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## Securing Europe's Future.

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industry for over 30 years. Granted there are problems and there is room for reform, but misguided and misleading books such as *The Defense Game* are counterproductive. If read and taken seriously by newly elected public officials and their staffs, it could lead to the creation of more don't-tell-me-the-facts-my-mind-is-made-up "experts" in Washington. There are many good staffers in Washington but when a supposedly "inside" staffer writes a book such as this, it casts a cloud over the entire Defense Establishment. Joining in its denunciation will only convince many defense critics of its correctness; ignoring it will only allow falsehoods to spread. This review is merely to alert the prospective reader to Stubbing's misleading innuendos and gross misstatements.

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Flanagan, Stephen J. and Hampson, Fen Osler, eds. *Securing Europe's Future*. Dover, Mass.: Auburn House, 1986. 336pp. \$32.50

The United States and her NATO allies have been confronted with a common military problem since the beginning of their alliance: the containment of Soviet military power. Too many Americans fail to see beyond this strategic imperative to understand the complexities of the European situation and the varying perspectives that result—a myopia that leads to frustrations on both sides of the Atlantic.

This volume, from the Harvard University Center for Science and International Affairs, is an important resource for policymakers and interested observers wishing to understand the sources of cohesion and strain in the Atlantic alliance. The well-written and detailed chapters provide an essential foundation for current discussions of issues ranging from nuclear force reductions and conventional deterrence to out-of-area operations, and do not seem dated by recent developments.

A foreword by Andrew Pierre introduces the problem: increased transatlantic contacts have not led to increased mutual understanding as the "successor generation" in Europe grows more influential and as non-European cultures become more important to Americans. As a result, there is a need for "careful management of divisive issues so as to maintain Alliance cohesion."

These issues are explored in depth in chapters dealing with nuclear and conventional issues such as the Strategic Defense Initiative, emerging technologies, nuclear and conventional options, and political issues such as the "German problem," European domestic politics, arms control, and possible NATO alternatives. A concluding section discusses European economic security, armed neutrality, and regional security beyond the traditional NATO area.

The various authors provide a context in which to understand issues currently dividing the alliance. It is important to remember that Europeans are anxious to avoid *any* war,

nuclear or conventional, on their territory; deterrence is their highest priority. Part of deterrence is accommodation to nearby political realities, a position viewed by many Americans as one of supine acquiescence and incipient Finlandization. One result of this is a disinclination by Europeans to support military doctrines that appear provocative, such as current options for striking far beyond the forward edge of troops to the reinforcing echelons of Warsaw Pact forces.

Another facet of deterrence is making the Soviets believe that any aggression would have incalculable consequences. It is this latter dimension that explains NATO-Europe's hesitation about nuclear arms reduction—even though a nuclear war would be fought primarily on their territory. Since any war would be disastrous for Europe, they feel that the increased risk that a war might go nuclear is acceptable if deterrence is thereby increased. It seems to this reviewer that many Europeans would prefer the Soviets to believe that Western nuclear forces constitute a “doomsday machine” that cannot be stopped once war begins. This contrasts with American “warfighting” doctrines that call for the careful management of nuclear forces. The latter position makes more sense if war should break out, but the former may be more useful for deterrence in Europe. As the “rational” use of nuclear forces has become less likely with nuclear parity, only irrational/automatic escalation remains credible. As the danger of this position

becomes more apparent, Europeans are still unlikely to move to a declaratory policy of “no first use,” although there will be support for a policy whereby no *early* first use is necessary to prevent a Warsaw Pact breakthrough.

On the degree to which NATO should become involved in regional security issues below the Tropic of Cancer, the book points out that it was the United States, not the Europeans, who insisted on the provision in the NATO Charter that operations there not be required in support of the alliance, although they may be permitted. While the United States supplanted her European allies as a global power, they grew unwilling to support global operations. In the early days of the alliance they would have been only too happy to have NATO support for their colonial empires.

Readers of this journal will note that the maritime dimension of the alliance is not well-covered. If, as Robert Jordan has pointed out, NATO should be viewed as a maritime alliance, this is a significant lapse in an otherwise comprehensive survey. The land forces' continental strategy cannot succeed without maritime power keeping the Atlantic bridge to Europe open and projecting power on the NATO flanks. The Maritime Strategy of the U.S. Navy has even more ambitious intentions, of course.

The previous reservation notwithstanding, *Securing Europe's Future* is an important addition to the professional libraries of those interested in explor-

ing the NATO alliance in depth and understanding the varying issues and perspectives that will shape its future—and thereby the future security of the United States.

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Archer, Clive and Scrivener, David, eds. *Northern Waters*. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1986. 240pp. \$37.50

*Northern Waters* is a collection of papers on security and resource issues affecting an area within the latitudes of 60°N to 80°S and longitudes 40°E to 90°W. This encompasses the islands of Arctic Canada, Greenland, Iceland, the Faroes, the Shetlands, Jan Mayen, and Svalbard, as well as the mainland of Norway, reaching to the Kola Peninsula, and including the adjacent seas.

At a glance, one can quickly see that the papers discuss an area of considerable strategic interest to the United States in general and the U.S. Navy in particular. They are written by various people from the region. Editors Archer and Scrivener provide an introduction that puts the articles in context and, further, joins the resource and security issues. They make three points:

- Since the northern waters protect areas of transit, they are important for the transportation of economic resources.
- There are resources within the region of the northern waters that are of great strategic value.

- Political actors in the area are able to make a deliberate connection between resource and security issues.

In many ways this book is a primer on the area as well as the issues. Subjects such as law of the sea, resource endowment and exploitation, transportation of resources, new military technologies (including an interesting discussion of satellites), contrasting military strategies and political perspectives (both internal and external), and the control of conflict are addressed. A modest amount of regional history provides a useful background. Because this book is a compilation of separate papers, a particular subject tends to be covered in its entirety in that one discourse. This makes it convenient to pick up the book and read only that in which you are interested.

What *Northern Waters* does best is give to an area, that is to most of us nothing but cold, barren land and seascape, a life and vibrancy that puts strategic discussions into a context. The treatment of Svalbard in the discussion on the "Soviet Union and Northern Waters" is particularly good. On balance, it is a valuable collection of papers that deserves the attention of strategists and planners concerned with East-West strategy in general and the northern latitudes in particular.

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Lamb, David. *The Arabs: Journeys Beyond the Mirage*. New York: Random House, 1987. 333pp. \$19.95