Naval War College Review

Volume 41
Number 3 *Summer*

Article 3

1988

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Recommended Citation

Hatttendorf, John B. (1988) "The Evolution of the Maritime Strategy: 1977-1987," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 41 : No. 3 , Article 3.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol41/iss3/3

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The Evolution of the Maritime Strategy: 1977 to 1987

John B. Hattendorf

The American system of strategic planning is pluralistic, whereby statements of strategy are made at four levels:

•High policy is established at the level of the President and modified or supported by Congress.

•War planning, the general conceptual planning for war, originates with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

•Program planning, the system of coordinating weapons procurement, is accompanied by statements of strategy that define the rationale for the weapons involved. The programs are designed by each service and coordinated by the Secretary of Defense.

•Operational planning, the preparation of precise plans for wartime operations, is done by the various unified and specified commanders in chief.

In theory, the four levels of strategy making should directly complement one another. High policy establishes the goals and objectives for both war planning and program planning. They, in turn, reflect operational planning. Some academics argue that, in practice, the theory is rarely, if ever, achieved. Each level of strategy making has its own set of requirements and constraints, resulting from the nature of the system, thereby creating the possibility for contradictions and disjunctions. Every decision-making element within each of the various levels of strategy making is the result of a strictly rational calculation of strategy.[1] This is caused by the practical necessity to simplify complex issues. It involves a high degree of uncertainty and motivated bias created through the interaction of bureaucratic interests. These factors, present in nearly every system of governmental machinery, need constant reevaluation and adjustment in order to reach a rational application of strategy. That rational calculus is forever changing as political events and technological developments alter the situation on the global stage. Thus, the development of strategy is a perpetual process of questioning, application, and reexamination. Within this context, one can

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profitably examine the U.S. Navy's development of the Maritime Strategy during the period 1977 to 1987.

The Evolution of Naval Thinking in the 1970s

Following the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, events in Ethiopia, Angola, Afghanistan, and Iran clearly demonstrated that the American position in international politics was not faring well, while the Soviet Union seemed to be having great success. This situation, following the stabilizing influence of Gerald Ford's Presidency, evoked a changing mood among leaders within the U.S. Government. Beginning with the Carter administration, the United States began to move outward again, using her armed forces to complement her foreign policy and establishing a clear trend in the use of U.S. naval and military force as a political instrument. Simultaneously, strategic nuclear forces seemed to play a declining and less obvious role, while conventional forces become much more important.

These trends in American foreign policy paralleled a number of other separate but interlocking developments. First, there were indications that the confusion that had evolved about naval theory was coming to an end. Secondly, there was a clear resurgence in general strategic thinking in many areas of the U.S. Armed Forces as well as in the academic world. Thirdly, the U.S. Navy was engaged in rebuilding its forces to modernize about half of the U.S. surface fleet. Finally, while these developments progressed, the Soviet Navy demonstrated new capabilities in its own dramatic development that had begun in 1962, culminating with the capacity of a global naval power. The consequence of these trends provided the central features of ambience in which new American naval thinking began to take shape.

Naval Theory Refined. Theory has never been an attractive area of study for naval officers, yet naval theorists do work in an important area, one that can both reflect and inform those whose concerns are strictly practical. In America, the most widely read theoretical works written in the postwar period were devoted to the political uses of navies short of war. The most prominent writers were academics such as Lawrence W. Martin, Edward Luttwak, and Ken Booth, as well as the diplomat Sir James Cable.

A small but less well-known group of thinkers centered at the Naval War College consistently devoted their efforts to creating a thoroughly modern synthesis of major strategic ideas for wartime. The dominant figure in this work was Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, joined by Dr. Herbert Rosinski and Dr. William Reitzel, among others. They tried to define, with semantic precision, the nature of naval strategy in modern warfare. At the same time, they wrote a basic description of what senior naval officers should understand intuitively and be prepared to develop into practical,

operationally sound strategic plans for naval forces.[2] Eccles expanded on Rosinski's definition that strategy is the comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas in order to attain broad objectives. As Eccles so succinctly defined the matter in practical terms:

A strategic concept is a verbal statement of:
What to control
For what purpose
To what degree
When to initiate control
How long to control and, in general,
How to control in order to achieve the strategic objective.[3]

Another naval officer, Rear Admiral Joseph C. Wylie, took this concept one step further. For him, the common factor in all power struggles is the concept of control. "Military control, or military affairs in the broad sense, can seldom be taken up in isolation," Wylie wrote. "Military matters are inextricably woven into the whole social fabric. And that is why a general theory of strategy must, I believe, be a theory of power in all its forms, not just a theory of military power."[4]

Naval theorists within the Navy initially concentrated on the uses of the Navy in wartime and then extended their thinking to include peacetime political applications of naval strategy in relation to the broader aspects of maritime and national power. There was a clear realization within the Navy that naval force is related to other aspects of national power. Among the most important aspects of this thinking was the perception that conventional naval forces had a role to be played in a world of nuclear deterrence and parity of forces.

This general trend in thinking augured a significant alteration in the American viewpoint. Conventional force seemed to gain utility, not only in its relation to the nuclear balance and deterrence, but also as an increment of escalation. It contributed to the threat of escalation both horizontally through geographical positioning, and vertically through the threat of a prolonged conventional war whereby economic and industrial strength would be the decisive factor.[5]

The Resurgence of Strategic Thinking in the U.S. Navy. The development of strategic thinking within the U.S. Navy goes back more than a century. For most of that time, the Navy had its contingency plans and analyzed ways in which to use naval power in future wars. Despite this planning, there has never been a clearly identified cadre of officers who have been given specific responsibility for developing naval strategy. Over the years, senior officials in Washington and scattered groups of more or less intellectually inclined naval officers working at the Naval War College, in OpNav, and on the staffs of fleet commanders have dealt with strategic ideas and issues.

The entire history of the Naval War College, in fact, has been a chronicle of repeated efforts to promote broad strategic thinking within the naval officer corps to complement the routine emphasis on technological developments and new weapons.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the official Department of Defense statement on naval missions did not change, yet, within that same time frame, the long-term naval force goals which the Navy used did change. In 1975, the goal for 575 ships was set by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger; in 1976 Secretary Rumsfeld set it for 600; in 1977-78, Harold Brown set it for 425-500 ships. The variance in these numbers reflected the differences in judgment regarding prudent planning for facing the uncertainties of the future. The high numbers reflected estimates that focused on a future world war involving the Soviet Union. The low numbers, particularly the 400-ship figures used by the Carter administration in its 1977 Department of Defense Consolidated Guidance, reflected the idea that the U.S. Navy's surface fleet was designed for peacekeeping operations and for conflicts in which the Soviet Union would choose not to be involved. In contrast to this view, the U.S. Navy wanted to maintain an edge of naval superiority over the Soviets.

The Navy staff, under Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James L. Holloway, III, considered the question of "how to size a navy." Studies were conducted for various naval force levels: 500, 600, 700, and 800 ships. Both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets required a balanced force of combatant ships, amphibious assault lift capabilities, support ships, and appropriate aircraft. The plan for a 500-ship navy was designed to retain the then current fleet size with a reduction to 40 SSBNs and 12 carriers. The 800-ship figure corresponded to the 1984 fiscal year force objective recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while the 600 and 700-ship fleets were intermediate alternatives. The Five-Year Defense Plan, already in use, corresponded to a 588-ship fleet by fiscal year 1983. When extrapolated to fiscal year 1985, it would be a 600-ship navy.

During the late 1970s, several developments occurred which had an impact on the transition to widespread offensive thinking within the naval officer corps. Admiral Holloway's emphasis on developing carrier battle groups and surface action groups became the operational basis upon which later strategic concepts were formed. There were two important early developments in the area of strategic thinking, and though sharing some qualities, their origins were different. One was the "Sea Strike Strategy" project developed by Admiral Thomas B. Hayward as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, 1977-78. The other was "Seaplan 2000," which began in the Navy's secretariat in Washington.

Sea Strike and the parallel work on Seaplan 2000 were key components in the development of the Navy's opposition to the Carter administration's

defense policy. Carter called for greater emphasis on the central front in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war, but a more constrained role for naval forces. The focal point of the Navy's criticism was the thought that the central front could not be isolated from the European flanks or from other theaters of war.

Leaders such as Secretary of the Navy Graham Claytor, Under Secretary James Woolsey, and Admiral James L. Holloway clearly established a general consensus within the Navy's Washington leadership that the service should strive for superiority at sea against the Soviets and, when examining the variety of possible wartime operations against the Soviet Navy, think in terms of forward, offensive operations as the most effective means for employing the Navy to achieve the Nation's broad defense policies. In promoting this view, the Navy was reasserting a traditional view of its strategic role. It reflected the strategic ideas which lay behind the establishment of NATO in the late 1940s and the long tradition of naval thinking embodied in the classic works of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett.

Thinking about the Soviet Navy, 1967-1981

Any serious thinking about strategy must necessarily deal with the effect that one's forces will have on an opponent. How an enemy will use his forces is a critical factor in any strategic evaluation. Thus, when determining how forces might be deployed for achieving broad future goals in a war, one must also assess the probability of how an enemy might act and react. One must examine everything that an enemy can do which may materially influence one's own courses of action.

From the early 1960s, when the growth of Soviet naval power became apparent, the predominant perception in America was one that contemplated the Soviets building a naval force with many capabilities—many of them similar to those which the U.S. Navy had already developed. The existence of a blue-water Soviet Navy seemed to emphasize, in American minds, the capability for peacetime power projection and for wartime attack on U.S. and other Western naval forces and sea lines of communication, as well as a capacity for strategic nuclear strikes from the sea. Increasingly, Americans worried about the Soviet Navy as a sea-denial force that could deprive the West of the free use of the sea, thereby creating political, economic, and military disaster. In short, many Americans viewed the Soviet naval capability by mirror-imaging and refighting World War II.

The public discussion of the issue in Congress and the press, as well as in the statements of senior naval officers, stressed this interpretation. But at the same time, specialists on Soviet affairs began to develop an interpretation that tried to move away from an American, ethnocentric view

of the Soviets. The soil in which this interpretation grew consisted of the Soviet Union's values and the views, aims, and objectives of its leaders. The first widely read book in America on this subject was Robert W. Herrick's *Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice*, published by the U.S. Naval Institute in 1968. Herrick wrote much of the book while serving as staff intelligence officer at the Naval War College in 1963-64. He based his study on his own detailed reading of Soviet literature and many years of experience as an intelligence specialist in Soviet affairs. Herrick concluded that Soviet naval strategy, like tsarist Russian naval strategy before it, was essentially defensive. This view was so different from the commonly held official viewpoint that the publisher added a preface to the volume and enclosed a printed bookmark which drew attention to this fact. The publisher called for comments and articles expressing alternative views to be published in the U.S. Naval Institute's *Proceedings*.

It took a long time for Herrick's interpretation to prevail within the U.S. Navy. This change did occur, however, at about the same time that the Maritime Strategy was formulated in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The process by which the U.S. Navy changed its views appeared clearly in two places: in the work of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) during the period 1967-1981 and within the naval intelligence community.

CNA's conclusions were quite different from those made at that time in the classified intelligence literature being prepared at the Pentagon. While some on the Navy staff endorsed the CNA conclusion, they were obliged to add qualifying language, anticipating objections from some quarters of the intelligence community.[6]

Continuing this work in the following years, CNA analyst James M. McConnell made a crucial contribution in 1977 in a draft, first chapter of *Soviet Naval Diplomacy*, which corroborated earlier interpretations of Soviet intentions to withhold their SLBMs. Developing evidence that the Soviet Union's SSBNs were under the direct control of the highest political leaders, and those forces would be used mainly in later periods of war, McConnell wrote, "Wars might be won by other branches of the armed forces, Gorshkov seems to be saying, but surrenders and armistices are arranged from the sea; and beyond that, navies have a value in influencing the course of actual peacemaking."[7]

In an October 1977 contribution to James L. George's volume, *Problems of Sea Power as We Approach the Twenty-first Century*, McConnell went further. He suggested that Soviet SSBNs would operate in defended, local sanctuaries in home waters such as the Barents Sea for the Northern Fleet and the Sea of Okhotsk for the Pacific Ocean Fleet. They would be heavily guarded by mines and fixed underwater acoustic surveillance systems. In addition, the Soviets would continue to emphasize the use of flight-deck cruisers

which could provide air defense and intercepter cover for submarines, surface ships, and aircraft engaged in barrier operations.[8]

Throughout the late 1970s, CNA analysts expressed growing concern that U.S. Navy plans were giving insufficient attention to the implications inherent in the Soviet adoption of a withholding strategy for their SLBM force and the assignment of their general purpose navy to a protective mission for their SSBN force.[9] In March 1980, Bradford Dismukes reported the results of an initial investigation of possible war termination missions for the U.S. Navy. This new topic arose from an attempt to assess the implication of the Soviet withholding strategy. In a briefing reflecting seminal ideas by James McConnell, Dismukes declared that "our nation's strategies require adjustment in reaction to a fundamental change that has occurred in maritime affairs."[10]

Reflecting on this dilemma for analysts of Soviet strategy, Captain W.H.J. Manthorpe, Jr. suggested that those who would try to predict whether the changes suggested by theory would actually occur are as likely to be wrong as they are to be right. In the U.S.S.R., the transformation of military science into doctrine is as much a function of party and bureaucratic internal politics as are other factors. However, those who wait for the hard evidence from fleet exercises that Soviet strategy actually has changed are likely to be the last to recognize when that change has taken place. "The moral is," Manthorpe wrote, "if you want to be early you may be wrong, but if you want to be right you'll surely be late in recognizing changes to Soviet strategy."[11]

With this in mind, official analysts in the Office of Naval Intelligence proceeded to evaluate the original contributions made by the Center for Naval Analyses, expanding and modifying them in the process.

From the CNO Strategic Concepts to the Work of the CNO's Strategic Studies Group, 1978-1986

The appointment of Admiral Thomas B. Hayward as the 21st Chief of Naval Operations in June 1978 marks an important stage in the transition of thinking within the naval officer corps. It was an affirmation of the strategic thinking which Hayward had done for the Pacific Fleet in 1976-78, and it marked the change in approach to strategic problems within the Navy. Up to this point, much of the debate about naval issues centered around the Navy's budget. The complicated mass of unit costs and program alternatives were often confused with strategy. Some critics charged that unrealistic strategies were occasionally employed for no other reason than to justify larger shares of money for one program or another. In this way the budget tended to drive strategic concepts. "This is why," Hayward explained, "academics and others say the Navy doesn't have a strategy."[12]

To combat this problem and to remove the misperception, Hayward sought to change the terms of the debate from a budget battle to an analysis of the strategic issues for a global maritime power. Under Hayward, the Navy's leadership agreed not to fight for particular force levels. Instead, they began to work for a highly ready navy with adequate manning and let Congress worry about how big that navy should be. In order to increase readiness, Hayward put his priority on spare parts, ammunition, pay, and benefits. Then he went on to point out that the central front in Europe was not the only problem for the United States. The country needed a war-winning strategy.[13]

Hayward gave briefings to Congress, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Science Board, the CNO Executive Panel, as well as other groups. He used the concepts which he developed in these briefings as the basis for the first part of his Annual Posture Statement to Congress. An unclassified version was published in the U.S. Naval Institute's *Naval Review 1979* in an article by Hayward entitled, "The Future of U.S. Sea Power."[14] Drafted for Hayward by Captain William Cockell, the article cast Hayward's unclassified Congressional testimony in a new format. It was, as Cockell later described it, "some simply stated principles . . . simple, not simplistic, and simple, by design."[15] It lacked the sophistication of the classified version, but the article expressed Hayward's basic concepts on how to think about naval force. For the readers of the *Naval Review*, Hayward made his point clear: classical naval theory is still valid.[16]

Bureaucratic Refinements. While people began to discuss Hayward's strategic concepts, the CNO was directly concerned with making some organizational changes within the Navy. In particular, he wanted to assist the Navy's leaders in thinking about strategy. First, he wanted to establish a focal point within the Navy staff for discussions on the broad aspects of naval warfare. In order to do this, in mid-January 1980 Hayward changed Op-095 from the Anti-Submarine Warfare Directorate to the Directorate of Naval Warfare. His idea was to create a directorate which could coordinate the work of the various platform sponsors—the Deputy CNOs for Air, Submarine, and Surface Warfare. This office was to be sympathetic to them while at the same time being the primary contact point for the fleet commanders and their concerns for future war-fighting developments.

Hayward saw another need within the Navy staff. For many years the Navy had undertaken long-range planning, and the various groups which had undertaken this work had varying degrees of success and influence on naval policy.[17] In January 1980, Hayward established the Long Range Planning Group (Op-00X) under Rear Admiral Charles R. Larson. Consisting of a small group of highly qualified officers, the mission of Op-00X was to assess resource limitations on future naval capabilities and

analyze alternative strategies for achieving long-range goals. The Long Range Planning Group had an important area to consider, but Hayward also wanted to examine another aspect of strategic thinking: the interplay between strategy and tactics.

At the same time, Hayward had two parallel interests. He wanted to create a core of future naval leaders who would be well-versed in the role of naval forces in national policy and strategy. He also wanted to reestablish the Naval War College as the pinnacle for education in naval strategic thinking.

As Hayward told the Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College in April 1981, "there is no dearth of strategic thinking going on these days in your Navy. What is lacking is a more useful way to capitalize upon that abundant talent with more alacrity."[18] As a step in this direction, Hayward established "a prestigious Center for Naval Warfare Studies" at the Naval War College. Along with this, he announced "the creation of a small, but impressive cell . . . a group of the best and brightest of our military officers," what was to become known as the CNO's Strategic Studies Group. Making his point clear, Hayward declared, "Our objective is to make this Naval War College respected around the globe as the residence of the finest maritime strategic logic of our time. A related objective is to provide the Chief of Naval Operations and our senior military officers with stimuli relative to strategy and tactics in order to make certain that regardless of the perception of those less informed, our Navy will never, never be found 'sailing backwards.' "[19]

Although the Strategic Studies Group (SSG) reports directly to the CNO, it is based in Newport to take advantage of the academic atmosphere and resources available at the Naval War College and to use the distance from Washington as insulation from the bureaucratic traumas of Pentagon life.

The Ambience for Strategic Thinking in 1981. The Strategic Studies Group did not operate in a vacuum. Its first mission was to educate itself in the strategic thinking of the day and to move forward, unencumbered by the friction of bureaucracy, in an effort to stimulate flag officers who held positions of responsibility for executing strategy in wartime. In the 1970s, one of the characteristic problems of the naval bureaucracy was the way in which it tended to isolate thought in certain communities within the Navy, preventing the exchange of views necessary for cultivating commonly shared opinions. Like the Naval Warfare Directorate on the Navy staff, the Strategic Studies Group tried to surmount the natural and artificial barriers to a free exchange of thinking which had developed over the years. In many ways the SSG acted like a small swarm of honeybees, migrating from one flag officer to another, discussing issues, exchanging views, and carrying the pollen of stimulating thought from one command to another. Charged

as they were with thinking in global terms about how to win a future conventional war with the Soviet Union, the viewpoints they expressed were so different that they shocked some listeners. As Captain Sam Leeds recalled, "the first reaction was to shoot the messenger."[20] However, once the initial defensive reaction was overcome, a fruitful exchange of opinion developed which was both educational and constructive.

At the Naval War College, each Strategic Studies Group was given one entire academic year for its work. As each succeeding group of officers worked on their project, they developed and refined a progressively better statement of the nature of the Soviet threat and a more coherent approach for using naval forces to achieve national aims. Each group found it necessary to examine the best use of all national resources in order to understand the role of naval forces. In so doing, they elevated the Navy to the forefront of thinking in terms of joint and combined strategy. The first SSG established the basic tenets and conceptual feasibility of a forward maritime strategy. They focused on Soviet missions and sensitivities and used a theater-wide combined arms approach to exploit Western advantages.

Upon completion of the second group's work, SSG Director Robert J. Murray summarized the outlook that had been developed in the two previous years: "The principles espoused here cut across the bow of prevailing opinion in some instances, but the strategy is not radically different from long-held conceptions of the proper employment of naval forces. The principles would not be unfamiliar to Mahan. In particular, our work confirms the value for national strategy of naval forces designed, trained and intended for offensive operations, and rejects as impractical and undesirable the notion, sometimes espoused outside the Navy Department, of a defensively organized and equipped Navy. It is clear to us that the best defense remains a good offense."[21]

The concept of forward defense, adopted as NATO strategy and already applied to land and air forces, is equally applicable to naval forces. Continuing, Murray said "it adds much to deterrence and places naval forces in preferred positions if deterrence fails." Going further, Murray noted that the SSG found no instance where it was necessary for U.S. naval forces to employ nuclear weapons to achieve their objective. "While it is necessary to understand how to operate in a nuclear environment," Murray concluded, "it is not necessary to take the initiative in using nuclear weapons for naval purposes; on the contrary, the use of nuclear weapons at sea appears to be to our clear disadvantage."[22]

Thus, in the five years of evolutionary development between Admiral Hayward's announcement of his strategic concepts in 1978, through the cumulative work of the first two CNO Strategic Studies Groups, American naval strategic thinkers had revived and modified classical naval theory and placed it clearly within the context of both the peacetime use of naval force

believed that the practices which were then current in the Pentagon led to exotic responses to extreme requirements, resulting in insufficient forces for real needs.

Although a general consensus had been formed by Small's first two memos, the document which actually triggered the immediate action to prepare the briefing that eventually became the CNO/SECNAV approved Maritime Strategy booklet was a memo written for Small's signature by Rear Admiral John A. Baldwin, Director of the Systems Analysis Division (Op-96). This memo expressed what many people on the Navy staff believed was necessary to tie strategy to force development and fiscal responsibility. As Vice Admiral Carlisle Trost wrote on the cover sheet for the memo as it went along the clearance ladder for Small's signature, "We really need this to get the entire OpNav staff moving in the same direction."[28]

Small signed the memo on 2 August 1982 and sent it to all four flag officers directly concerned with the preparation of the upcoming annual Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The POM is a complete line-by-line list of every appropriation item that the Navy requires for the next five years, within fiscal limits. Each service submits comparable memoranda in May of every year to the Department of Defense, and they become the basis for the budget request to Congress. The POM ties the multiple planning functions together in a single document and serves as the foundation upon which a budget can be constructed in support of the defined goals and objectives of the Navy. In starting the annual process which would lead to the submission of the POM in May 1983, Admiral Small repeated his view that a strategy appraisal was needed "at the outset of the POM process with respect to how naval forces will be employed in wartime and their disposition both in the sense of our CINC war plans and in the DG [Defense Guidance] scenario." The Strategic Concepts Group (Op-603), then headed by Captain Elizabeth Wylie, took action on Admiral Small's memo. Within that office, Captain Wylie selected an action officer, Lieutenant Commander Stan Weeks, to carry out the required work. When Weeks was given this task, it seemed only another routine chore in Op-603; neither he nor others realized how quick or extensive would be the success of their project.

As the scope of the work became plain, Commander W. Spencer Johnson was assigned to join Weeks in the project to produce a draft as soon as possible, focusing his efforts on the "front end" connection of national strategy and defense programming.[29] Within three weeks, these two officers, Johnson and Weeks, pieced together a secret draft briefing which answered Admiral Small's request. In developing their initial briefing, they turned immediately to some of the work which was already in progress. The key sources were: the work being done in Newport by the Strategic Studies Group; the analyses of the Soviet Navy by the Center for Naval Analyses

and the context of the nuclear age. In the process, a common approach and view was developing at the highest levels of the Navy's leadership, leaving room for future modifications and evolution to this firm conceptual foundation.

The Work of the Strategic Concepts Branch (Op-603), 1982-1986

The publication entitled *The Maritime Strategy*,[23] prepared in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, is the official statement of what is sometimes called the "Forward Maritime Strategy" or "The Maritime Component of National Military Strategy." The immediate origins of this booklet are clearly definable and lead directly from three memoranda written by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William N. Small.

In December 1981, Small wrote a memo to the Director of Navy Program Planning in which he said: "I think it is high time we take a formal, critical look at how we do the analysis that leads to our appraisals of Navy programs. Our current methodology is very susceptible to adverse interpretations, not only by those outside the Navy who wish to attack Navy programs and strategy, but even within the Navy where we are professionally misled by both the scenario displayed and the conclusion which may logically be drawn therefrom."[24] Small objected to the typical thinking within the Navy staff in Washington. He saw that strategy was ignored in program discussions for ship and weapon construction. He thought that the programs often seemed to drive the strategy. He wanted to reverse this situation so that serious and responsible thought about the naval aspect of national strategy would eventually become the basis upon which the United States built its future Navy.[25] In Small's view, a major deficiency in naval thinking was a worst-case mentality. "We assign the best capabilities to the enemy and the worst to our own forces," he wrote. In analyzing engagements, we put our forces "into tactical situations which no prudent planner or responsible commander would countenance. Moreover, the U.S. Navy seemed to have adopted a defensive outlook, not an offensive one. "Naval forces are intended to seek out and destroy the enemy," Small declared, "not defend themselves."[26]

Within the Pentagon's naval staff, Small saw the parochialism of each of the platform sponsors and the failure of the OpNav staff to integrate the analyses, appraisals, requirements, and programs with strategic planning. "None of the characteristics of a naval engagement are played in isolation from each other in the real world, as they seem to be in our current methods of analysis," Small declared. "If affordability were injected early into analysis, which is itself based on national forces employment against realistic threats, we would have fewer and better supported combat systems."[27] Small

and the Office of Naval Intelligence; and the basic ideas that Admiral Hayward had developed for the Pacific Fleet and elaborated upon for the entire Navy as CNO.[30]

In 1982, the first version of the CNO/SECNAV approved statement of the Maritime Strategy began as an internal OpNav effort to state clearly the strategic background for naval force planning and budget decisions. Almost immediately, the Weeks-Johnson Maritime Strategy began to develop a wider significance. By late September 1982, the new Deputy CNO for Plans, Policy and Operations (Op-06), Vice Admiral Arthur Moreau, had reported and immediately approved the basic Weeks-Johnson Maritime Strategy briefing, deleting only one backup paper.

The next step was to begin the process of review. The statement of the strategy, as well as the entire Program Objective Memorandum, would normally pass through three phases of review by three different oversight committees. These committees, from junior to senior, are: The Program Development Review Committee, chaired by the Director, General Planning and Programming Division, (Op-90); The Program Review Committee, chaired by the Director of Navy Program Planning (Op-090); and The CNO Executive Board, chaired by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. In early October, the Op-603 officers presented the briefing to the Program Development Review Committee, the most junior of the three. This committee of rear admirals, chaired by Rear Admiral Joseph Metcalf, III, decided that the Maritime Strategy briefing should be presented "as is." Within a week, Weeks and Johnson presented it to the CNO Executive Board, consisting of the CNO and all his deputy CNOs and principal assistants. When Weeks and Johnson made this presentation to their most senior audience, the new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Watkins, and the other senior flag officers reacted positively. In the discussion following the briefing, Watkins emphasized the need to keep the Maritime Strategy focused on cooperation with allies and with other services, particularly with the U.S. Air Force.

On 7 October, Admiral Watkins issued a message to the Fleet CINCs reviewing his first 90 days as Chief of Naval Operations and identified the areas on which he wanted to focus. Among those areas were war-fighting readiness, the revitalization of the Naval War College as the crucible for strategic and tactical thinking, integration of the Naval Reserve into our war-fighting thinking, and improvement of interservice cooperation and mutual understanding.[31] His design was to unify the work of the CINCs, bringing their collective knowledge and understanding to bear on the broad issues facing the Navy and particularly on the use of naval forces for deterrence. The briefing which Weeks and Johnson had developed during August and September 1982 to help decision makers in the budgetary process

played into Watkins' broader goals.[32] It quickly took on a larger significance, building on the wide range of thinking within the Navy.

What had begun only two short months before as Lieutenant Commander Weeks and Commander Johnson's briefing was now the official statement of the Navy's maritime strategy. The transition had been rapid, but the concepts which Weeks and Johnson had used and coordinated were firmly based in a line of thinking that had developed over a much longer period. They used ideas that had emerged in the 1970s and had been refined in the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Strategic Studies Groups, and on the staffs of the unified and fleet commanders.

During the winter and spring of 1982-83, the officers in the Strategic Concepts Branch gave the Maritime Strategy briefing widely. In February 1983, it figured largely in Admiral Watkins' Posture Statement before the House Armed Services Committee. Watkins' own concept of how strategic and tactical thinking was being improved within the Navy was important and reflected the emphasis he placed on certain organizations and their work. Emphasizing some long-term work which was already in progress, he mentioned in his Posture Statement four key elements in his thinking:[33]

- The effort to develop a better understanding of the Soviet thought processes and inherent strengths and weaknesses in order to counter and exploit them.
- The revitalization of the Naval War College as a crucible for strategic and tactical thinking; the parallel effort to expose the finest, tactically proven professionals to strategic thinking as a means of testing professional thought; as well as creating a cadre for sound-thinking, educated commanders ready for key assignments.
- The use of combined arms war games which were explicitly designed to avoid a parochial, Navy-only point of view.
- The use of the semiannual Navy Commanders-in-Chief's conference as a forum for discussing national strategy and the Maritime Strategy flowing from it; using this conference to help establish the basis for organizing fiscal programming considerations related to the CINCs' employment plans.

The new emphasis was on a wider role and wider audiences for the strategy briefing. The departure of Weeks for duty as a shipboard executive officer and the subsequent assignment of Commander Peter Swartz as replacement for both Weeks and Johnson coincided with the appointment of Captain Roger Barnett as the new Branch Head in Op-603. These changes marked the beginning of the next step in conceptual development of the strategy as well as the next phase of staff work in support of the POM-86 testimony on Navy budget and programs, along with joint and allied cooperative planning efforts. The key actors this time were Barnett and Swartz.

War College; the thinking of the Strategic Studies Groups; the speeches of Secretary of the Navy John Lehman; NATO's war plans; and the CINCs' current concepts of operations. As he studied these various sources, he found that they were, for the most part, mutually reinforcing and reflected the "operate well forward in an offensive stance" atmosphere that seemed attractive to naval officers at that time.[38]

Working to establish a broad statement of this approach, he saw clearly that the different and separate branches of thinking within the Navy fundamentally complemented one another. Swartz saw his basic task as one that would bring these lines of thinking together in a way that would be acceptable to all interest groups within the Navy. Having become thoroughly acquainted with strategic thinking throughout the Navy, Swartz concluded that the Pacific Command Campaign Plan formulated under Admiral Robert Long as CINCPAC, provided the basic model to apply globally. Long's briefing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which had been used by Weeks and Johnson, reflected some of the earlier thinking in Hayward's Sea Strike study and was compatible with the first version of the Maritime Strategy. For Swartz, this was the "main recent antecedent" to his work as the action officer on the Maritime Strategy.[39]

Swartz wanted to co-opt as many key officers on the Navy staff as he could, reflecting a wide variety of interests and perspectives. His purpose was "to partake of their knowledge and not get knifed later" as well as "to make sure of a baseline that would last."[40] To achieve these goals, he focused on the working-level of captains and commanders rather than flag officers, trying out his ideas and modifying his approach in the summer and fall of 1983 through many informal, off-the-record "murder board" sessions. During these meetings a wide variety of strategically minded officers and civilians gave Swartz their constructive criticisms and helped him to refine his synthesis. Following these sessions, Swartz's briefing was widely presented, gaining clarity in its concepts and precision in its phraseology as a result of nearly every session.[41]

Between October 1983, when the first full draft briefing was given, and May 1984 when the CNO signed the final version, some 75 briefings had been given to audiences ranging from OpNav officers to students at the various U.S. war colleges, allied chiefs of naval staff, representatives of other services, and members of Congress.[42] Nearly every meeting had produced a nuance that led to further polishing and clarification. This very process bothered some observers. As one officer harshly wrote, "My frank view is that the Maritime Strategy brief basically reflects the lowest common denominator approach commonly developed through a committee effort. . . . My reaction to the brief—and the strategy it proposes to develop—is that we genuinely expect the Soviets to do exactly what we want them to do, and that somehow 'Right will make Might' enabling us to carry out

Vice Admiral Moreau took a great personal interest in the plans for the new revision, although he himself would be transferred shortly. In all his years in the Navy, until 1982, he had not known of an American naval strategy for global warfare. He felt that the Navy had not thought through all the time-tested theories nor examined their applicability to the present. Moreau spent a great deal of time with Barnett, working directly with him on evenings and Saturdays, and also with Swartz. Moreau saw the first version of a maritime strategy briefing as a categorization of the priorities of naval tasks in global warfare. Through it, the Navy portrayed the relative importance of tasks and began to see that there was a problem in positioning the fleet during a crisis between the great alliances. "In every scenario, there is always a set of naval tasks to accomplish with competing assets," he said. "Fundamentally, naval tasks are a given, beyond that it is a question of recognizing Soviet strategy and tactics and dealing with them."[34] Captain Roger Barnett echoed the same point when he said "strategy is not a game of solitaire."[35]

For Moreau, it was important to take the conceptual underpinnings of the first version and begin the process of advancing them step-by-step, prioritizing, and then going on to examine the most probable course of action within this analysis. However, he saw there was a danger in this which could lead to an absolute vision of strategy unless the concepts were continually open to challenge.[36] Many naval staff officers believed at the time that the Maritime Strategy should not become dogma.

Moreau discussed the substance of the strategy directly with Barnett and Swartz and directed them to build upon the first version and develop an architecture on which to expand and provide depth. In essence, he felt that the strategy needed attention given to naval forces other than the carrier battle groups, to the allied navies and air forces, and to joint U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force strategy. It needed clear and in-depth connection with our understanding of Soviet naval strategy in both crises and wars. This kind of thinking carried with it the need to look carefully at Norway and its adjacent waters, the subject of the Strategic Studies Group's first analysis; the question of naval support to the central front; and the issues of the sea lines of communication in both the Atlantic and the Pacific.

As action officer for the Maritime Strategy briefing, Commander Swartz undertook his task with the strong belief that it should not be the product of some brilliant, ethereal strategic thinker, but rather the collective thought of the high command of the entire Navy. Influenced in his general approach by Rear Admiral Joseph C. Wylie's book, *Military Strategy*,[37] Swartz strived to employ Wylie's basic thesis that strategy is a form of control that is not isolated from other factors. In developing further the Weeks-Johnson statement of the strategy, he endeavored to use this concept to apply a wide variety of sources to the issue, including the global war games at the Naval

our plans successfully despite severe undernourishment in such areas as sustainability, sea-lift, and dare I say it—strategic thought."[43] Such criticism touched on an essential aspect of the Maritime Strategy: it was a widely held view of strategy in the process of development. As an officer in the Strategic Concepts Branch (Op-603) commented, "The Maritime Strategy has a lowest common denominator problem. But it has to be agreed upon." Moreover, the National Intelligence Estimate, which at that time was the view that all agencies within the U.S. Government had agreed upon, presented the same interpretation that the Maritime Strategy presented of the Soviet Navy.[44]

Further Developments, 1984-1986

The distribution of *The Maritime Strategy* during the summer of 1984, as a classified document within the Navy, was a major step in the effort to educate naval officers in the various considerations involved in thinking about a future war with the Soviet Union. It opened a new series of developments for further refinement and examination of the Navy's strategic ideas. Most importantly, many officers were being educated in current strategic concepts. Ideas about strategy were widely exchanged, both inside and outside the Navy. Using the central focus of *The Maritime Strategy*, officers throughout the naval service were beginning to ask the essential question: What must the Navy accomplish in wartime, and how does it use its forces to achieve those ends?

Through the widespread dissemination of the basic concepts involved in *The Maritime Strategy*, a broad variety of contributions were made to its further development, while the Strategic Studies Group at Newport and the Strategic Concepts Branch in OpNav continued their work. The staffs of the various commanders in chief continued to reexamine and refine their war plans. Discussions were held with the other services and with the allied forces. New campaign concepts were examined at the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College, at the Center for Naval Analyses, and at other institutions. In short, there was a blossoming of maritime and naval thinking in a variety of ways and places. As this is being written, it is too close to the events to know which of the various ideas will become essential elements in the future, as naval officers continue to develop and refine their thinking about strategy. The general trends of development between 1983 and 1987, however, were quickly reflected in the work of Op-603 and the successive Strategic Studies Groups, while an increasing number of other staffs and individuals also became involved in the process.

By August 1984, following the publication of the first Maritime Strategy booklet, a new team of officers arrived in Op-06 and determined that it

was time to begin again the cycle of reflection and revision. With the booklet in hand, Admiral Watkins looked for further, more detailed development of the strategy. He directed the Strategic Studies Group to explore further insights into the peacetime uses of navies, emphasizing that the Maritime Strategy was a deterrent strategy whose purpose was to help prevent war. Its effectiveness for such a task, of course, derives from the U.S. Navy's ability to be ready for war should deterrence fail and then to fight and to help win such a war.

It became obvious during discussions that some officers questioned the propriety of the CNO's role in creating a strategy. For some who served on CINC staffs, the CNO appeared to be interfering with the prerogatives of the CINC and with his chain of command to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[45] For those who shared such views, the concepts of the CNO/SECNAV Maritime Strategy were appropriate as plausible arguments to present in the procurement process, but not as an actual, operational strategy.

The officers in the Strategic Concepts Branch of OpNav concentrated their efforts on combating that criticism and pointed out that the Maritime Strategy filled a gap in the American system of strategic planning. The CINCs' strategies reflected only regional strategies and the national strategy was not tied to the procurement planning process. The Op-603 officers worked to explain the Maritime Strategy as the fully developed maritime component of a national strategy which no CINC was in a position to develop alone, but through the CNO's position as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff he could serve to coordinate and reflect the broad aspects of the strategy and naval campaign options available to the various Navy CINCs. At the same time, the CNO's role in the procurement and budget process under the Secretary of the Navy allowed him to link these additional matters to planning for future operations, thus filling the missing part of the strategy process.

There had been widespread criticism of the Maritime Strategy outside the Navy, and in Congress, as one Op-603 officer remarked, "we took on some of our most ardent critics head to head."[46] Despite fears, the briefings before Senate and House committees were very successful. In the report of the House Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials, Congressman Charles E. Bennett wrote, "The subcommittee finds that the maritime strategy is, in fact, a proper naval component to national level military strategy, and that the 600-ship Navy as currently described is a reasonable and balanced approach to meeting the force structure requirements of that strategy."[47]

Throughout the work of explaining the idea of the Maritime Strategy as a strategic concept rather than just a budgetary argument, Admiral Watkins frequently became personally involved. From January to June 1985, Watkins was most actively involved with the further development and

"selling" of the strategy. It was during this period that the Navy staff developed the idea to publish an unclassified article on "The Maritime Strategy." A first draft was written, but it was not until more than six months later, in January 1986, that Watkins' article appeared as a special supplement to the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*.

By the end of 1986 there had been considerable discussion, not only in the *Proceedings* and in the *Naval War College Review*, but in newspapers, magazines, and journals. Important comments were made by John J. Mearsheimer in *International Security* which were paired with an article by Captain Linton Brooks.[48] Additionally, in his *Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics and the Defense of the West*,[49] Dr. Colin S. Gray made some interesting comments about Ambassador Robert Komer's criticisms of the Maritime Strategy. As the public debate widened, it became the basis of discussion in university lecture courses, such as that offered by Professor Paul M. Kennedy at Yale, "Seapower Past and Present,"[50] and even in the work of Tom Clancy and Larry Bond in their best-selling novel, *Red Storm Rising*.

In January 1987, President Reagan delivered to Congress a public and unclassified statement of the *National Security Strategy of the United States*. Although it swept widely across the spectrum of American strategy, a few paragraphs clearly reflected the development of the Maritime Strategy that for a decade had been the focus of effort by naval strategists. Most significantly, the report stated: "Maritime superiority enables us to capitalize on Soviet geographical vulnerabilities and to pose a global threat to the Soviets' interests. It plays a key role in plans for the defense of NATO allies on the European flanks. It also permits the United States to tie down Soviet naval forces in a defensive posture protecting Soviet ballistic missile submarines and the seaward approaches to the Soviet homeland, and thereby to minimize the wartime threat to the reinforcement and resupply of Europe by sea."[51]

A careful examination of the evolution of the Maritime Strategy reveals the confluence of several streams of development. First there is the revival of classical naval thought and its modification for use in the nuclear age. Secondly, there is the development of a new American interpretation of Soviet naval intentions that contrasted sharply with that held in the 1960s and 1970s. Thirdly, there is the development of institutional procedures to break down the parochialism of the various parts of the U.S. Navy and to develop a consensus. Fourthly, there is the development of a means to rationalize and to coordinate procurement of new equipment. The Maritime Strategy reflects the confluence of these developments as a statement of a broad, national maritime strategy with a range of campaign options for use in the event of war with the Soviet Union. This statement is designed to be the link which unifies the Navy's procurement policy with

operations and training, reflecting the war plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the operational plans of their regional commanders in chief. Along with it, the Navy attempted to provide a realistic assessment of Soviet capabilities and intentions in a war with the United States.

The Maritime Strategy, as it evolved in the decade between 1977 and 1987, was an attempt to coordinate the pluralistic system of American strategic planning for the Navy. By 1987, the public and professional discussion of the issues surrounding the Maritime Strategy had taken a sophisticated form. The issues of naval strategy could be, and were, understood and debated widely. This contrasted starkly with the absence of such discussion a decade earlier and, at the same time, demonstrated a widespread revitalization of strategic thinking within the naval officer corps.

For the first time in many decades, the U.S. Navy's leaders had developed a concept of a national maritime strategy which, they agreed, was a reasonable basis upon which to plan and prepare for a possible future war with the Soviet Union, and at the same time, serve as a deterrent to such a war.

Notes

1. Jack Snyder, *The Idealogy of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1984), pp. 19-34; and David Alan Rosenberg, "Reality and Responsibility: Power and Process in the Making of United States Nuclear Strategy, 1945-68," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, March 1986, pp. 36-38.

2. A summary of the basic concepts may be found in H. E. Eccles, "Strategy—The Theory and Application," *Naval War College Review*, May-June 1979, pp. 11-21. The key works of Herbert Rosinski and William Reitzel prepared at the Naval War College are reprinted in B. Mitchell Simpson III, ed., *War, Strategy and Maritime Power* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1977), pp. 63-110.

3. Eccles, p. 13.

4. J. C. Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1967), p. 110.

5. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Defense Policy 1981-82," in Fred I. Greenstein, *The Reagan Presidency: An Early Assessment* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1983), pp. 101.

6. The bulk of this section is based on Robert B. Pirie, Jr., Director, Naval Strategy Program, Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), Memorandum for Director, Strategic and Theater Nuclear Warfare Division (Op-60). Subj: Revised "Audit Trail" on Pro-SSBN/Strategic Reserve Missions of the Soviet Navy (U). (CNA) 82-0762.10/22, June 1983. This is a series of photocopied excerpts from earlier CNA studies gathered on the suggestion from Admiral W. Small, Jr., USN, 20 May 1982. Hereinafter, reference to the excerpts from this document will be made by citing the original document, followed by the note: "Excerpt in CNA 82-0762."

7. Excerpt from first draft of James M. McConnell, *Doctrine, Missions, and Capabilities*, (U) Chapter 1, in Bradford Dismukes and James M. McConnell, eds., *Soviet Naval Diplomacy* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), pp. I-49, 50. Unclassified, May 1977. Excerpt in CNA 82-0762.

8. James M. McConnell, "Strategy and Missions of the Soviet Navy in the Year 2000" in James L. George, ed., *Problems of Sea Power as We Approach the Twenty-first Century* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), pp. 61-62.

9. Bradford Dismukes, *Implications of Soviet Naval Strategy* (U). CNA 77-0902. 16 June 1977.

10. Bradford Dismukes, *The War Termination Mission of the U.S. Navy: A Briefing*, CNA 80-0412.00, 31 March 1980, p.1.

11. Letter from Captain W.H.J. Manthorpe, Jr., USN (Ret.) to Hattendorf, 31 December 1986; see Dismukes and McConnell, eds.

12. Hattendorf interview with Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, USN, The Pentagon: 17 April 1985.

13. *Ibid.*
14. Thomas B. Hayward, "The Future of U.S. Sea Power," in *Naval Review 1979* (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, May 1979), pp. 66-71.
15. Hattendorf interview with Rear Admiral William A. Cockell, Jr., USN, San Diego, Calif.: 5 April 1985.
16. *Ibid.*
17. For the history of this, see David A. Rosenberg, *U.S. Navy Long-Range Planning: A Historical Perspective*, Wasbington: Naval Historical Center, scheduled for publication in 1988.
18. CNO address to Current Strategy Forum, Newport, Rhode Island, 8 April 1981.
19. *Ibid.*
20. Captain R. Leeds, USN, conversation with Hattendorf, August 1986.
21. Robert J. Murray letter to Admiral William N. Small, USN, 1 September 1983.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *The Maritime Strategy* (U). Opnav 60 P-1-84. SECRET-NOFORN. Distributed under CNO letter 00-45300236 dated 4 May 1984.
24. Office files of the action officer for The Maritime Strategy, Strategic Concepts Group (Op-603). The Pentagon, Room 4E486 (Hereinafter, Op-603 Files). VCNO Memo N-1241 dated 18 December 1981 to Director, Navy Program Planning, Subj: Program Appraisals and Analysis.
25. Interview with Admiral William M. Small, USN, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, in Naples, Italy: 11 April 1985.
26. Op-603 Files. VCNO Memo N-1241 of 18 December 1981.
27. *Ibid.*
28. Op-603 Files: VCNO memo ser 09/300636, 2 August 1982. Memo for Director, Navy Program Planning (Op-090); Director, Office of Naval Warfare (Op-095); DCNO (Manpower, Personnel and Training)/Chief of Naval Personnel (Op-01); DCNO (Plans, Policy and Operation (Op-06). Subj: POM-85 CPAM/Warfare Appraisals.
29. Interview with Commander Stanley B. Weeks, USN: 12 December 1985 and letter from Captain W. Spencer Johnson, USN to Hattendorf, 5 September 1985.
30. Interview with Commander Weeks: 12 December 1985; Commander Weeks' Briefing script B06249:05G:MH, 3 September 1982.
31. CNO Message 071841Z October 82, Personal for Admirals Crowe, Williams, Foley, McDonald, Vice Admiral Hays, Info: Vice Admiral Carroll; Rear Admirals Shugart, Palmer, Horne, Dillingham, from Watkins.
32. Interview with Admiral James Watkins, USN : 12 December 1985.
33. A report by Admiral James D. Watkins, USN, Chief of Naval Operations on the posture of the U.S. Navy for the fiscal year 1984.
34. Interview with Vice Admiral Arthur Moreau, USN: 18 April 1985.
35. Interview with Captain Roger Barnett, USN, (Ret.): 17 January 1985.
36. Interview with Vice Admiral Moreau, USN, Op-603 Files. Critique of POM-85 CPAM.
37. See Wylie.
38. Interview with Captain Peter Swartz, USN: 25 March 1985.
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Ibid.*
42. Op-603 Files. "The Maritime Strategy Development/Presentation/Publication Schedule," B08447: 06I:HCB. Op-60317. September 1984.
43. Op-603 Files. Commander Bruce Valley, USN, CSIS Navy Fellow at Georgetown Univ. to Commander Peter Swartz, USN, 4 April 1984.
44. Op-603 Files. Commander J. R. Stark, Comments on Valley's Critique. Op-603J. B10282: 05J: bms of 1 May 1984.
45. Captain Peter Rice comments on draft, January 1988; Hattendorf interview with CINCPAC Staff: 23 April 1985.
46. Letter from Commander T. Wood Parker, USN to Hattendorf, 14 August 1986.
47. Bennett to Aspin, 18 November 1985. Letter of transmittal in U.S. House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 1st Session, Committee Print No. 11. *600-Ship Navy: Report of the Sea Power and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services*, p. iii.
48. John J. Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," *International Security*, Fall 1986, pp. 3-7; and Linton F. Brooks, "Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy," in *ibid.*, pp. 58-88.
49. Published by National Strategy Information Center, New York, 1986.

50. Professor Kennedy's lecture series ran from September to December 1986, and included guest speakers whose subjects ranged from ancient history to the examples of failed sea powers, Germany, Japan, and Italy in World War II. It concluded with lectures by Michael MccGwire on current Soviet seapower, and John Mearshmeier and Secretary Lehman on the Maritime Strategy. Selected papers have been published in *The International History Review*, February 1988.
51. The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, January 1987, pp. 29-30.

". . . no servitude is more hopeless than that of unintelligent submission to an idea formally correct, yet incomplete. It has all the vicious misleading of a half-truth unqualified by appreciation of modifying conditions; and so seamen who disdained theories, and hugged the belief in themselves as 'practical,' became *doctrinaires* in the worst sense."

Alfred Thayer Mahan
Types of Naval Officers
(Boston, 1901, p. 17)