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# PROFESSIONAL READING

“One should not glibly criticize the bureaucracies for playing out their institutional repertoires; someone—the President—had to let them get away with it.”

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Rear Admiral S. A. Swarztrauber, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Komer, Robert W. *Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986. 174pp. \$17.50

**R**obert Komer aptly titled this book. The words, *Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict*, nicely imply the thesis that bureaucracies do not win wars.

I met Ambassador Komer in Vietnam in 1968, when I was a brown-water navy commander and he was deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS and then again about ten years later when I was a flag officer and he was UnderSecDef (Policy). I have not always agreed with his views, but was happily surprised to be able to applaud most of what I read in his new book.

He has done us a great service by putting his Vietnam experience and thoughts down. He was certainly one of the top civilian actors and one who saw it from both the seat of government and the rice paddies. This concise book makes an excellent counterpart to Colonel Harry Summers' *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, similarly pondering the war, but with a military mind's eye. (See *Naval War College Review*, March-April 1983.) Like Colonel Summers, Komer sees an omnihead, turf-protecting bureaucracy running things. Below the President, “everybody and nobody was responsible.” One is led to the conclusion in both books that only a President could have made the difference, either by making the war his number one priority or by appointing a czar with extraordinary authority.

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Rear Admiral Swarztrauber holds a Ph.D. in Interuational Affairs and writes widely on U.S. national security affairs.

Komer does not critique the Washington decision or policymaking process, but, given that decisions and policy were promulgated, he criticizes their execution or performance. This is a management-oriented book.

Bureaucracies tend to do things they are comfortable with, like doing, and do best, using tried and true procedures. They are characterized by inertia or momentum, as the case may be, and resist change. Vietnam called for innovation, flexibility, and adaptability; but the bureaucracy's response was usually the "school solution." If the conventional remedy did not work, the dosage was increased—more of the same, escalating the effort.

Komer fairly acknowledges that generals will behave like generals and does not fault them for it. He places equal blame on the military bureaucracy and civilian bureaucracy as both have the same weaknesses. He points out that the socio-economic-political side of the war—he equates counterinsurgency with pacification—got high-level Washington lip service as early as the 1950s, but little was actually done until the late 1960s when it was too late. He calls this a policy performance gap—a gap between what was said in Washington and what was actually done in Vietnam. He assails the lack of follow-up mechanisms, and the failure to appropriate money and talent. He believes that pacification might have been successful if tried before the massive "over-militarization" of 1965 and provided it had been given a full-scale try.

There were two main constraints on America's ability to do better.

First, we failed to do better because we placed too many of our eggs in a weak basket, that of the South Vietnamese Government. Komer describes the painful and frustrating process of trying to persuade, then coerce, Diem and others to combat corruption and institute reforms. We failed to extract performance as the price for the aid and assistance we offered. We did not use the leverage available to us and there was very little to lever. America became a prisoner, a classic trap for great powers dealing with weak allies. Vietnam used its weakness as leverage on us better than we used our strength as a lever on Vietnam. Given the fatal weakness of the Vietnamese leadership we should have worked around it.

Second, we failed because of institutional constraints. There is a bureaucratic tendency to see a mirror image. The enemy is expected to react to stimuli like we do. We mounted a conventional war using the conventional weapons we had, "hoping" to meet a North Korean or Warsaw Pact-type main force enemy. In 1965, when we were deprived of South Vietnam's ability to help themselves, and we pushed our ally aside to win their war for them, we "Americanized" the war. Yet, there existed no American solution for Vietnam.

Even our intelligence was skewed toward the "main force" concept, so we consistently underestimated the enemy. Foreign Service Institute courses were irrelevant to Vietnam. Twelve-month tours meant no institutional

memory. The JCS did not do critical analyses of the war effort, but merely rubberstamped COMUSMACV requests. The best officers traditionally went to line combatant assignments, not to advisory and pacification assignments. When top military leaders disagreed with the President, their institutional “can do” prevented them from saying no, and resigning, if necessary, in protest.

The great irony of this according to Komer is that America’s leaders clearly knew Vietnam was different and needed a different approach. Yet we let the bureaucracies play out their institutional repertoires. Our leaders knew that the measures we took were half measures—long shots—and might not suffice.

Among his suggestions for “next time”: there should be established strong, unified management, and means must be forged to *force* the bureaucracy to adapt. Komer laments that his suggestions are restatements of the obvious. But the obvious was not so obvious during Vietnam and we probably have not learned from our expensive mistakes.

While this is a very valuable book, Komer did let his personal and political biases show through occasionally. He does not believe the war was overmanaged from Washington, but rather undermanaged. Too much, he feels, was left to the military. He flatly states that the President and SecDef never infringed on the traditional military control over the conduct of the war inside Vietnam. My experience was otherwise. River patrol forces, at least, were hamstrung by rules of engagement that were mandated by OSD.

He acknowledges that the air war and mining against the North had considerable effect on the enemy but does not deal with the Administration’s failure to exploit it. Nor does he adequately treat management’s preoccupation with domestic—Great Society—programs and its failure to focus the necessary attention on the war effort, to mobilize public opinion, and to cut through the bureaucratic inertia. One should not glibly criticize the bureaucracies for playing out their institutional repertoires; someone—the President—had to let them get away with it.



Kaufmann, William W. *A Reasonable Defense*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986. 113pp. \$8.95

Epstein, Joshua M. *The 1987 Defense Budget*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986. 61pp. \$7.95

"How much is enough?" is the perennial question asked about defense budgets. The two works reviewed here attempt to answer that question, and their efforts are complementary. Epstein focuses on the fiscal 1987 budget, while Kaufmann gives an overview of defense budgeting. The Epstein volume is the latest contribution in a series of Brookings analyses of the Federal budget which was started in the early 1970s. In recent years Kaufmann has authored the annual examination of the defense budget, and readers of those earlier studies will find some of the same points made there in *A Reasonable Defense*.

Readers who are not familiar with the Federal budget in general and with the defense segment of that budget in particular should find these monographs helpful in understanding the defense budget. Kaufmann illustrates with the fiscal 1986 budget how difficult it can be to get the defense spending numbers straight. He then explains the various definitions of "defense" in the Federal budget, the relationship between budget authority and outlays, alternative budget formats (e.g. appropriations title such as military personnel, procurement, etc.; organizational

component such as Department of the Navy; and program budget with budget categories such as strategic programs, general purpose programs, etc.), the defense budget cycle, and the relation of the budget to the five-year defense plan (FYDP).

Kaufmann only mentions in passing the latest complication in Federal budgeting, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) Act. However, Epstein devotes his opening chapter to explaining GRH and its implications for national defense. Because Congress and the Reagan Administration have been unable to agree on how to deal with the large deficits in the Federal budget over the past several years, GRH establishes an automatic process to cut budget deficits. If the Administration and Congress are unable to agree on measures to reduce the budget deficit below specified levels, \$144 billion in fiscal 1987, GRH mandates cuts in both defense and nondefense spending. The cuts must be applied by reducing each program by an equal percentage irrespective of the priority of a program. Epstein shows how this form of budget cutting could have a devastating impact on defense capabilities.

Parts of GRH have been found to be unconstitutional so the defense budget may be spared the mindless cutting procedure of GRH. However, it is clear that, barring war or a major international crisis, defense spending will not continue the real growth that it has been enjoying under the Reagan Administration, (Kaufmann has a chapter on trends in

## 106 Naval War College Review

defense spending which shows defense spending's growth, its shares of the Federal budget and GNP, and the internal composition of the defense budget.) Both Kaufmann and Epstein believe that it is possible to reduce defense budgets from the levels proposed by the Administration in its budgets and FYDPs without reducing national security. They each propose ways of doing so by use of analysis of the programs which provide alternative ways of meeting national security objectives. They believe the failure to use rigorous analysis of defense programs has resulted in defense budgets which are excessive. Kaufmann argues for institutional reforms to get greater control over and rationality into the defense budget; the principal reform proposed is a return to more centralized planning by the Office of the Secretary of Defense as in the McNamara era.

Kaufmann compares the Reagan Administration's "Programmed Force" with a "Baseline Force" inherited in FY1981 from the Carter Administration and a "Combat Force" which represents Kaufmann's cost-effective solution to improving the ability of the Baseline Force to achieve U.S. security objectives by FY1992. The performance tests Kaufmann uses are the ability of U.S. strategic nuclear forces to have an effective second-strike capability on an extensive list of targets in the Soviet Union, the ability of theater nuclear forces to have an effective second-strike capability against a designated list of targets in a European war, and for conventional forces

to conduct a successful simultaneous defense in Central Europe, the Persian Gulf, and South Korea. As correlaries to these missions Kaufmann also tests the ability of airlift and sealift to deploy ground and air forces to key theaters, the ability to keep open sea lines of communication for resupply of overseas forces, and the combat sustainability of conventional forces. Kaufmann's Combat Force achieves all of these objectives with either a higher probability or to a greater degree than the Programmed Force, although the Programmed Force shows better performance in FY1992 than the Baseline Force but with considerably greater budgetary costs. Kaufmann discusses the various assumptions that he uses in making these force comparisons, but this work does not provide the details as to how he determines the probabilities of various outcomes.

The Navy does not fare well in these analyses. Both Kaufmann and Epstein would cut carrier battle groups to 12 from the Administration's programmed 15. The rationale for the 15-carrier force is to be able to conduct offensive action against the Soviet Navy in its home ports such as Murmansk. Kaufmann and Epstein conclude that this maritime strategy has a low probability of success and the likelihood of high losses in the attacking carrier battle groups. If, instead, carriers are used in defensive strategies to safeguard the sealanes against the Soviet Navy, a 12-carrier force is sufficient. However, the recent U.S. actions against Libya have shown that conditions in

the Third World may require multiple carrier employments because geography or political conditions may necessitate independent U.S. actions without access to forces based in allied nations. Would a 12-carrier program still be sufficient to meet such contingencies while simultaneously retaining enough forces to protect the sealanes against the Soviet Navy?

The climate for defense spending has changed significantly from a few years ago. These monographs should help readers see the nature of these changes and help stimulate thinking about how much is enough. While Kaufmann and Epstein cannot be said to provide the definitive analysis of the defense budget, they do further the debate on the best level and composition of the defense budget.

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Norton, Massachusetts

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Hudson, George E. and Kruzell, Joseph, eds. *American Defense Annual, 1985-1986*. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1985. 277pp. \$23, paper \$13.95

Kruzell, Joseph, ed. *American Defense Annual, 1986-1987*. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1986. 239pp. paper \$13.95

Believing that much of the public debate about defense issues is preoccupied with cost rather than policy, associates of the Merghon Center, Ohio State University, commenced

producing the *American Defense Annual* last year, the second issue appearing this spring. The goal is an authoritative annual assessment of American defense policy, a service provided by no other publication. *Military Balance* and *Strategic Survey*, published annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, do not examine U.S. policies in detail, nor does the *International Security Yearbook* published by the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, which is worldwide in scope. The annual Brookings Institution critique of the defense budget is limited to cost trends and projections.

Since defense issues do not change dramatically each year, another objective is to find authors who will cover different phases of an issue or divergent policy views on the subject. Success under these circumstances critically depends on the contributors. In both *Annals* to date, the formula has worked well.

The 1985-1986 *Annual* offered a liberal-conservative debate on "U.S. Defense Strategy—A Debate" by Earl Ravenal and William R. Van Cleave which set the stage for much of what followed. The reviewer found the debate marred somewhat by misplaced acerbity; others may find this a useful device in order to highlight divergencies. Such diversity appears in treatment of "Strategic Forces" by Walter Slocombe in the first edition and Colin Gray in the second edition; in "The Defense Budget" by Leonard Sullivan and Lawrence Korb; in "Manpower" by

## 108 Naval War College Review

Martin Binkin; and "Personnel" by David Segal. In the 1986-1987 *Annual*, views on "U.S. Defense Strategy" by Robert Komer on the one hand, and "Seapower and Projection Forces" by Admiral Harry D. Train II on the other, are quite enlightening.

Both editions offer a wealth of information, jargon-free, backed by ample charted data and illustrations which both the professional and the amateur will find helpful. Can the editors continue to find the level of outstanding contributors necessary to provide stimulating and comprehensive views each year within an essentially rigid format? To aid in this respect, a distinguished panel of defense authorities has been added as the *Annual's* editorial board to assist in finding new issues and potential contributors. The start, to date, has been auspicious.

PAUL R. SCHRATZ  
Arnold, Maryland

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Valenta, Jiri and Potter, William, eds. *Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security*. Winchester, Mass.: George Allen & Unwin, 1984. 319pp. \$40, paper \$18.50

Valenta and Potter edited and contributed to a series of papers presented at a conference at the Naval Postgraduate School in 1980 which have been updated for publication. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union is a country where even the simplest things are classified, and security matters even more so, the

authors are able to make perceptive analyses of the Soviet process for arriving at national security decisions. The studies range from conceptual bureaucratic models to case studies; e.g., Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. There are no definitive answers here, nor could there be, given the nature of the Soviet system. Nevertheless, the book marks, as the editors note, "the beginnings of wisdom." This is worthwhile reading for the serious student of Soviet affairs.

ARTHUR BEGELMAN  
Arlington, Virginia

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Sloss, Leon and Davis, Scott M., eds.

*A Game for High Stakes: Lessons Learned in Negotiating with the Soviet Union*. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1985. 180pp. \$24.95

According to Richard Pipes: "The emotionalism that surrounds the whole issue of these [nuclear] weapons transforms the process of nuclear-arms negotiation from what it ought to be—namely, matter-of-fact bargaining—into a quasi-religious ritual whose success is measured not by the results obtained but by the 'sincerity' with which it is approached." Although he did not write those words in review and criticism of the compilation of papers by Sloss and Davis, he well might have, for they accurately describe the general mindset of the contributors. The book does not offer, nor does it purport to offer, a comprehensive review of U.S.-Soviet negotiations, but sets forth



personal views of fourteen professionals who have face-to-face experience negotiating with Soviet officials. For a variety of reasons, each of the authors has a personal stake in the subject and as a consequence, their essays—let the reader beware—cannot be classified as objective analyses.

The authors of the papers, which range from four to twenty-eight and average about ten pages in length, are well known in the field. One of the current U.S. strategic arms negotiators, Max Kampelman, appears, as does Paul Warnke, Jonathan Dean, Herbert York, Edward Rowny, and Sidney Graybeal, all of whom headed delegations of negotiators on arms control at various times and at various levels. Others—such as the book's editor, Leon Sloss, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Howard Stoertz, Jr., Walter Slocombe, Raymond Garthoff, Robert D. Schmidt, R. James Woolsey, and Roger Fisher—have experience, or interest in the subject, or both.

Two important omissions detract from the value of the book. First, this is a compilation of opinions and recollections of advocates of, and in some cases apologists for, arms control negotiations with the Soviets. Absent are the views of those who believe that the asymmetries between the two political systems are of such magnitude as to render arms control an exercise of unilateral U.S. faith rather than of mutual interest between the parties. Not represented are strong criticisms of the likes of Foy Kohler, William Van Cleave, Richard Starr, Seymour Weiss,

Richard Pipes, Uri Ra'anán, Irving Kristol, or Brian Crozier—to name just a few who are *not* currently in government service. One might respond that this is the report of a series of seminars that took place in May and June of 1984, and as such is limited to the contributions of the attendees. Well enough, but the seminar organizers, under the auspices of the Roosevelt Center for American Policy Studies, must acknowledge that to exclude virtually all of the serious critics of the process they were studying renders the product vulnerable to criticism on that point.

Second, there is an absence of context for the essays. That is, for the most part, negotiations with the Soviet Union are considered outside any overarching national security framework. Few considerations, even rips of the hat, are offered to vital questions of how arms control fits (or should fit) into national security objectives of the parties. Throughout, there is the entirely tacit assumption that any negotiated arms control agreement would naturally be in consonance with the overall U.S. security scheme or, one supposes, might be made to conform. It is not irrelevant to ask whether the Soviet Union approaches the subject of negotiating the instruments of national security in such a detached manner. Moreover, although the collection of essays does not broach the question, it seems fair to ask whether it makes a difference either to the substance or to the form of arms control, if the two parties view the negotiations

## 110 Naval War College Review

from radically different perspectives. These vital matters of context are not emphasized in the essays, and the usefulness of the book suffers as a consequence.

As in all advocacy pieces on arms control, there is an abundance of platitudes, banalities, contradictions, and self-serving assertion. For example, we are reminded at least four times that the Soviets are "chess players." In a remarkable passage, one author states, "But to maintain long-term cohesion in the NATO alliance, we should move toward a principle whereby all nuclear weapons capable of hitting any part of the territory of either alliance are covered in East-West arms control negotiations with direct European participation." To the knowledgeable this counsels: (1) acceptance of the Soviet definition of what constitutes strategic weapons, transparently concocted in order to drive a wedge into the NATO alliance, and (2) a fundamental reversal of the U.S. position that has been staunchly upheld since the Soviet definition was first presented at SALT I.

Fortunately, Leon Sloss has provided a great service to readers in his "Introduction and Findings" chapter. Indeed, everything of substance in the book, stripped of personal bias and cant, appears in this chapter. Prospective readers would be well advised, bearing in mind the reservations about the work set forth above, to read Sloss's chapter and do a quick riffle on the remainder.

ROGER W. BARNETT  
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Segal, Gerald and Tow, William T., eds. *Chinese Defense Policy*. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1984. 286pp. \$29.95

There is a deplorable paucity of truly informative, nonideological literature about the defense policy of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Gerald Segal and William T. Tow have helped to fill this void by producing an extremely tight (especially for an edited collection of conference contributions) and insightful volume that presents the facts in both a straightforward and readable fashion. This is the result of the editors' insistence that the contributors restrict, as best possible, their analysis to five major questions, or themes, that are central to the entire Chinese defense policy debate. These questions are: How strong is the People's Liberation Army (PLA)? Is there a new military doctrine? Is the PLA unified? Who threatens China? And who aids China's security? For the most part, the contributors remain within the bounds of these questions; however, in a few of the pieces the questions receive only scant treatment, or the writers equivocate, leaving the reader in doubt as to the writers' positions on the questions.

Although the five major questions serve as both a unifying factor and navigational aid for the contributors and readers alike, Segal's and Tow's real contribution as editors was to have the very best authorities on the subject of Chinese defense policy contribute to the volume. Clearly, Harlan Jencks, Bill Sweetman, Bruce

Swanson and Gerald Segal are the foremost authorities on the PLA's ground, air, naval and nuclear forces, respectively. What's more, Ellis Joffe, who published the seminal *Party and Army* in 1965, which identified the "red versus expert" conflict existing within the PLA, and who has been one of the best writers on the Chinese military since the 1950s, contributes a very worthwhile piece on "Civil-Military Relations." This reviewer also found the chapters on China's "Military Industry" by Sydney Jammes and "Aspects of Modernization" by Karen Berney extremely useful, especially in terms of China's capacity for military modernity and the direction of that modernity.

The last third of the book is devoted to China's foreign policy and, in the opinion of this reviewer, is a bit less focused than the first two-thirds. However, to someone without much experience in this area, the chapters which deal with various geopolitical parts of the world might prove enlightening.

The most refreshing aspect of this book is that the authors, in addition to being extremely knowledgeable, are also concise and instructive. They avoid the jargon and almost theological pretense that one often finds in books about China and, instead, present the facts in a straightforward, realistic manner. For this alone, Segal and Tow deserve great credit. This reviewer recommends this volume for those with either a deep interest in China's defense policy or a more casual interest—there is something

in it for most everyone, and above all, there is sensible analysis throughout.

A. R. FINLAYSON  
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Kay, Robin, ed. *Documents on New Zealand External Relations: Vol. III, The ANZUS Pact and the Treaty of Peace with Japan*. Wellington: V.R. Ward, Government Printer, 1985. 1,268 pp. \$NZ 85,00

The above work represents the third volume in a series of publications comprised of declassified documents on New Zealand's external relations since 1944. The preceding two works are, *Volume I, The Australian-New Zealand Agreement, 1944* (1972); and *Volume II, The Surrender and Occupation of Japan* (1982). These volumes make up the modest series of official documents which are published by the Office for Historical Publications of the New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs. This series is not unlike, albeit on a limited scale, the U.S. Department of State's respected series, *Foreign Relations of the United States*.

Without question, the present writer recommends this volume of documents to those scholars who are interested in immediate postwar political relations in the Pacific leading up to the Japanese Peace Treaty and the establishment of the ANZUS alliance. The documents in this volume provide an excellent understanding of New Zealand political and diplomatic officials' attitudes

## 112 Naval War College Review

and perceptions toward the future outlook for their country's security stance in a Pacific region dominated by the United States. The unbending view of New Zealand for a "hard" peace treaty with Japan, or the effecting of a collective security arrangement with the United States as a *quid pro quo* for a "soft" treaty is well documented.

The editors of this volume which contains 451 documents, have clearly succeeded in providing the reader with the source material required for a full understanding of the situation in New Zealand following the Second World War. To aid the reader, the work has both an extensive index and a descriptive list of documents to facilitate the use of such a large work.

Despite the work's value, it must be acknowledged that there were some disappointments upon reviewing the work. Most importantly, New Zealand defense *per se* is not extensively addressed in much detail. It is surprising that the important Radford-Collins naval control and protection of shipping agreement between Australia, Britain, New Zealand, and the United States is not mentioned once. Nor is there any discussion of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff's secret assurances to the British Service Chiefs in October 1950 that the U.S. Navy would be sufficiently strong to defend maritime approaches to Australia and New Zealand in the event of a global conflict, thereby enabling both countries to deploy their national forces overseas in the defense of Western security objec-

tives. One important exception is an interesting study (dated April 1950; Document 199) of the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff which argues that in their collective view, a peacetime collective security arrangement with the United States is not needed under the then-current security environment! The argument that there is no discernable threat to New Zealand has a contemporary ring, although from a different quarter of New Zealand society.

One hopes that the postwar New Zealand defense issue will be fully addressed in Ian McGibbon's forthcoming official history of New Zealand in the Korean War. As a point of interest to readers of this journal, McGibbon is the author of the highly recommended and handsomely produced, *Blue-Water Rationale: The Naval Defence of New Zealand, 1914—1942* (Wellington: P.D. Haselberg, Government Printer, 1981).

Regardless of these singular omissions, "The ANZUS Pact and the Treaty of Peace with Japan" still comes highly recommended to students of Pacific security. Used in conjunction with *Foreign Relations of the United States*, this volume provides a wide range of primary-source material for this formative period of postwar history in the Pacific.

THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG  
Washington, D.C.

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Hopple, Gerald W. and Watson, Bruce W., eds. *The Military Intelli-*

*gence Community*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986. 298pp. \$24

This collection of essays purports to be "an exhaustive study of all facets of the intelligence profession." A reasonable first question is: who is the intended audience? Here, the editors are not particularly helpful. In an introductory note, they state that the contributors to this volume are "writing for intelligence officers and analysts at all levels." In the preface, they contend that "what is needed is a firm understanding of the military intelligence community, so that the public can deal with it more responsibly." The book reflects this lack of clarity and focus. Much of it is too basic for the intelligence professional, and much of it is too specialized to be of much interest to the general public.

When reviewing multiauthored books it is appropriate to ask, "is there considerable variation in the tone and quality of the individual essays." Here contributors range from captains of the U.S. Army and Air Force to a United States senator, and a former U.S. Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. The probity and sophistication of the individual essays clearly reflect this enormous spectrum of experience and authority.

The first two chapters, dealing with the structure of the national and military intelligence communities, are tough reading.

Part 2 (3 chapters) the least satisfying section of the book, deals with signals, human source, and imagery intelligence. It suffers from the

malady mentioned earlier: the material is too basic for the intelligence professional and probably not of great interest to anyone else. The information presented is largely definitional, organizational, and technical with relatively little offered on substantive issues.

Eight chapters, nearly half the entire book, are devoted to analysis. This concentration may well be justified and the section contains several imaginative and innovative essays. Three deserve particular mention: "Estimative Intelligence" by G. Paul Holman, Jr., "Principles of Warning Intelligence" by Timothy M. Laur, and "Basic Communications Skills for the Intelligence Analyst" by Gerald W. Hoppole. What sets these essays apart? It is difficult to generalize, but fundamentally they deal with substance rather than organizational relationships, with the real world rather than dissection of an Executive Order, with knowledge gained from years of experience rather than academic research.

The four chapters in part 4 deal, respectively, with the relationship between intelligence and ethics, law, the news media, and congressional oversight. These four essays are consistently thoughtful, well-written, and in general provide a balanced and cool-headed treatment of a series of issues which could easily inspire impassioned polemics. The authors accept the fact that the intelligence function is an essential part of the American national security fabric, and attempt to define a constructive relationship between these

## 114 Naval War College Review

activities and traditional American ideals.

Two basic factors serve to reduce the value of this book. First, in spite of its title, this volume is not really about *military* intelligence. In fact, chapter 2, which describes the Defense Intelligence Community, is the only section of this book which deals specifically with military intelligence. Every other essay would be equally at home in a more generic volume on the U.S. intelligence community. This is not to detract from the quality or value of the individual essays. The point is simply that if the reader, guided by the title, is expecting to encounter three hundred pages devoted to the military intelligence community, he will not find it in this book.

Second, a common criticism of many recent books which purport to deal with intelligence is that they are little more than collections of "spy stories," descriptions of individual exploits and operations without much grounding in the structure and organization of the intelligence discipline. *The Military Intelligence Community* is essentially the opposite: it tends to be academic and abstract without sufficient links to the real world. In short, it appears to be written for the professional student of intelligence rather than for the intelligence professional.

G. W. HARTMAN  
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Naval War College

Couteau-Bégarie, Hervé. *Géostratégie de l'Atlantique Sud*. Paris, France: Presses Universitaires de France, 1985. 214pp.

Mainly because the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal rendered the area almost obsolete in terms of heavy shipping, many people consider the South Atlantic peripheral to the East-West struggle. But the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 revealed a serious vulnerability, as the old routes of the Cape of Good Hope and the Horn regained value.

Be that as it may, Hervé Couteau-Bégarie, a young French scholar, holds that the South Atlantic is, geopolitically speaking, of subordinate importance. This is not to say that it lacks a significant relevance. It has such relevance for three reasons: it includes vital sea lines of communications, the riparian countries are important to the Western Alliance, and the potential operation of missile submarines in its waters would add a new dimension to deterrence.

This book examines the development of the bordering countries' naval power, and those powers' potential influence on the superpowers' policies. Couteau-Bégarie sees the South Atlantic not as a closed system, but as another element in the global struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. He also points out the effect of the struggle for regional hegemony by the southern Latin American countries, the role of the Antarctic region, the Soviet Union's presence in Angola and its effort to influence vital oil

lines, and the African expectancy of more influence upon world events.

Finally, the author emphasizes that although the South Atlantic is a low-risk area, its defense must be considered in a protracted war and, as such, some sort of agreement or alliance must be devised so as to involve the bordering countries in such a task. If one thinks that an attack on the South Atlantic sea lines of communications is highly improbable, then one must accept the same for an attack in Central Europe. But it is on this improbable hypothesis that the very existence of NATO is based.

This is a very interesting book on a not so well-known issue. Unfortunately, so far, it is available only in French.

ARIEL M. ROSAS  
Captain, Chilean Navy

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Dickey, Christopher. *With the Contras: A Reporter in the Wilds of Nicaragua*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985. 327pp. \$18.95

Given the title of the book, and add to it the author's pedigree—*Washington Post* Bureau Chief for Central America for three years, followed by a fellowship during which he produced this book—one expects a serious journalistic effort, well-documented and accurate in its facts. Finally, one might also expect to leave the book with a broader understanding of the Contras as an organization (if, indeed, they have

one) and a balanced assessment of their capabilities and potential.

If one has such expectations, one will be disappointed. What has emerged is an action/suspense novel written in the great tradition of Zane Grey, falling far short of the scholarship a topic of this importance demands. When one is able to sift out the substance of this book (which is substantial and which therefore makes the less-than-scholarly style all the more regrettable), one cannot help but be impressed at the degree to which the author took pains to document his sources. Drawing heavily from regional and U.S. press sources and a great number of interviews, such fastidiousness is vital for a book in which the facts as presented are often impossible to verify. In a few of the verifiable facts, Mr. Dickey's glaring errors throw into question those ascribable to privileged sources. For instance, General Edwin Meyer, Army Chief of Staff during a certain period of the book, is introduced as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (p. 123). Later, he describes Edgar Chamorro—an early member of the Nicaraguan Democratic Forces (FDN) Directorate—by saying that "for twenty years, Edgar was on his way to becoming a priest without ever quite making a wholehearted commitment." (p. 157). For whatever reason, the clear implication is that Chamorro was never a priest when he was indeed a Jesuit priest until 1969, when he left the order. Certainly neither of these transgressions of fact are vital to the issue, but they undoubtedly

## 116 Naval War College Review

have the effect of making the readership wonder just how accurate Mr. Dickey has been with those facts that one is unable to verify.

Perhaps the most serious misperception, though admittedly one over which the author may not have had much control, is the very title of this book. It gives one the impression that Mr. Dickey spent some appreciable amount of time "with the Contras." In fact, it becomes obvious that he traveled with them for only six or seven days, and for most of that period with a patrol of sixty men. Indeed, that section of the book in which he describes his brief sojourn into Nueva Segovia Province is only thirty pages long, wrapped up in 255 pages of narrative based on interviews conducted largely in Miami, Tegucigalpa, San Salvador and Washington, D.C., written in a style Louis L'Amour would be proud to call his own.

All of this is unfortunate because Mr. Dickey has a great deal to say. While his contacts with the Contras were limited to a nucleus which had obvious ties to Somoza's *Guardia Nacional*, he has nevertheless presented a disturbing picture of the early days of that organization, essentially through the fall of 1983. What he gives us is a profile of desperate, bitter and ruthless men leading a force of confused and questionably loyal *campesinos* whose number grows less. He also develops an unchallengeable audit trail of the growing role played by the United States Government, with CIA Director William Casey in the van, in the

funding, training and organization of the Contras which began in late 1981.

One cannot help but admire Mr. Dickey for the courage displayed in his decision to travel with the FDN at a time when many of his colleagues were being murdered in the crossfire of the human disaster which is Nicaragua. In that sense, his piece is valuable. In a broader sense, his work has only fanned the fires of polemic rhetoric which have defined the limits of debate on this vital issue.

LAWRENCE T. DIRITA  
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

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Heller, Mark A. *A Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel*. New York: Harvard University Press, 1985. 190pp. paper \$6.95

Heller, an Israeli scholar from Tel Aviv University's Center for Strategic Studies, examines the possibility of an independent Palestinian state and the effect it would have on Israel's security. He reaches the conclusion that the formation of a Palestinian state, provided it meets certain criteria, offers Israel the greatest benefit in terms of security. He makes clear in his preface that his primary concern is with Israel's security, and he makes no attempt to appear impartial.

Heller begins by examining an Israeli "double-track" strategy to achieve peace. This strategy seeks to maximize Israel's capacity to maintain security, while at the same time reducing threats to her security. In the author's view, the ever-increas-



ing costs of pursuing the former alone—as Israel has done in the past—makes a double-track strategy a necessity.

Heller examines in great detail the possibility of an independent Palestinian state. He discusses each of the five other alternatives to this possibility: nonsettlement of the conflict, territorial compromise, a nonterritorial settlement, a settlement without the P.L.O., and a settlement with other Arabs. In his analysis of the costs and benefits of each alternative, he shows that in comparison with the others, Israel's most favorable alternative is to reach an agreement with the P.L.O. in forming a Palestinian state.

Heller is not advocating simple submission to the demands of Palestinian and other Arabs for an independent Palestinian state. Indeed, he shows that even though this would end the present conflict, Israel would be left vulnerable. This vulnerability, when compounded by Palestinians or other Arabs who would still harbor maximalist objectives, would be an even greater risk to Israeli security than the status quo. Only if this settlement *reduces* other threats to Israel's security (by accepting force limitations being ratified by other Arab states, etc.) will its implementation be consistent with the double-track strategy.

Heller's analysis throughout the book is for the most part sound. His approach is logical and systematic, and he takes into account a wide variety of variables such as: the impact of economics, demographics, other Arab states, and non-Arab

states on an independent Palestinian state and Israeli security. What makes his approach feasible is that he keeps in mind at all times the fact that the costs and benefits of the alternatives are imperfect. Each is only relatively more or less favorable than another, making the comparative nature of his analysis one of its greatest strengths.

This reviewer found the section of the book in which the author deals with Jerusalem particularly interesting. An issue of "such emotional centrality virtually defies a rational cost-benefit analysis." Heller comes up with an unconventional formula for an acceptable solution. His solution is to ". . . [obfuscate sovereignty] to the point where both parties can credibly claim that they have secured their essential objectives."

*A Palestinian State* is a book that is of value to anyone concerned with modern politics in the Middle East. The writer's style is clear and concise, making it easy to follow his arguments. The points he makes are well-supported by a wide variety of sources, all of which are well-cited throughout the book. Heller has provided a provocative and interesting analysis of the possibility of an independent Palestinian state.

JOHN MULBURY  
Lieutenant, U.S. Army

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Linz, Susan J., ed. *The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Union*. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985. 300pp. \$28.50

## 118 Naval War College Review

The best introduction to this group of essays—some of which were presented at a symposium at Louisiana State University—can be found in the concluding chapter, written by Professor James R. Millar. He asserts that “no society in modern times has absorbed a blow of the severity of Operation Barbarossa and survived as a political, economic, and social entity. The Soviet experience in World War II and its impact upon postwar Soviet society have scarcely been charted by Western students of Soviet society. As a consequence, the war and the immediate postwar periods are the least understood of the years since 1917.”

Any American even vaguely familiar with contemporary Soviet life must confess to being somewhat puzzled by the large degree to which memories of the *Velikaia Otechestvennaia Voina* (The Great Patriotic War) remain alive and pervasive. Some liberals note this phenomenon and utilize it to support the proposition that the Soviet leaders and people, being more aware of the horrors of war, have been more cautious to avoid war than Americans. Some conservatives believe that the high level of suffering and sacrifice accepted by the Soviet people permits the Soviet leaders to contemplate more readily the fighting of the next war. Unfortunately, the essays under consideration do not shed much light on either belief. Yet, other serious and useful conclusions are reached.

Susan Linz calculates that World War II cost the Soviet Union between eighteen and twenty-five

years of earnings by its entire work force. She also concludes that “Stalin was perfectly rational in refusing to make political concessions in return for U.S. economic assistance after World War II.” The Marshall Plan would have provided the Soviets with less than the aid and reparations already in effect.

Sanford R. Lieberman argues that two factors: the establishment of the State Defense Committee (and its superimposition upon the entire political system); and the personalization of Stalin’s power through plenipotentiaries, allowed the Soviet leaders to cut through the normal bureaucratic red tape to accomplish the successful prosecution of the war. Professor Lieberman concludes that “despite all the negative aspects of Stalinism . . . it is doubtful whether the country would have been able to survive had a different system been in effect.”

World War II hastened the decline of Leningrad (Edward Bubis and Blair A. Ruble) while facilitating the autonomy of the technical experts in industry (Cynthia S. Kaplan). The German occupation resulted in the creation of a Soviet “Bible Belt”—territorially, a crescent from Leningrad to Volgograd—which consists of relatively young, religious and nationalistic non-Russians who look upon the “materialistic” Russians with disdain (William C. Fletcher). One might question, however, whether this religious fervor will withstand the increased russification at work; a direct result of the high World War II death rate of non-

Russian males (excluding Moslems) and the subsequent intermarriage of the ethnic females and Russian males (Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver).

Sheila Fitzpatrick's essay, "Post-war Soviet Society: The 'Return to Normalcy,' 1945-1953," demonstrates that the process was anything but normal. Twenty million Soviet citizens were dead. One million Soviet POWs were returned to the U.S.S.R., as were "several million" Soviets who had been forced to labor in Germany. Two million Poles moved from the U.S.S.R. to Poland; more than 500,000 Ukrainians, Russians, Belorussians and Lithuanians moved in the opposite direction. Newly acquired territories were subjected to harsh collectivization. The army of 11.4 million soldiers was demobilized to less than 3 million by 1948 (many of these soldiers chose to remain in the cities). The Soviet peasant, the unsung hero of the war, was rewarded with lower prices and higher taxes (on his private plot). Many peasants migrated from the countryside to the towns.

The essays found in *The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Union* support the conclusion that "World War II represents an important watershed for the Soviet Union. Economically, it was the first real test of the Soviet system of central planning. Politically, it thrust the U.S.S.R. into the world arena as a major world power. Socially, it provided a cohesive force previously lacking in Soviet society." Given this impact, are we far away from ques-

tioning how it colors, if not displaces, the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution?

WALTER C. UHLER  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

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Hosoya, C. et al., eds. *The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: An International Symposium*. Kodansha International Ltd., 1986; dist. New York: Harper & Row. 248pp. \$50

This volume is the English-language record (the Japanese-language record was published in 1984) of a symposium held in Tokyo in May 1983, the subject being the post-World War II trial of major Japanese war criminals conducted in Tokyo from 1946 to 1948 before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE). Apart from the Japanese participants in that symposium there were individuals from Burma, the People's Republic of China, Korea, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The panelist from the Netherlands was the late Dr. B.V.A. Roling, who had served as the Dutch judge on the Tribunal.

While much has been written and published about the trial of the major German war criminals before the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, the same cannot be said about the trial conducted before the IMTFE. The judgment itself was never officially printed—this reviewer's copy is a 1,348-page, double-spaced, mimeographed copy

## 120 Naval War College Review

of unstated parentage of the majority opinion, issued in November 1948. While two complete transcripts of the proceedings of the IMT have been published in English, it has very probably also been published in French, German, and Russian. No transcript of the proceedings of the IMTFE had ever been published until this was done privately in 1981; obviously, there is a need for more information about the IMTFE. This book will help to serve that purpose.

Several of the participants attacked the validity of the trial on the basis of a claim of *tu quoque* ("thou too"), calling attention to Afghanistan, Vietnam, etc. Even had they referred to incidents which occurred prior to the Pacific War, rather than long after it, few experts in criminal law would take the position that this doctrine is a valid defense to a criminal charge.

There were numerous references made to the fact that the subject of Japanese experimentation in bacteriological warfare in China had not been included in the indictment. In his introduction, Dr. Roling states that this matter had been withheld from the Tribunal because "the American military authorities wanted to avail themselves of the results of these experiments, criminally obtained by Japan, and at the same time to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Soviet Union." While this reviewer had great respect for Dr. Roling (whose lectures on war crimes he attended at The Hague in 1960), he must disagree with that statement. Inasmuch as most of the

Japanese who had been importantly and personally involved in that shameful episode were without question known to be already in Soviet custody (some were tried by the Russians in 1949 in one of the few war crimes trials which they have made public), any withholding of information concerning the subject from the Soviet Union was obviously an impossibility and could not have been a motivating factor in the decision not to present evidence on the matter of the Tribunal.

As would be expected with a symposium consisting of a large group of participants from various disciplines (historians, international lawyers, practicing lawyers, professors, etc.), including a number who had participated in various capacities in the trial itself, there were conflicting opinions on many of the issues discussed. Under the circumstances, readers will undoubtedly disagree with some of the positions taken by the papers and discussions contained in this book. That will undoubtedly enhance rather than detract from its value. This book is invaluable in bringing the Tokyo trial out of the cellar and giving the event some of the historical and legal significance that it was intended to have by those responsible for its existence.

HOWARD S. LEVIE  
Newport, Rhode Island

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Allen, Louis. *Burma: The Longest War, 1941-45*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1948. 686pp. \$29.95

It would be easy to say that if Burma were the longest war, this certainly is the longest book about that war. But that would be unfair to the author who has painstakingly sought out and found eyewitnesses to each engagement on both the British and Japanese sides; Mr. Allen's ability to use Japanese language sources would set his work apart from other efforts in English on the Burma campaign.

There were two Burma campaigns. The first was the Japanese sweep of 1941-42 which conquered Burma with a loss of less than 2,000 killed. There was a twofold aim—to drive the white man from Asia and to liberate Burma. U Nu, the first prime minister of independent Burma, has written that the Japanese were “motivated by high idealism and nobility of purpose . . . .” But the tale Mr. Allen tells shows a drastic falling off from such a standard. Japanese racism, service rivalries, carpetbaggers, etc., soon made a mockery of Burma's August 1943 “independence.”

And then the white man came back, in 1944-45. Mr. Allen sees the irony of the return. No political purpose was served; by January 1948 the British were gone for good. Militarily, the return was a triumph for the nonwhite Indian Army which erased the stigma of earlier desertions to the Japanese Indian National Army and, in the words of an American historian, “helped the British, unlike the French, Dutch and, later, the Americans, to leave Asia with some dignity.” Mr. Allen notes, “That, perhaps, is no small thing.”

*The Longest War* is different from most campaign histories in that the author includes a critique of the fiction that came out of the war, as well as a nontitillating chapter on the sex problems faced by both armies.

Some British reviewers have found Mr. Allen too kind to the Japanese. His admiration for their fighting qualities is evident, but he does not scant the brutalities which come from another culture, another time.

The conclusion is melancholy—the British Empire disappeared; the Burmese found independence frustrating; the tribal groups in Burma most loyal to the British found themselves abandoned to persecution by the Burmans under independence, and the Japanese relearned the poet Basho's 17th century lines

. . . summer grasses . . .  
all that is left of the  
dreams of soldiers . . . .

J.K. HOLLOWAY  
Naval War College

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Prange, Gordon W. with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine B. Dillon. *Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986. 699pp. \$19.95

Gordon W. Prange is dead, but the posthumous books attributed to his authorship seem to go on forever. *Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History* is the fourth book published under his name since he died in 1980. The copyright is owned by Anne Prange and Prange Enterprises, Inc., which employs two authors, Donald M.

## 122 Naval War College Review

Goldstein and Katherine B. Dillon. The corporation churns out books adapted, we are told, from Prange's unpublished manuscripts which, in turn, are based upon research material collected by Prange as a professor of history over the 35-year period before his death at age 70. The first posthumous book, *At Dawn We Slept*, coincided with the 40th anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor and enjoyed a measure of success. As the first book gave Prange something of a belated reputation, Prange Enterprises has been exploiting his name ever since. The corporation asserts that Prange left enough manuscript behind him to be the foundation for the three follow-on works. The second one, *Miracle at Midway*, was dreadful, largely because it used outdated research material, although one indiscriminating book club made it a selection. As a lot of material undoubtedly was amassed over Prange's lifetime, we may assume that more books will follow with Prange as the alleged author, in rather an odd twist to the concept of ghostwriting.

All this aside, what are the literary merits of *Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History*? It is a very long book of some 33 chapters, 7 appendices, and 699 pages including the index, footnotes, and bibliography. The book's theme is to determine who, if anyone, was responsible for the American unpreparedness for the attack. To answer the question, the text is divided into four sections. Part one examines how American attitudes shaped prewar foreign policy, particularly isolationism. It also contains an unnecessary

defense of Roosevelt's reputation against the so-called revisionist school of historians who claim that the President wanted the attack to happen to get his country into war with Japan. That seems hardly an issue (if it ever was), as such assertions have never been credible; consequently this part of the book is simply flogging a dead horse. Part two is about the principal Cabinet officers and the military and naval commanders in Washington. Part three assesses the responsibilities of the naval and military establishment in Hawaii, while part four looks into what happened in the Philippines.

One need read no further than the introduction to find the less than profound conclusion. "There were no Pearl Harbor villains: there were no Pearl Harbor scapegoats," states the author(s). "No one directly concerned was without blame, from Roosevelt on down the line. They all made mistakes." In other words, everyone was to blame, and no one was to blame. So there are no new revelations, no new conclusions or analyses, only platitudes. Nothing new in any respect, which rather sums up the whole book.

Why then read it? The book is slow going, because it is a cut-and-paste mélange of such things as newspaper and magazine clippings, Congressional Record excerpts, investigative records, and Prange interviews with American and Japanese participants. Direct quotes from hundreds of footnoted sources dominate and deaden the text. There is no writing style because it is everyone's

style, and reader fatigue sets in early. Original thought is hard to find. The reader who is anxious to get to a chapter's conclusion need not slog through each page; everything is distilled in the final paragraph. Consider the assessment of Roosevelt as an example. "A thoughtful reading of the facts about him discloses neither a blameless hero nor a villainous plotter." Platitude follows platitude.

It is implicit in the marketing of Prange's books that he was an authority on the war in the Pacific. But was he? There is no question that he collected a great deal of material, but there is a difference between collecting things and assessing, analyzing, and synthesizing what has been gathered. The fact that he spent 35 years collecting his material without publishing any books suggests a characteristic common with many academics: the pleasure is in the collecting itself, and writing is delayed indefinitely until it is too late. The expert historian, on the other hand, is distinguished by the act of publishing and submitting to the scrutiny of critics. The expert also shares new knowledge through the written word in a style that is both scholarly and interesting to read. Samuel Eliot Morison was the finest example of this kind of writing historian. In contrast, *Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History* reads more like an undergraduate thesis. One visualizes a stack of research cards in front of one of the authors, who systematically quotes and paraphrases from them, one by one, each paragraph meticulously footnoted. As a conse-

quence there is a sad absence of synthesis, analysis, interpretation, and original thought. Prange Enterprises should call it quits and stop further damage to what is left of Prange's reputation.

THOMAS B. BUELL  
Wayzata, Minnesota

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Ferrell, Robert H. *Woodrow Wilson and World War I, 1917-1921*. New York: Harper & Row, 1985. 346pp. \$19.95, paper \$8.95

Most everything about this astounding chapter of American history that should be put into a volume is here. In organization, brilliant; in example, apposite and original; in judgment, wise; Ferrell never drops a beat or misses the mark. What a story! The President's enormous success and terrible tragedy. What went on Over There, and Over Here. Mobilization (2,000,000 men sent across) and normalcy. Civil liberties and civil rights. Influenza and prohibition. Careful analyses of Wilson and his wife. Intense national triumphs; intense national failures. And a summary of what the country did, and did not learn. This excellent book is exemplar of the 'New American Nation' series.

GEORGE W. BAER  
Naval War College

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Walton, Frank E. *Once They Were Eagles: The Men of the Black Sheep*

## 124 Naval War College Review

*Squadron*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986. 191pp. \$18

A quirk?

A fluke?

Nope. Just a true and wonderful historical recap with some personal postscripts from the eagles who made it happen, forty years after the “last one that we won.”

Thirty Marine officers and a hundred or so mechs came together for the first time in September 1943 on Guadalcanal. There were twenty-seven rather new pilots, a flight surgeon from the Navy, a Marine intelligence officer named Lieutenant Frank Walton, and an “old” Marine major named Gregory Boyington as commanding officer—naturally they called him Pappy. In just eighty-four days Marine Fighter Squadron 214 (VMF-214) had shot down 94 enemy fighters over Japanese-held territory, shot down 3 other enemy aircraft, claimed 35 probables, damaged 50 other enemy fighters in aerial combat, plus, destroyed 21 more enemy planes on the ground.

By the end of the twelfth week, eight (28 percent) of the Black Sheep pilots were aces and had accounted for about 75 percent of the enemy fighters destroyed by VMF 214 in aerial combat. In turn, eleven Marine pilots were killed during the same period; none of the aces. The odds were interesting, typically outnumbered, perhaps something like U.S. fighter pilots could expect today against the Soviets.

What made VMF-214—that is to say, what made the men, the

Marines—historically significant is the measurable contribution their employment of tac-air made to the outcome of the Solomons Campaign, and, ultimately, to the Pacific war: they protected the U.S. foothold at Guadalcanal, and they played a major role in stopping the Japanese surface and air advances through the Solomons, and forced the Japanese to retreat from the bastion at Rabaul back to the Philippines, signaling the beginning of the end. From December 1941 through December 1943, Marine airmen shot down more than half of all Japanese aircraft destroyed in the entire Pacific area, and they did it in direct support of Marines or naval surface groups.

What a contrast with recent pronouncements that ground or surface units should maneuver to exploit long-range air interdiction efforts, or that interdiction efforts in Korea and Vietnam were not effective partly because the ground forces did not maneuver to “take advantage” of the air interdiction. The recently published JCS Pub 26 on Counter Air Doctrine would even suggest the subordination of ground maneuver and objectives to support the achievement of air superiority actions.

But Frank Walton did not write *Once They Were Eagles* to help modern defense thinkers get our trillion-dollar airpower concepts unscrewed or to reorient airpower to the support and achievement of ground and naval surface objectives, though we may need that. Rather, Frank felt the need to right another media wrong. Much has been written about Pappy



Boyington, and the TV program of the mid-70s—which depicted all the Black-Sheep as drunken, brawling, fugitives from courts-martial.

What slander.

For Boyington, F. Scott Fitzgerald may have said it best: “Show me a hero and I’ll write you a tragedy.” But a hero Boyington was. Boyington combined his great physical, intellectual—and yes, you have to say it—moral strengths and abilities to provide that single most valuable commodity in wartime: combat leadership. He molded the finest of America’s young men into the most lethal and successful fighter squadron. And did it in record time.

Forty years after the fact, Colonel Walton, the former squadron intelligence-officer-mission-briefer-note-taker-letter-writer-then-police-officer-and-now-retired-State-Department-diplomat, looked up and interviewed the thirty-four survivors of the original VMF-214 Black Sheep. Lawyers. Fishermen. Executives. Doctors. Tycoons. Golfers. Airline pilots. Engineers. Citrus growers. And Pappy.

How odd to read their reminiscences of those twelve weeks, for many the greatest experiences of their lives: the camaraderie, the feeling of family, the intense excitement, the unspeakable high of going in against odds and winning, the singing, and the intense care and leadership of Pappy. Pappy always seemed to know the Japanese mind, always set his pilots up in the best tactical position to handle the tremendous odds, aggressive and opti-

mistic, the first to take off and the last to land. He led from the front.

What a great book, Frank!

Except for one thing. The title. I guess I’d call it, “Once an Eagle Always an Eagle.”

M. ALLINDER

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

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Creed, Roscoe. *PBY/The Catalina Flying Boat*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1985. 352pp. \$21.95

Messimer, Dwight R. *In the Hands of Fate: The Story of Patrol Wing Ten, 8 December 1941—11 May 1941*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1985. 352pp. \$19.95

Judging from these two offerings, the Naval Institute Press was determined to make 1985 a banner year for PBY buffs. If so, they succeeded—in spades. Both represent prodigious research by their authors, and when you add in the twin gold mines of the bibliographies they included, there’s no reason left for a serious Catalina researcher even to bother thumbing through the library card index for more.

For those who flew the venerable bird, or simply want to recall her worldwide exploits, there’ll be fascination, action and satisfaction aplenty. Yet, as my eyeballs bored through these twin kaleidoscopes of Catalina operations, they tended to glaze over from dervishes of excruciating detail; particularly from Messimer’s narrative of Patrol Wing Ten. One was left with the feeling

## 126 Naval War College Review

that the official Wing history and duty logs, the squadrons' duty logs and the aircrews' mission debriefs had been laid out on a large table and snipped with scissors; then, pastepot in hand, blended back together in chronological order. For a serious researcher or history buff of Wing Ten's early World War II dogged retreat from the Philippines down to western Australia, then battling leap-frog fashion back up the South Pacific island chain, full comprehension would require a large chart on the bulkhead with an inexhaustible supply of multicolored pins and string. With a color for each PBY, each aircrew, each seaplane tender, each U.S. Navy and Japanese surface battle group, each Wing Ten staff splinter group, each obscure island harbor and base—that's the level of detail Messimer provides to sort out here. Otherwise, taken cold turkey from the pages alone, the reader's circuits (anyway this reader's) go into overload.

Yet Wing Ten's incredible story comes through: The shock and mass confusion following the Japanese December 1941 attack—the outrageous pitting of precious few obsolescent-from-day-one seaplanes against swarms of deadly fighters—of pleas back to CONUS for parts and replacements met by dead silence—of desperate mechanics performing miracles with bailing wire and glue, rebuilding bombed-out hulks—of patching leaking hulls with mattresses, rivet holes with navigators' pencils—of 14-hour patrol crew turnarounds, time and

again launching for 14 more with no rest—of spectacular rescue and evacuation flights—all against overwhelming odds; of valor, endurance and sheer guts unparalleled. It is, in microcosm, the archetypical story of how the U.S. Navy wrenched victory from the jaws of defeat in the Southwest Pacific in World War II.

Befitting his broader objective, Creed's history of the aircraft brackets more time and global geography to record the deeds (and some misdeeds) of the venerable old girl. Similar to, but predating Ed Heine-mann's Douglas hatchery of Navy birds, Mac Short's Lockheed Neptune, etc., the PBY was hatched in the early thirties as the latest of a distinguished seaplane lineage from the inspired drawing board of Consolidated Aircraft's Mac Laddon. Then, on fleet patrol from 1935 until World War II, the Catalina wrote what would become *The Book for U.S. Navy patrol aviation*. For the first time, squadrons capable of overseeing vast and distant reaches of the world's oceans could be launched on short notice. Indeed they routinely were, setting new aeronautical records for distance, endurance and massed flight with nearly every deployment.

For this reader, Creed's exposition of PBY worldwide World War II operations is well-documented, professionally organized and makes for a tad easier slogging than Messimer's Patrol Wing Ten history. Of particular interest are his World War II descriptions of the bare-bones beginnings of airborne ASW capability

beyond simple visual or radar search and holddown: localization techniques using sonobuoys, searchlights, and even a successful MAD barrier across the Gibraltar Strait.

With equally thorough documentation, Creed wraps up other navies' PBY operations, and concludes with stories of her postwar exploits as explorer, firefighter, air/sea rescuer and even luxury air yacht.

This reviewer wants to commend Messimer and Creed for the monumental tasks both have accomplished so well with these fine histories. After three years' immersion in the similar task of writing a history of the P2(V) Neptune (and nothing yet in print), I have more than a passing sympathy for the size of the job. Doing the research is fun, but later when you dig out from under the huge pile of miscellany, what now do you include in the book? What do you leave out? Or for that matter, for whom are you writing? Hoary bearded naval historians? World War II buffs? Airplane nuts? The chaps who flew her? Lollipops for recruiters' bait? Nobody said it would be easy—and it isn't.

STEPHEN P. REINERTSEN  
 Captain, U.S. Naval Reserve (Ret.)

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Ziegler, Philip. *Mountbatten*. New York: Knopf, 1985. 784pp. \$24.95

Philip Ziegler's official and authorized study of Mountbatten is a brilliant biography. Beautifully written, Ziegler quickly engrosses the reader with a fascinating life. It is a mar-

velous portrait which demonstrates all the strengths and attractions of biography as an art form. "Most people," Ziegler believes, "will feel this biography provides a generally favourable portrait of its subject, but it is far from hagiography."

There can be no doubt of that. On Mountbatten's command of H.M.S. *Kelly*, Ziegler comments, "if a destroyer could leave skid-marks, *Kelly* would have disfigured every sea in which she sailed. Mountbatten was impetuous. He pushed his ship fast for little reason except his love of speed . . . Above all, he lacked that mysterious quality of 'sea sense,' the ability to ensure that one's ship is in the right place at the right time. Mountbatten was as good a captain as most and better than many of his contemporaries, but among all his peers who have expressed an opinion the unanimous feeling is that, by the highest standard, he was no better than second rate."

No great captain, yet he was a legendary leader! He became one of the three Supreme Allied Commanders in World War II, and a quarter of a million Americans served under him. He was the last Viceroy of British India, and the first Governor-General of an independent India. First Sea Lord at the time of the Suez crisis, he went on to lead the battle for a massive reorganization of Britain's defense bureaucracy as Chief of the Defence Staff. Finally, he was advisor, matchmaker and honored guest among the royal families of Britain, Sweden, Greece and Spain. Mountbatten's family tree,

## 128 Naval War College Review

printed as endpapers to this volume, emphasizes his royal connections as little else can, but the irony of this book, and of Mountbatten's life, is that he was a man of great professional ability whatever the hindrances of royal connections and aristocratic manners in a modern navy. Mountbatten overcame them through professional competence, rising to the top through his own skill and determination, as well as his connections. He was loved, even adored, by his admirers and by many who served under him; and he was despised, even hated, by his rivals and his superiors. His wealth, his connections, his tastes, his interests were all unusual—and certainly beyond the scope of the average naval officer—but despite the attractions of so entirely different a world, Mountbatten remained intensely devoted to the navy as a profession. His professional views and opinions, however, were not those of an aristocrat. He fought to democratize the officer corps, and to make the navy a more efficient service within the context of the Ministry of Defence.

After 700 pages of reading, one feels that he has a clear appreciation of a man whose life, at times, blended into the general flow of history, particularly in World War II, in India, and in Whitehall, but we come to know him as a man, not an abstraction. He was brilliant and successful, ambitious, hard-working and knowledgeable, but he was also impetuous, egotistical, vain, intemperate, and sometimes, unwise. On reflection, one must appreciate the

very thin line which separates spectacular failure and meteoric success in those who are ambitious to be among the great.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF  
Naval War College

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Gleaves, Albert. *The Admiral: Memoirs of Albert Gleaves, USN*. Pasadena, Calif.: Hope Publishing House, 1985. 286pp. \$9.95

This autobiography of a senior officer in World War I brings into print a significant addition to recorded U.S. naval history, half a century after the author's death. It covers the period from 1873 when our aging wood-iron fleet stood 12th among navies, to 1922 when a great building program would soon make our Navy first in firepower.

Albert Gleaves, from Nashville, Tennessee, entered the Naval Academy at the age of 15, graduating in 1877. After the Academy, Gleaves' career followed the pattern of the times, with duty in the Mediterranean, the Far East and at home. At first the ships in which he served were wooden-hulled sailing ships with auxiliary steam. In 1889 he joined the first ship of the "new Navy," the steel gunboat *Dolphin*, when he was ordered to the cruiser *Boston* and in her sailed around Cape Horn to duty off Chile and in the Hawaiian Islands. In one of his few War College tales, he tells of the grounding of the new second-class battleship *Texas* on Goat Island, with the College students lined up by

today's Luce Hall observing that ship's maneuvering difficulties.

Gleaves' Spanish War service was in command of the *Cushing*, our first steel torpedo boat. In this little ship his first assigned task was bringing Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt to Newport from Oyster Bay to speak at the War College, a voyage which would help the admiral's Navy future. The *Cushing's* wartime work was with the fleet in the Caribbean, primarily on despatch boat duty from fleet to Key West and return.

Promoted to rear admiral in 1914, Gleaves relieved Captain William S. Sims in command of the Atlantic Torpedo Flotilla, soon designated Destroyer Force Atlantic. In this billet he was in Newport when the German *U-53* visited that city in October 1916. In civilian garb he inspected the submarine at the invitation of her skipper, noting her loaded torpedo tubes. The next day she sank several Allied merchantmen south of Block Island.

In the winter of 1916-1917 the Atlantic destroyers spent time in the Navy Yards preparing for the war soon to come. Gleaves was a "Type Commander" in today's parlance, and at war's outbreak his ships were speedily sent eastward. He, however, stayed behind. But his Annapolis classmate, William S. Benson, made Gleaves Commander, Cruiser-Transport Force, tasked with getting the American Expeditionary Forces to Europe. In his flagship, the cruiser *Seattle*, Gleaves took the first convoy to Europe in July 1917, bringing

14,000 soldiers and marines safely across. He is credited with the development of the convoy tactics by which over 2,000,000 men and their equipment were sent overseas by November 1918. Much of this tour found Gleaves in New York, and true to form is covered as other "shore duty," briefly.

All the foregoing, up to 1919, occupies three-fifths of *The Admiral*. The remainder describes his final cruise as full admiral in command of the Asiatic Fleet. With the armored cruiser *South Dakota* (renamed *Huron*) as flagship, Gleaves spent a busy year and a half during which Japan changed from ally to rival, the Allied occupation forces were withdrawn from eastern Siberia, there was constant rivalry and fighting between Chinese warlords, and Britain and France tried to reestablish their presence in the area.

My criticism of the book is primarily editorial, for there is too much misspelling and misprinting.

*The Admiral* is worthwhile reading for those who want to learn more about that period in history when the U.S. Navy changed from a small number of wood or iron sailing ships scattered about the world to the world's most powerful fleet, based in California looking westward towards Japan.

JOHN R. WADLEIGH  
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

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Harlec, John. *The Marine from Manatee: A Tradition of Rifle Marksmanship*.

## 130 Naval War College Review

Washington, D.C.: National Rifle Association, 1984. 330pp. \$16.95

John Harlee, a retired rear admiral, friend of John F. Kennedy, and chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission during the Kennedy Administration, has written no *Mommy Dearest*. What he has done is to write a highly respectful son's biography of his father, William C. Harlee.

Harlee senior was a Marine, retired eventually as a tombstone brigadier general. He began his career in the Texas Volunteers in the Philippines shortly after this country wrested those islands from Spain in 1898. Then, as a Marine, he took part in the Boxer Rebellion in China, which was followed by more duty in the Philippines. He also served in many of the "small wars" in the Caribbean in which the Marines were to participate in the early part of this century.

One of the things Harlee discovered quickly was that Americans had little fire discipline and couldn't shoot straight—at least, they didn't. Here is what a Marine colonel wrote about the incident at Vera Cruz, Mexico, in 1914: "We learned that most of the American casualties were due to wild shooting by our own people . . . of the nineteen Americans killed at Vera Cruz, thirteen deaths were due to accidental shootings by Americans."

Harlee, who was at Vera Cruz, already knew that, was busy doing something about it, or at least about the rifle skills of the Marines. By 1915 "the Marines had become the straight-

est shooters in the world." Harlee had a harder time with the Navy, however, for the sailors' interest was minimal. But soon the United States was at war with Germany and Harlee, by then a major, found himself building ranges and training men of all services to shoot. By the time the war was over, more than half a million soldiers, sailors, and Marines had had the Harlee treatment.

After the war Harlee commanded a regiment of Marines in Santo Domingo, now known as the Dominican Republic. He did well, too well, according to his son, and ran into opposition from some of the entrenched interests in that unfortunate country. In 1922 he was removed from command and court-martialed. The court, however, acquitted him of all charges and specifications. Harlee was returned to the Caribbean, promoted, and continued to serve ashore and afloat for 13 years more, retiring in 1935.

Harlee's long interest in improving American marksmanship, and his equally long association with the National Rifle Association (he became a director in 1910) explain why it was that organization which published his biography.

FRANK UHLIG, JR.  
Naval War College

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Coletta, Paolo E., ed. *United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Domestic*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985. 740pp. \$95

Coletta, Paolo E., ed. *United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Overseas*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985. 480pp. \$75

This two-volume encyclopedia of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps bases is an indispensable reference work for all serious students seeking even elementary information on such subjects. The price, unfortunately, is also akin to the costs of encyclopedias, so that the average researcher will probably prefer to prevail upon his librarian to purchase the set. Yet, *Bases* is a worthwhile investment for the serious scholar or enemy spy.

Each volume covers its topics—including Reserve bases, naval hospitals, and even the Naval Observatory—by alphabetical geographic location rather than by the bases' exact titles. This is particularly useful since several areas like San Diego or Newport have over the years represented a conglomerate of basing facilities. The *Overseas* volume goes from Aitape (New Guinea) to Zamboanga (Philippines), and is replete with almost as many South Vietnamese base areas as those of World War II. Occasionally Coletta combines geographical space with historical time to cover common ground in one entry, for example, World War I bases in France, Continental Naval Air Patrol Stations in World War I, or just Brazil.

Both volumes are introduced with short helpful overviews by Frank Uhlig, Jr., which place the Navy's bases in the larger continuum of history. Each entry contains a geo-

graphical, topographical, and meteorological description of the base, including the installation's size as it was expanded or contracted. Some origins of place names are treated, also pronunciation where appropriate, so we novices now know how to drop the name Pago Pago (Pong-o Pong-o). Like any good administrative history, this one usually notes costs, commanders, key dates, public works, ships built or based there, and "important" personnel changes such as when the first WAVES reported aboard! Each entry concludes with a superb bibliography of Navy unit histories and published secondary sources. Appendices in each volume give subject and state or geographic listings, as well as a common time line, though the latter should be consulted with caution (the "U.S." Navy had no Far Eastern naval bases in 1776, nor did the Continental or states' navies of the Revolution, though ports were open to them).

With K. Jack Bauer as associate editor, Coletta wrote the largest number of entries. Other contributors wrote generally complete essays, but special credit must be given to Lyon G. Tyler for his long and well-documented essay (including local sources) on Charleston; H. Brett Melendy on Pearl Harbor; Chic Bowling and Martin Gordon on San Diego with its 85 major commands; Peter Stewart for the Norfolk area; Bradley Reynolds on Gitmo; and David L. Woods for Bermuda. Most of the more obscure bases are given their adequate due but not always, for example, NAS Iberia, La.

## 132 Naval War College Review

Such a mammoth work is bound to suffer some imprecision and typos, as an elusive NAS Charleston, S.C., referred to on page 49 of the *Domestic* volume. And important exact dates are not always given, as for NAF Litchfield Park, Ariz. Several inaccuracies ought to be corrected in any second printing, such as this sampling: John (not Joseph) Reeves commanded at Adak. F. Julian Becton's dates of command at Long Beach are jumbled. The A-1 and A-2 planes in 1911 were individual craft, not types. The F-4 was a Phantom II, not a Wildcat in 1960. The FG Corsair was built by Goodyear, not Grumman. The F6F was the Hellcat, not the Skyray; and the SB2C the Helldiver, not Navigator. Eugene (not Richard) Ely made the first landing on a ship. And, as usual, *Liscome Bay* is misspelled.

Still in all, this remarkable set fills in many gaps and provides less-known nuggets that even make browsing a pleasure. One can only hope that some editor will produce similar useful reference tools for the researcher interested also in the Army and Air Force.

CLARK G. REYNOLDS  
Charleston, South Carolina

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Roberts, John, ed. *Warship, Volume VII*. London, England: Conway Maritime Press; dist. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1983. 288pp. \$23.95

Gray, Randal, ed. *Warship, Volume VIII*. London, England: Conway

Maritime Press; dist. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1984. 288pp. \$23.95

As most naval buffs are aware, England's Conway Maritime Press turns out the quarterly magazine *Warship* covering rare bits and pieces of ship-oriented history. The publisher subsequently binds each year's four issues into hardback volumes which are distributed in the United States by the Naval Institute Press. *Warship: Volume VII* covers the magazines published in 1983; *Volume VIII*, those in 1984. Each contains a wide range of naval subjects, many by well-known naval authors and historians. A number of the articles are related to books which the authors have published or are in the process of preparing. Each volume has something for everyone interested in naval history and its fighting vehicles, primarily ships.

*Volume VII* has articles on such specialized subjects as the British Northern Patrol at the start of World War II (parts one and two, Donald Kindell) and the 1899 German-built Russian cruiser *Askold* (parts one and two, Andrzej Jaskuta). The latter article includes detailed plans of the *Askold*, the only five-stack cruiser of its time. Of more general interest is an article on the development of the British escort carrier at the beginning of World War II. While these ships were not numerous because of the massive U.S. programs that replaced them, they contributed significantly to the development of this type. The British explored the basic idea first. There is an intriguing three-part



series on Japanese battleship design philosophy as it developed between the wars. While this material was assembled by Hans Lengerer, much of it appears translated from the Japanese and covers not only design considerations but personalities such as the eminent naval architects Hiraga and Fujimoto. All of this led to the 1935 *Yamato* class which would have eventually seen its nine 18-inch guns replaced by six 20-inch guns, the idea being to stay ahead of the Americans. All three articles are accompanied by *Yamato* photos of amazing detail and excellent plans, profile and lines of that ship, none of which are referenced in the text. Although not particularly well written, the material is priceless to those following Japanese naval ship design development. Also of interest are articles on the British M-class 12-inch-gun submarine monitors built shortly after World War I; the huge, for then, French *Surcouf*, a submarine cruiser with two 8-inch guns and a scout plane. There is an operational review of the German World War II torpedo boats designed during the twenties. These were not much larger than current FPBs. The final *Bismarck* action is reviewed again and there's a continuing series on British naval ordnance. There are interesting pieces on British naval battle damage during World War II. All in all, there is no major message; just material to enjoy.

*Volume VIII* looks at much the same type of material, covering different subjects. Captain Villar reports on British experience with merchant

ships during the Falklands; the series on British naval guns is continued; Norman Friedman covers the U.S. "Brownwater Navy" created during the Vietnam conflict for riverine service. Also of interest is the British experience in developing naval gas turbines starting with their early postwar high-performance ships. The British were the Free World leaders in this area at that time. Friedman also covers the development of anti-submarine submarines (SSK) during the late forties and early fifties. The three small K-1 class plus seven fleet host conversions are described, their most distinctive feature being the large sonar arrays added, all incorporated as a matter of course in SSNs now. Then there are the French Mogador destroyers of the thirties, a personal favorite. These were huge then, with impressive armament (eight 5.5-inch). They were twice the size of our *Porter*-class destroyer leaders of the same period but only half the size of a *Spruance* today. U.S. monitor designs are covered. These interesting anachronisms owed much of their authorized existence to the Civil and Spanish American wars. Additionally, one finds British scout cruisers, Japanese Kaibokan escorts, German S-boats and the reborn *Iowa* class.

Both books are well illustrated with rare photographs and often detailed drawings. Each contains book reviews and readers' comments ("A & As") on articles and pictures published previously. Overall, each volume has something for everyone and much about which one might

## 134 Naval War College Review

care less, but which is interesting. If you are a true lover of little-known naval detail, you should have these volumes. In that context, each is worth its rather impressive price.

RICHARD F. CROSS III  
Alexandria, Virginia

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Gardiner, Robert, ed. director.  
*Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1906-1921*. London, England: Conway Maritime Press, 1985. 439pp. \$39.95

This large book is one of a series of four reference works published over the past eight years by the Conway Maritime Press in Britain and marketed in the United States by the Naval Institute Press. This series follows a novel approach, providing a long overdue aid to the naval historian and student of warship history. These books are concise, in fact highly compressed encyclopedias of basic data on the major warships of the world's navies for the time period covered by each book. This latest volume in the series deals with World War I, the *Dreadnought*-building 'naval race' years that preceded that war, and the immediate aftermath; a very appropriate division. Earlier volumes have covered 1947-1982 (in fact, two volumes that together total 544pp., published 1983); 1922-1946 (456pp., published 1980); and 1860-1905 (440pp., published 1979).

The books' common format includes provision of ship lists by design class, with brief notes for construction dates and fate. Basic character-

istics given include displacement (normal and full load); dimensions; machinery (including speed and endurance); armor thicknesses; armament; and complement. Textual notes for larger ships add some background information on design concept, technical features of special interest, and occasionally, operational activities. Profile line drawings and small photographs are numerous, illustrating most of the ship classes from destroyer types upwards.

The novelty of this apparently straightforward approach is that most of the commonly available historical sources of warship data are riddled with errors or are incomplete. Most of these commonly used sources, contemporary "naval annuals," were published as guides to current fleet strength. This was the approach taken by all the great naval yearbooks, beginning with Brassey's *The Naval Annual* in 1886 and continued with *Jane's Fighting Ships*, *Les Flottes de Combat*, and Weyer's *Taschenbuch der Kriegsflootten* around the turn of the century. Any such description of contemporary naval strength has been constrained to some degree by restrictions upon the release of official information. At times these official sanctions have had extreme effect, such as in late-1930s' Germany, Italy, and Japan, and in the present-day Soviet Union. No one has ever gone back to redo one of these yearbooks using official data that became available perhaps twenty years later. The Conway series' *All the World's Fighting Fleets* attempts an analogous task, taking a 15- to 45-

year time span and describing all the principal vessels that were operational or planned during that time, using data subsequently available.

A second systemic problem in using "naval annuals" for historical data is that their focus on current strength usually precludes much mention of historical events. Ships lost in combat, units of a class scrapped or lost accidentally, or otherwise disposed of disappear from the book and sometimes go unaccounted for in the process. Accordingly, a 1946 *Jane's*, for example, said very little about the Axis fleets of World War II, most appearing only as war losses. Some war-built ships never appeared in the annuals at all.

Of course, an increasingly wide variety of detailed and accurate books on warship history have been appearing worldwide since about 1960. The late Dr. Oscar Parkes' *British Battleships* (1957) was the first great book of this kind. The avid student of warships can now find a weighty volume or detailed article on many of the most interesting ship types (books on battleships, cruisers, destroyers, etc.) or navies (books on all a given navy's ships).

Unfortunately, this wealth of information is limited on several counts. First, purchase of all these books would cost a huge sum of money and take an exorbitant amount of time merely to keep updated with new research appearing in magazines and other books. Second, gaps in coverage in published books remain. Third, language barriers effectively negate some of these books for most

Western readers.

Accordingly, the production of a new worldwide reference book, drawing on all this published work and additional research as necessary to produce a synopsis of key data seems to be an obvious need. Conway Maritime Press wisely sought to distribute the task of compiling such a work among various authors, each to have special expertise for the countries assigned. Several of the persons chosen, indeed, are recognized as leading authorities in their field, such as Erwin Sieche (Austria-Hungary); Gerhard Koop (Federal Republic of Germany 1947-1982 volume); Robert L. Scheina (South American navies); Aldo Fraccaroli (Italy); N.J.M. Campbell (German capital ships, 1906-1921); the late Karl-Erik Westerlund (Scandinavian navies); and Norman Friedman (U.S. Navy).

This series of books is not without flaws. France is not given justice in any of these books, and coverage of the Russian and Soviet fleets up to 1946 is unfortunate, despite the availability of data in Russian language sources. Coverage of Japan is disappointing, with no one working in Japanese language sources involved. Central American fleets are poorly covered; no use seems to have been made of the very good U.S. Navy Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) reports at the National Archives on those small forces, for example. Small craft and auxiliaries of most fleets are given short shrift or, in many cases, ignored.

There is virtually no discussion of sources anywhere in these books.

## 136 Naval War College Review

The reader is not told when authoritative, archival material is reflected and when recourse to contemporary books and magazines is necessary. At the least, it seems that each major chapter should have had a bibliographical note citing such cardinal sources as official ship lists (e.g., the U.S. Navy's *Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships* and the equivalent Dutch, Argentine, Italian, Brazilian, Greek, and other works), major scholarly books, etc.

Happily, the 1816-1859 volume that has been announced as in preparation has excellent choices of persons to prepare the critical United Kingdom and French sections, and the important Spanish section also is in very good hands. This forthcoming volume, expected in about a year, probably will be qualitatively the best of the lot—though the smaller number of ships being covered will give the authors some advantage despite the remoteness of the period in question. The editors at Conway's also have suggested that the 1860-1905 volume, the least well researched, is a candidate for revision and reissuance at some point in the future.

All in all, this set of books is indispensable for the serious student of warship history. What is most remarkable is that it took so long for such a useful series of books to be conceived.

CHRISTOPHER C. WRIGHT  
Baltimore, Maryland

Whitley, M. J. *German Cruisers of World War II*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1985. 176pp. \$21.95

This handsomely illustrated and well-written book is a significant addition to the literature on the cruisers which fought in World War II. Written as a companion to the author's earlier *Destroyer!* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1983), *German Cruisers of World War II* covers the design of Germany's light and heavy cruisers and their wartime operations. In the first part of the book, the ships' designs are described and illustrated by a number of detailed drawings, and the German ships are compared with similar warships constructed by the other naval powers. The second, and longer part of the book is devoted to a history of German cruiser operations during the war, and most of the operational narrative focuses on missions in or from Norwegian waters.

The growing interest of the U.S. Navy in the Norwegian Sea makes Whitley's section on cruiser operations especially timely. The German Navy found that sailing in Norwegian and Arctic waters took a heavy toll of men and machines. The pounding of high waves, sea spray icing and cold, combined to damage sensitive radar equipment—usually at those times when poor visibility made radar essential. Spray and ice also drastically reduced the effectiveness of optical ranging equipment, sometimes forcing cruisers to fight at very close range with torpedo-armed destroyers. Finally, wave action and

floating ice combined to stress cruiser hulls and injure their propellers, forcing unscheduled delays and extended spells in drydock. There were other enemies as well, particularly British submarines and aircraft. Together, the natural and man-made threats to the German cruiser force exacted a heavy toll. By the end of April 1940, for example, two of the six light cruisers in commission had been sunk and one other had been so heavily damaged that, when repaired, it was relegated to training cruises. Of the two 8-inch gunned heavy cruisers in service before the invasion of Norway, only one survived action there.

And so it went. There were simply not enough cruisers to meet Germany's needs, and the ships which were available suffered from a variety of problems. The light cruisers were too *lightly* built and protected to steam off on their own as commerce raiders. The 8-inch gunned type, on the other hand, though well protected and heavily armed (and way over the tonnage limits set by the Washington Treaty), did not have the endurance necessary for extended independent operations. Once the Royal Navy ran down the scattered tankers on which the German heavy cruisers depended, the threat to shipping posed by warships such as *Admiral Hipper* and *Prinz Eugen* fell off drastically. As Whitley notes, the German Navy learned that its armed and disguised merchant raiders were more effective against British and Allied shipping than its light and heavy cruisers. Because the German

cruisers were not very effective in the commerce raiding role, they played little part in naval campaigns after the end of 1943.

*German Cruisers of World War II* complements the growing literature on World War II cruiser designs and operations, a literature which includes books such as Norman Friedman's *U.S. Cruisers: An Illustrated Design History* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1984) and Alan Raven and John Roberts' *British Cruisers of World War Two* (London: L. Leventhal, Ltd., 1980). Whitley's study has only two minor faults: first, there are not enough maps of the North Sea, the Baltic, and the seas around Norway, and, second, readers in the United States may find it difficult to move back and forth from English to metric measures—as they must do when comparing the German cruisers with their U.S. and British contemporaries. Otherwise, *German Cruisers of World War II* has something for just about every interested reader—from operational summaries to armament data to revealing photographs.

THOMAS HONE  
Washington, D.C.

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Brouwer, Norman J. *International Register of Historic Ships*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1986. 321pp. \$28.95

Organized by four major classifications: Naval, Merchant Sail, Merchant Steam and Miscellaneous, the professional mariner, Norman Brouwer, has compiled a remarkable

## 138 Naval War College Review

directory of the 706 historic sea vessels in the world. Whether you are a naval or merchant marine officer, a yachtsman, a sea novel enthusiast, or a maritime history buff, you will find much to personally interest you.

Alphabetically grouped by forty-three nations or territories, the majority of the vessels are illustrated with photographs taken by the author during his travels to historic ship sites. Included are full histories for over forty ships that are especially significant, either historically, or as examples of successful restoration projects.

In addition to indexing all 706 vessels by country, from Argentina to Yugoslavia, the author has created a unique appendix listing the vessels by all known types, such as ancient and medieval sail, square rig, sail whaling, yachting, power, passenger, government, lightships, naval historic frigates, gunboats, aircraft carriers, submarines, battleships, destroyers, etc. This indexing plan makes it easy to locate a vessel by country, by vessel type, or by name, so one can quickly tailor the *register* to their preferences, either for reference or for planning a visit to a historic location.

To illustrate the thoroughness of detail, let us select a visit to the famous historic ship, the U.S.S. *Constitution*, presently owned by the U.S. Navy, at the Charlestown Navy Yard, Boston, Massachusetts. The photographs of the *Constitution* are excellent. Details, such as year built, original use as a frigate, type of rig,

hull, decks, superstructure, length, breadth, displacement are there, and a brief history and significance adds color to the accounting. The suggested bibliography guides you to further exploration.

A famous quote "Ships and the Sea, there's nothing finer made," words by John Masefield, poet laureate, introduces a preface by Frank G.G. Carr, chairman of the World Ship Trust. In Mr. Carr's words "It is only in the last three decades that a much wider public has become aware of the outstanding importance of the world's Maritime heritage in the contribution it has made to the history of mankind."

A 1962 graduate of Maine Maritime Academy, the author went on to serve on active duty in the U.S. Navy. Later, as an officer in the merchant marine, he worked cargo ships and a research vessel that "steamed" the littoral of the Antarctic and Cape Horn. He left the sea in 1970 to pursue a career in maritime history by way of New York State University at Oneonta and as curator of the South Street Seaport Museum in New York. Norman Brouwer has authored over eighty articles on maritime history, led expeditions in 1976 and 1978 to document the remains of 19th century sailing vessels surviving in the Falkland Islands, all of which have added to the richness of our maritime heritage.

Considering the qualifications of the author, his thorough dedicated treatment of the subject matter, and the broad range of vessels presented, you will be well rewarded, when you

add *International Register of Historic Ships* to your Library.

GEORGE CASWELL  
Milford, Connecticut

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Clancy, Tom. *Red Storm Rising*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1986. 652pp. \$19.95

Last year, Tom Clancy's first effort, *The Hunt for Red October*, was selected as a textbook for the introductory session of the Naval War College's Operations Course—not because every detail of modern submarine and antisubmarine operations was precisely depicted, but because on the whole it was the most readable and accurate piece available on one facet of contemporary naval operations outside wartime. *Red Storm Rising* could easily provide several sessions more—again, not for its precise depiction of future history, but because this new novel is so thoroughly researched and authentic that it provides a plausible overview of warfare in the Atlantic and NATO, available nowhere else.

Criticisms? Certainly. There are a few obvious stereotypes; Soviet hats may be too black and those of the Americans too white. The scenarist could argue with Muslim terrorists blowing up a refinery on the Ob River. A strategist could argue with any Soviet plan to attack NATO as distraction during a move toward the Gulf's oil fields. A literature major could criticize Clancy's shallow character development and his use of a portfolio of snapshots across the

land and ocean battlefields, rather than creating a smoothly flowing motion picture. A modern naval or military professional might take offense at the number of mirrored personalities in the book whose primary emphasizing adjective is an inarticulate participle implying that inanimate objects are attempting procreation. With those trivia declared behind us, let's look at Clancy's war game scenario as a whole.

The time of the *Red Storm* is today and the forces arrayed exist here and now—with the possible exception of F-19 "stealth" fighter-bombers which you cannot see anyway. The date is not specified but becomes clear as Clancy's Soviets propose unilateral decommissioning for 20 (of their current 27) Yankee-class SSBNs for *maskirovka*. Hence, one would be remiss not to compare the strategies and scenario of *Red Storm Rising* with *The Maritime Strategy* as spelled out, for example, in the U.S. Naval Institute's special edition of last January. Again Clancy has done his homework thoroughly. His characters express current U.S. doctrinal views on how the Soviet Navy would be expected to deploy during the "transition to war." However, Clancy's Soviet Navy does not always cooperate with NATO expectations. Their strategists are not as wedded to doctrine as some other writers would have us believe. Rather than placing their SSBNs well north, bastioned near the polar ice cap, the Soviets husband this strategic deterrent force in fjords behind mine and ASW barriers. Rather than threatening northern

## 140 Naval War College Review

Norway, Soviet Naval Infantry embark in a LASH ship disguised as a Lykes liner, and leapfrog straight to Iceland. From there the Soviets base Backfires, Bears, and Badgers, threatening to sever the Atlantic SLOCs. The United States "swings" amphibious forces from the Pacific, a move that is inconsistent with today's exposition of strategy. A major factor in turning the tide is "Operation Doolittle," a sub-launched Tomahawk strike on Soviet Backfires at their bases, using dispersed munition warheads. Early in the conflict high technology weapons, e.g., precision-guided munitions, become scarce and the battle stalemates. Both sides face a war of attrition which will be extremely difficult to support logistically at the front or with the population at home. The Soviet strategists were sufficiently prescient to consider this. The temptation to preempt with chemical weapons was analyzed by Clancy's Soviets and that option rejected. And what about tactical nucs to break the stalemate after a few weeks of fighting? That would give away too much of the plot.

Tom Clancy has earned the title of "Operational Artist" who comprehends strategy, tactics and the wide operational void between. Dating from the translation of Soviet writings 15 years ago (Colonel V. Ye. Savkin), the term "Operational Art" has gained evermore prominence among U.S. military theorists, especially in the U.S. Army. The term has also come into vogue among dilettantes and reformists in Washington who see themselves as occupying the

only position sufficiently Olympian that both strategies and tactics can be observed. Clancy has shown the rare capability to think in terms of a theater campaign to include options covering both failure and the unexpected. He even raises the issue of changing war aims over time, and examines necessary and sufficient conditions for termination of hostilities.

Seminarians are taught that sermons are like love affairs; any fool can start one, but it takes a wise man to end it in a satisfactory fashion. Wars (and, perhaps, novels about wars) suffer from the same difficulty. Once the war machine is set in motion, how is it stopped, even slowed, maneuvered or otherwise refocused? Did Tom Clancy write the ending first then build his novel to match? Or, did he get the tanks, Backfires, submarines and carriers all moving, then wonder how to stay under 700 pages? Even more thought provoking, where does Clancy go next? Having expanded from submarines and ASW to world war III and concluding that campaign, has he left himself any stone unturned? Let us hope not. Whatever scenario and locale he chooses, we stand to learn much about ourselves from examining our strengths and flaws through his discerning eyes.

*Red Storm Rising* should be fascinating reading for those in uniform, those who used to be in uniform, and those who dabble in strategy. Especially, it should be digested by those in Washington who would abhor realpolitik, assume a benign enemy,



ignore the Soviet war machine, and slash defense budgets to balance the checkbooks they have overdrawn. Warfare is still an accepted extension of politics. If, due to perceived weakness, deterrence does fail and we must face the Soviet Military, the budget will be balanced in blood.

Clancy's short world war III costs thousands of lives. However, the losses he shows are low compared to those of previous world wars when viewed in the light of today's massive weapons of destruction.

DAVID G. CLARK  
Captain, U.S. Navy

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## RECENT BOOKS

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Aker, Frank. *October 1973: The Arab-Israeli War*. Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1985. 185pp. \$19.50

This book approaches the October 1973 war from both an Arab and Israeli perspective. The author analyzes the background, planning, and preparation for war and includes a narrative of the campaigns during the attack, the holding actions, counterattacks, flanking attacks, and breakthrough phases. He also includes sea and air operations of the combatants, and it is his view that the great military significance of the war lies in the insights it provides as an alternative warfare in a nuclear age. With superpowers reluctant to use the ultimate weapons, future conflicts could, as was the case in the October 1973 war, become strategic contests where the best use of high-tech and traditional weaponry would determine the outcome.

Blitzer, Wolf. *Between Washington & Jerusalem: A Reporter's Notebook*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 259pp. \$15.95

In this volume, a journalist's view of the U.S.-Israeli relationship, the author outlines the limits of the relationship, showing why neither country can afford an all-out confrontation. He gives special emphasis to the way decisions are made in Washington and the varied roles of the foreign policy bureaucracy, the Congress, the press, the American Jewish community, the Arabs and their supporters, and the official Israeli presence. Particularly illuminating is his explanation of the rarely understood strategic and intelligence cooperation between the two countries.

Dupuy, Trevor N. et al. *Dictionary of Military Terms*. New York: H.W. Wilson Co., 1986. 237pp. \$30

This volume emphasizes the military meaning and derivation of terms widely used in literature dealing with national security affairs. It covers official designations and nicknames, and lists terms dealing with all aspects of military and naval affairs—