioners of special operations become so caught up in their own self-importance that cooperation with others is virtually impossible for them. The ultimate result of such a mentality is a series of bitter turf wars as each secret "empire" seeks to preserve and advance its own interests. Another problem is the sharing of the resources and information developed by these small groups in light of the need for secrecy. Several instances in the book highlight situations where one group had information invaluable to other groups or to higher authority, but did not pass it on for fear of compromise.

Given that these special units, in some form, will remain a necessary national security tool for the immediate future, the issues raised must be addressed if our nation is to conduct effective special operations. Foremost among these issues is the question of control. How is the necessary control maintained without crippling the effort? Normal bureaucratic procedures and lengthy chains of command rob the units of the two things they need most to respond to terrorists: speed and decisiveness. Yet too much freedom, as this book details, invites abuse.

The solutions to these problems are not easy. *Secret Warriors* does a service by presenting clear illustra-

tions of the need to address them. But the work would be of much greater value if Mr. Emerson spent more time discussing issues and less on telling anecdotes. Such an approach would have produced a far more balanced and usable book. As it now stands, it is an entertaining newsmagazine with a hard cover.

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Godson, Roy, ed. *Comparing Foreign Intelligence*. New York: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Pub., 1988. 157pp. \$17.95

Intelligence has been recognized as a legitimate subject for academic research and teaching only in the last ten years. Early seminars brought together scholars from a variety of universities and disciplines, but most were political scientists from American institutions. These seminars, and writings by former intelligence officers, journalists, and politicians specializing in intelligence, soon brought realization of the necessity for a multidisciplinary approach to the vastly increasing body of information available. It was also recognized that study has centered mainly on U.S. intelligence after 1940 (since more information was available on that topic than any other) and that explicit comparative research was needed on intelligence experiences of countries with diverse historical, political, and cultural backgrounds. Accordingly, this book consists of six

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essays intended to highlight differences and peculiarities that need to be understood.

The preface and first essay, by Roy Godson, describe the short history of the academic study of intelligence and provide overviews of the other contributing authors' essays. He stresses throughout the still embryonic state of the entire subject.

Kenneth G. Robertson, a member of the British Study Group on Intelligence, writes on "The Study of Intelligence in the United States." He contends that the United States is the most influential center for intelligence study because of its strategic importance in the Western Alliance, the sheer quantity of information concerning U.S. intelligence, and the variety of conceptual approaches to the study. Robertson identifies and discusses four approaches: an early series of books and articles endeavoring to establish intelligence work as a respectable profession; the "liberal" approach, which considers as central the contrasts between intelligence activities and the values and systems of a democracy; the "surprise" school, which focuses on how intelligence can contribute to successful crisis management; and the "realist" approach. In the last of these, the defense of democratic values from threats to national security is considered more important than any tension between those values and the necessary intelligence activities. The emphasis is on developing efficient and effective intelligence practices through such methods as identifying

threats and opportunities, and establishing intelligence requirements.

The third essay, by Christopher Andrew of Cambridge, concerns historical research on the British intelligence community. He makes some interesting observations on the relationships that have occurred between British and U.S. intelligence, and closes with a caution against presuming U.S. intelligence to be a pattern reflected in all other communities. This point is greatly expanded upon in later essays.

John J. Dziak, a defense intelligence officer at DIA, writes on "The Study of the Soviet Intelligence and Security System." His description of the Soviet system as the "counterintelligence state" sheds light on the extreme differences that national or cultural philosophies can cause between one intelligence system and another. A dominant concern with "enemies" drives the Soviet Union and various satellites toward making the security service and foreign intelligence the same organ of state. Dziak describes historically how the Soviet system came to be what it is.

Dale F. Eickelman, a professor of anthropology at New York University, addresses "Intelligence in an Arab Gulf State." The state he examines is Oman. He concentrates on one period: from the creation of a modern intelligence service (1957) to a palace coup (1970). The special cultural and political influences highlight differences in circumstances and therefore in objectives, obstacles, and conduct of activities between efforts in Oman and those

in other places, such as the United States. Among these influences are regional politics (where family or tribal loyalties may sometimes conflict with loyalty to the state), shifting popular ideas of security "threats," rapidly and greatly changing economic conditions (here affected by oil), and the participation of foreigners in the process. Eickelman points out the value of understanding how perceptions of political activities in different cultures shape the knowledge their intelligence communities generate (what is reported and how it is reported), and how this can affect the policies formed as a result of that knowledge. The small scale of the intelligence apparatus in Oman allows a full exploration and understanding of how various pressures and assumptions helped shape the reporting, analysis, and contributions to policy.

The final piece, by Adda Bozeman of Sarah Lawrence College in New York, is entitled "Political Intelligence in Non-Western Societies: Suggestions for Comparative Research." Bozeman begins with an explanation of the need to explore the history, culture, theology, and other aspects of the peoples one wishes to understand. The emphasis is that the "other" must be understood on its own terms, rather than from a framework of one's own values. She presents several case studies, mostly of Europeans in Africa and Asia, to illustrate successes and failures which hinged on this concept. She also offers observa-

tions on American approaches to foreign societies and shows why we have not done as well in winning friends as we might have due to our indisposition to look at circumstances from the viewpoint of the "other."

National interests increasingly revolve around places and peoples different from America and Americans in varying, sometimes drastic, degrees. Learning how the decisions and actions of other nations are influenced may be considered the very essence of foreign intelligence.

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Richelson, Jeffrey. *Foreign Intelligence Organizations*. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988. 330pp. \$89.95

As someone who has worked most of his professional life on the periphery of the intelligence community, I feel some reluctance to reveal one of its greatest and best-kept secrets: no matter what the conclusions are (or how they are packaged), the intelligence process itself is usually boring. The intelligence community is made up of thousands of bright, dedicated, and, frequently, very interesting and serious people who may spend their working hours poring over obscure newspapers or satellite photos; the field operative, trying to convert the distracted midnight comments of a source into something coherent and meaningful for the home office, feels