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
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PROFESSIONAL READING



“The fact that the Soviet Union routinely falsifies published economic statistics, proposes ‘compromises’ with the West that further Soviet military advantages, and masks its nuclear weapons production under ‘medium machinery building’ is considered indicative of the deception that permeates Soviet society.”

Lieutenant Sam J. Tangredi, U.S. Navy

Dailey, Brian D. and Parker, Patrick J., eds. *Soviet Strategic Deception*.
Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books and Hoover Institution Press, 1987.
560pp. \$49

The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) never has been considered to be in the forefront of research on strategy and defense. This is due to a variety of factors: its distance from Washington; the relative youthfulness of its National Security programs (established 1975); and its continuous export of talented faculty, to name but a few. However, one area of politico-military research in which it has made steady and increasingly significant progress is the study of strategic deception. *Soviet Strategic Deception*, the second major effort of this kind to be published, is a collection of papers originally presented at an NPS-sponsored conference held 26-28 September 1985. Without exception, it is the best compendium on Soviet deception to be found in the open literature.

Collections from academic conferences usually contain chapters that vary wildly in theme and quality. In contrast, *Soviet Strategic Deception* seems remarkably balanced and organized. It starts with a description of the Soviet organizational structure for deception and disinformation; identifies the ideological, cultural, and historical motivations that prompt this organization; and then focuses on four specific target areas for Soviet deception: arms control negotiation and verification; the masking of Soviet military planning; regional conflicts; and the manipulation of U.S. strategic planning. The contributors represent a blend of academicians, policy analysts, policymakers, and intelligence officers, all of whom have sound scholarly credentials. Yet, despite the diversity, each chapter does a superb

job in complementing the next. Each analyzes a small piece of the shadowy mosaic that creates what contributor John Dziak has called the ultimate "counter-intelligence state." It reveals the enormous scope of Soviet efforts to deceive all who attempt to estimate their capabilities or intentions.

This is not to say that the contributors agree on what properly constitutes "deception." The collection uncovers subtle, but analytically significant disagreement between the career members of the U.S. intelligence community and the outside specialists. As is made evident in the contributions of Richards Heuer, U.S. intelligence officers utilize a narrow definition of "deception" that distinguishes between "cover" or the denial of information, and "active measures" or deliberate efforts by the Soviets to deceive foreign decision makers and intelligence services. Under the second category, a further distinction is made between what the editors term "perceptions management" (propaganda and disinformation directed towards political leaders and the general public) and "intelligence deception" (double agents, false telemetry, and other covert counterintelligence practices). Needless to say, intelligence agencies concentrate on detecting the latter and tend to assume the former is routine.

In contrast, many outside specialists consider "perceptions management" as the most effective means of Soviet deception since it has a direct impact on the public debate that drives American policy-making. The fact that the Soviet Union routinely falsifies published economic statistics, proposes "compromises" with the West that further Soviet military advantages, and masks its nuclear weapons production under "medium machinery building" is considered indicative of the deception that permeates Soviet society. As Robert Bathurst and Robert Conquest, in studies of Soviet ideology and linguistics, and Kerry Kartchner, in his survey of pre-World World II Soviet diplomacy, point out, Soviet leaders have frequently boasted of their abilities at fooling the bourgeoisie. Just as often, leaders of the bourgeoisie do not, or pretend not, to hear.

The overall themes of the Soviet deception and disinformation effort, that is, what the Soviets *want* the bourgeois West to hear, are effectively summarized by John Lenczowski. The list reads like the media speculation it is meant to foster: "communist ideology is dead," "the Kremlin is divided between Hawks and Doves," "the Soviet Union has changed," "Soviet military doctrine is defensive-oriented," "the Soviets have a self-interest in mutual arms control," etc.

Perhaps even more disturbing is the Soviet scientific research effort in "reflexive control," which is documented in a chapter by Clifford Reid. Reid has analyzed the writing of Russian psychologist Vladimir Lefebvre concerning Soviet military efforts to develop a mathematical algorithm of perception management. According to Lefebvre, who conducted a portion of this research but later emigrated to the West, the objective was to utilize

psychological methods to modify or interfere with Western decision-making practices. Like Pavlov's dogs, the Western decision makers were to be conditioned to make particular responses to Soviet actions. Lefebvre maintains such research is continuing.

Other chapters concentrate on how the Soviets attempted to use or may have used deception in international politics. The section on arms control is particularly strong; the chapter by William R. Harris of the Rand Corporation contains the most comprehensive list on Soviet violation of arms control agreements yet published, combining information from all the official reports. A section on regional deception discusses how the Soviets have covered their involvement in the European anti-INF campaign, in Nicaragua, and in the Mid-East conflict.

Another section reviews Soviet doctrine on *maskirovka* (masking by means of denial and deception) in military operations. Particular attention is directed towards the covert use of chemical and biological warfare agents.

But of all the topics, the section on U.S. strategic planning has greatest impact. Leon Sloss, a primary architect of President Carter's 1980 Presidential Directive 59 concerning strategic targeting policy, details how deception has led American decision makers to downgrade the possibility of Soviet strategic advantages and assume ample strategic warning in the event of strategic attack. William Van Cleave analyzes the question of strategic warning in detail and concludes that, given the institutionalized Soviet deception program, the possibility of a surprise strategic attack cannot be discarded. Angelo Codevilla explains the ways that our satellite sensors—which we rely upon for strategic warning—could be deceived, particularly if the United States does not develop a counter-deception doctrine. Thomas Rona, on what may seem a less glamorous topic, the formulation of national intelligence estimates, provides even more thought-provoking fare. During a long tenure as a Defense Department consultant, Rona has been impressed by the fact that American intelligence officials and decision makers frequently discount or misinterpret intelligence data when it conflicts with previous assessments of Soviet behavior that are reinforced by open sources. General impressions, such as the existence of a missile gap or Soviet acceptance of mutual assured destruction, develop a life of their own within the minds of decision makers despite a lack of hard evidence. To a considerable extent, this reinforces the view that “perception management” is the most effective form of Soviet deception.

Perhaps the volume's major weakness is too much information—much more than can be summed up in a succinct concluding chapter. No one can state unequivocally what all of it means, and it is impossible for any one person to trace each individual crack. However, like most large mosaics, the image becomes clearer when one takes a step backwards. The reader comes away with one definitive conclusion: not only do the Soviets have

a propensity for deception, they are superbly organized, bureaucratically and ideologically, to carry it out.

However, two areas for further research are readily apparent. First, there is ample evidence that self-deception is an American characteristic and has more to do with U.S. policy blunders than with Soviet active measures. The book does not explore the linkage between latent misbeliefs and Soviet reinforcement in detail. Second, with the exception of one reference to fake SSBNs, there is no mention of the use of deception in Soviet naval operations. This is a grievous fault in a book from the Naval Postgraduate School.

Everyone who studies the formation of U.S. defense policy or American-Soviet relations should read this book. Unfortunately, at the publisher's price, I suspect that few will. A less expensive executive summary is definitely in order.

Graham, Loren. *Science, Philosophy, and Human Behavior in the Soviet Union*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1987. 565pp. \$45

This important book is a major revision and expansion of the author's earlier work, *Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union* (New York, 1972). So thoroughly has Loren Graham recast and enlarged his earlier work that the result is virtually a new book.

The underlying structure of the present volume remains that of Graham's earlier work: description and analysis of the relationship between Soviet science and the philosophy of dialectical materialism. The period that interests him most follows the end of the Second World War, although he does not neglect earlier work by Soviet scientists. Against a background of the history of Soviet science and philosophy, Graham describes scientific research in the U.S.S.R. as well

as philosophical controversies over various aspects of research in the fields of genetics, physiology, biology, cybernetics, chemistry, quantum mechanics, relativity physics, and cosmology.

Graham, a professor of Soviet studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, enjoys complete command of the Russian language as well as a record of long periods of research residence in the Soviet Union. The trip described in his recent *NOVA* telecast "How Good is Soviet Science?" was his 15th visit to the Soviet Union. For the most part, Graham's visits have been welcomed by Soviet academicians, particularly those of the Academy of Science of the U.S.S.R.

Graham's earlier book carried his detailed examination of Soviet science and philosophy up to 1970. The present work takes the reader through mid-1985. Two new chapters on Soviet research and studies on

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human behavior include descriptions of prominent Soviet figures in the "Nature or Nurture" debates, as well as various topics on the relationship of biology to human life—sociobiology, crime and social deviance, ethnic relations, and biomedical ethics.

Following a historical overview of the relationship between Soviet politics and science, Graham devotes a chapter to dialectical materialism, the official philosophy of the Soviet Union, which Graham claims to be not only an important intellectual achievement in itself, but a conceptual scheme that a number of front-rank Soviet scientists have found stimulating and helpful in their work. This high estimation of dialectical materialism (the term was first used not by Marx or Engels but by Plekhanov) will prove troublesome to many scholars.

Graham's respect for dialectical materialism does not influence him to ignore the long history of Soviet Government interference with scientific research. The Lysenko affair remains the best known to Westerners and, oddly, has the least to do with dialectical materialism. Graham illuminates a number of important but less familiar controversies in various fields of Soviet science in which one party or another has been accused of diverging from orthodox materialism. For example, he describes how, decades ago, resonance theory in chemistry and quantum mechanics in physics alerted guardians of Soviet scientific orthodoxy to wag

warning fingers at Soviet scientists concerned with research in these disciplines.

The complementarity principle associated with Bohr's and Heisenberg's interpretation of quantum mechanics threatened to lead to "idealism," a philosophical position Lenin considered incorrect. The squabble over the alleged unorthodoxy of "Copenhagen physics" lasted nearly twelve years before it finally petered out; in 1960 the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* gave its blessing to quantum mechanics. But as recently as 1981, Graham notes, Iurri Zhdanov, son of Andrey Zhdanov, Stalin's cultural hatchet man, declared that chemical reactions obey dialectical laws, an opinion not wholly seconded by Soviet chemists. The latter are willing to grant dialectical materialism an epistemological role in scientific research, but balk at being forced to acknowledge an ontological one. The epistemologists acknowledge the value of dialectical materialism as a cognitive method, but are reluctant to grant the more conservative ontologists' claim that dialectical materialism represents an actual description of Being or Reality. According to Graham, progressive figures in Soviet science today tend to favor the methodological, less metaphysical, understanding of the official philosophy.

The high value of Graham's book rests largely in its rich cargo of meticulously researched information about personalities and developments in 20th century Soviet science.

The book could have been written only by one closely familiar with the Russian language, with Soviet culture, and particularly with the manifold scientific theories—many quite recondite—here chosen as representative. Much of this data would have remained inaccessible to the West were it not for Graham's tireless pilgrimages to the Soviet Union and his patient searching in the Soviet and pre-Soviet courses which has yielded so much of the material he so lucidly presents.

This reviewer's reservations about the book concern the author's claim that dialectical materialism is an intellectual achievement comparable to the Aristotelian or Cartesian models of the physical universe. Certainly Graham has assembled an impressive array of acknowledgment citations by Soviet scientists who talk, apparently with some freedom, of their debt to this official philosophy and of courses that are still compulsory in every field of Soviet higher education. It is puzzling to a Westerner that this dated schematism, so closely related to late 19th and early 20th century process philosophies and emergent evolutionisms, should still escape demythologizing in the U.S.S.R., while it has been dismissed as arid scholasticism even by Communist intellectuals in other countries—for example, by Raymond Jean in France.

But perhaps unqualified, official approval of dialectical materialism in the Soviet Union is already easing off. Graham himself cites I. B. Zel'dovich and I. D. Novikov, two cosmologists

who represent new trends in that scientific discipline and whose reputations have spread favorably to the West. This brilliant pair, says Graham, tend to avoid writing about Marxism or dialectical materialism in their scientific works. Indeed, Graham adds, they back away from philosophical and historical questions in general, "as if they know such issues can only cause trouble."

In *Science, Philosophy, and Human Behavior in the Soviet Union*, Graham does not deal directly with the question raised in his *NOVA* presentation, "How Good is Soviet Science?" In the telecast, he made it forcefully clear that so far as pure science is concerned, Soviet science today still lives in a quasi-spiritual tower, hermetically sealed off, save in exceptional instances, from application to technology. As a result, Graham says, Soviet technology, at least in the civilian sphere, lags 10 to 15 years behind that of the West, particularly trailing the United States and Japan. This is part of the gap Gorbachev is trying to close. In the military sector, the lag may not be as great. With their prestige, power to cut through bureaucratic restrictions, and consequent easier access to required high-quality material, the Soviet military may be in a better position to acquire first-class, high-tech equipment for their armed forces. Graham did not discuss this in his book, nor did he touch on it in his *NOVA* program save for his introductory statement that military scientific laboratories are off-limits to Western visitors.

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In any case, for military and civilian readers alike, Graham's large book, with its panorama of Soviet scientific research and accomplishments, stands as required reading for all those who share interest in the science, philosophy, and culture of the great nation to the east, some of whose leaders at least today incline to the belief, hitherto unthinkable, that their national interests may coincide to some degree with our own.

J. G. BRENNAN
Naval War College

Gleick, James. *Chaos: Making a New Science*. New York: Viking, 1987. 352pp. \$19.95

In the last twenty years mathematicians and scientists have come to recognize that much of what goes on in nature is not as random and noisy as previously thought, but contains beautifully and subtly intricate behavior which appears to be chaotic only at first look. James Gleick of the *New York Times* has written a remarkable and orderly book about this disorderly business. He has used his considerable talent to present the fundamental concepts and applications of chaos in ways which the non-mathematical reader will find exciting and stimulating.

There are concepts and techniques in this new field that may well have application to both the development of naval hardware and to an understanding of the complex processes of naval warfare. Indeed, the Navy has

supported some considerable research into the mathematics of chaos.

Through the early 1970s, much of the observable variation in the world around us was assumed to be random noise of no significance for prediction. When Edward Lorenz began modeling the earth's atmosphere and weather on an early digital computer at MIT, he found that he got rather dramatic changes in the resulting climate forecasts from apparently insignificant changes in the initial conditions.

Lorenz' work, along with similar observations in other fields of natural science such as insect population growth, led to a serious challenge to traditional scientific intuition. That intuition had held that, over the long term, a steady state will evolve in nature. Chaos was not an acceptable answer. Not so in the things studied by Lorenz and the others. They began to find many situations where orderly disorder prevails over the long term. Plant and animal populations, while appearing to change slowly but constantly, might in fact be constantly and forever alternating between two or more short-term stable states. This sort of bifurcation was quite unrecognized until the tools of the mathematics of chaos became available.

As Gleick describes it, the mathematics of chaos is itself a wonderfully chaotic subject with many trails and threads leading to new and intriguing ideas. One that has received a good bit of popular attention is the study of fractals, those ornate, almost rococo, shapes

that describe the boundaries between initial conditions or states leading to chaotically different outcomes. Fractals often have an ethereal beauty of their own as Gleick illustrates with some elegant computer generated pictures in his book.

The significance of fractals lies in their repetitiveness at smaller and smaller scales—as the resolution increases, the same pattern appears again and again, albeit in smaller size. In mammals, blood vessels, nerves, and bronchi branch and branch again in fractal like ways. Some geneticists have speculated that the DNA code may contain a simple fractal key for these rather than a specific guide for each branch and junction.

Another intriguing fractal that may have some naval application is the Cantor set. Imagine a line of fixed length, remove the middle third, and then remove the middle third of each of the remaining thirds. If this process is continued infinitely, it will generate “a strange dust of points, arranged in clusters, infinitely many yet infinitely sparse.” As it happens, study of this fractal set has revealed some important insights into the occurrence and behavior of errors in the transmission of digital information.

Turbulence has frustrated mathematicians, physicists, and engineers for centuries. Why should the orderly flow of air over a wing or water in a pipe suddenly change to swirling, turbulent instability? Why does a flag flap continuously rather than holding a steady position in the breeze? On his

deathbed, the great physicist Heisenberg is supposed to have said that he would have two questions for God: “Why relativity and why turbulence? He then said: “I really think He will have an answer only to the first question.”

Gleick describes some simple but immaculate experiments by Libchaber and his colleagues to examine the onset of turbulent flow. The mathematics of chaos gave them new insight into the problem and can be expected to lead to more efficient designs for such practical things as wings and hydraulic systems.

The mathematics of chaos is an unusual subject for students, alumni and friends of the Naval War College to pursue, but it is well worth the reading. The subject has fascinating potential for research in international and military affairs. Certainly the impact of the mathematics of chaos on turbulent flow and weather will be of eventual use to planners of naval warfare. One could happily speculate on the parallels between the green and white earth solutions and the fragility of the difference between peace and war or even the difference between winning and losing a battle!

FRANK C. MAHNCKE
Naval Surface Warfare Center

Keegan, John. *The Mask of Command*.
New York: Viking, 1987. 368pp.
\$18.95

John Keegan's *Mask of Command*, a study of Alexander, Wellington,

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Grant, and Hitler, is enlightening but not as captivating as his earlier work, *The Face of Battle*. In *The Mask of Command* Keegan describes the background, nature, and "routine" of each man in the context of his battles. He then analyzes in depth how each one succeeded or failed, and sums up with five "imperatives" necessary for successful command: kinship; prescription (or inspiration); sanction; action (that is, recognizing or knowing what to do and doing it); and personal example.

Of the four commanders, Grant emerges remarkably well. This is surprising because he rose from the discouraging circumstances of being penniless and unemployed just prior to the war, to become a remarkable commander. He also had a well-developed democratic philosophy and a remarkable respect for the Constitution. He was a compelling writer as well; his *Personal Memoirs* are still in print. His democratic philosophy was appealing and may have been the source of his leadership: "Grant fought for his country not because birth made him its subject, but because he judged its cause just."

The other three fare less well. Hitler, while morbidly fascinating, lost his war and, therefore, is difficult to compare with the others who were successful. Alexander and Wellington, while enormous historical figures, have already been surveyed at length by others.

The book examines various aspects of war. The movement of generals farther and farther from the

forward edge of the battle area is chronicled in each commander's case until it reaches its apotheosis in Hitler, who centralized command in a bunker far from the front and far from his people. Keegan also summarizes the change in weapons from edged to musket to rifle to artillery to tank. "War is progressive," as Grant said. This evolution of weapons is depicted as the cause of the increasing remoteness and the diminishing "heroism" of the commanders involved.

One may quarrel with the choice of persons selected, but, except for Hitler, who is a negative example, they are representative for the purposes of Keegan's survey. Hitler fought for an unjust cause and either failed to realize that his war could not be won, or realized it but failed to act accordingly. It might be interesting to compare Nelson or Nimitz with the others. Naval commanders generally have not been looked upon as heroic or even charismatic. Understatements such as "there seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today" is their currency. The results of poor preparation, tactics, or timing, however, are catastrophic, as attested at Trafalgar, Tsushima, and Midway. Indeed, monumental naval engagements tend to be like the Alexandrian battles: decisive and short.

This is a readable book; an introduction to the subject. It is not, nor does it purport to be, a thorough text on the analysis, intuition, or motivation of leadership. Indeed,

after reading it, one is left with the impression that current generals might learn more from Japanese business leaders than from the commanders of history. Perhaps that disconnection with the past is what Mr. Keegan best points out.

Finally, a bit of Wellingtonian attention to detail would have been helpful in the preparation of this book. Correction of the many typographical errors and the inclusion of publishers in the bibliography would enhance the utility of a second edition.

RICHARD E. RIEDER
Captain, U.S. Naval Reserve

Kagan, Donald. *The Fall of the Athenian Empire*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987. 456pp. \$39.50

Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* has been core reading at the Naval War College for many years. As a study of the relationship between policy and strategy, the work is invaluable. Readers, however, have had to contend with the realization that many of the events described are colored by Thucydides' view of the world. Donald Kagan's previous three volumes on the war have gone a long way in clarifying the events of the battle between Athens and Sparta. In this fourth and final volume of his narrative history of the war, Professor Kagan has continued his analysis of the events chronicled by Thucydides. By balancing Thucydides'

account with those written by ancient observers such as Xenophon and Diodorus, the author has greatly augmented our understanding of the events in the war. Professor Kagan picks up his narrative following the disastrous defeat of the Athenians in Sicily and takes the reader through to the final defeat of Athens at the hands of Sparta and her allies in 404 B.C. He contends that, and provides sufficient evidence to support his view, after Sicily the extent and length of the war were less a result of Athenian efforts than the failure of the Spartans to capitalize on the Athenian disaster.

Although the defeat at Sicily was viewed with great alarm in Athens, its effect on the empire and the subsequent reaction of the Persians resulted in the final defeat of Athens. The revolt of the empire, and the extensive financial support of Sparta by the Persians created serious financial constraints on Athens. As Kagan points out, the failure of the Athenian commander to engage the Spartan Fleet at Miletus in 412 B.C. cost Athens the opportunity to crush the revolt of the empire before it could spread. As the revolt expanded, the Athenian economy was less and less able to sustain the economic demands of the war. Once the Persians committed themselves to the financial support of Sparta, the weakness of the Athenian economic position became apparent. The Spartan strategy of depriving Athens of the Ukraine grain traffic and collection of tribute from members of her empire left Athens with few

alternatives. Every competent Athenian naval commander must have prepared for battle with the realization that, much like Jellicoe in a later war, he had the capability to lose the war in a single day.

The political disarray in Athens, resulting from the defeat in Sicily, combined with the revolt of the empire, is extensively analyzed. The circumstances surrounding the oligarchic coup and the subsequent restoration of the Athenian democracy serve to clarify many of the attendant problems Athens experienced in insuring that her military forces were properly led. In particular, Kagan goes to great lengths to analyze and trace the checkered career of Alcibiades.

Despite the disaster at Sicily and the rapidly deteriorating economic situation, Athens still managed significant naval victories over her Spartan foes. The extent of those defeats twice led Sparta to propose an end to hostilities. In spite of her serious condition, Athens twice refused to stop fighting. Kagan suggests that Athenian disappointment with the Spartan adherence to the ill-fated Peace of Nicias may have influenced the Athenians to reject the opportunity to end the war and thus retain what remained of the empire. The battle of Aegospotami resulted in a crushing Athenian defeat, one from which her depleted treasury permitted no recovery.

The Peloponnesian War was a classic battle between a land power and a sea power. Victory would eventually come to the power

retaining its acknowledged superiority while making inroads against its opponent's strength. Sicily provided the opportunity that Sparta required. How the Spartans accomplished their objective, in spite of themselves, has been superbly crafted in this work. It is eminently readable and a valuable addition to a more complete understanding of the course of this war.

BRANCE PARKER
Captain, U.S. Navy

Durkin, Joseph T. *Confederate Navy Chief: Stephen R. Mallory*. Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1987. 446pp. \$19.95

Still, William N., Jr. *Iron Afloat: The Story of Confederate Armorclads*. Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1987. 262pp. \$19.95

For all the thousands of volumes published on the military campaigns of the American Civil War, there are relatively few on the history of the naval war and even fewer about the Confederate Navy. It is therefore pleasant to welcome two major works about the Confederate Navy, both of them part of the "Classics of Maritime History" series reprinted by the University of South Carolina Press.

Joseph Durkin's biography of Stephen Mallory originally appeared in 1954. Long considered one of the Confederacy's ablest Cabinet officials, Mallory emerges in this account as a self-taught and highly

knowledgeable expert on naval affairs. Although Durkin concentrates on Mallory's tenure as Navy Secretary, he also provides comprehensive coverage of Mallory's early years, especially his term as U.S. Senator from Florida during the turbulent 1850s. Durkin effectively links Mallory's stint as chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee to his later actions in the Confederacy. While chairman of that committee, Mallory labored diligently to professionalize and to instill discipline into the naval service. Moreover, he became a staunch advocate of constructing gunboats and improving naval ordnance. According to Durkin, Mallory's principal "axiom" that later became the "directing principle" of the Confederate Navy was: "'Naval strength (or weakness), from the character and design of the service is altogether relative, and must ever be measured by that of its adversaries.'"

Durkin's portrait of Mallory is sympathetic, indeed, almost laudatory. Yet, he never crosses the line to hagiography. He correctly credits Mallory with building a navy from scratch, and shows how innovative the Secretary could be in pushing for the construction of ironclads. Indeed, Durkin hints that Mallory may have been preoccupied with the ironclad program, and that preoccupation led to his failure to order the construction of other vessels designed primarily for harbor defense.

If there is a weakness in Durkin's biography it is the product of his

effort to illuminate the "inner man." Frequent shifts of focus to family problems and concerns do not quite succeed in developing a fully three-dimensional portrait.

The second volume in this series is William Still's *Iron Afloat*. Still notes in the preface that this second edition contains new illustrations, an addendum bibliography, and some other "minor corrections," though in general, it is little different from the 1971 edition published by Vanderbilt University Press.

The author chronicles the Confederate Navy's ironclad program in topical and chronological fashion, beginning with a discussion of Mallory's role in ironclad construction and provides a general overview of where the ironclads were built, their successes, and failures. He devotes individual chapters to the *Virginia* and the *Arkansas*—the two most successful and famous of the Confederacy's ironclads, and remaining chapters to military theaters of operation. While such organization is logical, it can also be confusing. For example, Still discusses ironclads and the defense of the West from 1861-1862, but unfortunately does not return to that theater for another one hundred pages.

In his assessment of the Confederate ironclad program, Still returns to one key theme: all the grand plans and all the efforts of able organizers and administrators could not compensate for the lack of skilled mechanics, raw materials, and facilities (especially rolling mills) needed

to convert what materials were available into iron and ordnance. Still also cites the "lack of cooperation" between the Army and Navy as a complementary problem. Although the Confederacy did manage some successes in its ironclad program, its fateful decision to concentrate solely on ironclads left harbors and rivers vulnerable, an oversight that supports Durkin's conclusions. In the end, however, Still does accord the ironclad program passing marks. He concludes that, "If time had allowed, the Confederate ironclads might have made a more significant contribution to the Southern war effort. As it was, they certainly achieved some success in the overall strategy of defense."

The most valuable contents of *Iron Afloat* deal with the building and design of ironclads. The author studied Confederate naval records, and his efforts are rewarded with a clear, detailed analysis of every aspect of ironclad production. The narrative is enhanced still further with excellent maps, diagrams, and pictures.

Still's volume on Confederate ironclads remains the seminal work on the subject. Combined with Durkin's biography of Mallory, the history of the Confederate Navy and its ironclads is cogently and effectively presented.

MARY A. DECREDICO
U.S. Naval Academy

Herwig, Holger H. *Germany's Vision of Empire in Venezuela, 1871-1914*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986. 285pp. \$38

Historians habitually begin books with questions. Here, Holger Herwig, professor of history at Vanderbilt University, asks: Why were the Germans involved in Venezuela, and what did their involvement mean? A careful examination of the German archives gave him the answer—German naval officers wanted to establish a strategic outpost for the world power competition between nations, and trade was sought by German entrepreneurs. But neither's position became an important feature of the government's fitful "world policy," nor of "imperialism" as understood for serious political support of economic expansion. There was less to German involvement than imagined by Marxist theorists or dreamed of by "fleet professors" whose pens outran the reality of an American "empire." Herwig's fine book is a valuable addition to the redefinition historians are making of overseas engagements in the 19th century and to his own highly respected studies of German naval and maritime strategy.

Herwig shows that existing German trade and cultural expansion in Venezuela were small and individual, not part of a broader political program. Berlin's support of naval enthusiasts was likewise limited. Navalists like Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and officers in the

Caribbean wanted to challenge the position of Britain and the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Venezuela or an island off its coast was to be the position from which to move against traffic sailing through the Isthmus of Panama. It was a vain hope. The German Government, cautious in spite of itself, permitted the navy no bases and allowed it only on occasion to meddle, which was all "world policy" added up to anyway.

The German blockade of Venezuela in 1902-03, however, was enough to stir up the United States. Undertaken for the sake of meaningless prestige, the German Navy was unable to stand alone once the British had withdrawn. Herwig found no evidence in the archives to sustain Theodore Roosevelt's claim that he threatened the emperor, but the President was worried. At the time of the blockade he told Admiral George Dewey to use an ongoing maneuver of fifty-four ships to get the emperor's attention. Dewey linked the way the Germans had fished in the troubled waters of Manila Bay in 1898 to their presence in the Caribbean four years later. Thus, War Plan Black against Germany became the Navy's primary concern. Relations were not helped by the fact that the emperor considered the Monroe Doctrine an "insolent dogma," and refused to recognize it. The refusal, like much of German policy, was pointless. Once the British had withdrawn, Germany, who was without means of independent action in the Western

Hemisphere, was never a threat to Venezuela's independence.

Despite some private gains in trade, Herwig shows that the "vision of empire" was an illusion. The main legacy of the inept, clamorous, and politically irresponsible visionaries was the resentment of the United States—a cost that no benefits from Venezuela could have ever offset.

GEORGE W. BAER
Naval War College

Campbell, N.J.M. *Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1986. 439pp. \$26.95

Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting is a painstakingly detailed account of the most analyzed battle ever fought. Author John Campbell emphasizes the exchange of fire: the tactics and technologies of naval gunnery and the battleships and battle cruisers' ability—or lack of ability—to withstand punishment. Extensive data tables and diagrams chronicle the shell hits taken by capital ships of both sides. This is useful analysis, but the reader looking for a new or clearer understanding of the forces' maneuvers and the reasons for them will be left unsatisfied. H.H. Frost's *Battle of Jutland*, for the former, and Richard Hough's *The Great War At Sea 1914-1918*, for the latter, are better sources for those purposes.

I believe Campbell's emphasis is deliberate, and that he set out to state the facts of the gunfire only, leaving

any reinterpretation of the skills and deficiencies of the tactical commanders to others. There are a few hints as to where Campbell stands. He says: "Scheer was a better choice than either of his predecessors, and together with Jellicoe, Beatty and Hipper can be considered as sufficiently able, and though the spark of genius was lacking in all four, the conditions of Jutland were singularly unsuited to the display of this quality." The book, in fact, may be interpreted as a representation of the immensity of the unsuitable conditions. Campbell continues: "Dissatisfaction in Britain over the result of Jutland subsequently caused a virulent paper war between the supporters of Jellicoe and Beatty, but there was far less difference between the views of the two Admirals than Beatty's partisans were willing to believe. . . . Jellicoe was much keener to fight a battle with the High Seas Fleet than the foregoing [explanation of Jellicoe's strategic caution] might indicate. But it was impossible to tempt the Germans to an action with the whole Grand Fleet unless quite unacceptable risks were taken." Critics like Frost, who would have replaced Jellicoe for excessive caution and Beatty for a lack of tactical skill, give insufficient credit to the superior material quality and combat competence of the German Navy.

This book is not fun to read. I am on record that exercising the machines of war in tactical evolutions is the most exhilarating part of being a naval officer, even in

combat, within limits. Nevertheless, tactical competency has its pedestrian side. Understanding Jutland is hard work, but it is part of the preparation for war. For the action-oriented person, I liken historical study to a football coach studying old videos of Super Bowl games, frame by frame.

Campbell is more than willing to reach conclusions as to the gunnery effectiveness and staying power of the two sides. He corrects the erroneous impression that German gunnery was markedly superior to that of the British. Though the Germans were capable of a higher rate of fire, they rarely achieved it. Though their optical fire control system was justly admired, it resulted in about the same percentage of hits as the British.

The criticism of Jellicoe at Jutland has softened over the years. As appreciation has grown for the technical superiority of German ships and shells and the physical and informational fog of war he faced, most appraisals have become more charitable. Campbell cannot add a great deal to the record of this, the most closely analyzed battle ever fought, but he contributes something. For instance, representative of the early attacks on Jellicoe are a few sentences in the 12th edition (1922) of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, written by one Captain A.C. Dewar, RN (Retired): "The battle was not a decisive one, and the British battle fleet was never seriously under fire (its casualties were two men killed and five wounded). It must be

admitted that the British C.-in-C.'s [Jellicoe's] tactics were characterized by excessive caution." With the help of Campbell's data it is possible to put Dewar's caustic figure in a different light. During Beatty's run to the south and back again (1548-1815) his forces sustained 62 major caliber gun hits, while inflicting 36 on Hipper's scouting forces. When the fleets met and Jellicoe was in tactical command of his twilight duel with Scheer, the Germans were hit 68 times, while his forces were hit 23 times. Only two hits were against his battle line (causing the seven casualties recorded by Dewar), but it was his battle line that pounded the Germans, almost unopposed. There were a host of reasons for these results, but they boil down to the effective, if cautious, deployments by Jellicoe when he was in control of the fighting.

Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting has two shortcomings of more than passing interest. One is the publisher's fault. Some of the diagrams of the battle damage (for example on pages 185, 186, 188, 193, 228, and 304) are an embarrassment to a publishing house as competent technically as the Naval Institute Press. This is a serious defect because Campbell's achievement is to draw together the detailed relationships between gun caliber, shell, target range, armor, and damage. That the publisher was uncharacteristically sloppy is evidenced by the omission of lists for the 140 or so tables, diagrams, and charts which are central to the book's objective.

The second deficiency lies with the author. It is his inadequate attention to scouting, screening, and the geometric relationships of the forces. Campbell is fine in communicating the inherent confusion of a battle involving 252 ships, but compared to his handsome reconstruction of shells fired, hits obtained, and damage inflicted, the charts of the action are paltry. They are no worse than many attempts, but they are no better in addressing this aspect of tactical analysis and tactical success, which had come to be as important as the delivery of firepower. World War I marked a watershed point in the new importance of scouting (early and timely detection, tracking, and reporting of the enemy). By 1916, naval commanders had come to invest many of their combat resources in their scouting forces, and *most* of their personal energy before and during battle.

But this reviewer is in danger of riding his scouting hobbyhorse. *Jutland* is a good technical book and an essential one for every student of naval history. Its strengths are in its objectivity and detail. To read it is to appreciate the literal fog (smoke) of battle and its massive effect; the awesome complexity of coordinating the movements of great fleets in opposition; and the importance of detail, both in engineering designs and operational evolutions. Campbell gives us facts: how many hits, where they landed, and what were the effects. Those who like their history summarized in majestic one-

liners should remember, only God sees all things in one, and the devil's in the details.

WAYNE HUGHES
Naval Postgraduate School

Kemp, Paul. *The Russian Convoys 1941-1945*. England: Arms and Armour; dist. New York: Sterling, 1987. 64pp. \$7.95

Surface warfare officers and naval aviators who seek a preview of the conditions under which they might have to fight a world war III between NATO and the Soviet Union can get just that from a brief look at the photos in this thin paperback picture book.

"The Russian Convoys" were those that sailed, laden with the goods of war, from North America or Britain for the Soviet port of Murmansk. Those cargoes which survived the voyage were shipped down a long one-track railroad to Leningrad for redistribution thereafter to the fighting fronts.

At the time, Germany was the foe; the Soviet Union was a major ally; and northern Norway was in the hands, not of friends, but of enemies. Now West Germany, by far the larger of the two parts into which Germany is split, is a friend; Norway is healthy, reasonably well-armed, and in full possession of her territory; and the only potential foe in the far north is our former ally. While politics and political geography have changed since World War II, neither geography itself nor the weather

have changed at all since the end of that war, and neither is likely to.

This little book shows graphically what war in the far north is like for those who attempt to wage it with ships or with aircraft launched from ships. The ice-covered 14-inch guns of the battleship *Duke of York* shown at the top of page 14 and the view on the bottom of the page of the same ship, with water cascading off the forecastle as it rises from one wave, and cascading onto the fantail as it sinks into the next, should raise questions in the minds of those responsible for keeping a modern frigate's missile launcher ready for firing. How well can it be done?

Indeed, a view on page 40, taken from the bridge of a 10,000-ton cruiser, in which one has to look *up* to see the crest of the next wave, ought to raise some more questions in the minds of those who someday might find themselves there. So ought the caption, which tells us that soon thereafter, "one wave struck 'B' turret a terrific blow, removing the roof and hurling it over the side." B turret of that cruiser, shielding three 6-inch guns, was on the 02 level and the armored roof was, of course, higher than that.

Viewing the icy flight decks shown in several photos, naval aviators might wonder what it would be like to return to a ship pitching into seas such as removed that cruiser's turret roof. They might also wonder how many snow shovels or snow blowers are apt to be found in their carrier today.

People survived such conditions and, as other photos show, there were flat calms, too. Whatever the weather, people fought whenever the enemy came within range. That those on both sides were successful is evident from the toll. Among ships alone, the Germans lost 37 warships, the Allies 29 warships and 98 merchantmen.

FRANK UHLIG, JR.
Naval War College

Schofield, William and Carisella,
P.J. *Frogmen: First Battles*. Boston:
Branden Publishing, 1987. 191pp.
\$15.95

Admiral Charles E. Morgan, Royal Navy, pinned the Italian Gold Medal for Valor on the tunic of Italian Navy Lieutenant Luigi Durand de la Penne in March 1945. The citation? Lieutenant de la Penne, steering a two-man torpedo and wearing a frogman outfit, had sunk the British battleship HMS *Valiant* in December 1941 when Morgan was her skipper!

Five warships, seven tankers, twenty cargo ships, two subs, and some small craft—that was the box score of ships, mostly British, sunk by the Italian 10th Light Flotilla. The scene of action was the Mediterranean and the Straits of Gibraltar, between March 1941 and August 1943. The sailors were career seamen of the Italian Navy, augmented by a specially recruited levy of competitive swimmers serving in the wartime army.

Authors Schofield and Carisella have interviewed survivors and participants to reconstruct this chapter of naval warfare in World War II. They tell how Italian engineers produced the E-boat, a speedboat that was half bomb and half engine, and the two-man submarine whose crew rode astride the torpedo-rigged hull wearing wet suits and oxygen tanks. Less than fifty of these frogmen challenged the mighty Royal Navy for command of the Mediterranean, culminating with the midnight raid on Alexandria that left the battleships HMS *Queen Elizabeth* and HMS *Valiant* out of action for months.

In April 1942, Prime Minister Winston Churchill told the Parliament in closed session how the Royal Navy had not one operational capital ship in the Mediterranean. He lauded the valiant Italian frogmen. Two months later, Italian Navy Commander (Prince) Valerio Borghese briefed Admiral Karl Dönitz, Commander in Chief of the German Submarine Fleet, on his plans for another frogman attack that also would have strategic consequences. What target was proposed by the commander of Italy's 10th Light Flotilla? New York Harbor. The means of attack? Two-man subs, mounted to the decks of Italian and German U-boats for the transatlantic journey.

Allied antisubmarine war-fighting measures became effective just in time to prevent the 10th Light Flotilla from trying out their plan. And frogman operations went over

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to the Allied forces as over-the-beach sappers who cleared the way for landing craft flotillas. Yet the 10th Light Flotilla lives in the 1980s as the Ayatollah Khomeini's surface attack squads continue to savage world shipping in the Persian Gulf, occasionally under the noses of mighty warships.

Schofield and Carisella have illustrated this action story with photographs that show clearly how a few determined frogmen, properly equipped, can create havoc on a strategic level for the world's sea powers. The authors are first-rate naval historians, and the reader of *Frogmen: First Battles* will experience the feel of air bubbles in dark water, gray steel hulls exploding, and men swimming for their lives amid burning oil slicks.

RUSSELL W. RAMSEY
The Air University

Galantin, I.J. *Take Her Deep: A Submarine Against Japan in World War II*. Chapel Hill, N.C.: Algonquin Books, 1987. 262pp. \$17.95

O'Kane, Richard H. *Wahoo: The Patrols of America's Most Famous World War II Submarine*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1987. 345pp. \$18.95

A number of fine World War II submarine histories by former commanding officers are now appearing in the bookstalls. *Take Her Deep* by Admiral Pete Galantin, and *Wahoo*

by Rear Admiral Dick O'Kane, certainly rank high as adventure stories. O'Kane's earlier volume, *Clear the Bridge*, on the exploits of the U.S.S. *Tang*, became a best-seller; he was executive officer for the six Pacific war patrols of *Wahoo*, having been detached before she was lost in action on the seventh. Galantin's *Take Her Deep* covers the last five combat patrols of the U.S.S. *Halibut*, under his command, ending with a near fatal depth charging in Luzon Strait in November 1944, which damaged her so badly she had to be withdrawn from service. A heroic story of a close-knit fighting team, the book was written at the urging of "Captain Pete's" wartime crewmen.

Pete Galantin took command of *Halibut* at Midway Island in August 1943. A modern fleet submarine, approximately a year old, she had compiled an excellent combat record in five previous patrols. Galantin was ten years out of the Naval Academy, having served seven years in submarines, including two previous commands in vintage boats and had made one war patrol as a prospective commanding officer in *Sculpin*. His first *Halibut* patrol, conducted off northern Honshū and Hokkaidō, soon brought the heartbreak of erratic or dud torpedoes foiling two well-conducted attacks on a *Shigure*-class destroyer. During the resultant depth charging by an undamaged and thoroughly aroused surface enemy, ship and crew paid the price of peacetime penury and bureaucratic stupidity. *Halibut* soon got her

revenge, however, damaging another destroyer and sending several more to the bottom.

On her next patrol, off Bungo Suido and the Japanese Inland Sea, she damaged the carrier *Junyo*, but the *coup de grace* to send her to the bottom was foiled by a torpedo running hot in the launching tube. Subsequent patrols finally produced the submariner's dream, five torpedo hits apparently sinking a battleship, only to find the victim subsequently downgraded to a lesser warship. On her last patrol off the Philippines, following a melee with convoy, *Halibut* was heavily damaged by air attack, dishing in the pressure hull and making a shambles of the submarine interior, forcing abandonment of the officers' and chiefs' living quarters because of deadly chlorine gas from the battery compartment beneath. Too badly mauled to continue on patrol, she struggled to the surface and headed for Saipan without gyroscope, sonar, radio, radar, or other vital equipment. When a radar could be made operational, she called her sister ship *Pintado* for help, using the radar beam as a signal light. *Pintado* escorted *Halibut* over 1,500 miles to Saipan where her damages were judged to be beyond repair. She earned a Navy Unit Citation for her gutsy skipper and stalwart crewmen, but the time had come to put her to pasture in New London, serving as an alongside training ship. The book is well-written, a gripping story for anybody with a love of the sea or adventure in submarine combat.

Wahoo tells a somewhat different story. Commissioned at Mare Island Naval Shipyard in June 1942, *Waho* made seven war patrols, the first two under an experienced but unaggressive skipper, the remaining five under Commander Dudley W. "Mush" Morton, whose amazing exploits soon made her the most famous American submarine and Morton one of the most admired COs. The transformation of *Wahoo* from a mediocre to an outstanding submarine is the heart of O'Kane's book. The accounts of the patrols are spine-tingling, both in triumph and tragedy. It is a tale of great courage, brilliant leadership, and daring innovation in a new type of submarine warfare fought largely on the surface in waters closely controlled by the enemy. Where Morton's predecessor had spent 500 hours submerged on his final patrol, Morton spent only 50 on his first, capitalizing on superb new surface search radar and the great mobility gained by surface operations. Again, heartbreaking torpedo performance limited results, yet Morton and O'Kane both became top aces in wreaking devastation on Japanese shipping. In the shallow, turgid waters of the Yellow Sea-East China Sea, for example, Morton had nine confirmed ship sinkings on one patrol, a feat surpassed only by O'Kane a year later in *Tang*, with ten.

If O'Kane's prose occasionally becomes a bit contorted, who is to say that the rough chisel in the hand of one sculptor is less dramatic in

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effect than the polished marble produced by another? The less graceful language sometimes contributes to an aura of first-person authenticity. Particularly vivid is O'Kane's painstaking reconstruction of *Wahoo's* final patrol. O'Kane assumes that *Wahoo* was struck and seriously damaged by a circular run of her own erratic torpedo, just as *Tang* was later lost. While it is more likely that the initial damage came from shore batteries, there is no doubt about the subsequent details of her final agony, which are documented from Japanese sources. Successive waves of attack on the gravely wounded submarine were launched by an overwhelming combination of shore batteries, antisubmarine air and surface forces, dropping sixty-three depth charges or large bombs and forty smaller bombs before the final destruction of this gallant ship and her incomparable crew. O'Kane asks in her memory that, based on the evidence of the four additional ship sinkings on her final patrol, not known until after the war, Morton's Navy Cross be upgraded to a Medal of Honor and the gallant ship be awarded another Presidential Unit Citation. Few would disagree; more has been given for less.

Both of these books add to the lore of the deadly game played beneath the seas. Over the years many valuable lessons learned in combat have been too largely forgotten by a new generation in a new era. Dramatic accounts such as these preserve unique records of resource-

fulness and great courage for the edification of us all.

PAUL SCHRATZ
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Hastings, Max. *The Korean War*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. 389pp. \$22.95

Max Hastings is a writer who obviously stayed awake during English composition class. His book reads smoothly and its meaning is immediately clear. Both are essential attributes when covering the Korean war in 344 pages.

The Korean War is not so much about tactics, strategy, and logistics as it is about feelings. The dust jacket picture (an exhausted, weeping soldier) sets the reader on course for the entire book. Mr. Hastings has avoided parroting the books, papers, and news releases of the principals of that war. Instead, he has brought to print, through extensive personal interviews, the individual experiences of enlisted men, NCOs, and unit officers of many nations and both sides. Few of these participants ever would have written a book, and fewer still would have been widely read. However, their words and emotions are preserved here.

A strong cement of solid history backed by a 103 book bibliography and references to numerous military museums, archives, and institutions hold it all together. He does not allow the interviews to overwhelm, but rather, to act as flavoring or

exclamation points. Recounting the feud between the Marines at Chosin and their Army commander, General Almond, he depicts the inability of Almond to appreciate the Marines' predicament. Almond, while touring the ranks, confronted a group of enlisted Marines with the comment, "When I got up this morning there was a film of ice on the glass by my bed." The reply, "That's too ----ing bad, General," succinctly stated the feelings of a combatant who is freezing to death in the open.

There are chapters on intelligence, in which the toddlerhood of the CIA is related; the war in the air; and prisoners.

Generally, *The Korean War* is not the definitive book on the conflict, nor is it a reference work. It is a book of sensation and insight, evaluating the war through the comments of the combatants. In the final chapter, "Hindsight," the effects of the war are considered and a positive conclusion is drawn:

"We went into Korea with a very poor Army and came out with a pretty good one."

"We stopped Communism. Didn't we?"

"No Korean liked the war. It was worthwhile. I like our life very much now."

"The war revitalized NATO. It caused us to drop the tradition of demobilizing. . . . It hastened the schism between China and the Soviets. It saved Formosa. It contributed greatly to Japanese recovery. It probably saved the Philippines for a time."

A few technical notes are in order. It is expertly printed and easy to read. There are only five maps, but they are clear, concise, and located in the right places (a rarity); and

seventy-five black and white photos (some from the Chinese Army Museum), which are well-chosen and reinforce the text. There is also an interesting appendix which details the military contribution of various U.N. members. A few word errors exist, but not enough to detract from this fine, readable, and thought-provoking book.

CLINTON B. JOHNSON
Captain, U.S. Naval Reserve (Ret.)

Kaufman, Burton I. *The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command*. New York: Knopf, 1986. 381pp. paper \$8

Do not look for a military, naval, or aviation history of the Korean war in this book. The author glosses over the war's background in deference to his interest in the contemporary politics of the period and its relation to the general topic of the war.

Kaufman's book emphasizes reasons why the United States became involved, when for five years it was uninterested in Korean affairs; how the United States behaved internally and externally in a coalition war; and just how politics influenced the battlefield. It is an excellent overview of the war from the viewpoint of the capital, SCAP in Tokyo, the U.N. Command in Korea, and the capitals of the participants. The majority of the book deals with the Washington and U.N. Command—crises, credibility, and command.

Before June 1950 the problems between Korea and the United

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States, among the World War II Allies in regard to Korea, and among the Koreans living in Japan made Korea an area that some wished would go away. Korea did not go away, and the invasion from the North put the Americans into a new arrangement with the Rhee regime. Kaufman covers the pre-1950 scene lightly and concentrates on the decision to intervene and the deepening American involvement. The key element in Kaufman's book is the weaving of the U.S. domestic scene into the setting. The reader is provided with opinions from conservative and liberal leaders at home and from others abroad. Heavy reliance is made on Department of State literature and other Government documents. The author's attempt to provide a comparison of the Korean war with the Vietnam war is limited, and there is only a short examination of the Korean conflict in the context of the larger cold war, although opportunities for such comparisons do exist.

Overall, Kaufman has written an interesting book with added dimensions for viewing the war. The individual observations and viewpoints on the Korean conflict are as varied as the individuals themselves. While this is evident, readers who are not familiar with the actual conflict would provide themselves with a better overall perspective by complementing this knowledge with a book that deals with the ground, naval, and air war.

PETER CHARLES UNSINGER
San Jose State University

Frank, Benis M. *U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 1982-1984*. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1987. 196pp. \$10

This book begins with the bombing of the Battalion Landing Team 1/8 headquarters building on 23 October 1983 at the Beirut International Airport where 241 Americans died. It then moves back in time to the summer of 1982 and the deployment of the 32nd Marine Amphibious Unit. It describes the evacuation of the PLO, and continues with a chronological account of the several units deployed to Lebanon for a "presence" mission. The book closes with the departure of the 22nd Marine Amphibious Unit in February 1984, although the operations of other Marine units remaining in Lebanon until July 1984 are also mentioned. Although based primarily on the monthly command chronologies and biweekly situation reports of the Marine units deployed to Lebanon, other official documentation as well as information gathered by the author during 119 interviews with key personnel also has been incorporated.

Mr. Frank has illustrated his book exceptionally well with maps, photographs, and reprints of editorial page cartoons from major U.S. newspapers. General Kelley's remarks to the Senate Armed Services Committee concerning the bombing and the conclusions and recommendations of the Long Commission are also included.

This book does not deal with major high-level political decisions nor with diplomatic efforts in the Middle East.

Rather, it is a history of Navy-Marine operations and, as such, draws no conclusions.

DAVID CLARK
Captain, U.S. Navy

Kupchan, Charles. *The Persian Gulf and the West: The Dilemmas of Security*. Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1987. 254 pp. \$39.95

Charles Kupchan contends that in the postwar era the most vociferous and divisive debates about national security in the West have focused on the Third World, not on Europe. He points out that it is difficult to identify those geographic areas on the periphery that are worth the effort of doing battle. Here, because of the strategic value of its oil reserves, the author has focused on the Persian Gulf region. Regional anti-Western and anticolonial sentiment, endemic conflict among local states, and the relationship between the Gulf and Arab-Israeli dispute have repeatedly threatened to throw the region into turmoil.

Historically, the interests of the United States were established between the end of World War II and 1973—we sought to contain Soviet advances in the region, we supported the security of Israel, and the oil flowed freely. However, after the 1973 war, the United States and the Western bloc were faced with the possible cutoff of Arab oil. Still, our policy toward the Arab states saw little change until the Iranian

revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Both events raised America's consciousness of the importance of the region and its strategic vulnerability. The Carter Doctrine marked not only a change in U.S. security policy toward the Gulf, but brought the region within our sphere of "vital interests."

The Rapid Deployment Force came into being as a means of fulfilling the deterrence needs of the Gulf. It was an innovative and tailored plan designed to meet emerging needs in the face of an imbalance of forces. It established an American commitment to use force in defense of vital U.S. interests and it forced the Western Allies in Europe to recognize an "out-of-area" problem.

Kupchan concludes that NATO is not prepared to adequately address threats outside the NATO area, but he does point to some measure of success in the Gulf. Despite Washington's preoccupation with global concerns, the United States was able to react to Middle East developments with uncharacteristic sensitivity to interregional considerations. However, he does point out that U.S. and Western interests in the region will remain vulnerable until we are able to eliminate our dependence on Persian Gulf oil, a matter that is not likely to come to pass in an oil-dependent economy.

FRANKLIN D. JULIAN
Captain, U.S. Navy

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Stares, Paul B. *Space and National Security*. Wash., D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987. 210pp. \$10.95

Mr. Stares provides documentation as comprehensive as can be found of the increasing importance of various types of satellites to the war-fighting capabilities of all three of our armed forces, as well as the Soviets'. As might be expected, the U.S. Navy, out of all the services, derives the greatest benefit from enhancement of military capabilities from our reconnaissance, communication, navigation, and weather satellites. It is also the service at greatest risk from enemy satellites, especially Soviet reconnaissance satellites that can locate and target our carrier task forces; and even further risk, should the Soviets develop a satellite that can detect and target submerged submarines from space.

Mr. Stares examines in detail the Soviets' antisatellite (ASAT) capabilities which currently include a very limited intercept missile capability, a nuclear weapons capability using air defense or ballistic missile weapons, a limited ground-based laser capability, a communication link jamming capability, and the means to attack our ground control and reception stations and our principal satellite launching facilities at Kennedy and Vandenburg. To counter these threats, he lists the checks we are incorporating into many of our newest satellites.

The author continues on to say that in spite of mutual restraints on

further ASAT testing (Congressionally imposed in our country), key technologies for better ASATS are being pursued by both superpowers since they both have high priority development programs for antiballistic missile (ABM) systems which could also be used as ASAT weapons. By the early 1990s, the Soviets, according to Defense Department intelligence, are likely to have both space and ground-based laser weapons with ASAT capabilities, as will our country—a fallout from our Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. Additionally, our Air Force has requested funding in FY 88 and FY 89 budgets to study the possible use of ground-based excimer lasers for the ASAT mission.

Mr. Stares then states that unless agreed restrictions are adopted by the superpowers on ASAT developments, the task of protecting U.S. satellites from a formidable Soviet threat will become progressively more difficult with the result that in time of war the United States could not rely on the current capabilities that satellites provide. He goes on to say that by being the prime beneficiary of satellites, our Navy has the most to lose, particularly in wartime when the effectiveness of our fleet could be severely—maybe critically—impaired if utility is denied. He also points out the dangers of basing our war plans on an assumed availability of satellites and calls for fleet war exercises, in which satellite enhancements are not used, to be conducted.

In conclusion, Mr. Stares lists a series of recommendations for the United States which include joining the Soviets in their ASAT testing moratorium, forgoing testing of all ABM-related weapons in space, continuing an ASAT research and development base, continuing to improve the survivability of U.S. satellites, increasing the redundancy of U.S. space systems, continuing to improve U.S. capabilities for surveillance of activities in space, continuing to take measures to reduce the threat from Soviet satellites, and, finally, negotiating several space weapons agreements with the Soviets.

This book is essential reading for those interested in the increasing military importance of space.

JOHN E. LACOUTURE
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Charlton, Michael. *From Deterrence to Defense: The Inside Story of Strategic Policy*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1987. 154pp. \$20

This invaluable book is based on taped interviews for a series of BBC radio broadcasts on the history and evolution of strategic doctrine. The twenty-three interviews were conducted with eminent American and European defense public officials who have participated in the making of recent strategic policy. Among the interviewees are Robert McNamara, Henry Kissinger, Paul Nitze, Richard Perle, Harold Brown, President Jimmy Carter,

General Brent Scowcroft, General William Odom, Dean Rusk, Helmut Schmidt, Edward Heath, and Lord Carrington. Perhaps the only influential American public officials omitted from the list are McGeorge Bundy, President Richard Nixon, James Schlesinger, and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

While there are excellent accounts of the historical evolution of American strategic thought (such as Lawrence Freedman's *The Evolution of Strategic Doctrine* and Jerome Kahn's earlier study, *Security in the Nuclear Age*), the great merit of this brief study is that it presents an oral history of American nuclear policy from the early 1960s through the mid-1980s. Most of the notions and perceptions propounded by the interviewees will be familiar to students of strategic policy. But the book, which provides a candid, straightforward presentation of statesmen's views on strategic policy, is an exceptionally worthwhile source of ideas and facts about deterrence, détente, and strategic defense. Examples of facts to be gleaned from this study include:

- when MIRV research was begun in the mid-1960s, it was recognized as dangerous (McNamara);
- the development of MIRV technology was begun solely to counter ABM deployment and not to provide a means for implementing a counterforce strategy (McNamara);
- Kissinger thought that détente was more disarming for the Soviet Union than it was for the West,

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while Richard Perle thought just the opposite;

- both Gerard Smith and Paul Nitze opposed the signing of the SALT I Interim Agreement;

- President Carter admitted that "the Soviets are inclined to be paranoid";

- the purpose of Presidential Directive 59 was not to send signals to the Soviet Union, but to define how to use nuclear weapons most effectively (Carter);

- the arms race is not inherently bad (General Scowcroft);

- McNamara thought that nuclear weapons did not have much effect on the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis, while Nitze thought that the American nuclear advantage did have some impact on the outcome of the crisis;

- the ABM Treaty of 1972 was not based on common assumptions or understandings between the United States and U.S.S.R. about the role of nuclear weapons (Nitze);

- both Helmut Schmidt and Edward Heath oppose SDI, in part because it undermines French and British nuclear deterrence;

- since most Western European targets are near the coast and most Soviet targets are inland, European targets are more vulnerable to submarine missile attacks than are Soviet targets (Sir Hermann Bondi).

This book is essential reading for all those interested in Western security. By presenting interviews of leading policymakers, we learn not only about strategic affairs but also

about the Soviet threat, the nature of the international system, and the role of strategic policy in countering Soviet influence and aggression. While the interview format does not lend itself to the development of arguments, it provides an excellent means for presenting diverse ideas about nuclear policy. Charlton's book is strongly recommended both for the novice and the student of military affairs. Because the study is written in clear, succinct prose and because the author provides thoughtful introductions and commentaries to ensure coherent, informative chapters, the former will find the study an invaluable introduction to a topic which is often described in technical, arcane language. And for those familiar with nuclear strategy, this study will illuminate the convictions and beliefs of many of the leading architects of American strategic policy since the early 1960s.

MARK R. AMSTUTZ
Wheaton College, Illinois

McNamara, Robert S. *Blundering into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1986. 212pp. \$14.95

This book is a disappointment! And it is not because the author has limited himself to trivial issues. His discussion of the dangers of inadvertent nuclear war between the superpowers; his critique of Gorbachev's call for the total elimination of nuclear weapons as well as of

Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative; and his proposals that not only both America and the Soviet Union drastically reduce the number of their strategic nuclear weapons, but also that NATO base its defense of Western Europe primarily on conventional forces certainly are highly interesting and important matters. So what is the book's problem? It is the way McNamara deals with his material.

Nearly all of the information presented is already familiar to the readers of journals such as *International Security*, so this relatively knowledgeable audience is not the one for whom this book is either suitable or intended. Instead, it was written for the general public with its major goal being, unmistakably, one that will generate support for McNamara's record. In order to achieve his objective, he has oversimplified his treatment of opposing views, which he presents as merely "strawmen" to be cut down in a paragraph or two, and ignores much that is not supportive of his position.

Some illustrations: first, he does not discuss the deterrent values of conventional defense and tactical nuclear weapons in severe crisis situations in Western Europe; second, McNamara conveniently "overlooks" the fact that a conventional war between the superpowers, should it occur, would be an unmitigated disaster for tens of millions of people; third, he gives no credible reason to believe that the NATO countries will ever spend the amount

of money he has determined as requisite for strengthening their conventional defenses; fourth, he all but disregards the British, French, and Chinese nuclear forces; and fifth, he "ignores" the reality of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism as a serious long-term danger to American society. For our former Defense Secretary, the only nuclear danger worth his attention in this work is the one dealing with the rivalry between the superpowers.

Blundering into Disaster may be excellent propaganda, but, unfortunately it is a weak book. This is regrettable for two reasons: the author is capable of doing better and the American people deserve better.

JOSEPH M. SCOLNICK, JR.
Wise, Virginia

Smith, Perry M. et al. *Creating Strategic Vision: Long-Range Planning for National Security*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press, 1987. 133pp. Approx. \$6

Creating Strategic Vision is a collection of four essays by the former commandant of the National War College and three 1985 graduates. Unlike many edited works, the articles complement each other and form a coherent whole. The result of a year-long National Defense University research seminar, clearly it has made a major contribution to the literature.

The problem addressed by the authors is the lack of good, long-range planning throughout the U.S.

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Government. Recommendations are found up front rather than in a conclusions chapter; hence, the book is biased in its advocacy for better and institutionalized long-range (10 to 25-year) planning. The authors define such planning as the forecasting of, and projecting of, the impact of strategies upon alternate futures.

The creation of alternate futures is the first step recommended by the authors. Of six possible methodologies to create alternate futures, building scenarios based upon expert judgment and genius forecasting are the preferred two. I am not sure if I would so thoroughly discredit the use of seminar and other gaming techniques since they too can help with scenario-building. Having created such alternate futures, the authors then recommend a plan to: (1) define core values and create a strategy to defend/attain them; (2) define basic objectives and create strategies to strengthen opportunities to attain them (vice the attempt to weaken an opponent); and (3) identify unpredictable elements and hedging strategies to adapt to changing circumstances.

The final chapter applies this system to two possible alternate Soviet futures and strategies, leading to the better of the two alternates. The results of the two example alternative futures and possible strategies certainly can be debated, but their primary purpose is merely to flesh out the prescribed methodology.

Other topics covered in the book are General Smith's 15 "Laws" of

long-range planning (or at least principles to consider), his suggestions on how to pick strategic planners, and why managers do not do long-range planning. Varying case studies are offered as positive examples (NASA and the Air Force), negative examples (Department of State and FEMA), and the Navy (a special case).

As the authors readily admit, theirs is a first step; a situation that this reviewer agrees is long overdue. Certainly there are other case studies that could have been used (the Navy General Board) and an extremely rich field of business strategic management and planning which is given only passing reference. The whole question of business' dissatisfaction with strategic planning and former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman's successes in achieving his force level goals without comprehensive systems analysis and supporting documentation should be considered.

This book is *not* for the average reader. The general strategic planner in the Pentagon probably will be frustrated by its methodological basis. The reader experienced with business methods may see only limited value in the effort. Yet the book is important for the few of us involved with improving long-range planning. It is a valuable first step as is any that attempts to introduce rationality to decision making through the allocation of scarce resources to competing entities. General strategic planning is on the rise within Government but, lest

future authors get sidetracked into perfecting techniques (like the systems analysts), planners may be in a better position to recognize that allocation and planning decisions are essentially political, and political decisions may often be made for extremely important, but not necessarily "rational" reasons. The book is highly recommended for the Government strategic planner.

JAMES J. TRITTEN
Naval Postgraduate School

Moss, Armand. *Disinformation, Misinformation, and the "Conspiracy" to Kill JFK Exposed*. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1987. 219pp. \$22.50

One's initial reaction to this title is difficulty in believing that any new light could be shed on this subject. Happily, Armand Moss does provide some. In general, he effectively destroys the "conspiracy myth." In particular, he even more effectively establishes why Lee Harvey Oswald killed the President.

Regarding the conspiracy, he painstakingly shows, through extensive quotes, that Oswald was the only assassin involved on that fateful day of 22 November 1963. He also shows that the myth of the conspiracy was nurtured through: disinformation provided by the Soviets and "fellow travelers"; misinformation supplied by "authors hoping for a best-seller, and . . . serious writers who relied on chapter 7 [which is entitled 'Lee Harvey Oswald: Back-

ground and Possible Motives'] of the *Warren Report*."

The only criticism I have of Moss's disinformation theme is that he tends to overkill his argument. For instance, while he shows that writers of numerous essays and books may, or are, of the fellow traveler type (among others, he includes Thomas Buchanan, Mark Lane, and Joachim Joesten); and explains how the Soviets, through the use of their publications (e.g., *Novoe Vremia* [New Times], from which he quotes heavily) spread disinformation, and in some cases actually create it by clandestinely printing books abroad (e.g., *L'Amérique brule* [American Burns]); he tends to carry it too far when he makes such sweeping statements as "America began to lose its prestige immediately after President Kennedy's death [fully debatable!]," and "those who believe that the investigation . . . was scandalous do not know themselves what convinced them of the existence of a conspiracy [hardly!]"

However, as I alluded to earlier, where Moss really shines is in his explanation of why Oswald killed President Kennedy. The answer is alarmingly simple. Essentially, Kennedy's fate was sealed "by a frustrated, insignificant individual who believed that his wife had just decided to leave him."

His frustration, caused not only by his "wife's moods," but because of: an unhappy childhood; difficulty in coping with "a reading disability [dyslexia]" that was aggravated by an above average I.Q.; "disappoint-

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ments [including a failed attempt on General Edwin A. Walker's life]"; and lastly, a "need to be noticed." And while it may be hard for some to swallow "that the most important political figure in the world . . . died merely . . . of a family quarrel," the *Report of the Warren Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy* notes that on the morning of the murder, Oswald "for the first time left his wedding ring . . . on the dresser . . . [and] took . . . [a] long brown package . . . to the School Book Depository."

JOHN C. THOMPSON
LaGrange, Georgia

The Future of German-American Relations. Washington, D.C.: International Security Council, 1987. 207pp. \$4.95

The Federal Republic of Germany and the United States now find themselves in transit to a better balanced and mature partnership where rights and duties are more evenly distributed. This development takes place at a time when the Germans have become aware of the far-reaching consequences of the U.S.-Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) to their vulnerable and exposed country located in the heart of Europe; namely, the concentration of the remaining nuclear short-range weapons on German soil. The dominate question for Germany in light of the changing strategic conditions is, can a community of equally shared risks between

Europe and the United States, in which nuclear weapons play a role acceptable to the protectors and the protected, be maintained? The Americans, emphasizing a different issue, expect Germany to carry a fair share of the common defense burden—both inside and outside the NATO Treaty area—utilizing its considerable economic power as well as defense resources.

The International Security Council (ISC)—an independent, voluntary association for statesmen, senior officers, diplomats, scientists, and historians—deserves credit for the creation of a forum that provides the frank and intense exchange of ideas on those issues that are key to German-American relations. The symposium was held in June 1987 in Berlin, the divided city in the center of Europe, and the key to the necessary distinction between the freedom of the West and captivity of the East.

The ISC has published these worthy contributions to the Berlin conference, which provide an American and a German perspective on those catchwords defining the present debate: strategy and arms control, defense and deterrence, neutrality and reunification, cooperation and competition. Since the overwhelming number of speakers were outspoken right-wingers, and no liberals or socialists were represented, the views remain somewhat simplistic and unbalanced. This permits a misleading impression of the German domestic debate.

A good example of the imbalanced views reflected by the speakers is the fact that there appears to be a common denominator among the majority of the contributors that arms control agreements "would discourage, not encourage, modernization and defense programs in the West: rather than leading to necessary improvements, they would more likely stifle them, thereby magnifying and making more dangerous the many other unbalances that favor the Soviet Union."

It is certainly in the interest of a more sober and strategically oriented view towards arms control to balance the present arms control fever and the public euphoria. It does not help, however, to define arms control as a process which leads to the "Destruction of the Alliance."

The present generation of American politicians have less experience and are less knowledgeable about European affairs, in particular about complex issues such as the "German question," which often results in superficial views and disturbing statements. Thus, the importance of a comprehensive and informative overview such as the ISC publication—a collection of facts and arguments which describes most accurately the state-of-the-art discussion about a political perspective for the divided Germany.

All in all, the study shows that NATO was founded under conditions different than those it currently faces and will face in the future. The German-American relationship has a

sound basis of shared values and interests: this relationship, however, needs an emotional and political boost in order to stay as healthy in the nineties as it has been in past decades.

ULRICH WEISSER
 Captain, Federal German Navy

Johnson, Robert Erwin. *Guardians of the Sea: History of the United States Coast Guard, 1915 to the Present*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1987. 368pp. \$23.95

Coast Guardsmen, like all military folk, are fond of their traditions, and there are doubtless few in uniform or out who would not know that the service traces its lineage to the year 1790 when the 1st Congress authorized the construction of ten "cutters" to enforce the customs of the new republic. Probably fewer are aware of the significance of the year 1915, but it was then that the modern Coast Guard was created through a merger of two Treasury Department agencies: the Revenue-Cutter Service and the Life-Saving Service.

Ironically, the 1915 merger resulted from a report by a "President's Commission on Economy and Efficiency" which recommended that the Revenue Cutter-Service be abolished and its functions transferred to the Navy, and that the Life-Saving Service be transferred to the new Department of Commerce and Labor. There would be further mergers and transfers in the years to

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follow: the Lighthouse Service would become part of the Coast Guard in 1939, followed by the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation in 1942, and in 1967 the entire service would move from Treasury to the newly formed Department of Transportation—not to mention wartime transfers to the Navy Department in 1917-1919 and 1941-1945.

One of the two main themes of this history is the organizational changes that came about as the service grew, adapted to new missions, and weathered social, political, economic, and technological changes—as well as subsequent attempts to reorganize it out of existence. Johnson, a historian at the University of Alabama and a World War II veteran of the Coast Guard, not only has carefully studied official Coast Guard records, but has delved into the letters and papers of key service leaders, Congressmen, and Cabinet members in order to put the changes into the political perspective of the times in which they occurred.

One of the enduring sources of tension within the Coast Guard, as well as the reason for such frequent legislative and executive scrutiny, has been the fact that it is a military service with predominantly civil missions. The military character of the service was established early in the history of the Revenue-Cutter Service, and it was that branch of the service (Johnson often refers to the “cutter branch”) that continued to dominate and provide the leadership as successive civil agencies were

absorbed. Johnson makes it clear that the Coast Guard is indebted to *that* leadership for, more often than not, it has been the service’s military character that has provided both the vision and the sense of tradition, enabling those leaders to cement its disparate elements into an effective and resilient organization.

The second theme of the book, carefully woven into the first, is an operational history. Here Johnson masterfully retells many stories of disaster, wartime action, and rescue at sea with the sure touch of an accomplished novelist. The incidents recounted, many of them well-known in Coast Guard folklore, and some more widely known, have been judiciously chosen to illustrate both the nature of Coast Guard duties at various times and the ways in which major events influenced the subsequent evolution of the service.

If there is a weakness in this book, it is the disappointingly brief treatment of the twenty years since the Coast Guard was transferred to the Department of Transportation. The author acknowledges this weakness, referring to his final chapter as “a hasty survey, a postscript of sorts,” and the characterization is accurate. It is a forgivable weakness; although the Coast Guard has undergone, and continues to undergo, dramatic changes since 1967, an adequately objective analysis of the trends and their significance clearly cannot be made at such close range—at least not from the historian’s perspective.

Overall, this is a fine book—one which will go far to help both Coast

Guardsmen and the general public understand how the Coast Guard came to be the unique institution that it is. Professor Johnson's objective, yet sympathetic, point of view and his clear and economical prose style make for fascinating and entertaining reading.

DAVID V.V. WOOD
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard

Beaver, Paul. *The British Aircraft Carrier*. Wellingborough, Northamptonshire, United Kingdom: Patrick Stephens, 3rd ed., 1987. 256pp. \$19.95

Paul Beaver has written a very readable account of British carrier aviation, providing many interesting insights into a navy that closed World War II with 52 aircraft carriers in service and 18 under construction. Beginning with H.M.S. *Argus* in World War I, Mr. Beaver traces the history of the aircraft carrier in the Royal Navy through the Falklands to the present day. He also presents the story of the many innovations that the British have pioneered—the angled flight deck, mirrored landing system, armored flight deck, and the steam catapult.

The British aircraft carrier's history is a rich one, and this book provides a full account, highlighted by numerous personal interviews and photographs. Besides covering theaters of operations familiar to

many, such as the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean, Mr. Beaver also details operations in the Indian Ocean and those in conjunction with the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Equally interesting are the postwar actions, including the Korean war and the Suez crisis.

The Royal Navy's carrier force, like the U.S. Navy's, frequently has been the subject of debates concerning its role and composition. Most significant for the American reader are the circumstances that prepared the way for the 1966 decision leading to the demise of the large deck carrier force and its conventional aircraft.

The principal change to this third edition is an additional chapter which discusses British carrier developments since the Falklands. Most of this information relates to equipment changes on ships and aircraft. A new table has been added to the appendices, and two line drawings also have been added—one is mislabeled, indentifying H.M.S. *Eagle* as H.M.S. *Invincible*. While the book is worthy of purchase, there is little cause for an owner of the second edition to upgrade to the third.

Though not a definitive history, *British Aircraft Carriers* accomplishes its purpose: to present an excellent overall account of a fascinating subject. For American readers, who would tend to be more knowledgeable of U.S. naval operations, this volume provides much interesting and valuable information on a force

that was, and still is, in the vanguard of navies that operate aircraft at sea.

CHRISTOPHER C. STASZAK

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve

Lambert, Andrew, ed. *Warship, Volume X*. London/Annapolis: Conway Maritime Press/Naval Institute Press, 1986. 288pp. \$24.95

When the periodical *Warship* first appeared, I was impressed. I was also certain that, after its contributing authors had covered well-known warships or warship classes, it would fold from a lack of interest in less famous ships or classes. The appearance of the tenth annual collection of *Warship* articles is proof that the field covered by the periodical is so strong that it will never dry. That is good news for those who care—whether professionally or as amateurs—about fighting ships and about their operation and histories.

This particular volume contains a very diverse set of offerings. There is a two-part article on the ironclad turreted ship *Huascar*, built in England for Peru in 1865. Later captured by Chile, *Huascar* has been restored and preserved as a national monument by the Chilean Government. A small ironclad with a Coles turret, *Huascar* was purchased to thwart efforts by Spain to reassert her dominance over lost American colonies during the Civil War in the United States. She continued in the service of Peru and then Chile until 1901, and she is now a museum. Four

articles discuss the development of another 19th century fighting ship which has been preserved: *HMS Warrior*. These papers, plus another describing the preserved Norwegian torpedo boat *Rap*, are interesting introductions to the beginnings of modern warship design and combat.

More contemporary warships are also covered, including the French dreadnoughts of the *Bretagne* class, the nuclear-powered missile cruiser *Long Beach*, and the Imperial Japanese Navy's torpedo cruiser *Kitakami*. In each case, numerous photographs and drawings are provided. Some odd types are also reviewed. For example, there is an interesting discussion of the operations of the German *Elbing*-class torpedo boats (actually small destroyers) in World War II. This discussion might be the starting point for an investigation of the numerous and important small boat operations in European coastal waters in World War II—operations which might be repeated again in the event of a military clash between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. An essay on a special German type for coastal operations—the *Kriegsfischkutter*—provides more details about small military craft whose extensive operations went mostly unheralded during the war and are sadly ignored even now. The category of amphibious ships is covered by three essays on fast landing ships of the Imperial Japanese Navy, constructed during World War II to enable Japan to supply and support her many island garrisons threatened by the mobile forces of the U.S. Navy.

There are even studies of ships which one might not expect to find in a journal entitled *Warship*. The best example is a short but tantalizing offering on the liner S.S. *United States*. Another is a two-part discussion of U.S. Navy gunnery training and missile testing ships, including the *Norton Sound*, the former seaplane tender which served as the Aegis system test ship in the 1970s. But some of the best articles talk about subjects which most readers might never have considered before. A four-part presentation on ships of the line of Spain's navy in the years 1714-1825 begins with a brief explanation of why and how Spain's fleet declined over the period. Another two-part essay explores the career of HMS *Invincible*, a French ship of 74 guns captured by British forces in battle in 1747, fitted for service with the Royal Navy, and then lost to grounding off the Isle of Wight in 1758. (I will copy and preserve a drawing, showing how a full-rigged ship goes about, so I can finally understand all the ships' maneuvers in the novels by C.S. Forester.) Finally, there is a compilation of Soviet submarine operations in the Arctic in World War II that makes fascinating reading for anyone familiar with the trials and tribulations endured by the S-class boats stationed in Alaska by the U.S. Navy in 1943. Arctic operations were extremely difficult for diesel submarines. Forced to operate on the surface much of the time, they were buffeted and soaked by heavy, frigid seas. Finding and striking targets was

made difficult by the foul weather. It was a hard life and, for submarine captains hungry for kills, a lean one.

Warship Volume X also contains several interesting articles on matters of naval policy. There is a discussion of "Operation Catherine," a plan pushed by Winston Churchill in 1939 to force the Kattegat with a squadron of heavy surface ships and cut Germany off from Norway. The operation never really got beyond the planning stage, but it is interesting as an indicator of Churchill's thinking, and it illustrates the problems that must dog any expedition that has not carefully prepared for hostilities. There is also a fascinating paper on the effects of aerodynamic drag on long-range gunfire, plus another on the problems faced by the Royal Navy as it tried to build up its naval forces in the Far East in 1944 for the counter-attack against Japan. A most intriguing essay on the decline of British naval strength after World War II tops off the list of policy articles. Indeed, the policy papers are perhaps the most interesting subset of all the essays in *Warship Volume X*, suggesting that *Warship* may be developing a strong collection of authors and readers who are just as interested in how ships are used as in how they are designed and built.

The only problem with *Warship* is the uneven quality of the papers. Some are wonderfully written; others, even though they deal with interesting topics, are poorly organized and crafted. Some papers have

good references. Others have scarcely any. Most, but not all, have excellent photographs and drawings. *Warship* has always catered to the enthusiast, and that policy still governs the selection of topics and the layout of the journal. Accordingly, there are, in *Volume X*, a number of excellent photographs, including a fine pictorial essay on the warships of the Royal Netherlands Navy since World War II. Browsing can be rewarding, even for those who, like myself, are not ship enthusiasts. There is always the chance that something important can be learned, whether from a discussion of ship design, ship operations, or the technology of naval warfare. *Warship*, like the American-edited *Warship International*, is an important periodical. It has weathered its tenth anniversary, and this reviewer hopes that we will see it celebrate many more.

THOMAS HONE
Arlington, Virginia

Mack, William P. and Mack, William P., Jr. *South To Java*. Baltimore, Md.: Nautical and Aviation Pub. Co. of America, Inc., 1987. 385pp. \$19.95

When war hit the Asiatic Station on 8 December 1941, Manila time, Lieutenant Junior Grade William P. Mack was already a veteran. He had served two years aboard the World War I vintage four-pipe destroyer U.S.S. *John D. Ford* (DD 228). She would be the only survivor of a four-

ship division, and one of the two out of a thirteen-ship squadron to win the Presidential Unit Citation. Her skipper, then-Lieutenant Commander J.E. Cooper, would be awarded two Navy Crosses, the Dutch equivalent Bronzen Kruis, and the U.S. Silver Star. It was upon this background experience that Bill Mack drew for *South To Java*.

The authors Mack employed a clever stratagem in combining romance with truth by setting their story aboard a fictional Asiatic Fleet four-piper, the "U.S.S. O'Leary (DD 200)," which, ghostlike, joins a division of the real Asiatic Fleet, the latter using the true names.

Any professional naval officer of 1941 could have stepped aboard "O'Leary," the fictional ship, and felt right at home. There is the usual wardroom mix of the good, the not-so-good, the stud, the straight man, the slightly ridiculous, plus in this case a suicidal skipper. The repartee and chatter of the enlisted men and their various reactions are genuine, four-letter words and all. Below decks, as in any Asiatic Fleet destroyer, were some hard-fisted pub trashers, plus the usual long-time, dedicated petty officers who were expert in their trade. And of course the inevitable brutish but effective chief boatswain's mate.

For the non-nautical reader there are simply worded, clear descriptions, casually inserted, explaining the mysteries of the power plant, armament, state of repair, and the ship's company. It should make fascinating reading for any 1988

destroyer man, a flashback to the near antediluvian past, as unreal as paddle wheels and muzzle-loaders, so immense have been developments in the span of two generations.

Basically, this is a gripping, accurate history of the life and death of the Asiatic Fleet, December 1941 to April 1942. History can be dull. But not this one. You get the totally accurate story, including the real names of ships and people, plus some piquant sauce. I know, because like the elder Mack, I was there. Romance on the Asiatic Station was a way of life, as it had been for a century. Chinese, Japanese, Russian, and Filipino girls captured many an American seagoing heart. The battles so accurately described were fought by obsolete ships with near-full wartime complements of really professional sailors, and nearly 100 percent of their officers equally professional graduates of the U.S. Naval Academy.

Battles start with the nearly complete loss of the Army's air force on the first day of war (an O'Leary officer just happened to be at Clark

Field!); then total destruction of Cavite Navy Yard on 10 December; the retreat to Java; our one small victory at Balikpapan, Borneo; the several wasting battles under the plucky Dutch Admiral Karel Doorman; and lastly, the final fallback of the shattered remnants to Australia.

Laced through it all are the wholly believable and touching romances involving both officers and enlisted men. Indeed, if all histories were so embellished, it is probable that there would be more enthusiasm in students of the humanities. Truth would be not only stranger but vastly more interesting than the fiction which all too often passes for fact in many school textbooks, written to the least common denominator, offensive to none, all American heroes, the enemy despicable, stupid curs.

South To Java is definitely in the "can't-put-it-down" category. Its paper is nonreflective, the print large and easily readable.

KEMP TOLLEY
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

RECENT BOOKS

Annotated by
R.M. Laske

Banks, Arthur S., ed. *Political Handbook of the World: 1987*. SUNY Binghamton, N.Y.: CSA Publications, 1987. 850pp. \$67.95

First published in 1928, this reference work has been published for the Center of Education and Social Research, SUNY Binghamton, New York and for the Council