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## Submarine Warfare Today and Tomorrow

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discussions or debates. This comprehensive list is worth the price of the book.

The author's final recommendation concerning possible arms control restrictions of ASW is cautiously worded but appropriate. Since there is no real threat, there is little that a treaty fix—if it were ever negotiated and actually adhered to—could do except confuse a stable situation. If the book's conclusion makes anyone angry, it is because it is honest.

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Moore, John E. and Compton-Hall, Richard. *Submarine Warfare Today and Tomorrow*. Bethesda, Md.: Adler and Adler, 1987. 308pp. \$22.95

Since the advent of nuclear power, submarines have evolved into first-line fighting ships—the mark of a great naval power. Their speed, endurance, stealth, and combat effectiveness make them preeminent in a wide variety of naval missions from covert mining to strategic nuclear deterrence. However, their cost is high, with estimates for the initial unit of the proposed U.S. SSN-21 series close to \$1.7 billion. Arguments about the size and quality of the submarine force often focus on the cost, ignoring other vital factors; submariners in Western countries are often not very articulate about the true capabilities of, and need for, such ships.

The authors are retired British submariners with extensive command

experience. Additionally, Moore is the editor of *Jane's Fighting Ships*, and Compton-Hall is the director of Britain's submarine museum. Their purpose is to present as accurate a picture as possible of submarine operations, using unclassified sources. They cover the environment in which submarine operations take place, review the weapons and equipment of the present and near future, and discuss how they are developed and procured. There are chapters on the major navies' submarine orders of battle, on the technical and operational facets of ASW, and on the potential of midget submarines in a world of increasingly sophisticated engineering. The utility of submarine presence in a maritime conflict is illustrated by the submarine and anti-submarine operations conducted by both sides in the Falklands war. There is a discussion of the strategic deterrent value of SSBNs and the impact that cruise missiles may have on strategic planning.

The authors are highly critical of the procurement processes in Britain and the United States whereby platforms and propulsion systems are designed first and then fit with weapons. The importance of proper design increases as the Soviet submarine force draws even in technology with its opponents in the West. The authors offer a lengthy critique of the British independent nuclear deterrent force. They claim it is not British, being mostly U.S.-designed; not independent as it must be targeted in close cooperation with the United States; and too small to be much of a deter-

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rent. The political value of Britain's nuclear forces is not well addressed. The book lacks substantial discussion of submarine intelligence missions, probably inevitable because of the classification of the data on such missions. The final chapter is an attempt to apply the "Principles of War" to determine the future of underwater warfare. Their effort is not entirely successful and a summary of the authors' recommendations would be more useful.

On the whole the book is a credible effort to provide readers with a broad picture of submarine warfare. The writing is a little uneven, sometimes very informal and sometimes very dense, and the use of British examples can slow a non-British reader down a bit. Short vignettes of submarine life are scattered throughout the chapters and provide interesting sidelights on submarine operations. Most of the information is available elsewhere, but it is packaged well in this book.

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Baer, George, ed. *A Question of Trust: The Origins of U.S.-Soviet Relations; The Memoirs of Loy W. Henderson*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1987. 579pp. \$44.95

The memoirs of Loy Henderson, one of the designers of the U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union before and after the Second World War, is an insightful reservoir of information. His writing is elegant

and bears a remarkable stylistic similarity to Henry Kissinger's two recent volumes. Judgments are expressed with subtlety, and personalities, some of which are legendary, are described with understanding and sympathy.

Henderson dwells on the events surrounding the U.S. recognition of the U.S.S.R. in 1933 and the deteriorating relationship that followed, the Stalin purges, and Soviet attempts to avoid a German attack. His incisive description of the Soviet goal of world domination raises the hard question of whether that goal has changed. Indeed, it appears to persist with compromises or deviations occurring only where overriding parochial national interests are threatened. Henderson noted in 1939 that the ultimate aim of Soviet rulers was "to enlarge the Soviet Union and to include under the Soviet system additional peoples and territories." Their tactics were to "hold intact the territory already under their control" and to "increase as rapidly as possible the economic and military might of that territory." Brezhnev said the same thing to Kissinger when he stated "what we get, we keep."

Henderson brings an American point of view to the posturing of Britain and France on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other, in the face of the growing Nazi threat. The British and the French clearly wished to avoid an attack against them, as did the Soviets. Each hoped for the best at the expense of the others. Indeed, the Soviets are portrayed as fearing nothing as much