

1988

From Deterrence to Defense: The Inside Story of Strategic Policy

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Recommended Citation

Amstutz, Mark R. (1988) "From Deterrence to Defense: The Inside Story of Strategic Policy," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 41 : No. 3 , Article 27.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol41/iss3/27>

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In conclusion, Mr. Stares lists a series of recommendations for the United States which include joining the Soviets in their ASAT testing moratorium, forgoing testing of all ABM-related weapons in space, continuing an ASAT research and development base, continuing to improve the survivability of U.S. satellites, increasing the redundancy of U.S. space systems, continuing to improve U.S. capabilities for surveillance of activities in space, continuing to take measures to reduce the threat from Soviet satellites, and, finally, negotiating several space weapons agreements with the Soviets.

This book is essential reading for those interested in the increasing military importance of space.

JOHN E. LACOUTURE
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Charlton, Michael. *From Deterrence to Defense: The Inside Story of Strategic Policy*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1987. 154pp. \$20

This invaluable book is based on taped interviews for a series of BBC radio broadcasts on the history and evolution of strategic doctrine. The twenty-three interviews were conducted with eminent American and European defense public officials who have participated in the making of recent strategic policy. Among the interviewees are Robert McNamara, Henry Kissinger, Paul Nitze, Richard Perle, Harold Brown, President Jimmy Carter,

General Brent Scowcroft, General William Odom, Dean Rusk, Helmut Schmidt, Edward Heath, and Lord Carrington. Perhaps the only influential American public officials omitted from the list are McGeorge Bundy, President Richard Nixon, James Schlesinger, and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

While there are excellent accounts of the historical evolution of American strategic thought (such as Lawrence Freedman's *The Evolution of Strategic Doctrine* and Jerome Kahn's earlier study, *Security in the Nuclear Age*), the great merit of this brief study is that it presents an oral history of American nuclear policy from the early 1960s through the mid-1980s. Most of the notions and perceptions propounded by the interviewees will be familiar to students of strategic policy. But the book, which provides a candid, straightforward presentation of statesmen's views on strategic policy, is an exceptionally worthwhile source of ideas and facts about deterrence, détente, and strategic defense. Examples of facts to be gleaned from this study include:

- when MIRV research was begun in the mid-1960s, it was recognized as dangerous (McNamara);
- the development of MIRV technology was begun solely to counter ABM deployment and not to provide a means for implementing a counterforce strategy (McNamara);
- Kissinger thought that détente was more disarming for the Soviet Union than it was for the West,

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while Richard Perle thought just the opposite;

- both Gerard Smith and Paul Nitze opposed the signing of the SALT I Interim Agreement;

- President Carter admitted that "the Soviets are inclined to be paranoid";

- the purpose of Presidential Directive 59 was not to send signals to the Soviet Union, but to define how to use nuclear weapons most effectively (Carter);

- the arms race is not inherently bad (General Scowcroft);

- McNamara thought that nuclear weapons did not have much effect on the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis, while Nitze thought that the American nuclear advantage did have some impact on the outcome of the crisis;

- the ABM Treaty of 1972 was not based on common assumptions or understandings between the United States and U.S.S.R. about the role of nuclear weapons (Nitze);

- both Helmut Schmidt and Edward Heath oppose SDI, in part because it undermines French and British nuclear deterrence;

- since most Western European targets are near the coast and most Soviet targets are inland, European targets are more vulnerable to submarine missile attacks than are Soviet targets (Sir Hermann Bondi).

This book is essential reading for all those interested in Western security. By presenting interviews of leading policymakers, we learn not only about strategic affairs but also

about the Soviet threat, the nature of the international system, and the role of strategic policy in countering Soviet influence and aggression. While the interview format does not lend itself to the development of arguments, it provides an excellent means for presenting diverse ideas about nuclear policy. Charlton's book is strongly recommended both for the novice and the student of military affairs. Because the study is written in clear, succinct prose and because the author provides thoughtful introductions and commentaries to ensure coherent, informative chapters, the former will find the study an invaluable introduction to a topic which is often described in technical, arcane language. And for those familiar with nuclear strategy, this study will illuminate the convictions and beliefs of many of the leading architects of American strategic policy since the early 1960s.

MARK R. AMSTUTZ
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McNamara, Robert S. *Blundering into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1986. 212pp. \$14.95

This book is a disappointment! And it is not because the author has limited himself to trivial issues. His discussion of the dangers of inadvertent nuclear war between the superpowers; his critique of Gorbachev's call for the total elimination of nuclear weapons as well as of