

1988

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Recommended Citation

Janssou, C.Nils-Ove (1988) "The Baltic: A Sea of Contention," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 41 : No. 3 , Article 6.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol41/iss3/6>

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The Baltic: A Sea of Contention

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The Baltic Sea can be characterized as a backwater maritime theater. When studying the maritime situation in the context of an armed conflict in Europe, naval writers often concentrate their efforts on the Norwegian Sea and the Atlantic sea-lanes, while limiting their treatment of the Baltic to its approaches.

Nevertheless, in today's strategic environment, the Baltic Sea is part of a much larger maritime theater—the northern flank—which combines the Norwegian Sea, the Barents Sea, the Fenno-Scandinavian peninsula, the Baltic Sea, and the North Sea. From a continental perspective, the Baltic Sea and the North Sea would constitute a sea flank to the central front in Europe in the event of war. The Baltic can also be seen as an incursion behind the Iron Curtain, almost reaching into the Soviet heartland.

New ideas have influenced the politico-military situation in the Baltic in recent years. These concepts include the U.S. Maritime Strategy, the NATO Follow-on-Forces concept, and changes in the Soviet Strategic Command System and Soviet military doctrine. These changes, when considered within the general framework of conventional war in Europe, afford a better appreciation of the maritime capabilities and options that bear on the strategic importance of the Baltic Sea.

Maritime Aspects of the Geography

The Danish straits separate the Baltic Sea from the North Sea and the Atlantic. The Aland straits divide the Baltic Sea into two maritime operations areas, i.e., the central Baltic and the Gulf of Bothnia (chart 1). The strategic significance of these straits has been recognized for centuries, and the 19th century international treaties concerning these two areas are still in effect today.¹ Additionally, there are important man-made connecting waterways: the Kiel Canal, which shortens the route from the Baltic to the

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


Chart 1

English Channel by some 300 miles and the 480-mile-long White Sea-Baltic Canal, linking the Baltic at Leningrad to the Soviet Northern Fleet in the White Sea.

Since it is a confined area, time and distance factors are especially crucial in the Baltic. Limited time for reaction creates the demand for real-time or near real-time surveillance of the area to protect one's forces from surprise attack. This confinement also permits land-based air power to play a major role in maritime operations in the Baltic. A further consideration is the special combination of shallow water, hydrographic, and geologic

conditions which favor submarine and mine warfare. The limited depth, however, imposes restrictions on the size of submarines and their areas of operation.²

Other factors worth mentioning are the coastal terrain, ports, islands, and climate. The eastern and southern coasts are open and low, while the western and northern coasts are more rugged and covered with archipelagos. The few ports in the east and south are either situated in river mouths or artificially constructed. On the opposite coasts there exist excellent natural harbors, and sheltered areas can be found along the shorelines of Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. The islands of Gotland and Bornholm in the central Baltic are important because they create channels for movement on the sea. These islands can also be used for surveillance of the surrounding sea and for bases. Climate plays a significant role as the Baltic is situated on the border between the maritime and the continental climatic zones. This creates great weather variations throughout the year as well as overall variations from one year to the next. Operations are restricted by ice on the average of from two to five months in the southern and northern part of the Baltic respectively.

The Maritime Forces

Maritime forces in the Baltic have adapted to the area's geographic characteristics. This is particularly true of the NATO forces—Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany. Prevailing operational conditions in the Baltic Sea not only require tailored weapons systems, but also necessitate special tactics and procedures for cooperation.³ Thus, a joint NATO command, the Allied Command Baltic Approaches (ComBaltAp), was established in 1961. Its primary wartime mission is to maintain control over the Baltic exits—the Danish straits, the Kiel Canal, Kattegat, and Skagerrak. The NATO forces available for deployment in the Baltic Sea and its approaches include 50 modern missile boats, 28 coastal submarines, and about 100 naval fighter attack aircraft. These forces are supported by minelaying and mine countermeasures forces in the straits. Some significant improvements in NATO maritime forces have been made during recent years: German submarines have an increased minelaying capacity and carry up to 24 mines in externally mounted mine belts, and the transition of the German Naval Air Arm to Tornado aircraft has increased its capabilities and range—the all-weather capable Tornado can reach targets as far north as the mouth of the Gulf of Finland.⁴

In war, the existing air defense of the Baltic Approaches would be reinforced with five U.S. and two British fighter squadrons based in Denmark. Further reinforcements to southern Norway, by eight U.S. and two Canadian air squadrons, could also be used in the Baltic Approaches.⁵

Finally, Royal Air Force and U.S. bomber squadrons stationed in the United Kingdom could be used for air strikes.

The strength and weakness of the NATO position in the Baltic are apparent. As a map will indicate, NATO's strength is its initial control over the Danish straits and the ability to close them at will. A confined geographical area from which to conduct defensive and support operations is its weakness. Partial compensation for this vulnerability is NATO's seaborne logistics support, which makes it less dependent on land facilities, thereby providing greater mobility and less vulnerability.

The Soviet Baltic Fleet has experienced major changes during the last 25 years. Most significant has been its growth in missile armament. Other improvements include the buildup of an amphibious force and a mine countermeasures force, the largest forces in any of the four Soviet fleets.⁶ Yet, despite these facts, several Western naval analysts have asserted that with the enormous growth of the Northern and the Pacific Fleets, the Soviet Baltic Fleet has lost its importance. To substantiate their premise they emphasize the decrease in the number of major combatants and submarines in the Baltic Fleet.⁷ However, a more realistic evaluation is that this fleet is being fitted to the Baltic environment, adjusting naval technology and equipment to the geography and the threat. Given that perspective, it would appear that the Soviet Baltic Fleet is improving its capability to deal with potential hostilities.

The Soviet Baltic surface force consists mainly of ASW ships—destroyers, frigates, corvettes, and patrol boats. Missile corvettes and missile boats are the core of the surface attack force. Older destroyers can be used for minelaying and gunfire support. All submarines are diesel-electric powered. The Golf II and Juliett classes carry medium-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles respectively. The number of attack submarines, mainly Whiskey class, is difficult to estimate because there are quite a few being held in reserve or waiting to be scrapped. The Soviet submarines will be hard-pressed to find surface targets in the Baltic during wartime. If deployed within the Baltic, other missions such as surveillance, ASW, minelaying, and special operations will most likely be emphasized.

World War II taught the Soviet Navy that mines can be a very effective weapon and they now have a large inventory.⁸ Most surface ships, submarines, and airplanes can lay mines, and in a prewar situation merchant ships can also be used. While they have a large mine countermeasures (MCM) force, many of these vessels are old and built with steel hulls; others are small and suited for harbor protection. Only a relatively small number have mine-hunting capabilities.

The amphibious force consists of one naval infantry brigade supported by amphibious landing ships and hovercraft. The Baltic Soviet merchant fleet

has the capability for lifting several motorized army divisions and participates regularly in amphibious exercises. The Baltic Fleet also has one naval Spetsnaz brigade for special operations, the units of which can be transported by air or by sea to their targets.⁹ The Naval Air Arm has three bomber regiments (two equipped with Backfires), one attack regiment, and reconnaissance and ASW squadrons. These can be supported by strategic air forces and attack squadrons from military districts or fronts.

The Polish Navy recently intensified its modernization plan with a domestic construction program and Soviet deliveries of missile corvettes and submarines.¹⁰ Their most significant contribution to the Warsaw Pact forces is a naval infantry division and an estimated 20 amphibious landing ships.

The navy of the German Democratic Republic has been expanding during the 1980s, both in numbers and in capabilities, especially in such areas as ASW, surface attack forces, coastal defense, and shipborne supply. An army regiment has been organized and trained as an amphibious assault force. Their air force has one attack regiment specially trained in naval warfare.¹¹

The Warsaw Pact geographic position in the Baltic is far superior to that of NATO's because they control the 1,000-mile-long southern and eastern coast from the inter-German border to the Gulf of Finland. To protect their relatively few naval bases, they have developed a strong air and coastal defense system coupled with local ASW and MCM forces. Further, the East German Navy has in place a shipborne supply system which reduces its dependency on its exposed land bases.

The neutral countries, Sweden and Finland, have structured their maritime defense to deal with a potential invasion over the sea, relying heavily on coastal defense systems and mines. The Swedish Fleet, which consists of approximately 35 very capable missile boats, 12 modern submarines, and a large number of mine and MCM units, can be supplemented by three reconnaissance and five attack squadrons from the Swedish Air Force. During recent years, in response to the submarine violations of Swedish waters, a slow buildup of ASW capabilities has begun.

The Finnish Navy is centered around a surface attack flotilla with corvettes and missile boats supported by mine and MCM forces. Both the Swedish and Finnish coasts have excellent basing facilities and extensive dispersal areas for naval forces. The large archipelagos along the coasts of both countries also can be used to tactical advantage during maritime operations in the Baltic.

The U.S. Maritime Strategy

The U.S. Maritime Strategy, if implemented as it has recently been described,¹² will have a significant impact on the entire northern flank. There are at least two considerations that will affect the Baltic during the early

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phase of a conventional war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. First is defense of the Baltic Approaches;¹³ second are strikes against Warsaw Pact fleets in the Baltic. For instance, surface action groups (SAGs) deployed in the North Sea with conventional armed cruise missiles can reach targets within a range of 700 miles. That means that targets along the southern and eastern coast of the Baltic, up to the Gulf of Finland, can be struck. As the Tomahawk cruise missile is further developed it will be able to strike high-value targets such as port facilities, fuel and munition depots, and airfields. Future generations of cruise missiles can be expected to have increased range and accuracy, improved warheads, and higher selectivity.¹⁴

As the Maritime Strategy matures, it is envisioned that naval task groups will be able to undertake attacks in eastern Europe and against the Soviet homeland. Amphibious operations will be considered for the North Sea coast or the Baltic, depending on the general situation in Central Europe.¹⁵ The success of these operations will hinge on NATO's ability to gain control of both the sea and air.

NATO Follow-on-Forces Attack

In late 1984, the Follow-on-Forces Attack (FOFA) concept was accepted.¹⁶ This idea calls for using superior Western technologies to destroy major communications such as railway facilities, bridges, and road and rail junctions, thus creating delays and concentrations of the Warsaw Pact's follow-on forces and logistics—concentrations that then could be attacked and destroyed.

The FOFA concept could influence the Baltic theater since the Warsaw Pact could be expected to put more emphasis on sea transportation to support the central front. Sea lines of communication are more efficient in hauling cargo than are railroads and truck convoys. Recent construction of port facilities in Soviet Baltic ports and in East Germany may be a sign of the sea lines' increasing importance.¹⁷ Also, NATO maritime forces could benefit from FOFA surveillance and weapons systems. In the Baltic area, missions might include attacks on the Warsaw Pact amphibious forces in their embarkation ports. In sum, this could be called the maritime FOFA carried out against a selected segment of the Warsaw Pact's second echelon.¹⁸ Thus, to complement the strikes against land communications, the FOFA concept could deny Warsaw Pact control of the Baltic. FOFA technology would give NATO a better capability to achieve this by attacking heavily defended airfields and port facilities.

The Soviet Strategic Command Systems

The Soviet reorganization from central command to unified commands in theaters of military action (TVDs) was made not only to reduce the

number of subordinate forces, but also to promote the principle of combined arms operations.¹⁹ (The European theaters of military action are shown in chart 2.)²⁰ A maritime view of the boundaries discloses that the inland seas—the Baltic, Mediterranean, and Black Seas—are all divided between different TVDs. The North Sea and the Channel area are also separated from the Atlantic. This is obviously influenced by the dominance of land warfare in Soviet military science. It also gives the impression that the Soviets view strategic straits more as barriers with which to close off certain operation areas than as vital communication links.²¹ If the emphasis is on combined arms operations to conquer and set up the barrier concept, the division of TVDs has merit.




Chart 2

In the Baltic there are some interesting questions to be considered. The northern part of the Baltic Sea belongs to the northwestern TVD. The Soviet Baltic Fleet is subordinate to the commander of the western TVD. Does this mean that the northern part of the Baltic, the Gulf of Bothnia, is of lesser importance, or does the boundary overlap, giving operational responsibility for the entire Baltic to the Commander in Chief, Baltic Fleet? The latter view is most probable, and support for it is evident in light of

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the fact that no high command for the northwestern TVD has been identified. In the event of Soviet operations against northern Scandinavia, including Norway, Finland, and the northern part of Sweden, the existing command structure could be complicated since it involves more than one front and elements from both the Northern and the Baltic Fleets.²²

There is also the connection between the Baltic Sea and the North Sea. While both areas appear to belong to the western TVD, it would be more realistic for the North Sea to belong to the Northern Fleet. Soviet ships would have better access from the north, and forces could be coordinated between the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea, and the Atlantic. However, there is a compelling counterargument. The primary naval forces deployed in the North Sea, at least in an early stage of a conflict, would be diesel submarines, pre-positioned mines, and bomber regiments. Minelaying, using merchant ships and deployment of submarines, would have to be completed before the outbreak of war. Considering the distance factors for diesel submarines, Soviet Northern Fleet craft would be at a disadvantage. Also, naval forces from the Baltic Fleet are deployed to the North Sea on a regular basis.²³ The Baltic Fleet bomber regiments can, from their bases in the western Soviet Union, more easily reach the North Sea than regiments based on the Kola Peninsula. Finally, the North Sea is an important area for NATO reinforcements and logistics support for the central front and ComBaltAp.²⁴ Thus, Soviet naval operations in the Baltic, the Baltic Approaches, and the North Sea can be coordinated with other operations within the western TVD to achieve the greatest effect against NATO.

Soviet Combined Arms Operations

According to Soviet military doctrine, the combined arms concept is an essential element of modern warfare. The Soviet Navy's view of more independent operations ended with Admiral Gorshkov's retirement in 1985. Thus, one can expect Soviet fleets to be closely tied to the direct support of ground forces in the TVDs.

The most traditional maritime combined arms operation is the amphibious assault. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the number and size of Soviet and Warsaw Pact amphibious exercises increased, especially in the Baltic Sea.²⁵ Airborne and seaborne assaults are playing an increasingly important role in Soviet planning for deep operations in theater warfare. For example, in coastal attacks, amphibious landings would coincide with airborne assaults. These assaults would be directed against theater strategic objectives or in direct tactical support of advancing fronts or armies. ZAPAD 81—an exercise that has been hailed as a milestone in Soviet military science—used operational maneuver groups (OMGs) and airborne and amphibious assaults to penetrate as deeply as was operationally feasible into the enemy

rear. Theater strategic objectives include seizing important politico-industrial and military centers, seizing important maritime straits, and establishing a second front to force selected nations within NATO to withdraw from the war. On the tactical level, objectives can be the seizure of islands, maritime straits, critical ports, and naval bases, or sectors of the enemy coast needed for subsequent operations.²⁶

In the concept of deep operations, other actions such as special operations with Spetsnaz units can also be used. Surprise strikes and sabotage against key targets can either be conducted separately to remove high threats or in conjunction with a major assault. Very little is publicly known of Soviet naval diversionary forces. Swedish reports of submarine intrusions into their territorial waters indicate the use of conventional submarines, midget submarines, and divers. The characteristics and the pattern of these intrusions suggest that they are preparations for wartime operations with diversionary forces.²⁷

In accordance with the combined arms concept, non-naval forces can be used for maritime missions. For example, the Army's seizure of the coastal areas along a strategic strait can contribute to naval supremacy in a closed sea. Air forces supported by rocket troops can also interdict sea lines of communication by attacking ports which receive reinforcements by sea. In the main TVD, the central front in Europe, maritime forces would probably be used in a role subordinate to the land forces. For example, amphibious lift could, if necessary, be used to transport military equipment such as replacement tanks from the Soviet Union to East Germany.²⁸

Maritime Concepts and Options

A traditional Western view of the Warsaw Pact concept in the Baltic foresees the Soviets seizing the Danish straits, clearing the minefields and allowing the Baltic Fleet to steam out into the North Sea to join forces with the Northern Fleet.²⁹ A closer examination reveals several weaknesses in this scenario. The first concerns air power, especially in confined waters where control of the air is a decisive factor. For the Soviets to be successful, they must neutralize NATO air in the ComBaltAp area, southern Norway, and the United Kingdom, while simultaneously battling for air superiority over the central front. Furthermore, Warsaw Pact forces would have to occupy Danish territory to ensure continued mine clearance without interference. Finally, the NATO naval forces, including submarines in the Baltic and surface forces off southern Norway, would have to be dealt with. After these major achievements, the Soviet Baltic Fleet would still face NATO forces deployed in the North Sea as well as the uncertainties to Soviet operations posed by the NATO Strike Fleet, Atlantic.

Recently, Western analysts have argued that a barrier concept is a more realistic alternative for the Warsaw Pact.³⁰ The main objective is not to break out, but to close the Baltic Sea. Such a concept would be less costly and would better match the deteriorating ocean-fighting capability evidenced in the Soviet Baltic Fleet. The operation would require disruption of Danish air defenses, Soviet occupation of Schleswig-Holstein and parts of Denmark, and extensive minelaying in the straits, thus, forcing NATO naval forces out of the Baltic. The barrier would help Warsaw Pact forces to gain control over the Baltic and also open an air corridor to the North Sea. There are several additional options within this concept. One is to infiltrate the North Sea with light surface forces, possibly through the Kiel Canal,³¹ using missile boats, submarines, and naval air to interdict NATO reinforcements coming in through the Low Countries. Another option would be to maintain the barrier, but open the straits at a later phase of the war. This could be very important in a prolonged war as 50 percent of the Soviet shipyards are situated in the Baltic.³²

To gain control of the Baltic, the Warsaw Pact would have two remaining problems to solve, regardless of which of the two concepts it tried to implement. First, the 15 to 20 submarines that NATO would probably have deployed in the Baltic would have at least 2 to 4 weeks' endurance. Even if not supported by other NATO forces, they would pose a considerable threat to the Pact's SLOCs, and would tie up a sizeable Soviet naval force in the Baltic for at least the first month of a war.

Next, the neutrals—Finland and Sweden—would have to be taken into consideration. How would they react to NATO forces seeking protection or resupply in their ports, to Soviet bombers overflying their territory, or to cruise missiles violating their airspace? Even if Warsaw Pact forces maintain respect for neutral territory, it would still be necessary for the Pact to hold forces in reserve for the unexpected. While Soviet planners may consider a preemptive attack in the Baltic as a viable option, an early war with Sweden and Finland would be most unfavorable for the Warsaw Pact as it would change the correlation of forces by initiating major operations on the northern sea flank.³³

NATO's concept of operations for the ComBaltAp area is to close and defend the Baltic Approaches with minefields, surface forces, and coastal batteries—the defense would be a defense in-depth.³⁴ Submarines with mines and torpedoes, coordinated with naval air, could operate over the entire central Baltic. Submarines could be protected by air strikes against Warsaw Pact ASW forces, and offensive minefields could be safeguarded by conducting offensive operations against Warsaw Pact minesweepers. If there is a weakness in the NATO Baltic defense system, it is the landfront in Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland. Even if the first attack could be stopped,

the Warsaw Pact forces could successively deploy a number of fresh divisions in this direction.³⁵ The defense of this area would then be dependent on the timely arrival of reinforcements.

If the NATO command is willing to reinforce ComBaltAp with strong marine and army forces, even in the event of a drawback on the central front, the area could be used to stage a major counteroffensive. Maritime operations on the exposed flanks offer opportunities to flank Soviet forces in central Europe.³⁶ From the onset of war, NATO's naval forces could then choose alternative concepts for the Baltic Sea. Instead of only trying to deny sea control to Warsaw Pact forces, they could contest it with the intent to control the southern half of the central Baltic.³⁷ The forces and the technology behind the U.S. Maritime Strategy and FOFA make such options possible. Operations would have to include aggressive and extensive air strikes—with cruise missiles and other airborne stand-off weapons against air bases and naval bases, blockading ports with mines, and engaging Warsaw Pact naval forces at sea. (Bombers, like the B-52 and B-1, equipped with cruise missiles and land-based missiles in Europe, would complement the sea-based inventory.)³⁸

It has been suggested that submarines equipped with cruise missiles could carry out offensive actions into the enemy rear areas from the deep waters south of Norway.³⁹ Such deployments are possible, but in an early phase of the conflict it would be better to deploy surface action groups in the North Sea and carrier battle groups in the vicinity of the British Isles while attack submarines are carrying out the operations in the high north. These proposed areas are less exposed to Soviet air and submarine threats than the Norwegian Sea. They are also excellent areas from which to project power into the Baltic Sea. NATO's freedom of action would increase dramatically if the Warsaw Pact amphibious forces could be destroyed before leaving port;⁴⁰ security for the Danish islands would improve and NATO could consider further naval offensive operations in the Baltic that might force major Soviet naval units back into the sanctuary of the Gulf of Finland.

Such an offensive NATO naval strategy could be met by Soviet dispersal. In the Soviet military dictionary, a ship dispersal area is "a sector of the coast, within the limits of the operation zone of a naval base, equipped for dispersal berthing of ships."⁴¹ Such dispersal areas can probably be found in the Gulf of Gdansk, the Gulf of Riga, and the Gulf of Finland. However, given current and projected technology in surveillance and weapons, much wider dispersal would be necessary for this tactic to provide adequate protection.

The Finnish and Swedish coasts, with their large archipelagos, would be attractive to the Soviets as dispersal areas.⁴² The feasibility of such plans would depend on whether local defense forces could be neutralized and if

the dispersed forces could be supplied. International law restricts neutral states to providing haven for no more than three warships of a given nation during time of war, and then for only a limited time.⁴³ In demilitarized areas, like the Aland Islands, military forces are not allowed at any time. An effort to circumvent these laws and treaties would be met by force from the neutral countries, Finland and Sweden, according to their forces' rules of engagement. Attempts by the Soviet Union to use the "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance" with Finland would most certainly be rejected on the grounds that the threats against the Soviet Union were not coming through Finnish territory.

There are other Soviet maritime options in the Baltic that should not be overlooked. Operations in the northwestern TVD could involve Finnish and Swedish territories. Should the Soviet Union launch a major offensive through Finland and Sweden toward Norway, naval and amphibious operations in the Baltic could be very important. Combined arms amphibious landings in the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Bothnia could break the resistance and speed up the offensive. A major attack toward Norway by land would most likely be supplied by sea transports from the eastern Baltic as far north as the Gulf of Bothnia. Supply by land from Leningrad's military district through northern Finland and Sweden to Norway would be open to interdiction, especially since the routes are few and low in trafficability.

An alternative to the above would be to open a front in Sweden before her defense forces are fully mobilized. Given initial success, this could threaten all of NATO's northern flank and thereby counter any U.S. offensive against the Arctic bastion.⁴⁴ Such an operation would have to involve surprise strikes against Swedish air and naval forces together with airborne and amphibious landings. Higher readiness has been emphasized as an important part of the latest Parliamentary defense decisions of both Finland and Sweden. The increasing strategic importance of the Nordic area and the military buildup in the surrounding countries contribute to that conclusion.

A Warsaw Pact defensive option could involve operations against the islands in the Baltic. Deployment of early warning systems on Bornholm, Gotland, and Aland would enhance Soviet air defense, especially against low-flying targets. Such actions could be undertaken to counter an increasing threat from NATO cruise missiles. Further development of over-the-horizon radars and improved airborne early warning systems would make such an option less attractive in the future.

The Baltic Sea has always had a large concentration of maritime forces, larger than anywhere else in the world relative to its limited area. Yet, tensions on the contemporary scene have been relatively low in comparison to other areas. The neutral countries, Sweden and Finland, have

contributed to this relatively stable situation. However, the Soviet Union has had a long-standing goal to dominate the Baltic Sea. The Soviet buildup of the Baltic Fleet since World War II—especially in its amphibious capability, together with various Soviet proposals to close the Baltic to navies from nations outside the Baltic area—clearly demonstrates her objectives:

Further evidence of Soviet interest in the Baltic is the integration of the Baltic Sea with central Europe and the western TVD. This integration consists of changes in the Soviet strategic command system and in operational doctrines. NATO's forward defense strategy and its tactical concept of deep interdiction on the battlefield will probably reinforce such integration even further. Thus, the Soviet Union places great value on the Baltic as a strategic entity.

What we have witnessed on the northern flank is an overlapping of strategic interests. The enormous growth of the Soviet Northern Fleet, particularly its strategic submarine force, has gradually expanded the Soviet security zone over the whole northern flank. Challenges, such as the U.S. Maritime Strategy, that threaten not only the Soviet Strategic Submarine force but also the Warsaw Pact's sea flanks of central and northern Europe, will definitely increase the strategic importance of the whole northern flank of which the Baltic Sea is one part. Evidence of this increasing strategic importance can be seen in the pre-positioning of military equipment, naval presence, maritime exercises, and submarine intrusions. Neutral countries must keep pace with these changes or jeopardize their security.

For NATO, the continuing problem is to keep abreast of Warsaw Pact developments in the Baltic. Failure to take these developments seriously and respond to them adequately will provide the Warsaw Pact with control of the Baltic, thus opening additional supply routes to the central front and a key to the North Sea.

Notes

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The author is indebted to Professor John B. Hattendorf, Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History at the Naval War College, for sponsoring the research and for his advice throughout this work.



To See the World

"Part of the naval experience is to see strange ports, and Newport is definitely a strange port."

Commander Richard H. Hartman, U.S. Navy,
CO of U.S.S. *Albuquerque* (SSN 706) while
visiting Newport, as reported in *The Providence
Journal*, 22 August 1983