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Germany's Vision of Empire in Venezuela, 1871-1914

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to convert what materials were available into iron and ordnance. Still also cites the "lack of cooperation" between the Army and Navy as a complementary problem. Although the Confederacy did manage some successes in its ironclad program, its fateful decision to concentrate solely on ironclads left harbors and rivers vulnerable, an oversight that supports Durkin's conclusions. In the end, however, Still does accord the ironclad program passing marks. He concludes that, "If time had allowed, the Confederate ironclads might have made a more significant contribution to the Southern war effort. As it was, they certainly achieved some success in the overall strategy of defense."

The most valuable contents of *Iron Afloat* deal with the building and design of ironclads. The author studied Confederate naval records, and his efforts are rewarded with a clear, detailed analysis of every aspect of ironclad production. The narrative is enhanced still further with excellent maps, diagrams, and pictures.

Still's volume on Confederate ironclads remains the seminal work on the subject. Combined with Durkin's biography of Mallory, the history of the Confederate Navy and its ironclads is cogently and effectively presented.

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Herwig, Holger H. *Germany's Vision of Empire in Venezuela, 1871-1914*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986. 285pp. \$38

Historians habitually begin books with questions. Here, Holger Herwig, professor of history at Vanderbilt University, asks: Why were the Germans involved in Venezuela, and what did their involvement mean? A careful examination of the German archives gave him the answer—German naval officers wanted to establish a strategic outpost for the world power competition between nations, and trade was sought by German entrepreneurs. But neither's position became an important feature of the government's fitful "world policy," nor of "imperialism" as understood for serious political support of economic expansion. There was less to German involvement than imagined by Marxist theorists or dreamed of by "fleet professors" whose pens outran the reality of an American "empire." Herwig's fine book is a valuable addition to the redefinition historians are making of overseas engagements in the 19th century and to his own highly respected studies of German naval and maritime strategy.

Herwig shows that existing German trade and cultural expansion in Venezuela were small and individual, not part of a broader political program. Berlin's support of naval enthusiasts was likewise limited. Navalists like Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and officers in the

Caribbean wanted to challenge the position of Britain and the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Venezuela or an island off its coast was to be the position from which to move against traffic sailing through the Isthmus of Panama. It was a vain hope. The German Government, cautious in spite of itself, permitted the navy no bases and allowed it only on occasion to meddle, which was all "world policy" added up to anyway.

The German blockade of Venezuela in 1902-03, however, was enough to stir up the United States. Undertaken for the sake of meaningless prestige, the German Navy was unable to stand alone once the British had withdrawn. Herwig found no evidence in the archives to sustain Theodore Roosevelt's claim that he threatened the emperor, but the President was worried. At the time of the blockade he told Admiral George Dewey to use an ongoing maneuver of fifty-four ships to get the emperor's attention. Dewey linked the way the Germans had fished in the troubled waters of Manila Bay in 1898 to their presence in the Caribbean four years later. Thus, War Plan Black against Germany became the Navy's primary concern. Relations were not helped by the fact that the emperor considered the Monroe Doctrine an "insolent dogma," and refused to recognize it. The refusal, like much of German policy, was pointless. Once the British had withdrawn, Germany, who was without means of independent action in the Western

Hemisphere, was never a threat to Venezuela's independence.

Despite some private gains in trade, Herwig shows that the "vision of empire" was an illusion. The main legacy of the inept, clamorous, and politically irresponsible visionaries was the resentment of the United States—a cost that no benefits from Venezuela could have ever offset.

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Campbell, N.J.M. *Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1986. 439pp. \$26.95

Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting is a painstakingly detailed account of the most analyzed battle ever fought. Author John Campbell emphasizes the exchange of fire: the tactics and technologies of naval gunnery and the battleships and battle cruisers' ability—or lack of ability—to withstand punishment. Extensive data tables and diagrams chronicle the shell hits taken by capital ships of both sides. This is useful analysis, but the reader looking for a new or clearer understanding of the forces' maneuvers and the reasons for them will be left unsatisfied. H.H. Frost's *Battle of Jutland*, for the former, and Richard Hough's *The Great War At Sea 1914-1918*, for the latter, are better sources for those purposes.

I believe Campbell's emphasis is deliberate, and that he set out to state the facts of the gunfire only, leaving