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Book Reviews

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A Harmonic in Some Diverse Writing on British Naval History

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Cordingly, Davis. *Nicholas Pocock 1740-1821*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1986. 120pp. $18.95

Gough, Barry M. *Gunboat Frontier: British Maritime Authority and Northwest Coast Indians, 1846-1890*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1984. 287pp. $27.95

Lambert, Andrew. *Battleships in Transition: The Creation of the Steam Battlefleet 1815-1860*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1985. 200pp. $18.95

Ranft, Brian, ed. *Ironclad to Trident: 100 Years of Defence Commentary: Brassey's 1886-1986*. London, England: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986. 407pp. $39

Rodger, N.A.M. *The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1986. 445pp. $21.95

Semmel, Bernard. *Liberalism and Naval Strategy: Ideology, Interest and Sea Power during the Pax Britannica*. Winchester, Mass.: Allen and Unwin, 1986. 239pp. $34.95

The recent spate of books on British naval history has touched a wide variety of topics and has ranged across the centuries. Some particularly important recent works have already been reviewed in this journal, such as Piers Mackesy's *War Without Victory* (November-December 1985); Brian Lavery's *The Ship of the Line* (March-April 1986) and Philip Zeigler's *Mountbatten* (Winter, 1987). In addition to those volumes, there

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are a half-dozen more that deserve to be grouped together as books that suggest a broad subtle change of emphasis in writing naval history. A glance at the list above produces no obvious connection between the titles, nor for that matter does one hear the same note struck in reading the books. Yet amidst the various chords produced, one can detect a resonance among all these works as one listens to the *sinfonietta* of naval history. Each study, in its own way, relates naval affairs to the broader concerns of society in general. Each is a specialized work, but at the same time, each brings light to its subject by demonstrating a relationship between naval history and some aspect of general history. Not long ago, naval history was so specialized that few without professional naval interests, a technical background and practical experience even bothered to read it. Only 70 years ago, the British naval historian Sir Julian Corbett lamented that naval history had not found its rightful place. "The general historian . . . cannot afford to neglect naval history," Corbett wrote, "and he is the poorer for that link never having been fully forged for him." In the intervening years, one can virtually count on one's fingers the number of first-class works of naval history that have succeeded in reaching toward that goal. Now, to have the authors listed here, as well as others simultaneously working along such lines, certainly suggests that a silent revolution has occurred in the field. This change has been readily obvious within the academic world which now shows strong interest in naval and military affairs. This change also needs to be fully appreciated by the naval profession. What once was a narrow specialist preserve has now rapidly become an example of something with broader ramifications. With this change, the body of expertise is shifting toward those who see the navy, not as a world apart, but as a small part of the whole world. The challenge for the navy is not to resist the change of emphasis, nor to resist what might be seen as the intrusion of outsiders. The challenge is to learn to benefit from the new insights which this change brings with it. Naturally, the new emphasis will tend to emphasize civil, political, intellectual and social issues, and it might be thought that some of the more specialized topics of purely professional interest might be forgotten. That need not be the case, but surely this new emphasis will add to our understanding through a cross-fertilization of thought and reflection.

Nicholas Rodger's *The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy* deals with the earliest period among these books, and it is the most recent to appear. For the social history of the Royal Navy it stands as a beacon amidst largely uncharted waters. At the same time, it suggests a corrective to the work of earlier writers, particularly to Michael Lewis's *A Social History of the Navy*, John Masefield's *Sea Life in Nelson's Time* and Dudley Pope's *Life in Nelson's Navy*. However, these volumes, upon which our understanding of the social history of the navy rests, deal with the Napoleonic War period. Rodger's

work is a very carefully documented study of the social conditions within the navy during the Seven Years War, 1756-1763, in which he goes on to draw, with some caution, conclusions for the larger period 1740-1775. While the book is not the sweeping survey of the social history of the 18th century navy, as the title would suggest, Rodger's indepth examination, using hitherto untapped sources, paints a quite different picture of social conditions than the earlier writers have suggested. Traditionally, we have been led to believe that the English Navy of this period was a kind of floating concentration camp, but Nicholas Rodger skillfully shows that the social characteristics of the navy and society at-large were quite similar. Given the social values of both officers and enlisted men, a rigid and oppressive regime would not have been tolerated in the mid-18th century. As Rodger puts it, "no one who has ever commanded ships or men imagines that cruelty or oppression are the way to mould an efficient fighting force." British society in the 18th century displayed a kind of disordered cohesion, and so did the navy. "This made for a loose and disorderly system," Rodger writes, "but it also linked officers and their men together by the bonds of mutual need. Officers were not in a position to get what they wanted by the simple exercise of force and authority, and those who might have been inclined by nature to do so were restrained by the knowledge that the attempt would be counterproductive." In coming to this conclusion, Rodger relates the facts in a lucid style with a sense of humor and a keen eye for fascinating anecdotes. He is a rare writer who can coat his assiduous examination of the documents and pioneering analysis, based on the dry data of musters and paybooks, with engaging and readable prose.

Rodger examines with care the full range of issues from shipboard life, food and health, to career patterns, manning, discipline and politics. At the end of the volume there are appendices that provide a series of fascinating tables to support his conclusions and serve as a resource for other students of social history. Rodger's conclusion "that for all its undoubted peculiarities, the Navy resembled the society from which it was recruited in many more ways than it differed from it," expresses most clearly the new emphasis in naval history. His work is certainly a brilliant contribution to 18th century studies as well as a model for similar investigations of other periods and other navies.

David Cordingly's small book, *Nicholas Pocock 1740-1821*, is a study of a naval artist, and its value lies beyond the specialized interest of marine art historians. Indeed, Pocock is an unusual subject because so many of his working drawings, sketches and letters have survived. Using this material, Cordingly has been able to produce a portrait of a man that links the artist's own experience at sea, as well as his artistic work and career, with the taste of his high-ranking naval patrons and the evidence of historical events which these patrons provided to the artist. Cordingly's success in linking naval

history and art history is valuable. One hopes that this first volume in the *Conway Marine Artists* series is only the first step in an examination that could significantly enlarge our perspective. Needless to say, this is a neglected field, and it is one made far more difficult by the fact that "the admirals who commissioned paintings of sea battles, and the captains who ordered ship portraits were less concerned with a painter's artistic qualifications than with his knowledge of seamanship." Yet elucidation of that fact, which typifies so much naval art, certainly gives us a deeper perspective in appreciating both artist and art from an entirely new vantage point.

At first glance, Andrew Lambert's *Battleships in Transition* seems to be a book designed for the ship buff who is fascinated with the details of ship construction, rigging, and armament. The tables detailing such particulars and the well-chosen illustrations serve that purpose well. Yet the book is much more than that. Lambert also provides an interpretation which explains the nature of transition in warship design and shows the rationale for it in terms of both technical development and naval policy. In short, Lambert has attempted to take the study of warship design, which in the past has been seen only as a separate subject, and unite it with the mainstream of naval historical writing. This is a laudable goal which others can usefully emulate in the light of Lambert's success in this direction.

Two dates, 1815 and 1860, mark important periods in British naval history. The end of the Napoleonic War in 1815 is often regarded as the final high point in the age of fighting sail, while the year 1860, in which the first armored battleship, H.M.S. *Warrior*, was launched, is often used to mark the beginning of the era of modern warships. The 45 years between these two periods is usually forgotten, its warships regarded as ungainly and ill-designed wooden hybrids which could neither sail nor steam effectively. In fact, as Andrew Lambert brilliantly demonstrates in his richly illustrated volume, the years between 1815 and 1860 were a period of ferment, testing, and experimentation in which the steam battlefleet was created.

The central figure in Lambert's study is Captain Sir Baldwin Walker, Surveyor of the Royal Navy from 1847 to 1861. The British wooden steam warship was essentially his creation. A conservative and methodical man who lived in an era of dramatic innovation, Walker guided the surveyor's office along a path of evolution, rather than revolution, in introducing new naval technology. Leaving radical innovations to the French, he used superior British construction methods and conversions of older ships to maintain an effective balance.

By 1860, it was already clear that wood was no longer a suitable material for warship construction. Wood could not carry the concentrated weight of the newly developed engines and ordnance, but the change had been long delayed for several reasons. At first, timber was substantially cheaper than

iron, however this changed to give iron the advantage. Secondly, wooden hulls offered crews far better protection until armor plate was developed. Even then wooden hulled ironclads proved far stronger than ships built entirely of iron. Only after the navy adapted the idea of fitting armor plates, backed with a substantial amount of wood, to an iron hull was it proved that iron hulls could support more armor than wooden ones could. In addition, the Crimean War (1854-56) provided the first occasion when industrial nations mobilized their newly found technological powers to fight a war, and at the same time provided a stimulus to further research and development in warship design.

Lambert's book is clearly focused on British history, although developments in Russia, Turkey, the United States, Austria, Sweden, Denmark and Italy are summarized in three pages—and four pages of text are given to France. American readers will be interested to note that the British Navy had been particularly impressed by the U.S. Navy's steam frigate *Niagara* and the *Merrimack* class. The British built the *Mersey* class of 40 gun frigates in 1856-1858 as a direct response to American innovation. In general, this is a useful reference work combined with an insightful, extended essay on a transition period in naval ship design.

Gunboat Frontier is a masterful conclusion to Barry Gough's trilogy devoted to the Royal Navy's activities on the Canadian west coast in the 19th century. The previous volumes in the series, *The Royal Navy and the Northwest Coast of North America 1810-1914* (1971), and *Distant Dominion* (1980), rightfully attracted attention as well-researched and superbly written histories in the tradition of Gerald Graham. These earlier books dealt with the more commonly understood elements of naval power, extending the knowledge of naval historians to little known and seldom appreciated events. In his latest book, Gough examines an entirely new aspect of the subject: the interaction of the navy and the natives who were the objects of naval operations. Naval historians have traditionally looked at the continuum of a nation's national policy and strategy with its expression in terms of naval operations. Gough has taken a significant step forward in scholarship by including in that understanding the cross-cultural relations which are so often ignored, but which are so typical of overseas naval operations. His work in this area is all the more striking as it is a historical examination of the relationship between a European power and aborigines with few written records.

The central theme of the book is the navy as an instrument in extending British law and order among the Indians. In developing the theme, Gough first examines the relevant differences between white and Indian societies in the period, then reviews both British and Canadian provincial policy toward the Indians in British Columbia, focusing on the way in which the navy attempted to stop slavery, control the liquor trade, as well as to protect and support Christian missions in the region.

The readers of this journal will undoubtedly value the book more as a case study in naval power than for its contribution to Canadian history and the history of the American Indian, or even the light it throws on U.S. policy in Alaska. Yet, Gough's contribution in these areas is equally distinguished, even if it is not described in this review. The most interesting aspect for the general naval reader of this book is to see the customary technique used by a gunboat commander in carrying out his mission. Unquestionably, it was a technique which involved the use of force as a last alternative, but which maintained the resort to force as a credible choice for a naval commander, following a process of steadily escalating and selective pressures, short of all-out violence.

The customary technique for a gunboat commander was first to place his ship in a position where he could obviously use his guns to their greatest effect should they be needed. Then, as a show of force, he might draw attention to this fact by firing guns or rockets at a target. By the 1880s, searchlights could be used to increase the effect at night. Having suggestively demonstrated the potential use of his gunboat, the commander then attempted to reach his goals starting at the opposite end of the spectrum. First, he had a parley with the natives. If that brought no immediate results, he moved to punish publicly the offenders involved in petty crimes. If these restrained actions still brought no result, the commander then seized property, such as canoes which could also restrict the Indians' means of escape. Moreover, he could take chiefs as hostages until certain conditions were met. Throughout this process, an astute naval commander needed to be aware of the risks he was taking and the reactions of the other side. Therefore, he needed a constant stream of intelligence which was obtained by sending interpreters ashore with the police and by hiring native informants.

If the process of gradual escalation brought no satisfactory effect, overt force was used to destroy the livelihood of the natives. Gunboat sailors burned salmon weirs and canoes, torched villages and killed some of the inhabitants. As Gough phrased it, "If caught and tried, the guilty would be hanged before the assembled tribe. But in many cases, the smouldering ruins of a village and a scattered tribe were the telling testaments of the process of keeping Northwestern coast Indians in awe of British power."

Thus, the *Pax Britannica* constituted a system of worldwide dominion, but it was an empire based on power and not infrequently marked by racial and cultural tension. Peace in the British Empire meant a series of wars and low-level conflicts. In British eyes, this was a battle to establish virtue, law and order, and to prevent anarchy and chaos among peoples. It was a deeply felt responsibility which carried with it the high vision of eradicating slavery, piracy, murder, theft, cannibalism, and intertribal warfare. As an aside to this central purpose, there was Britain's prospect for gain through

trade and strategic position. In British Columbia, the character of this rule was determined, not by the distant committees meeting in London, but by the local governor and the local military and naval commanders on the spot. Their decisions and judgments mattered the most and characterized the era.

Despite the heavy cost of a "world police force," Britain clung to the basic principles of gunboat diplomacy for most of the 19th century: enforcement of local law and order through the threat of legalized violence. Barry Gough's case study is a major contribution to naval history and to understanding "gunboat diplomacy."

Bernard Semmel's *Liberalism and Naval Strategy* represents a welcome contribution to naval literature from a different quarter. All of the other scholars whose works I have mentioned here have been naval specialists whose work has broadened out to link other aspects of society with their special interest. Semmel, however, is an established student of liberal ideology who focuses on the navy for the first time. While his work occasionally betrays an unfamiliarity with naval affairs, these few slips are unimportant and do not mar the main point of his well-researched study of the naval literature of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Semmel demonstrates that liberal ideology played a key role in the shaping of naval policy in that period. While liberal ideology is often characterized as pacifist and antimilitary in nature, Semmel demonstrates that then, as well as now, there are different conceptions of the ideology, some of which played a role in formulating naval plans. Among these were naval operations against the slave trade; war on, as well as the protection of, commerce; the debate over offensive and defensive conceptions of strategy; policies regarding neutral shipping; and international maritime law.

The author paints a picture of two extreme ideological types. On the one hand, he shows a radical-liberal, and on the other, a reactionary-conservative. But he cautions that these are stereotypes, and the idea of a polarization between the two must be guarded against. The characterization of the two serves a useful purpose in showing a difference in outlook, although in practice, a more practical and qualified version of the types were involved in naval debates. In looking at his two "ideal" types, he characterizes them as "a free trader confronting a mercantilist, a cosmopolitan and internationalist opposing a nationalist and patriot; an advocate of liberal maritime policy versus an up-holder of belligerent rights at sea." The radical-liberal saw himself as rational and peace-loving in the vanguard of progress, while the conservative insisted that men were always as they had been and would ever be: ruled by passion, a thirst for power and warlike. When one sees the naval debate of 1880-1914 unfold in these terms, one gets a very valuable and useful insight into the nature of the social and intellectnal outlooks which drive the debate over the fundamental uses of the navy. It is an insight useful not only to the historian but also to the observer of current discussion.

This book is not easy reading for one unfamiliar with the historical period or one unfamiliar with the intellectual viewpoints expressed. That aside, it is a valuable and far-reaching contribution to our understanding of naval history on a wide plane.

With *Ironclad to Trident*, the well-known British naval historian, Brian Ranft, has produced an excellent centenary volume for *Brassey's Annuals*. Founded in 1886 by the famous naval specialist Thomas Brassey, the *Annual* has flourished for a century under a variety of names. First called the *Navy Annual*, it has also been titled the *Naval and Shipping Annual*, *Brassey's Annual: The Armed Forces Yearbook*, and today it continues as the *Royal United Services Institute and Brassey's Defence Yearbook*. Each change has reflected the way people have viewed naval matters over the last hundred years, first as a specialist subject, then merging with shipping and merchant marine, and finally as part of a broader understanding complementing the other services under the rubric of defense. The mutation in names is perhaps more than a reflection of various editorial preferences. It shows the maturation of thought on naval and defense matters over the last century.

A century of volumes is a library in itself, and it has been no easy task to pare down these riches into a cohesive single volume. Professor Ranft has not only done an excellent job in accomplishing that, but also provides us with an outlined history of the publication and, through his selections, reminds us of the rich trove to he found in the full set of *Brassey's Annuals* sitting on the library shelves. Ranft's sound approach to his task has been to divide up the 100 years into chronological sections which have a thematic unity and to select those articles which, in his judgment, best depict the most significant developments—both as they were seen during those years and as we look back on those years from the standpoint of today. In addition to the articles, Ranft has also selected a fine group of illustrations and advertisements from the volumes.

The themes which have been chosen are "Global Rivalry and Technological Change" in the period 1886-1904; "Anglo-German Rivalry and Continuing Technical Advance," 1905-1914; "The Great War," 1914-1919; "Disarmament and the Air Power Controversy," 1920-1935; "The Approach to War," 1936-1939; "World War II: Interpreting the Lessons," 1940-1949; Infantry Wars in a Nuclear Age," 1950-1956; "Strains within Nato: The ICBM," 1957-1965; "Nato and the Increasing Soviet Threat," 1966-1981. Over the years, the *Annual* expressed a wide outlook, not confining itself entirely to British views. Among these selections, Ranft has chosen some distinguished American naval leaders, including an article by W.S. Sims in 1907 on "Tactical Qualities of the Dreadnought Type of Battleship," E.J. King on "U.S. Naval Aviation" in 1936, C.W. Nimitz on the "Future Employment of Naval Forces" in 1948, and E.P. Holmes on "NATO from a

SACLANT Point of View" in 1971. Going over the list of articles one is struck, too, by the growing contribution of academics to defense literature. In the selections, we note the names of such well-known writers as Alistair Buchan, Michael Howard, John Erikson, and Lawrence Freedman. Notable, too, are the writings of senior officers and defense officals, ranging from Winston Churchill's statement in the House of Commons as First Lord of the Admiralty in 1914, to J.M.A.H. Luns on NATO defense in 1978, to the final article by the current Chief of the British Defence Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Fieldhouse, on "British Defence Issues, 1986."

Throughout its history, *Brassey's Annuals* have sought to provide intelligent commentary and accurate information on defense matters. Utilizing well the nature of the material at hand, Brian Ranft has made a judicious selection of commentaries from the wealth of *Brassey's Annuals*, providing historical insight into the development of modern defense thinking.

With these six volumes, one can sense a widely reaching change of emphasis in writing naval history. It is not a new development, but one that has occurred slowly over a long period of time. What is new, however, is the proliferation of the broad perspective in linking naval affairs with society at large. This is something which should be welcomed not only in academic circles, but within the navy itself.

Cimbala, Stephen J., ed. *The Reagan Defense Program: An Interim Assessment*. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1986. 215pp. $35

Stephen Cimbala deserves praise for presenting a symposium in print that allows the reader to be led in quick succession from the realities and appearances of the present and previous National administrations through a discussion of decisionmaking processes, or the seeming inconsistencies thereof, to a remarkably clear discussion of defense manpower by Lawrence Korb. The middle of the book features a chapter on "Special Operations Forces in the 1980s" and a chapter on the War Powers Resolution that includes, as an appendix, the text of the 1973 resolution that was passed over President Nixon's veto. The remaining 40 percent concerns the Reagan record on strategic weapons—"Ballistic Missile Defense: The Strategic Defense Initiative," arms control, and a summary of the Reagan Strategic Offensive Modernization Program. All contributors to Cimbala's symposium are academic political scientists who carry out their assessments from the viewpoints of that discipline.

In a brief review designed to help the professional naval audience decide the potential value of this addition to the literature, and perhaps also its value as a personal accession, it would be folly to attempt to discuss and

argue with each of the eight authors, so a brief view of the landscape will have to do.

The Oliver and Nathan chapter describes the Reagan policy of "horizontal escalation" without any identification of the "vital" Soviet assets that are thought to be at risk to such a U.S. policy. Perhaps the problem is that the viability of a horizontal escalation policy can only be determined through quantitative examination of options and capabilities available to both sides.

In the chapter entitled "Decision Making, Decision Makers, and Some of the Results," Vincent Davis notes that the Reagan administrations have violated the first rule in forming a government, i.e., decide how to decide. This has led to muddled organizational and procurement decisionmaking nightmares in the White House and the Pentagon, and an apparent lack of a national strategy. The reader should ponder his generalization: "the Air Force had too few modern weapons, the Army had too few people, and the Navy had too few thinkers." He also noted the questionable state of readiness of the services, except for the Marine Corps.

Cimbala seems to dismiss major conventional wars as being too difficult to think about. Does he imply that the Reagan defense program is relying on "nuclear overhang"? By ignoring the defense policy aspects of full mobilization and protracted conflict, Cimbala and his colleagues are missing initiatives the Administration is taking that may well redress concerns about sustainability and readiness of conventional forces. Omission of these areas of concern lessens the value of this book because of the inescapable linkages among manpower, budget, and strategy.

Sarkesian's one-sided discussion of "Special Operations Forces in the 1980s" fails to recognize the Soviet Spetsnaz or the roles played by modern unconventional forces from the Franco-Prussian War and on. Those who would ponder special operations forces should visit France and its myriad plaques to heroes of the French Resistance, or Burma where the American General Peers raised an indigenous enemy in the tradition of Lawrence of Arabia. Better yet, read Anthony Cave Brown's monumental *Bodyguard of Lies*.

"Ballistic Missile Defense" by Donald M. Snow undertakes the Herculean task of outlining the elements of the strategic debate and the Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative. He fairly outlines some of the pros and cons, but absent is a very convincing assessment of technological factors—will it work? Nor does Snow outline the assumptions and conditions that have to be met for it to work. Substantive matters of physics and engineering are seemingly subordinated to ideological arrangements.

Charles R. Gellner and Jeanette Voas call the Reagan approach to arms control an evolving record of hope. There are many who would question the authors' implicit asser-

tions that the Administration is dedicated to arms control. They clearly describe the increasing complexity of attaining arms control objectives, a result of the continuing build-up of defensive systems, which remains a nonnegotiable part of the discussions. Here again questions of technological feasibility seem to have been eclipsed by economic and political considerations.

Stephen Cimbala contributes the final chapter on the "Reagan Strategic Offensive Modernization Program." He develops some interesting dichotomies in the simultaneous modernization of the strategic offensive forces and the introduction of the Strategic Defense Initiative. He touches on the idea of "escalation dominance," the credibility and controllability of the limited nuclear option and on the concept of "launch on warning." He comments that even if the U.S.S.R. were to spend itself into bankruptcy, it would not necessarily provide for a more stable international environment. Cimbala does not comment on a bankrupt U.S. position.

In summary, *The Reagan Defense Program* is useful if topical reading. Whether it can be called an assessment is doubtful as few assessment criteria are presented. To paraphrase the 1980 campaign—has the U.S. national security posture been improved or decreased as a result of the high expenditures made and promised for the future? The book does not answer, except in a peripheral manner. But there is much material for the serious student to ponder and much to argue about if one introduces technical considerations and objective measures of effectiveness. Cimbala's book closes the gap between science and politics by offering practitioners of each discipline a glimpse into the other. Unfortunately, if accurate technical material exists, it is in the classified literature and of limited utility for purposes of the defense debate.

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Epstein, Joshua M. *The 1988 Defense Budget*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987. 57pp. $8.95

Joshua Epstein, a research associate in the Brookings' Foreign Policy Studies program and author of the Brookings' study of the FY87 defense budget, has written a study of the proposed FY88 defense budget in which he holds to the arguments presented in his previous work. Drawing on the research of other analysts as well as his own previous studies, Epstein concludes that the defense budget could be reduced by over $47 billion in budget authority in FY88-89 without adversely affecting the security of the United States. The budget cuts would be focused on the "investment accounts" (procurement, research and development, and military construction) in both strategic nuclear and conventional forces.

Epstein would reduce spending on strategic nuclear programs by canceling the Midgetman missile and the

antisatellite program, freezing spending on the Strategic Defense Initiative at the FY86 level, reducing development spending on the stealth strategic bomber, and capping the MX missile at 50 units. His basis for these proposals is that the United States already has a more than adequate deterrent, especially in the Trident submarine. The programs that he would cut add significant cost but do little to enhance the strategic nuclear war deterrent.

Although the cuts in strategic programs would save about $18.5 billion over the next two years, reductions in conventional forces would save even more—almost $28.8 billion in budget authority in FY88-89. The Navy would bear a large part of the budget cuts because Epstein would reduce the number of carrier battle groups from the programmed 15 to 12, thereby eliminating funding for two new nuclear-powered carriers and reducing spending on carrier-based aircraft and other ships in the carrier battle groups.

The rationale for the 600-ship, 15-carrier navy is said to be The Maritime Strategy which calls for the U.S. Navy to attack the Soviet Navy in its home ports. However, Epstein argues that to carry out such high-risk missions with even a moderate expectation of success would require at least 21 carriers. He claims that it would be more cost-effective to destroy the Soviet Navy through a combination of land-based air force attacks and naval barrier defenses. Without the offensive maritime strategy, no more than 12 carrier battle groups would be needed to defend the sea lines of communication.

Not all military affairs analysts reach Epstein's conclusion on the need for carriers. William V. Kennedy has argued for a 15-carrier navy and a modified maritime strategy (*Wall Street Journal*, 10 July 1987). Kennedy agrees with Epstein and other Brookings analysts that carrier-led attacks on the Russian naval base at Murmansk and operations in the Norwegian Sea would be suicide and cannot be the strategic basis for the 15-carrier, 600-ship navy. But, unlike Epstein, Kennedy believes that successful carrier and amphibious task force attacks could be carried out against the Soviet base at Petropavlovsk in the North Pacific. The threat to Soviet territory in the North Pacific might act as a deterrent to Soviet actions elsewhere and thus justify a 15-carrier battle group navy.

Epstein does favor some increases in naval spending on fast sea lift in place of more expensive airlift. Given this sea lift and the use of air power to block key passes in the Iranian mountains, he argues that Iranian oil fields could be defended against a Soviet invasion with two less Army light divisions than the Administration's budget calls for. He would convert these excess light divisions to armored brigades and shift them to NATO.

Epstein's analysis shows that a successful nonnuclear defense of NATO is possible. He indicates how this could be done, even with some reductions in certain NATO-oriented Army and Air Force programs. But

he also shows how NATO could not succeed if 100,000 U.S. troops were withdrawn as some have advocated. Interestingly, William Kennedy would favor the troop withdrawal to fund and man the 15-carrier navy.

Some hard choices lie ahead for U.S. defense planners. If increases in the defense budget continue to be less than the rate of inflation, as was the case in FY86 and FY87, then investment programs like shipbuilding may continue at the expense of operations and support funding needed to maintain personnel and readiness levels. Can we afford this? Epstein says no and provides his solution to the budget crunch. We may not like his conclusions, but we will be challenged to provide better ones. This study is worth reading in order to prepare for that challenge.

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Stubbing, Richard A. *The Defense Game*. New York: Harper & Row, 1986. 445pp. $21.50

In the recent plethora of books by so-called defense reformers, there have been some useful ones, but this one definitely does not fit into that category. *The Defense Game* contains errors in fact, is oversimplified, and casts issues in a manner that creates false impressions.

For instance: Stubbing claims that the military is overpaid and when he finishes with his pay gymnastics, the "typical" 0-3 is in the 44 percent tax bracket. Fact or fiction?

Another: he attempts to credit Secretary McNamara with the elimination of Atlas and Titan missiles (ICBMs) from the SAC inventory for financial reasons. This completely ignores the military's cognizance of differences between the operating efficiencies of solid and liquid-propelled missiles. The U.S. Air Force planned early on that Atlas and Titan I (liquids) were stopgap measures until Minuteman (solid) could be perfected.

Give Stubbing high marks for his "revelation" that the failure of the U.S. Air Force to pay adequate attention to the Close Air Support (CAS) mission has caused frustration for the Army and contributed to its higher cost alternatives. His solution grossly fails—he would transfer the CAS mission to the Army's control—overlooking the infrastructure of air fields, personnel, maintenance facilities, and other requirements that the Army lacks to perform this mission. Transfer of the mission would probably cause duplication of this infrastructure. He rightly damns the Army for its managing of DIVAD but fails to recognize that there is a valid need for an antiaircraft weapon to be deployed with ground troops. He considers aircraft carriers to be an infantile fixation of the Navy, without understanding their mission.

Stubbing's chapter on Caspar Weinberger is not only inaccurate but downright vicious and his comments misleading. He demands strong controls over the military, yet he decries micromanagement.

This reviewer has served in both the U.S. Air Force and the defense

industry for over 30 years. Granted there are problems and there is room for reform, but misguided and misleading books such as *The Defense Game* are counterproductive. If read and taken seriously by newly elected public officials and their staffs, it could lead to the creation of more don't-tell-me-the-facts-my-mind-is-made-up "experts" in Washington. There are many good staffers in Washington but when a supposedly "inside" staffer writes a book such as this, it casts a cloud over the entire Defense Establishment. Joining in its denunciation will only convince many defense critics of its correctness; ignoring it will only allow falsehoods to spread. This review is merely to alert the prospective reader to Stubbing's misleading innuendos and gross misstatements.

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Flanagan, Stephen J. and Hampson, Fen Osler, eds. *Securing Europe's Future*. Dover, Mass.: Auburn House, 1986. 336pp. $32.50

The United States and her NATO allies have been confronted with a common military problem since the beginning of their alliance: the containment of Soviet military power. Too many Americans fail to see beyond this strategic imperative to understand the complexities of the European situation and the varying perspectives that result—a myopia that leads to frustrations on both sides of the Atlantic.

This volume, from the Harvard University Center for Science and International Affairs, is an important resource for policymakers and interested observers wishing to understand the sources of cohesion and strain in the Atlantic alliance. The well-written and detailed chapters provide an essential foundation for current discussions of issues ranging from nuclear force reductions and conventional deterrence to out-of-area operations, and do not seem dated by recent developments.

A foreword by Andrew Pierre introduces the problem: increased transatlantic contacts have not led to increased mutual understanding as the "successor generation" in Europe grows more influential and as non-European cultures become more important to Americans. As a result, there is a need for "careful management of divisive issues so as to maintain Alliance cohesion."

These issues are explored in depth in chapters dealing with nuclear and conventional issues such as the Strategic Defense Initiative, emerging technologies, nuclear and conventional options, and political issues such as the "German problem," European domestic politics, arms control, and possible NATO alternatives. A concluding section discusses European economic security, armed neutrality, and regional security beyond the traditional NATO area.

The various authors provide a context in which to understand issues currently dividing the alliance. It is important to remember that Europeans are anxious to avoid *any* war,

nuclear or conventional, on their territory; deterrence is their highest priority. Part of deterrence is accommodation to nearby political realities, a position viewed by many Americans as one of supine acquiescence and incipient Finlandization. One result of this is a disinclination by Europeans to support military doctrines that appear provocative, such as current options for striking far beyond the forward edge of troops to the reinforcing echelons of Warsaw Pact forces.

Another facet of deterrence is making the Soviets believe that any aggression would have incalculable consequences. It is this latter dimension that explains NATO-Europe's hesitation about nuclear arms reduction—even though a nuclear war would be fought primarily on their territory. Since any war would be disastrous for Europe, they feel that the increased risk that a war might go nuclear is acceptable if deterrence is thereby increased. It seems to this reviewer that many Europeans would prefer the Soviets to believe that Western nuclear forces constitute a "doomsday machine" that cannot be stopped once war begins. This contrasts with American "warfighting" doctrines that call for the careful management of nuclear forces. The latter position makes more sense if war should break out, but the former may be more useful for deterrence in Europe. As the "rational" use of nuclear forces has become less likely with nuclear parity, only irrational/automatic escalation remains credible. As the danger of this position becomes more apparent, Europeans are still unlikely to move to a declaratory policy of "no first use," although there will be support for a policy whereby no *early* first use is necessary to prevent a Warsaw Pact breakthrough.

On the degree to which NATO should become involved in regional security issues below the Tropic of Cancer, the book points out that it was the United States, not the Europeans, who insisted on the provision in the NATO Charter that operations there not be required in support of the alliance, although they may be permitted. While the United States supplanted her European allies as a global power, they grew unwilling to support global operations. In the early days of the alliance they would have been only too happy to have NATO support for their colonial empires.

Readers of this journal will note that the maritime dimension of the alliance is not well-covered. If, as Robert Jordan has pointed out, NATO should be viewed as a maritime alliance, this is a significant lapse in an otherwise comprehensive survey. The land forces' continental strategy cannot succeed without maritime power keeping the Atlantic bridge to Europe open and projecting power on the NATO flanks. The Maritime Strategy of the U.S. Navy has even more ambitious intentions, of course.

The previous reservation notwithstanding, *Securing Europe's Future* is an important addition to the professional libraries of those interested in explor-

ing the NATO alliance in depth and understanding the varying issues and perspectives that will shape its future—and thereby the future security of the United States.

JOHN ALLEN WILLIAMS
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Archer, Clive and Scrivener, David, eds. *Northern Waters*. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1986. 240pp. $37.50

Northern Waters is a collection of papers on security and resource issues affecting an area within the latitudes of 60°N to 80°S and longitudes 40°E to 90°W. This encompasses the islands of Arctic Canada, Greenland, Iceland, the Faroes, the Shetlands, Jan Mayen, and Svalbard, as well as the mainland of Norway, reaching to the Kola Peninsula, and including the adjacent seas.

At a glance, one can quickly see that the papers discuss an area of considerable strategic interest to the United States in general and the U.S. Navy in particular. They are written by various people from the region. Editors Archer and Scrivener provide an introduction that puts the articles in context and, further, joins the resource and security issues. They make three points:

- Since the northern waters protect areas of transit, they are important for the transportation of economic resources.
- There are resources within the region of the northen waters that are of great strategic value.
- Political actors in the area are able to make a deliberate connection between resource and security issues.

In many ways this book is a primer on the area as well as the issues. Subjects such as law of the sea, resource endowment and exploitation, transportation of resources, new military technologies (including an interesting discussion of satellites), contrasting military strategies and political perspectives (both internal and external), and the control of conflict are addressed. A modest amount of regional history provides a useful background. Because this book is a compilation of separare papers, a particular subject tends to be covered in its entirety in that one discourse. This makes it convenient to pick up the book and read only that in which you are interested.

What *Northern Waters* does best is give to an area, that is to most of us nothing but cold, barren land and seascape, a life and vibrancy that puts strategic discussions into a context. The treatment of Svalbard in the discussion on the "Soviet Union and Northern Waters" is particularly good. On balance, it is a valuable collection of papers that deserves the attention of strategists and planners concerned with East-West strategy in general and the northern latitudes in particular.

J.S. HURLBURT
Captain, U.S. Navy

Lamb, David. *The Arabs: Journeys Beyond the Mirage*. New York: Random House, 1987. 333pp. $19.95

In this book, David Lamb sets out to answer the question he posed in preparation for his Los Angeles Times Middle East correspondent assignment: "If I want to understand the Arabs, not just their politics, where do I go. . . . Who are they?" While any one volume would be insufficient to answer fully this overlarge question, the author comes very close to providing a very comprehensive look at the people "beyond the mirage" of Arab politics, U.S. Middle East policy, oil politics, etc.

Beginning with a look at the people of Cairo and the plight of modern Egypt, Mr. Lamb then takes the reader on a tour of the Middle East based largely on his personal experiences there during the momentous years of 1981-85. His descriptions of Lebanon, Libya, terrorism, Islam, religious fundamentalism, the Palestinians, oil and the Gulf States, and the challenge of modernization are written in a tight, easily read, journalistic style which is filled with graphic images of people, places, and phenomena of the Arab Middle East. His successful attempt to add flesh and color to a region, which in many cases is described in the cold, hard logic of geopolitics, is a useful tool for one wishing to understand the Arabs.

In writing this description, Mr. Lamb has used the journalists' method of simplification. This could prove frustrating to some readers, but—as in his description of the evolution of Islam—he has in most cases provided the reader with an accurate account without the burden of minutiae. Certainly, more detailed, thorough, and scholarly works on the world's third monotheistic religion abound, but they are not read by the average American, and misunderstanding persists.

The real strength of this book is that it is simple enough to catch and hold the average reader's interest, but detailed enough to inform accurately about numerous aspects of what is to many a totally alien and mystifying Middle Eastern culture. Lamb tries to adhere to the advice given him by many Arabs: "Understand our culture for what it is, not for when it fails to measure up to Western standards." In fact, there are several portions of this book (Lebanon, Palestine) which could be considered to be too pro-Arab.

The book is weakest where Lamb dabbles in political analysis. For example, he is obviously concerned about international terrorism but falls into the trap of minimizing its moral impact by comparing terrorist death statistics with U.S. traffic fatalities. Similarly, while providing a highly illuminating view of both the cunning and the tunnel vision of Muammar Qaddafi ("a good study for a psychiatrist"), Lamb again goes on to minimize the long-term political impact of terrorism. His prescription for the problem also indicates a lack of in-depth political analysis of the field: revivifying the peace process; balancing U.S. policy in the Middle East; reducing U.S.-Soviet competition; and covert assassination of terrorist leaders. The first three recommendations are commendable

but his political analysis would have been far more convincing had he enumerated practical ways in which to accomplish them and had he also explained in detail why these methods have not worked as yet.

Lamb has, however, successfully avoided the pitfall of expanding this book into coverage of all Muslims and thereby confusing the issue of "who practices Islam," with "who (and what) is an Arab." He adhered admirably well to the central focus of the book: where the Arabs came from, what drives them, and what challenges they are likely to face in the future—all with a view to producing something to be read and understood by the layperson.

I would not recommend this as a comprehensive sourcebook on the Middle East but, if complemented by a study of Israel and Iran, it would certainly provide a good start. For the Middle East scholar, it will be unsatisfying from the standpoint of serious political description, but it will provide a potpourri of verbal images to enliven his understanding of the region.

D.B. DISNEY, JR.
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Parrot, Bruce. *The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987. 121pp. $17.95

Tucker, Robert W. et al. *SDI and US Foreign Policy*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987. 126pp. $19.50

In *The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense*, Bruce Parrot analyzes Soviet ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities, deployments, and policy statements by tracing the evolution of Soviet policies toward BMD. Parrot's work is a useful and much needed addition to the small body of literature currently available on Soviet BMD policy. *SDI and US Foreign Policy* is a collection of essays by Johns Hopkins University professors Robert W. Tucker, George Liska, David P. Calleo, and the late Robert E. Osgood. The authors examine the implications of SDI *vis-à-vis* U.S.-Soviet relations and NATO.

In *The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense* Parrot uses inductive reasoning and protocol evidence to examine and compare Soviet military and civilian publications on U.S.-Soviet relations and strategic defense. Soviet public statements are also tested against Soviet weapons development for possible political deception. Parrot argues that there are serious BMD policy disagreements in the Soviet Politburo. He claims there are two contending policy lines and interservice rivalries in the military. Supporters of the first policy line—such as the patrons of Brezhnev and now Gorbachev—aver that détente with the West is necessary so that more economic resources can be channeled away from the military and into additional high technology projects, thereby closing the East-West technology gap and improving Soviet economic performance.

According to Parrot, Gorbachev's Politburo patrons are attempting to

implement a two-pronged plan of diplomacy and public pressure with a sophisticated Western media campaign. However, this plan has been consistently undermined by the supporters of the second policy line. Here Parrot points to Politburo members Romanov and Shcherbitskii—who are often cited by Western scholars as opponents of Gorbachev—and several leading military officers, such as Marshals Akhromeev and Ogarkov. The second policy line is strongly in favor of BMD. The Air Defense Forces, backed by elements of the General Staff, support this line, while the Strategic Rocket Forces are more cautious. Parrot assumes that Romanov and others are encouraging military leaders to oppose Gorbachev's diplomatic initiative. There is some minor contention on this point since there is not enough information on the closed-door polemics of the Kremlin. Some Soviet analysts and most emigré-based assessments maintain that the relationship of the Soviet military to the Party's Politburo is such that the military is not a key political player in intense policy debates. Nevertheless, in the post-Stalin era, the military has been able to voice its concerns and offer expert advice to the Politburo. Active military officers are not represented on the Politburo and, as result, their interests are not directly represented at those long "Thursday" meetings.

In *SDI and US Foreign Policy*, Tucker avers that "SDI raises the prospect of precipitating a war—and perhaps a nuclear war—between the superpowers." He buttresses this argument with a White House pamphlet on SDI which contends that deterrence would collapse if the Soviets unilaterally deployed a nationwide BMD. Tucker believes that SDI is the first way point on an isolationist course for U.S. foreign policy: "SDI betokens the attempt to return to a past that cannot be restored, to a past when we were secure from physical attack. . . . " Tucker's arguments are indeed worthwhile, although he occasionally discusses mutual assured destruction as if it were the same as mutual deterrence. He does not recognize the concept of mutual assured survival. Both mutual assured destruction and mutual assured survival are, of course, corollaries of the concept of mutual deterrence.

Liska's essay propounds the obverse of Tucker's isolationist argument. Liska maintains that the United States could use BMD to effect the "elimination of Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe, using local disaffection from behind the shield of strategic defense." Calleo argues that BMD is a "technological fantasy" that will only exacerbate conventional, vice nuclear, defense spending priorities. Osgood sees no transformation of the NATO alliance—at least not for the worst—caused by SDI or a deployed U.S. BMD and believes a weapons regime with antitactical ballistic missile systems will exist. There is some domestic opposition in Europe to SDI research programs, but the United Kingdom, West Germany, and France are involved in SDI

research programs and a similar European initiative, and France has even embarked on its own BMD research program.

ANTHONY C. HOLM
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Prados, John. *Pentagon Games: Wargaming and the American Military*. New York: Harper & Row, 1987. 81pp. $9.95

John Prados is a man who knows the subject of wargaming well. As a designer of commercial wargames, he has tangled with the same problems in the creation of a tabletop game as Pentagon strategists do in the invention of a much more complex war simulation. In this book, Prados not only explains the difficulties and faults of using wargames as an accurate simulation of the real world, but delves into the reasons why strategists are so fascinated by the artifical reality they create.

The book begins with a quote from Stephen Vincent Benét which sums up the essential problems of converting slippery reality into hard technical data. "It is all so clear in the maps, so clear in the mind, but the orders are slow, the men . . . are slow to move, when they start they take too long on the way." Men cannot be reduced to "wooden blocks," orders cannot be expected to be executed perfectly every time, and confusion reigns on the battlefield. The war does not proceed as foreseen in the well-ordered world of the wargame—the fog and friction of battle triumph.

A short history of the development of wargaming follows, from early models such as "Go" and "Chess" to more advanced models such as the German "Kriegspiel" which utilized many different types of playing pieces, terrain, and a specific scale to represent size and weight of units. Interesting anecdotes abound throughout these pages, including a short history of the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor and the use of a real-time Kriegspiel which led to the German counterattack at the Battle of the Bulge.

The remainder of the book focuses on the growing use of the wargame as a simulator of reality in U.S. military policy, starting with the "Aggressor" and "Opposing Forces" simulations of the late 1950s and 1960s, to the current "MILES" wargames held at Fort Irwin, California and the Studies Analysis and Gaming Agency (SAGA) games played deep within the Pentagon.

The greatest portion of the book deals with the problems of quantifying the arms and men that form an army. To have an accurate and realistic wargame, the values used for the combat ability of each specific type of weapon and unit must be extremely precise. Firepower, though, is an ambiguous concept. Firepower scores are determined in laboratory conditions where there are no duds, and all equipment works perfectly. Additionally, while each weapon is tested in isolation, in a battle they operate together. Their collective firepower values cannot simply be added to find an aggregate value for

the larger unit. Finally, the decrease of weapon effect over range is not usually figured into the firepower scores. Explosive shells retain the same strength regardless of the distance to the target, whereas solid shot weaponry effect decreases radically as distance goes up. Certain weapons become much more useful than others over small distance changes, but this is not calculated into unit strength.

A further fallacy in the creation of firepower scores lies in the use of the most recent war as the model for effectiveness of weapons, measured by which type of weapons cause what percentage of casualties. However, the technological advances in weaponry render any data obtained in a previous war almost useless for determining the utility of the weapon in the next war. The type of war fought can also change dramatically. The most obvious example is Vietnam where casualty percentages from mines and booby traps were much higher than in the Korean war, from which the weapon effectiveness figures had been drawn. The effects of terrain introduce another level of complexity into the design of a wargame. Like firepower, it is nearly impossible to quantify accurately the effects of terrain upon each piece of equipment moving over it, defending it, or shooting through it. Leadership, troop morale, and training add yet more complexity to the simulation, for weapons cannot be used to their full expected effectiveness if the troops that use them are of poor quality.

All of these uncertainties come to a head when nuclear weapons are introduced into the equation. There has never been a war that has employed tactical nuclear weapons, and the net U.S. experience of combat in a nuclear environment was a series of extremely artificial maneuvers conducted in the 1950s. Very little is known about how these weapons will function in a real war and what their effect will be upon other aspects of the battle. Any quantification of their effects contains a good element of guesswork.

The final type of wargames that Prados analyzes are politico-military simulations. These suffer from further subjectivity as they are usually moderated by human umpires who add their own biases into the game. In many games, the people who caused the game to be played have specific personal agendas and aims which they wish the games to show. Therefore, the umpires force the game to proceed in ways which the players are trying to avoid, thus negating any semblance of realism. One example was a SAGA game which ended in a nuclear war. One player complained that "if your control group had left us alone, we could have negotiated a lasting peace!"

The book includes three pull-out wargames to introduce the novice to the ideas behind simulated wargaming. Although fairly simple, they serve to illustrate the complexities of reducing real-life situations such as Pentagon research and development or budget procurements into playable

wargames. One realizes with a start that the appreciable differences between reality and these games is probably quite similar to the differences between a real war and a Pentagon simulation.

Prados does not state that wargames have no utility, only that now, during a period of peak interest in gaming technologies, they are being used far in excess of their abilities to predict anything real. Commanders who play wargames are often lulled into believing that they have had real battlefield experience, when in reality they have nothing of the sort. The true strength of wargames lies in their ability to inculcate basic tactical concepts into field commanders and to give the experience of making command decisions to higher level officials. To claim that a wargame, however complex, simulates the actual events of a war is the purest fantasy.

HENRY W. MAHNCKE
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Burrows, William E. *Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security*. New York: Random House, 1987. 401pp. $19.95

As impelled by the title, William Burrows takes the reader on a fantastic, sometimes disconcerting, and often incredible journey into the deepest reaches of the so-called black world of the U.S. intelligence community. He approaches the subject with the zeal of an investigative reporter preparing an exposé and the plodding style of a graduate student writing a history seminar paper. His uneven handling of this material, while a distraction, fortunately does not detract from the fundamentally solid nature of the book.

Mr. Burrows begins and ends his book with the same thesis. According to him, "[I]n the case of arms control, it is important for the citizens of the Western democracies to gtasp enough of the process of the national technical means of verification and about space surveillance in general so that they can make informed judgments on the matter, rather than abandon such an important subject to the whims of successive politicians and their subordinate ideologues."

Despite the title, this work addresses much more than just the business of "space espionage and national security." The contents of the book range from a continuing discourse on the competition between the U.S. Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for control of U.S. space-based reconnaissance assets, to a review of the growth of the U-2 and SR-71 programs, to rather elaborate (and one suspects sometimes speculative) discussions of past, present, and future space surveillance systems. The author even includes a discussion of the Soviet space reconnaissance programs and antisatellite weapons as he and his sources understand them. The technical descriptions make for fascinating reading, and the conviction with which Mr. Burrows describes the sophisticated equipment makes one believe that the

systems described could indeed do what he says they do. Unfortunately, the secrecy that shrouds such technology makes it virtually impossible to verify even the existence of these systems, not to mention their capabilities.

If the information presented is correct, as Mr. Burrows alleges, there is much that the intelligence community can point to with pride. The author examines in some detail how the developers of space-based surveillance systems continually push technology to the very limits in their search for a better way to gather the information demanded by the National Command Authority. There is also a great deal about the U.S. intelligence collection process that should be an embarrassment to the Government. Mr. Burrows does not seem to find fault with the trial and error methods employed in the pursuit of new technology. Rather, he criticizes the apparently unnecessary competition between agencies within the Government as each tries to best the other through its design contractors. His contention that secrecy often is used to hide inefficiency and a lack of cooperation between Government organizations is the heart of his criticism and is well-documented.

Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of this book is the reader's inability to confirm the accuracy of the author's statements. It is the nature of such works that the sources who are willing to discuss (for attribution) their experiences are often those who have expressed dissenting views, either during their tenure "on the inside," or after they have left the Government. This may mark them as "rabble-rousers" or "sore losers," and cast some doubt on their comments. The use of unnamed inside sources or expert sources who are outside of the system, while lending credibility, still falls short of confirming the accuracy of the author's allegations. Thus, the reader is left to decide for him/herself exactly where the truth lies.

In this book, the author has resorted on several occasions to the technique of "validation by condemnation." That is, he cites a well-placed individual who expressed fear or anger at the revelations being offered and then implies to the reader that this is proof of the accuracy of those revelations. This is an appealing argument and may have some basis in fact. The author's use of buzzwords and certain documentable facts also has the effect of lending credibility to what might otherwise be called innuendo or speculation. A good example of this is his habit of referring to space reconnaissance programs (real and postulated) by declassified or compromised code names that have appeared in the open press. This gives him the aura of someone on the inside, in spite of his acknowledgment that his data has been gathered from available unclassified sources.

The underlying motivation for this book is revisited convincingly in the final chapter. Mr. Burrows concludes his examination of the growth of the various "national technical means of

verification" with an intriguing enigma. His questions are simple and straightforward. If the United States has been able to detect and identify Soviet violations of previously negotiated arms control agreements through the use of the aforementioned national technical means, why do current Government officials contend that future arms control agreements are impossible because they would be vulnerable? If past systems have been sufficient to support allegations of Soviet treaty violations, why would the present and future surveillance systems described in this book be unsuited to the task of treaty monitoring in the future? The questions are good ones, no matter how one feels about the factual content of the rest of the book. The average reader will be left with an uncomfortable feeling that perhaps there is indeed something that the Government is not telling the American public. If that feeling persists, Mr. Burrows will have achieved his objective.

CHARLES L. ALDRICH
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Lockhart, Robin Bruce. *Reilly: The First Man.* New York: Penguin Books, 1987. 167pp. $3.95

Readers who enjoyed Lockhart's *Reilly: Ace of Spies* will want to read his sequel, *Reilly: The First Man. Ace of Spies* was made into a TV miniseries and, in the final episode, after learning his fate from the Cheka (Soviet secret police) boss, the dreaded Feliks Dzherzhinsky, Reilly is gunned down in a forest clearing.

In his new book, Lockhart reveals the disagreement he had with the series' producers about this ending. He wanted the series to end as the book did, with Reilly's fate wrapped in mystery. In reality, the original Russian news version of Reilly's death stated that he had been killed on the Soviet-Finnish frontier in September 1925. But, there has never been an official Soviet statement that Reilly died at the hands of Soviet authorities.

Lockhart's sequel makes the startling claim that Reilly not only was not killed, but in fact defected to the Soviet side and for the next two decades assisted Soviet intelligence in setting up and running foreign clandestine operations. Lockhart's new book is a storehouse of evidence to support this unsettling thesis.

Why should it be unsettling that Sigmund Rosenblum (Reilly's real name) was not shot by Dzherzhinsky's fanatics, but ended up working for them? What importance would this have other than tidying up a footnote in the narrow and murky *demimonde* of espionage history? According to Lockhart, it is extremely important because Reilly's defection to the Soviets over 60 years ago so damaged Western security interests that the consequences are still with us today. Such was the evil fruit of Reilly's change of uniform that Western intelligence agencies, especially the British, have been crippled by the implantation of a coven of moles or by a suspicion of moles which has

precipitated a paralyzing mistrust among Allied intelligence agencies.

Here follows the bare bones of Lockhart's hypothesis. Sidney Reilly returned to Russia in 1925, only ostensibly, to contact members of the anti-Bolshevik conspiracy called the Trust. Beforehand, he had arranged, through back channels, with Dzherzhinsky to defect to the Soviet Union under the cover of the Trust operation. The Cheka received him with open arms and masked his defection with false reports of his death. Dzherzhinsky and companions welcomed Reilly with honor because although they were veteran conspirators—cunning and patient—their experience was almost entirely within Russia. Reilly not only brought them an Aladdin's cave of information on the British secret service, but a high degree of sophistication and familiarity with the world outside of backwards Russia—a quality in extremely limited supply among top Bolshevik leadership. After Reilly's disappearance in 1925, Soviet intelligence changed tack and launched a quiet but persistent and insidious attack on the West, focusing on Britain. Reilly's knowledge of the turf was indispensable and probably the inspiration behind the new effort. He identified targets among the sophisticated yet disaffected upper class in England. This resulted not only in the recruitment of a "hornet's nest of homosexual moles" but also of the lethally effective heterosexual, Kim Philby. (Apparently the KGB's enlightened employment policies barred no one on the grounds of his/her sexual preference.) The same approach was taken elsewhere in Europe and to some extent in the United States where the Roosevelt administration, all the way to the White House, became peppered with Soviet agents. Western counterespionage services, where they existed, were made aware of the scope of Soviet operations in the thirties only by the defection of key Soviet intelligence officers who bolted to the West in preference to certain death in the U.S.S.R., which Stalin's purges had turned into an abattoir. Though Reilly is now dead, his legacy lives on in current day Soviet clandestine operations, not only in technique, but in the patient long-term recruitment and placement of agents.

Lockhart makes this mouthful palatable by seasoning it with both evidence and conjecture. First, there is substantial data from widely disparate sources stating that Reilly did not die in 1925. Many sources attest (some to Lockhart personally) that Reilly was alive at least as late as the midforties. The author also claims that despite the fact that Reilly was illegitimate, left his motherland in his youth, and spied for Britain, he always had a deep affection for Russia. Furthermore, despite his high living and capitalist business adventures, Reilly's political leanings were very much to the Left. He not only flirted with Marxism in his youth, but in later life attested to the virtues of Bolshevism. (He even did this in writing to Lockhart's famous father, Bruce Lockhart, with whom Reilly

conspired to overthrow the Reds in 1918.) Reilly had, on occasion, predicted the victory of the Bolsheviks and often remarked that it would probably be better to join rather than to fight them. In addition, Reilly's personal and professional life gave such ample evidence of deceit and deviousness as to cast suspicion on his loyalties, if, indeed, he had any. It has also been attested that Reilly knew that the Trust was a Soviet setup before he made his final trip to Russia. Soon after Reilly's disappearance, British intelligence suffered dramatic reverses and agent losses in Russia. Lockhart claims that an MI5 (British counterespionage) "mole-hunter" told him in no uncertain terms that Reilly went completely over to Moscow.

Most of the evidence presented in *Reilly: The First Man* is circumstantial. Lockhart's chain of evidence has some weak links in it. The statement that Sidney Reilly did not die in 1925, lived two more decades, was Left in his politics, and so on, does not mean that he became a Karla-like *eminence grise* masterminding post-1925 Soviet intelligence operations. Although convincing and intriguing, many of Lockhart's arguments are of the *post hoc non propter hoc* genre.

On the other hand, airtight ratiocination is but one method of nailing down truth. Intuition is the mind's direct line-of-sight to the truth. The fact that Lockhart does not present his conclusions by means of a neo-scholastic thesis does not mean that he has not rent the veil shrouding the mystery of Sidney Reilly.

Lockhart also makes a case for a serious scholarly historical study of intelligence. If not handed down, a treasury of knowledge can be dissipated in less than a generation. How many professional intelligence officers in the West today have read even one of the accounts of important Soviet defectors such as Agabekov, Krivitsky, Reiss, and Orlov, or later defectors such as Gouzenko, whose revelations led to the disclosure of U.S. atom spies? Loss of memory is regarded as a mental disorder in a person. Can it be considered anything less in an institution?

Lockhart is an excellent writer. He is not only clear and concise, but eloquent. His prose is captivating, and his new book is good reading not only for those in the intelligence world, but also for those who enjoy a well-spun tale.

DENNIS A. BARTLETT
Saint Ignatius Institute

Dower, John W. *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War.* New York: Pantheon Books, 1986. 398pp. $22.50

The devastation left in the wake of the Pacific war was immense. For the United States, total victory was synonymous with total destruction. What was required to achieve total destruction was only possible through mass mobilization of the population and the creation of a fighting force which could mirror the intensity of the Nation's anti-Japanese sentiment. The result was a ferocious battle cry

which reduced the enemy to a subhuman level.

Perhaps it was only through this reduced consideration of the enemy that the war could have progressed through such horrific proportions. In any case, victory was achieved in a "war without mercy." In his book, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*, John W. Dower examines the evidence of this racial intensity between the United States and Japan. In a time when it appears as though the population of the world has gained a greater understanding of, and respect for, racial differences and diverse heritages, it is disturbing to read Dower's account and accept the fact that he is writing about very recent history. The war atrocities, the savagery in battle, the dehumanization of the enemy by both sides, and the very dimensions of the conflict, which Dower describes in comprehensive detail, are shocking and difficult to imagine. According to the author, however, these facets were unique to the Pacific war and are the products of racial differences which turned into racial hatred.

In addition to his examination of the war itself, Dower devotes a good portion of his text to an exploration of Japanese culture and the perception of the "Yamato Race" as the nucleus of a grand global policy by the Japanese. While this examination reveals some very interesting and enlightening aspects of Japanese society, Dower's conclusions will not surprise any student of Japanese history. There is, however, in the final chapter of this book, a subtle foreboding over Japan's economic prowess and how that may once again spawn "patriotic anger" between the United States and Japan. If economic competition leads to conflict, just as territorial expansion did in 1941, Dower appears to believe that racial aspects of such a conflict may appear again. How prevalent these aspects become will certainly be an indication of how far the world has truly progressed over the past 40 years.

THOMAS B. MODLY
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

Nguyen, Tien Hung and Schecter, Jerrold L. *The Palace File*. New York: Harper & Row, 1986. 542pp. $22.95

This book chronicles the demise of the Republic of Vietnam. It is a distressing story. There is little that is new in it, but the detailed documentation of American guarantees to Saigon and the blend of anguish and outrage permeating its pages combine to leave the reader with a feeling of anger and shame, anger at what happened and shame for America's role therein.

Three themes are intertwined in this tale. One is about the decline and fall of South Vietnam, reaching high drama in the spring of 1975. The second deals with key personalities in the United States and South Vietnam and the part they played in the final debacle. The third is the South Vietnamese perception of what transpired—indeed, this is President Nguyen Van

Thieu's history of the last years of his country, told principally through Nguyen Tien Hung's pen.

One sees the slide into disaster beginning with an optimism that altered, pace by measured pace, into a sense of foreboding followed by an awareness of impending doom. To the South Vietnamese, the blend of Vietnamization plus negotiations utilized by the Nixon administration "competed with and undercut one another." The U.S. opening to Beijing meant to Thieu that "South Vietnam had metamorphosed from being an asset to a liability." The Paris Accords of 1973, which purported to achieve "peace with honor . . . [made] no provision for the removal of North Vietnamese troops [from South Vietnam]. . . ." It was understood in Saigon that "the threat of U.S. intervention was critical to deterring a North Vietnamese invasion." Thieu apparently believed that to be a credible threat, principally because of Nixon's earlier willingness to use force in the face of massive public and political opposition. Reinforcing South Vietnamese confidence in the American guarantee was the apparent existence of "a U.S. contingency plan to keep North Vietnamese targeting information updated even after the cease-fire."

We cannot know if such a threat would ever have been exercised had Nixon been President when, or perhaps, *if*, Hanoi had undertaken its grand offensive against Saigon. What is certain is that the Watergate scandal weakened the Presidency and replaced Nixon with a weak and mediocre President. The scandal and its immediate consequences were not fully understood by Thieu. What was recognized in short-order was that Congress "had no time or inclination to deal with any other issue, let alone aid for South Vietnam."

These developments finally made an impression on Saigon. The authors describe how Thieu planned to relinquish virtually all of the two northern Corps areas in order to save the rest of the country, as "a reduced 1975 [U.S.] aid program could support only a truncated South Vietnam." The intensity of the ensuing Communist assault, initiated before that withdrawal could occur, was a shock to Saigon, although the attack itself apparently was not a surprise. The end was truly pathetic. As the authors put it, "Evening TV news programs showed terrified refugees struggling to flee Da Nang, the South Vietnamese Army in a shambles, and [President] Ford playing golf." On 30 April 1975, the war ended with the last Americans and some South Vietnamese scrambling for safety from the ruins of a war.

It is hard to be dispassionate about this portrayal of an American humiliation and a South Vietnamese catastrophe. One is struck by how personalized the Vietnamese leadership viewed policy in general and the United States in particular. Senses of reassurance, despair, and betrayal fluctuated according to the U.S. officials with whom Saigon was dealing. Nixon comes across in a

generally favorable light as a strong President who "had no illusions about Hanoi's intentions" and acted as best he could under the circumstances. Others do less well in this book. There is something profoundly unsettling about a photograph of Ford, Kissinger et al. sitting in the White House under a portrait of Theodore Roosevelt, while acquiescing in defeat and abandoning an ally. One senses that Nixon (to say nothing of Roosevelt!) would have done better.

The book itself is hardly a model of craftsmanship. It reads like a diary with some expanded narrative and documentation. The discussion lacks chronological continuity in places. The authors acknowledge the corruption that permeated the Vietnamese leadership, yet they downplay Thieu's own authoritarianism and corruption, to say nothing of the venality of his family. The text could also have benefited from the judicious application of a better editorial pen.

These caveats notwithstanding, one must nonetheless acknowledge the essential accuracy of the book's thesis. The United States pledged its support to South Vietnam before and after the Paris accords were signed, and the U.S. Congress—aided and abetted by Ford, Kissinger, and their cohorts—betrayed that trust. The extent to which U.S. policy was hostage to the vagaries of elections occurring at fixed intervals is driven home with exceptional force. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China served Hanoi better than the United States served Saigon; after all, whose flag now flies over Ho Chi Minh City? Averting a repetition elsewhere of this modern tragedy remains the first order of business for the United States.

ALAN NED SABROSKY
U.S. Army War College

Evans, Ernest. *Wars Without Splendor: The U.S. Military and Low-Level Conflict*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1987. 160pp. $27.95

A small book of even smaller success, *Wars Without Splendor* does, nevertheless, have some virtues. The first four chapters provide a brief but knowledgeable *tour de horizon* of the current state of revolutionary insurgency and terrorism. With somewhat less success, Evans, a professor of international relations at Rhodes College, Memphis, Tennessee, also discusses why he thinks low-intensity conflict is a major American foreign policy problem.

The second part of the book reviews the Nation's current and proposed capabilities for dealing with low-level conflict. Evans defines "capability" in strictly military terms, which indicates that he has drawn incomplete lessons from all the historical experience he cites in the first section of his book. Becoming more flaccid as it limps to a close, *Wars Without Splendor* offers no new concepts or even a thoughtful synthesis of old ideas in its two skeletal concluding chapters. Only a useful selected bibliography reminds

the reader of the author's earnest intentions. However important its subject, *Wars Without Splendor* may be safely forgotten.

ALLAN R. MILLETT
Ohio State University

Larrabee, Eric. *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants and Their War*. New York: Harper & Row, 1987. 723pp. $25

This superb history, beautifully and tightly written, is a summation of U.S. war experience as directed or influenced by the President as Commander in Chief and by his principal deputies—briefly preceding and including World War II. Not only are the Joint Chiefs (Marshall, Arnold, and King) featured, but the Unified Commanders (MacArthur, Nimitz, and Eisenhower) are included as well. In addition, three central figures (Vandegrift, Stilwell, and LeMay), key to America's involvement, are highlighted to reflect the depth and breadth of the President's awareness and the varied but close relationships he had developed within the military over the years.

Narrative in style, the author's insights provide thorough evaluations of the characters and actions of the President, his lieutenants, and allied officers. Specific battles provide insights into situations and theories of which some examples are: the mid-1943 U.S. raid on the Ploesti (Rumania) refineries as a test of strategic warfare; Vandegrift's and Nimitz' leadership in pivotal Guadalcanal and Midway battles; and Eisenhower's brilliance in building the coalition which resulted in the successful invasion of Normandy. Special gems such as Roosevelt's put-down of MacArthur, "You must not talk that way to the President!" and the wonderful quotes from a 23-year-old Army Air Force officer, Bert Stiles, killed very shortly after having written them.

Though the book is generally based on secondary sources, extensive research and cross-checking generate fresh insights and understandings. The author is reasonably objective and shows warmth and understanding toward his principals despite their sometimes surprising deviations; exceptions being MacArthur and Stilwell. The myths surrounding MacArthur receive more than pinpricks, and readers must weigh for themselves how deserved these "cuts to size" are. There is a certain lack of focus that makes the chapter on Stilwell the least satisfying. There is no dearth of incident, too much discussion of U.S.-China relationships at every level, but no discussion of Stilwell's relationship with the Communist Chinese. The worth of General Stilwell in the field is not developed sufficiently to justify the proposition that it was wrong to have fired him when the Generalissimo insisted.

On the other hand, President Roosevelt could not have a more sympathetic biographer. Though his strong stands against the Joint Chiefs are noted, and his divergences from Churchill and the British Joint Chiefs

fully covered, there is no hint that any of these decisions were other than right and proper. In his service to his country, it is clear that President Roosevelt relished his role as Commander in Chief and found in it his ultimate fulfillment. His life had qualified him very remarkably for wartime leadership, and his understanding of the Constitution and our democratic process insured his political success, whatever his military genius. He proved himself global in scope, brilliant in conception, sensitive to logistics and timing, perceptive in selecting major leaders, and effective in delegating. Only in Guadalcanal did he interfere directly with a military operation after it was underway. He insisted that the JCS direct every possible force to save that shoestring campaign, and his intervention proved correct.

As World War II fades into the past, especially for today's military and political leaders, this book is most timely, reminding us of such major war requirements as mobilization, rules of engagement, battle readiness, and strategic plans. *Commander in Chief* should be required reading for *every* War College student and military commander, *every* member of Congress, and *every* media reporter.

The tools may have changed, but the global and personal dynamics of war remain the same. This book reminds us of the fundamentals of war—the human factor, the irrationalities, the raw courage, the glories and squabbles of services and allies, the untried and variedly successful theories, the mobilization of production, and above all, the essentiality of publicly supported objectives and an agreed basic strategy.

T. R. WESCHLER
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Hammel, Eric. *Guadalcanal: Starvation Island*. New York: Crown Publishers, 1987. 435pp. $24.95

For several years the Naval War College's warfighting courses have used the battles for Leyte Gulf as the primary case study of World War II. There, an overwhelming superiority of U.S. power determined the outcome—tactical brilliance and errors notwithstanding. The battles on and around Guadalcanal from August through December of 1942 offer far more thought provoking and valuable material for contemporary military leaders and planners. In today's world we no longer have a dominance of power. The early months of any future war may well resemble those months of confusion and bloodshed to control an island of no strategic importance where, as Hammel states, a "confluence of events" focused the military might of two great nations.

To his credit, Eric Hammel does not become pretentious in attempting to provide strategic overviews or draw historical implications. What he does do very well, and in chronological order, is portray small pieces of this campaign as viewed by those in the jungle, in the cockpit, and on the decks of the naval units involved.

The action is vividly captured but not overblown; the fear, hunger, filth, disease, stupidity, improvisational brilliance, and sheer bravery of the combatants at Guadalcanal could not be overstated. This book should be read by all who train for warfare for the same reasons stated eloquently by Ernest Hemingway in his introduction to *Men At War*, published in the same year this battle occurred: "So when you have read it you will know that there are no worse things to be gone through than men have been through before."

Battles in the Coral Sea in May and off Midway in June had been costly strategic victories, their value not clearly perceived despite the successful containment of Japanese expansion. The British, Australians, and New Zealanders, who had the most at stake in the Solomons, were overtaxed defending the Empire elsewhere. Japanese attempts to build an airfield on the Lunga Plain forced changes in U.S. strategy and focused attention on Guadalcanal.

U.S. ground, sea, and air units had been stripped of the personnel trained to provide cadres for newly built units. Surviving on captured food, troops suffered from fungal and jungle diseases, and tolerated clothing inadequate for jungle warfare. Our torpedoes were totally ineffective while those of the Japanese could tear off a cruiser's bow or disintegrate a destroyer in seconds. Our Navy still steamed in close line ahead and tried to cross the "T" long after those torpedoes had made this the worst possible tactic. Fighter aircraft designed for export to Europe were diverted to the theater without support or even directions for assembly. Their oxygen systems were inoperative and could not be flown above 14,000 feet to take on the Zeros, Vals, and Bettys which operated well above that ceiling. Ships sailed into battle without doctrine, communications, or knowledge of the others on their team. Admirals worried about conserving scarce carrier assets while men died on the beach. At one time there were no fully operational carriers in the theater. The sheer violence of some battles still ranks as the worst of all time; the events at Bloody Ridge and the early hours of Friday, 13 November, off Savo Island, should never be forgotten.

The litany could be extended over several pages but more important are the human traits pictured so well by Hammel: the bravery, ingenuity, dedication despite frustration, endurance, and sheer guts under the worst possible conditions. Many of the names he mentions have lived on in history: Puller, Walt, Edson, Foss, Scott, Callaghan, Vandegrift, Halsey. Thousands more never made the history books though their gallantry was fully as great. He introduces a few and permits us glimpses of the conflagration through their eyes, glimpses that remain starkly vivid despite the years.

Warfare is more than arrows drawn across a map, more than long-range high-tech weapons. It concerns dedicated men and women who may find themselves in a situation such as

Guadalcanal, fighting a determined enemy at a distance of only a few feet or yards, with weapons designed for long-range use, and where tactics will fail and operable strategy will become clear only in hindsight. Eric Hammel has written a concise, readable, colorfully descriptive but unassuming tribute to those who served their nation with distinction at that difficult time. To have been at Guadalcanal was the mark of a tested hero for many years. These men, pictured so well by Hammel, would agree with Hemingway's words from that same year, "I have seen much war in my lifetime and I hate it profoundly. But there are worse things than war; and all of them come with defeat. The more you hate war, the more you know that once you are forced into it, for whatever reason it may be, you have to win it."

DAVID G. CLARK
Captain, U.S. Navy

Coffman, Edward M. *The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986. 412pp. $35

This standard work, first published 19 years ago, is reprinted in paperback without change, a fitting decision because no alternative interpretation has materialized. Coffman's book remains the best single history of the American Expeditionary Forces (A.E.F.) during World War I. He sought to produce an account "more comprehensive than earlier histories" by moving beyond traditional headquarters narratives and bringing in "the people who were actually involved . . . at all levels." In this respect he anticipated John Keegan's *The Face of Battle* and aspects of the "new social history."

Nevertheless, the book culminates rather than inaugurates a historiographical effort. Like predecessor accounts that it replaces, the book concentrates on the A.E.F. of 1917-1918 and the celebration of its achievements. Although more candid and less partisan than earlier accounts written closer to 1917-1918, the book—like other such works—is essentially an operational history of the A.E.F. Limited analyses of national policy and strategy are subordinated to operations, although mobilization and logistics receive measurable coverage. The book approaches its subject from the national perspective, minimizing treatment of the larger struggle of which the American contribution was a part.

We leave Coffman's pages with the feeling that despite all manner of difficulties, including unpreparedness and obtuseness on the part of the Allies, the A.E.F. became a splendid fighting force and made the difference in the war. The youthful, vigorous, and pristine republic was successful in its effort to resolve the conflict that had exhausted decadent Europe. General John J. Pershing emerges as the hero of the enterprise—taut, disciplined, seasoned, and determined—the embodiment of what it takes to win campaigns

despite all manner of interference from the home government and allies.

The only competitor volume is that of Harvey DeWeerd, *President Wilson Fights His War*, also published in 1968 as part of the Macmillan series on the wars of the United States. DeWeerd attempted to break with the traditional approach to his subject, recognizing the obvious reality that the struggle was essentially European in nature: "Europe was fully engaged for four years . . . any attempt to describe the American contribution in a vacuum, or to present the European phases of the war as mere background to the American effort is bound to produce distortion."

Unfortunately this promising approach did not lead to a distinctive, authoritative outcome. Despite his intent, DeWeerd produced a book that in essentials is similar to those of the A.E.F.—tradition centered. He provides extensive background, devoting most of the first two hundred pages to the development of the war during 1914-1917, before the A.E.F. became a factor. Moreover, he recognizes that American operations in 1918 were an aspect of inter-Allied campaigns—the desperate Anglo-French-Belgian defense against the great German offensives of March-July and Foch's decisive counteroffensives of July-November.

Until someone offers a new analysis based on a perspective different from that of the traditional A.E.F. studies and does the task well, *The War to End All Wars* will remain the standard general history of the American role in the great conflict of 1914-1918.

DAVID F. TRASK
U.S. Army Center of Military History

Gall, Lothar. *Bismarck: The White Revolutionary 1851-1898*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1986. 676pp., 2 vols. $69.90

Published in German in 1984, this important work constitutes the first in-depth reevaluation of Otto von Bismarck by a major West German historian since 1945. Gall, professor of modern history at Frankfurt University, has taken as his theme, Bismarck the "white" or conservative revolutionary. The two volumes, divided at the year 1871, abound with attestations to the Iron Chancellor's ability to conduct the politics of the feasible. The statesman who emerges from these pages based his actions upon cold, rational calculations of power politics, knew the limitations of any given situation, and placed *realpolitik* above *idealpolitik*.

Gall has two major points to make. First, he rejects both the positive hero worship of Bismarck by the Prussian school—largely based upon Bismarck's memoirs wherein the chancellor wrote history not "as it happened" but rather as he wished it to have happened—and the denigration of Bismarck's accomplishments by today's scholars. Along the way, Gall rejects the thesis that Bismarck was the master manipulator. Rather

than unraveling a carefully thought out, predetermined plan to realize Prusso-German hegemony in Europe, Bismarck conducted several short campaigns against isolated adversaries on the basis of the given power-political constellations. In doing so, he was guided less by ideas than by vital interests.

Secondly, Gall decries the ongoing fixation of West German historians with the alleged primacy either of domestic or foreign affairs. Both interact constantly; neither is independent of the other. Thus he depicts Bismarck's colonial policy of 1884-86 as a function of both foreign and domestic policy. Moreover, Gall rejects current buzzwords such as "Bonapartism" and "Caesarism" to depict Bismarck, as neither reflects the political system under which Bismarck worked. The chancellor's relationship with the military is a case in point. Gall argues that the permanent elevation of the military above the political branch of government, its constitutional foundation as a weapon of royal prerogative, and its five or seven-year removal from Parliament's budgetary control reflect more the realities of the Prusso-German state that Bismarck inherited than his own specific views on the subject.

Bismarck's greatest accomplishment—especially in light of subsequent German history—was his ability to understand the nature of the European chessboard upon which every piece interacted with every other. Taking the Anglo-Russian antagonism as the norm in European affairs, Bismarck sought to pursue a "free hand" in diplomacy within the limits imposed by this constant. His voluntary renunciation of future wars of aggression and acceptance of semi-hegemony in Europe in the "Bad Kissingen Decree" of 1877, perhaps, is the best evidence of the chancellor's intellectual growth from his earlier days as crisis minister and political juggler.

On the negative side of the ledger, Gall points out that Bismarck left a bitter legacy, or mortgage, both to his own and to future generations. The chancellor's penchant for denouncing his political foes as enemies of the state, his simplistic friend-foe mentality, his inability to appreciate political compromise, and his "irresponsible" policy of forceful "Germanization" of Prussian-Polish lands foreshadowed many of the future policies of German leaders, especially during the two World Wars of the 20th century.

This superb study, above all, partially liberates West German scholarship from the narrow confines imposed upon it by those who believe in the primacy of impersonal structures and systems and restores the credibility of "historical biography" as a legitimate method of explaining historical phenomena. It further reaffirms A.J.P. Taylor's assertion that Bismarck is the one European statesman worthy to be recalled from the grave for a discussion of his policies.

HOLGER H. HERWIG
Vanderbilt University

Schroeder, John H. *Shaping a Maritime Empire: The Commercial and Diplomatic Role of the American Navy, 1829-1861*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985. 229pp. $35

John Schroeder is a professor of history at the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee and the author of several previous works about the antebellum U.S. Navy. In this study his central thesis is that although the U.S. Navy's role expanded greatly between the inauguration of Andrew Jackson in 1829 and the outbreak of the American Civil War in 1861, this expanded role was not part of a conscious policy shift, but was an *ad hoc* response to growing American commerical interests and diplomatic responsibilities. Despite the Navy's expanded role, he writes, "traditional American assumptions and attitudes about the professional military, in general, and the navy, in particular, remained in place."

In the 1840s, proto-Mahanians like Matthew F. Maury and Secretary of the Navy Abel P. Upshur urged upon Congress the idea that a nation's navy should be comparable to its commercial interests. Such views were out of step with the mainstream of American thought about the proper use of an American Navy. Nevertheless, expanded commercial interests and diplomatic ties during the next two decades dictated an expanded role for the Navy. U.S. naval vessels were the most visible American presence in areas where Americans traded, and captains of those vessels almost automatically assumed a diplomatic role--often as negotiators, occasionally as combatants. The absence of a clear national policy defining this expanded role meant that there was virtually no coordination between American diplomatic representatives and the Navy Department. As a result, Navy captains did not feel bound to honor requests, however urgent, from American diplomats, and at no time did an American administration use the Navy as part of a systematic strategy to expand American interests abroad.

Schroeder illustrates his thesis clearly with a number of specific examples that make the book as much a history of American naval activity as of American naval policy. He does a much better job, for example, of explaining the political significance of antebellum U.S. Navy scientific expeditions than does Vincent Ponko in *Ships, Seas, and Scientists* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1974), and he provides an excellent, if brief, overview of the diplomatic activities of U.S. Navy captains like Lawrence Kearney and Matthew C. Perry in the Far East.

Another particular strength of the book is Schroeder's explanation of the connection between naval policy and the growing sectional crisis in the 1840s and 1850s. For example, during the Oregon border dispute with England in the 1840s, many southerners supported naval expansion out of fear that British naval forces in the Caribbean might raid the southern coast of the United States and incite a slave rebellion. Thus it was concern for the security

of their peculiar institution rather than an ambition to possess Oregon that motivated them. Similarly, southerners advocated the construction of small steam vessels (as opposed to larger warships) in the 1850s, at least in part because they saw them as potentially useful for penetrating South American rivers and spreading U.S. influence in areas where southern filibusters might take the next step toward eventual American annexation and the further expansion of the southern slave empire. Northerners were suspicious, quite naturally, of southern motives in both cases and voted accordingly.

This book is an excellent survey of antebellum naval policy and a must for naval historians of the 19th century.

CRAIG SYMONDS
U.S. Naval Academy

Lewis, Archibald R., and Runyon, Timothy J. *European Naval and Maritime History 300-1500.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985. 192pp. $22.50

This small volume is a welcome addition to the literature on medieval warfare. There are several volumes readily available on land warfare, but this is the first which attempts to give a broad general survey of the development of naval and maritime history. The authors have tried to present the story at a popular level and they have succeeded in giving us a very broad overview of more than a thousand years. Quite rightly, they have chosen to see naval history in this period as one which includes maritime and commercial relationships, rather than as simple listings or descriptions of fights on the water. For indeed, war at sea in this period had not developed into the rather specialized form of state-controlled activity that we understand today.

In presenting this overview, the authors have also provided the reader with a very useful list of books for further reading and, at th. same time, surveyed the literature for the key pieces of interpretation. The text itself is unencumbered with details that so often dominate the work of medieval historians. Instead we have a refreshing synthesis that brings together the main points that we know, not only from traditional means of research, but also from the exciting new developments in underwater archaeology. For the medieval period, much of naval development remains obscured in the "Dark Ages," and this volume shows clearly where these gaps are. At the same time the authors have successfully outlined the transition from naval battles fought like land battles to true naval battles fought offshore. One also sees the development of characteristically naval tactics for such battles, as well as the simultaneous development of early forms of amphibious warfare, convoy, and raids. In the broadest aspect, one can see the relationship of naval power to the development of a nation's overseas influence and power as well as its clear connection to financial, commercial, and maritime interests. Most importantly, the

authors, by examining the early stages of European naval and maritime development, illuminate the limited effect of naval power on land power.

This is a short, very readable book that gives to the naval specialist both a broad perspective and stimulation for further research in the field, as well as insight into a highly technical aspect of scholarship for the general student of medieval history.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College

Raven, Allan. *Fletcher-Class Destroyers*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1986. 158pp. $21.95

Watton, Ross. *The Battleship Warspite*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1987. 120pp. $21.95

Allan Raven begins a new series, "Warship Design Histories," with this volume on *Fletcher*-class destroyers of the Second World War. His format is similar to the "Anatomy of the Ship" series except that the snbject is an entire class rather than a single ship.

A brief introduction, complete with tables and sketches of design proposals, is followed by more than 90 photographs, frequently superb and clearly reproduced. Next are line drawings mixed with photographs which observe the "Anatomy of the Ship" formula for general arrangement plans, fittings and equipment, propellers, shafting and rudders, antennas, weapons and associated equipment, fire control equipment, and camouflage and funnel designs. The drawings, while excellent, are fewer in number and the keyed captions less extensive than in the "Anatomy of the Ship" series.

Raven concludes by listing the 175 *Fletcher*-class destroyers and their builders along with the dates they were laid down and commissioned. It is a pity the list could not have been expanded somewhat to include the fate of each ship. The emphasis, however, is clearly on design and materiel rather than on operational history and the class as a whole, at the expense of individual ships.

The now solidly established "Anatomy of the Ship" series has chosen for its ninth subject what is undoubtedly one of the most famous warships of the 20th century. H.M.S. *Warspite* incurred damage from mines, aircraft, and a radio-controlled glider bomb in a career that spanned the two World Wars, including a harrowing time at the Battle of Jutland where her steering mechanism broke down; extensive reconstruction during the interwar period; the second Battle of Narvik in 1940; the Mediterranean and Cape Matapan in 1941; D-day; and finally, at the conclusion of her career, providing support for the landing at Walcheren in November 1944.

Watton, who previously completed the cruiser *Belfast* volume in the same series, has matched his high standards with this work on the *Warspite*. The book adheres to the usual series format, with nine pages of introductory text followed by a

brief outline of the ship's career, but the emphasis is on materiel rather than history. The succeeding 22 pages carry photographs (the core of the book) and line drawings which are a distinctive feature of this series and provide the reader with a detailed view of the ship's anatomy. These include general arrangements and deck plans, machinery, hull construction, superstructure, armament, fire control equipment, fittings, ship's boats, and aircraft. Also included is information on camouflage schemes. The line drawings are keyed, sometimes in great detail, but generally clear even to those without a technical background. Oblique drawings are also provided for perspective.

PAUL G. HALPERN
Naval War College

Campbell, John. *Naval Weapons of World War Two*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1986. 403pp. $34.95

Recently I needed some definitive physical descriptions of World War II 40mm and 20mm guns. Norman Friedman's U.S. section of *Destroyer Weapons*, as well as other library references, provided pictures but no plan and profile drawings. John Campbell's *Naval Weapons of World War Two*, which unevenly remedies this deficiency, is an easy-to-use, Jane's-sized volume. Organized by country, it starts with Great Britain (the original was produced by Conway Press of that country) and works down by navy size through the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and the Soviet Union. These chapters are followed by a section on "Other Countries" which mainly covers weapons unique to the smaller nations and often based on U.S., British, and Swedish designs. Each of the major country chapters contain technical descriptions of guns, gun design, gun mountings, fire control, specific heavy, medium, and light caliber guns and their turrets or mountings, automatic guns, torpedoes, antisubmarine weapons, mines, bombs, rockets, and missiles such as they then were. Much of this is backed up by official descriptions and drawings, some of the latter rendered useless because of significant reduction without touch-up.

As might be expected, the British and U.S. chapters are very thorough, particularly the former. My problem with the 40mm and 20mm guns, for example, is solved by reproductions of official plans for the 40mm quads and twins and the 20mm singles. Regrettably, there are statistics but no drawings of the infamous 1.1-inch antiaircraft quad upon which the United States planned to rely as the war started. The sections on turret design are intriguing, for this is a little-known area of sophisticated design, construction, and testing which dictated the success of a particular class of warship. There were, necessarily, few large caliber designs, and the expertise, such as it was, could only be maintained by a handful of the larger, more affluent nations.

Germany and Italy are well-covered; France and Japan less so.

Many of the drawings in the French and Italian sections are originals, while none exist in the chapter on Japan. The Russian section, as might be expected, contains relatively little specific information. The few drawings, apparently created exclusively for the book, do not approach those in the European and U.S. sections in quality or in information.

One-fourth of the book is devoted to Great Britain while the U.S. section covers two-thirds as much. The latter provides an excellent complement to the Naval Institute's recent volume on battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, with details of each class's armament components. Much of this deals specifically with the designs rather than the reasons for their development. All torpedo summaries, while good, suffer from too few torpedo cutaways. Where is the famous Mk 24 "mine," the first truly successful homing torpedo?

In summary, *Naval Weapons of World War Two* covers the physical details of the weapons systems that influenced the development of so many combatants that are of interest to historians and others. This volume is not perfection and may elicit a number of reasoned responses to some of the points about which the author speculates. Thus, a second edition, especially if it included comparable details on the Japanese Navy, would be of great benefit and a welcome contribution to this body of knowledge.

RICHARD F. CROSS III
Alexandria, Virginia

Heatley, C.J., III. *The Cutting Edge.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1986. 152pp. $38

This is the one—this is the one for all the armchair aviators, amateur aviators, poor folks with lead wings, naval aviators, warp drivers, fast burners, and all those who know they have got the right stuff. C.J. "Heater" Heatley is a Navy fighter pilot, and superb photographer whose pictures inspired the movie *Topgun*. He must have the only optically true canopy in the Navy, for his photographs—taken through his canopy with a hand-held 35mm camera—are without blemish and are magnificent. There are so many grand photographs beautifully reproduced in this book that you will find yourself saturated at first and only on the second or third pass realize that each in its own way is a small masterpiece. My favorite is an F-14 climbing through a humid sky with rarefaction condensation waves forming over the wings. Picking yours will be a delightful chore.

Everything photogenic in carrier aviation is here—the people, the sky, the clouds, the sea, the ships, and the planes. All the good ones are here: F-18s, F-14s, A-6s, A-7s, S-3s, E-2Cs, CODs, and choppers. The aerial photographs of Russian aircraft could be sold to them to facilitate their lagging recruitment. Accepting the cliche about a picture being worth a thousand words, Heatley skillfully weaves lean text, from the pilots and crew, between his photographs. Since I cannot show you the photographs with this review, you will have to settle for a few of the best words.

From Heatley: "Morning launches are the best. The dawn patrol. . . . There's something about strapping on 50,000 pounds of fire breathing hardware, roaring off into the heavens and defying the laws of nature."

An A-6 pilot: "Getting airborne is the only phase of carrier aviation that you, as a pilot, have no control over."

The F-14 pilots: "When you go supersonic, you don't feel a thing . . . . Things just happen faster." "Fighter pilots always want to dogfight. That's the whole reason they became fighter pilots." An F-14 pilot on intercepting Russian overflights: "They speak pretty good English. They ask us what it's like to be on a carrier; we tell them we're there for the dancing girls."

From the pilots flying other aircraft: " . . . I like flying a single person plane (A-7). You get to make all the decisions." "We say there are only two types of pilots, those who fly the FA-18 and those who wish they did."

On carrier landings: "Trapping on a carrier is violent. . . . You go from 150 miles per hour to nothing in two seconds." "Night landings are definitely the hardest thing that a naval aviator does. . . . One day you may have a great landing, and the next day, it's as if snakes are in the cockpit."

The words are good, the pictures outstanding. For about six times the price of going to see the movie *Topgun* you can buy *The Cutting Edge*. Do so, it has staying power—you won't be hungry two hours later.

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Murray Bradley and Patricia Daly

Blechman, Barry M. *U.S. Security in the Twenty-First Century*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987. 173pp. $15.95

Applying statistics, Delphic techniques, and expert opinions to factors that influence long-range U.S. military planning, the author arrives at five alternative strategic environments for the beginning of the next century. Among the factors considered are demographic trends, nuclear proliferation, military technology, and public opinion. In general, he forecasts a weakening of international institutions, accompanied by more independent foreign policies and frequent recourse to military force.