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## Reilly: The First Man

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verification'' with an intriguing enigma. His questions are simple and straightforward. If the United States has been able to detect and identify Soviet violations of previously negotiated arms control agreements through the use of the aforementioned national technical means, why do current Government officials contend that future arms control agreements are impossible because they would be vulnerable? If past systems have been sufficient to support allegations of Soviet treaty violations, why would the present and future surveillance systems described in this book be unsuited to the task of treaty monitoring in the future? The questions are good ones, no matter how one feels about the factual content of the rest of the book. The average reader will be left with an uncomfortable feeling that perhaps there is indeed something that the Government is not telling the American public. If that feeling persists, Mr. Burrows will have achieved his objective.

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Lockhart, Robin Bruce. *Reilly: The First Man*. New York: Penguin Books, 1987. 167pp. \$3.95

Readers who enjoyed Lockhart's *Reilly: Ace of Spies* will want to read his sequel, *Reilly: The First Man. Ace of Spies* was made into a TV mini-series and, in the final episode, after learning his fate from the Cheka (Soviet secret police) boss, the dreaded Feliks Dzherzhinsky,

Reilly is gunned down in a forest clearing.

In his new book, Lockhart reveals the disagreement he had with the series' producers about this ending. He wanted the series to end as the book did, with Reilly's fate wrapped in mystery. In reality, the original Russian news version of Reilly's death stated that he had been killed on the Soviet-Finnish frontier in September 1925. But, there has never been an official Soviet statement that Reilly died at the hands of Soviet authorities.

Lockhart's sequel makes the startling claim that Reilly not only was not killed, but in fact defected to the Soviet side and for the next two decades assisted Soviet intelligence in setting up and running foreign clandestine operations. Lockhart's new book is a storehouse of evidence to support this unsettling thesis.

Why should it be unsettling that Sigmund Rosenblum (Reilly's real name) was not shot by Dzherzhinsky's fanatics, but ended up working for them? What importance would this have other than tidying up a footnote in the narrow and murky *demimonde* of espionage history? According to Lockhart, it is extremely important because Reilly's defection to the Soviets over 60 years ago so damaged Western security interests that the consequences are still with us today. Such was the evil fruit of Reilly's change of uniform that Western intelligence agencies, especially the British, have been crippled by the implantation of a coven of moles or by a suspicion of moles which has

precipitated a paralyzing mistrust among Allied intelligence agencies.

Here follows the bare bones of Lockhart's hypothesis. Sidney Reilly returned to Russia in 1925, only ostensibly, to contact members of the anti-Bolshevik conspiracy called the Trust. Beforehand, he had arranged, through back channels, with Dzherzhinsky to defect to the Soviet Union under the cover of the Trust operation. The Cheka received him with open arms and masked his defection with false reports of his death. Dzherzhinsky and companions welcomed Reilly with honor because although they were veteran conspirators—cunning and patient—their experience was almost entirely within Russia. Reilly not only brought them an Aladdin's cave of information on the British secret service, but a high degree of sophistication and familiarity with the world outside of backwards Russia—a quality in extremely limited supply among top Bolshevik leadership. After Reilly's disappearance in 1925, Soviet intelligence changed tack and launched a quiet but persistent and insidious attack on the West, focusing on Britain. Reilly's knowledge of the turf was indispensable and probably the inspiration behind the new effort. He identified targets among the sophisticated yet disaffected upper class in England. This resulted not only in the recruitment of a "hornet's nest of homosexual moles" but also of the lethally effective heterosexual, Kim Philby. (Apparently the KGB's enlightened employment policies

barred no one on the grounds of his/her sexual preference.) The same approach was taken elsewhere in Europe and to some extent in the United States where the Roosevelt administration, all the way to the White House, became peppered with Soviet agents. Western counterespionage services, where they existed, were made aware of the scope of Soviet operations in the thirties only by the defection of key Soviet intelligence officers who bolted to the West in preference to certain death in the U.S.S.R., which Stalin's purges had turned into an abattoir. Though Reilly is now dead, his legacy lives on in current day Soviet clandestine operations, not only in technique, but in the patient long-term recruitment and placement of agents.

Lockhart makes this mouthful palatable by seasoning it with both evidence and conjecture. First, there is substantial data from widely disparate sources stating that Reilly did not die in 1925. Many sources attest (some to Lockhart personally) that Reilly was alive at least as late as the midforties. The author also claims that despite the fact that Reilly was illegitimate, left his motherland in his youth, and spied for Britain, he always had a deep affection for Russia. Furthermore, despite his high living and capitalist business adventures, Reilly's political leanings were very much to the Left. He not only flirted with Marxism in his youth, but in later life attested to the virtues of Bolshevism. (He even did this in writing to Lockhart's famous father, Bruce Lockhart, with whom Reilly

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conspired to overthrow the Reds in 1918.) Reilly had, on occasion, predicted the victory of the Bolsheviks and often remarked that it would probably be better to join rather than to fight them. In addition, Reilly's personal and professional life gave such ample evidence of deceit and deviousness as to cast suspicion on his loyalties, if, indeed, he had any. It has also been attested that Reilly knew that the Trust was a Soviet setup before he made his final trip to Russia. Soon after Reilly's disappearance, British intelligence suffered dramatic reverses and agent losses in Russia. Lockhart claims that an MI5 (British counterespionage) "mole-hunter" told him in no uncertain terms that Reilly went completely over to Moscow.

Most of the evidence presented in *Reilly: The First Man* is circumstantial. Lockhart's chain of evidence has some weak links in it. The statement that Sidney Reilly did not die in 1925, lived two more decades, was Left in his politics, and so on, does not mean that he became a Karla-like *eminence grise* masterminding post-1925 Soviet intelligence operations. Although convincing and intriguing, many of Lockhart's arguments are of the *post hoc non propter hoc* genre.

On the other hand, airtight ratiocination is but one method of nailing down truth. Intuition is the mind's direct line-of-sight to the truth. The fact that Lockhart does not present his conclusions by means of a neo-scholastic thesis does not mean that he has not rent the veil shrouding the mystery of Sidney Reilly.

Lockhart also makes a case for a serious scholarly historical study of intelligence. If not handed down, a treasury of knowledge can be dissipated in less than a generation. How many professional intelligence officers in the West today have read even one of the accounts of important Soviet defectors such as Agabekov, Krivitsky, Reiss, and Orlov, or later defectors such as Gouzenko, whose revelations led to the disclosure of U.S. atom spies? Loss of memory is regarded as a mental disorder in a person. Can it be considered anything less in an institution?

Lockhart is an excellent writer. He is not only clear and concise, but eloquent. His prose is captivating, and his new book is good reading not only for those in the intelligence world, but also for those who enjoy a well-spun tale.

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Dower, John W. *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1986. 398pp. \$22.50

The devastation left in the wake of the Pacific war was immense. For the United States, total victory was synonymous with total destruction. What was required to achieve total destruction was only possible through mass mobilization of the population and the creation of a fighting force which could mirror the intensity of the Nation's anti-Japanese sentiment. The result was a ferocious battle cry