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American Security: Dilemmas for a Modern Democracy

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stop short of the culminating point of success in the use of force, a quality which their predecessors certainly had. It was precisely his sensitivity on that score that made Ben Gurion a statesman of the first rank. He was perfectly willing to use force, more so in many ways than Begin (he certainly authorized many more military actions), but he also knew when to stop, and what is more, when to call off victorious action to prevent the decay of victory into defeat. Below that level, technological sophistication has itself taken its toll. Instead of working out sound and mostly economical tactical or operational solutions to military problems as they come up, Israelis are now much more likely to act as their American colleagues might, by calling for a high-tech equipment solution for every problem.

Yaniv's book actually delivers much more than the title suggests, for the reader can learn much from it about the formation of strategy as such, rather than just Israeli strategy. Having struggled with the definition of a general theory of strategy myself, I was intrigued by the theoretical understructure of this important work.

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Berkowitz, Bruce D. *American Security: Dilemmas for a Modern Democracy*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1986. 282pp. \$25

Bruce Berkowitz wades right into the many problems facing Americans in their search for a secure world and attempts to sort them out in a logical fashion. He makes clear that reality severely restricts the number and choices of solutions; that solutions are limited by economics, politics, and technology; and that even after a government chooses a solution, in a democracy the governed may still refuse the choice.

The author shows that defense spending has remained fairly stable over the years and that the recent defense buildup is not responsible for the deficit in the federal budget. He holds out hope that major savings in the budget will occur if we make alterations in foreign policy objectives. However, political interest groups, and the role they play in forming and altering defense thinking and choices, often frustrate any hope for savings.

Berkowitz does not see an end to the dilemma of nuclear war because buying nuclear weapons, compared to the other alternatives, is inexpensive. Therefore, it will be difficult to reduce the number of such weapons and their delivery systems, and the author feels that we have a real problem if we tie the traditional arms control agreements to Soviet-American relations. He does not see the proliferation of nuclear devices among nations as the threat some people have determined it will be.

The bulk of *American Security* is devoted to the issues around the Central Front and the defense of Western Europe. Berkowitz

examines a vast range of alternatives and, despite the fiscal appeal of nuclear weapons, eventually sees a conventional NATO defense as the best option; but bear in mind, the author continually reminds the reader that "best" does not necessarily mean "politically feasible."

In examining the Persian Gulf and the Rapid Deployment Force, he reminds us that the United States should not get into a conflict in two places at once.

While many may not agree with Berkowitz' arguments, he is persuasive and clear.

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Amme, Carl H. *NATO Strategy and Nuclear Defense*, Contributions in Military Studies, No. 69. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1988. 208pp. \$37.95

Time proves it to have been no accident that Carl H. Amme won the U.S. Naval Institute's Annual Prize Essay Award four times in the past, and in 1962 the Navy League's Alfred Thayer Mahan Award for Literary Achievement. His new book could not be more timely in providing the background for consideration of problems of NATO strategy and offering a way out of the dilemma of a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons which has been a tacit part of American strategic thinking since the NATO alliance was formed.

A key assumption of Amme's strategy hinges upon acknowledgment that superpowers have parallel

interests in preventing war with one another. There are cooperative as well as competitive aspects to military confrontation. Arms control is labeled by Amme as an aspect of military cooperation. He examines problems and principles useful in nuclear arms control negotiation and implementation.

The author has some fairly controversial solutions to problems of Atlantic alliance defense. They are based in part upon his in-depth knowledge of the strategic alliance, its ups and downs, the effects of de Gaulle's withdrawal of France (which he calls "defection") from NATO's military arm, and the military impact of the independent network of alliances in which most NATO members are linked, Bismarck-style.

Carl Amme proposes an advertised doctrine of nuclear constraints. He argues that this makes it possible to use battlefield nuclear weapons in a selective and discriminate way, even in defensive first use, without escalation as the inevitable result. Promulgating rules of engagement that make it clear to all that first use of battlefield nuclear weapons is not a starter's gun for world war III would diminish fear of tactical nuclear weapons. He discusses the narrow line between "offensive" and "defensive," "tactical" and "strategic" nuclear arms, but argues that modernization has redefined the tactical defensive weaponry essential to NATO military strength in light of Soviet/Warsaw Pact nations holding a preponderance in conventional