

1987

Soviet Decision making for National Security

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Recommended Citation

Begelman, Arthur (1987) "Soviet Decision making for National Security," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 40 : No. 1 , Article 16.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol40/iss1/16>

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Martin Binkin; and "Personnel" by David Segal. In the 1986-1987 *Annual*, views on "U.S. Defense Strategy" by Robert Komer on the one hand, and "Seapower and Projection Forces" by Admiral Harry D. Train II on the other, are quite enlightening.

Both editions offer a wealth of information, jargon-free, backed by ample charted data and illustrations which both the professional and the amateur will find helpful. Can the editors continue to find the level of outstanding contributors necessary to provide stimulating and comprehensive views each year within an essentially rigid format? To aid in this respect, a distinguished panel of defense authorities has been added as the *Annual's* editorial board to assist in finding new issues and potential contributors. The start, to date, has been auspicious.

PAUL R. SCHRATZ
Arnold, Maryland

Valenta, Jiri and Potter, William, eds. *Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security*. Winchester, Mass.: George Allen & Unwin, 1984. 319pp. \$40, paper \$18.50

Valenta and Potter edited and contributed to a series of papers presented at a conference at the Naval Postgraduate School in 1980 which have been updated for publication. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union is a country where even the simplest things are classified, and security matters even more so, the

authors are able to make perceptive analyses of the Soviet process for arriving at national security decisions. The studies range from conceptual bureaucratic models to case studies; e.g., Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. There are no definitive answers here, nor could there be, given the nature of the Soviet system. Nevertheless, the book marks, as the editors note, "the beginnings of wisdom." This is worthwhile reading for the serious student of Soviet affairs.

ARTHUR BEGELMAN
Arlington, Virginia

Sloss, Leon and Davis, Scott M., eds.

A Game for High Stakes: Lessons Learned in Negotiating with the Soviet Union. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1985. 180pp. \$24.95

According to Richard Pipes: "The emotionalism that surrounds the whole issue of these [nuclear] weapons transforms the process of nuclear-arms negotiation from what it ought to be—namely, matter-of-fact bargaining—into a quasi-religious ritual whose success is measured not by the results obtained but by the 'sincerity' with which it is approached." Although he did not write those words in review and criticism of the compilation of papers by Sloss and Davis, he well might have, for they accurately describe the general mindset of the contributors. The book does not offer, nor does it purport to offer, a comprehensive review of U.S.-Soviet negotiations, but sets forth