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The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense

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but his political analysis would have been far more convincing had he enumerated practical ways in which to accomplish them and had he also explained in detail why these methods have not worked as yet.

Lamb has, however, successfully avoided the pitfall of expanding this book into coverage of all Muslims and thereby confusing the issue of "who practices Islam," with "who (and what) is an Arab." He adhered admirably well to the central focus of the book: where the Arabs came from, what drives them, and what challenges they are likely to face in the future—all with a view to producing something to be read and understood by the layperson.

I would not recommend this as a comprehensive sourcebook on the Middle East but, if complemented by a study of Israel and Iran, it would certainly provide a good start. For the Middle East scholar, it will be unsatisfying from the standpoint of serious political description, but it will provide a potpourri of verbal images to enliven his understanding of the region.

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Parrot, Bruce. *The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987. 121pp. \$17.95

Tucker, Robert W. et al. *SDI and US Foreign Policy*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987. 126pp. \$19.50

In *The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense*, Bruce Parrot analyzes Soviet ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities, deployments, and policy statements by tracing the evolution of Soviet policies toward BMD. Parrot's work is a useful and much needed addition to the small body of literature currently available on Soviet BMD policy. *SDI and US Foreign Policy* is a collection of essays by Johns Hopkins University professors Robert W. Tucker, George Liska, David P. Calleo, and the late Robert E. Osgood. The authors examine the implications of SDI *vis-à-vis* U.S.-Soviet relations and NATO.

In *The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense* Parrot uses inductive reasoning and protocol evidence to examine and compare Soviet military and civilian publications on U.S.-Soviet relations and strategic defense. Soviet public statements are also tested against Soviet weapons development for possible political deception. Parrot argues that there are serious BMD policy disagreements in the Soviet Politburo. He claims there are two contending policy lines and interservice rivalries in the military. Supporters of the first policy line—such as the patrons of Brezhnev and now Gorbachev—aver that détente with the West is necessary so that more economic resources can be channeled away from the military and into additional high technology projects, thereby closing the East-West technology gap and improving Soviet economic performance.

According to Parrot, Gorbachev's Politburo patrons are attempting to

implement a two-pronged plan of diplomacy and public pressure with a sophisticated Western media campaign. However, this plan has been consistently undermined by the supporters of the second policy line. Here Parrot points to Politburo members Romanov and Shcherbitskii—who are often cited by Western scholars as opponents of Gorbachev—and several leading military officers, such as Marshals Akhromeev and Ogarkov. The second policy line is strongly in favor of BMD. The Air Defense Forces, backed by elements of the General Staff, support this line, while the Strategic Rocket Forces are more cautious. Parrot assumes that Romanov and others are encouraging military leaders to oppose Gorbachev's diplomatic initiative. There is some minor contention on this point since there is not enough information on the closed-door polemics of the Kremlin. Some Soviet analysts and most emigré-based assessments maintain that the relationship of the Soviet military to the Party's Politburo is such that the military is not a key political player in intense policy debates. Nevertheless, in the post-Stalin era, the military has been able to voice its concerns and offer expert advice to the Politburo. Active military officers are not represented on the Politburo and, as result, their interests are not directly represented at those long "Thursday" meetings.

In *SDI and US Foreign Policy*, Tucker avers that "SDI raises the prospect of precipitating a war—and perhaps a nuclear war—between the superpowers." He buttresses this

argument with a White House pamphlet on SDI which contends that deterrence would collapse if the Soviets unilaterally deployed a nationwide BMD. Tucker believes that SDI is the first way point on an isolationist course for U.S. foreign policy: "SDI betokens the attempt to return to a past that cannot be restored, to a past when we were secure from physical attack. . . ." Tucker's arguments are indeed worthwhile, although he occasionally discusses mutual assured destruction as if it were the same as mutual deterrence. He does not recognize the concept of mutual assured survival. Both mutual assured destruction and mutual assured survival are, of course, corollaries of the concept of mutual deterrence.

Liska's essay propounds the obverse of Tucker's isolationist argument. Liska maintains that the United States could use BMD to effect the "elimination of Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe, using local disaffection from behind the shield of strategic defense." Calleo argues that BMD is a "technological fantasy" that will only exacerbate conventional, vice nuclear, defense spending priorities. Osgood sees no transformation of the NATO alliance—at least not for the worst—caused by SDI or a deployed U.S. BMD and believes a weapons regime with antitactical ballistic missile systems will exist. There is some domestic opposition in Europe to SDI research programs, but the United Kingdom, West Germany, and France are involved in SDI

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research programs and a similar European initiative, and France has even embarked on its own BMD research program.

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Prados, John. *Pentagon Games: Wargaming and the American Military*. New York: Harper & Row, 1987. 81pp. \$9.95

John Prados is a man who knows the subject of wargaming well. As a designer of commercial wargames, he has tangled with the same problems in the creation of a tabletop game as Pentagon strategists do in the invention of a much more complex war simulation. In this book, Prados not only explains the difficulties and faults of using wargames as an accurate simulation of the real world, but delves into the reasons why strategists are so fascinated by the artificial reality they create.

The book begins with a quote from Stephen Vincent Benét which sums up the essential problems of converting slippery reality into hard technical data. "It is all so clear in the maps, so clear in the mind, but the orders are slow, the men . . . are slow to move, when they start they take too long on the way." Men cannot be reduced to "wooden blocks," orders cannot be expected to be executed perfectly every time, and confusion reigns on the battlefield. The war does not proceed as foreseen in the well-ordered world of the wargame—the fog and friction of battle triumph.

A short history of the development of wargaming follows, from early models such as "Go" and "Chess" to more advanced models such as the German "Kriegspiel" which utilized many different types of playing pieces, terrain, and a specific scale to represent size and weight of units. Interesting anecdotes abound throughout these pages, including a short history of the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor and the use of a real-time Kriegspiel which led to the German counterattack at the Battle of the Bulge.

The remainder of the book focuses on the growing use of the wargame as a simulator of reality in U.S. military policy, starting with the "Aggressor" and "Opposing Forces" simulations of the late 1950s and 1960s, to the current "MILES" wargames held at Fort Irwin, California and the Studies Analysis and Gaming Agency (SAGA) games played deep within the Pentagon.

The greatest portion of the book deals with the problems of quantifying the arms and men that form an army. To have an accurate and realistic wargame, the values used for the combat ability of each specific type of weapon and unit must be extremely precise. Firepower, though, is an ambiguous concept. Firepower scores are determined in laboratory conditions where there are no duds, and all equipment works perfectly. Additionally, while each weapon is tested in isolation, in a battle they operate together. Their collective firepower values cannot simply be added to find an aggregate value for