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## Space and National Security

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Stares, Paul B. *Space and National Security*. Wash., D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987. 210pp. \$10.95

Mr. Stares provides documentation as comprehensive as can be found of the increasing importance of various types of satellites to the war-fighting capabilities of all three of our armed forces, as well as the Soviets'. As might be expected, the U.S. Navy, out of all the services, derives the greatest benefit from enhancement of military capabilities from our reconnaissance, communication, navigation, and weather satellites. It is also the service at greatest risk from enemy satellites, especially Soviet reconnaissance satellites that can locate and target our carrier task forces; and even further risk, should the Soviets develop a satellite that can detect and target submerged submarines from space.

Mr. Stares examines in detail the Soviets' antisatellite (ASAT) capabilities which currently include a very limited intercept missile capability, a nuclear weapons capability using air defense or ballistic missile weapons, a limited ground-based laser capability, a communication link jamming capability, and the means to attack our ground control and reception stations and our principal satellite launching facilities at Kennedy and Vandenburg. To counter these threats, he lists the checks we are incorporating into many of our newest satellites.

The author continues on to say that in spite of mutual restraints on

further ASAT testing (Congressionally imposed in our country), key technologies for better ASATS are being pursued by both superpowers since they both have high priority development programs for antiballistic missile (ABM) systems which could also be used as ASAT weapons. By the early 1990s, the Soviets, according to Defense Department intelligence, are likely to have both space and ground-based laser weapons with ASAT capabilities, as will our country—a fallout from our Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. Additionally, our Air Force has requested funding in FY 88 and FY 89 budgets to study the possible use of ground-based excimer lasers for the ASAT mission.

Mr. Stares then states that unless agreed restrictions are adopted by the superpowers on ASAT developments, the task of protecting U.S. satellites from a formidable Soviet threat will become progressively more difficult with the result that in time of war the United States could not rely on the current capabilities that satellites provide. He goes on to say that by being the prime beneficiary of satellites, our Navy has the most to lose, particularly in wartime when the effectiveness of our fleet could be severely—maybe critically—impaired if utility is denied. He also points out the dangers of basing our war plans on an assumed availability of satellites and calls for fleet war exercises, in which satellite enhancements are not used, to be conducted.

In conclusion, Mr. Stares lists a series of recommendations for the United States which include joining the Soviets in their ASAT testing moratorium, forgoing testing of all ABM-related weapons in space, continuing an ASAT research and development base, continuing to improve the survivability of U.S. satellites, increasing the redundancy of U.S. space systems, continuing to improve U.S. capabilities for surveillance of activities in space, continuing to take measures to reduce the threat from Soviet satellites, and, finally, negotiating several space weapons agreements with the Soviets.

This book is essential reading for those interested in the increasing military importance of space.

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Charlton, Michael. *From Deterrence to Defense: The Inside Story of Strategic Policy*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1987. 154pp. \$20

This invaluable book is based on taped interviews for a series of BBC radio broadcasts on the history and evolution of strategic doctrine. The twenty-three interviews were conducted with eminent American and European defense public officials who have participated in the making of recent strategic policy. Among the interviewees are Robert McNamara, Henry Kissinger, Paul Nitze, Richard Perle, Harold Brown, President Jimmy Carter,

General Brent Scowcroft, General William Odom, Dean Rusk, Helmut Schmidt, Edward Heath, and Lord Carrington. Perhaps the only influential American public officials omitted from the list are McGeorge Bundy, President Richard Nixon, James Schlesinger, and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

While there are excellent accounts of the historical evolution of American strategic thought (such as Lawrence Freedman's *The Evolution of Strategic Doctrine* and Jerome Kahn's earlier study, *Security in the Nuclear Age*), the great merit of this brief study is that it presents an oral history of American nuclear policy from the early 1960s through the mid-1980s. Most of the notions and perceptions propounded by the interviewees will be familiar to students of strategic policy. But the book, which provides a candid, straightforward presentation of statesmen's views on strategic policy, is an exceptionally worthwhile source of ideas and facts about deterrence, détente, and strategic defense. Examples of facts to be gleaned from this study include:

- when MIRV research was begun in the mid-1960s, it was recognized as dangerous (McNamara);
- the development of MIRV technology was begun solely to counter ABM deployment and not to provide a means for implementing a counterforce strategy (McNamara);
- Kissinger thought that détente was more disarming for the Soviet Union than it was for the West,