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The Defense Game.

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he also shows how NATO could not succeed if 100,000 U.S. troops were withdrawn as some have advocated. Interestingly, William Kennedy would favor the troop withdrawal to fund and man the 15-carrier navy.

Some hard choices lie ahead for U.S. defense planners. If increases in the defense budget continue to be less than the rate of inflation, as was the case in FY86 and FY87, then investment programs like shipbuilding may continue at the expense of operations and support funding needed to maintain personnel and readiness levels. Can we afford this? Epstein says no and provides his solution to the budget crunch. We may not like his conclusions, but we will be challenged to provide better ones. This study is worth reading in order to prepare for that challenge.

JOHN A. WALGREEN
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Stubbing, Richard A. *The Defense Game*. New York: Harper & Row, 1986. 445pp. \$21.50

In the recent plethora of books by so-called defense reformers, there have been some useful ones, but this one definitely does not fit into that category. *The Defense Game* contains errors in fact, is oversimplified, and casts issues in a manner that creates false impressions.

For instance: Stubbing claims that the military is overpaid and when he finishes with his pay gymnastics, the "typical" 0-3 is in the 44 percent tax bracket. Fact or fiction?

Another: he attempts to credit Secretary McNamara with the elimination of Atlas and Titan missiles (ICBMs) from the SAC inventory for financial reasons. This completely ignores the military's cognizance of differences between the operating efficiencies of solid and liquid-propelled missiles. The U.S. Air Force planned early on that Atlas and Titan I (liquids) were stopgap measures until Minuteman (solid) could be perfected.

Give Stubbing high marks for his "revelation" that the failure of the U.S. Air Force to pay adequate attention to the Close Air Support (CAS) mission has caused frustration for the Army and contributed to its higher cost alternatives. His solution grossly fails—he would transfer the CAS mission to the Army's control—overlooking the infrastructure of air fields, personnel, maintenance facilities, and other requirements that the Army lacks to perform this mission. Transfer of the mission would probably cause duplication of this infrastructure. He rightly damns the Army for its managing of DIVAD but fails to recognize that there is a valid need for an anti-aircraft weapon to be deployed with ground troops. He considers aircraft carriers to be an infantile fixation of the Navy, without understanding their mission.

Stubbing's chapter on Caspar Weinberger is not only inaccurate but downright vicious and his comments misleading. He demands strong controls over the military, yet he decries micromanagement.

This reviewer has served in both the U.S. Air Force and the defense

industry for over 30 years. Granted there are problems and there is room for reform, but misguided and misleading books such as *The Defense Game* are counterproductive. If read and taken seriously by newly elected public officials and their staffs, it could lead to the creation of more don't-tell-me-the-facts-my-mind-is-made-up "experts" in Washington. There are many good staffers in Washington but when a supposedly "inside" staffer writes a book such as this, it casts a cloud over the entire Defense Establishment. Joining in its denunciation will only convince many defense critics of its correctness; ignoring it will only allow falsehoods to spread. This review is merely to alert the prospective reader to Stubbing's misleading innuendos and gross misstatements.

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Flanagan, Stephen J. and Hampson, Fen Osler, eds. *Securing Europe's Future*. Dover, Mass.: Auburn House, 1986. 336pp. \$32.50

The United States and her NATO allies have been confronted with a common military problem since the beginning of their alliance: the containment of Soviet military power. Too many Americans fail to see beyond this strategic imperative to understand the complexities of the European situation and the varying perspectives that result—a myopia that leads to frustrations on both sides of the Atlantic.

This volume, from the Harvard University Center for Science and International Affairs, is an important resource for policymakers and interested observers wishing to understand the sources of cohesion and strain in the Atlantic alliance. The well-written and detailed chapters provide an essential foundation for current discussions of issues ranging from nuclear force reductions and conventional deterrence to out-of-area operations, and do not seem dated by recent developments.

A foreword by Andrew Pierre introduces the problem: increased transatlantic contacts have not led to increased mutual understanding as the "successor generation" in Europe grows more influential and as non-European cultures become more important to Americans. As a result, there is a need for "careful management of divisive issues so as to maintain Alliance cohesion."

These issues are explored in depth in chapters dealing with nuclear and conventional issues such as the Strategic Defense Initiative, emerging technologies, nuclear and conventional options, and political issues such as the "German problem," European domestic politics, arms control, and possible NATO alternatives. A concluding section discusses European economic security, armed neutrality, and regional security beyond the traditional NATO area.

The various authors provide a context in which to understand issues currently dividing the alliance. It is important to remember that Europeans are anxious to avoid *any* war,