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A Game for High Stakes: Lessons Learned in Negotiating with the Soviet Union

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Martin Binkin; and "Personnel" by David Segal. In the 1986-1987 *Annual*, views on "U.S. Defense Strategy" by Robert Komer on the one hand, and "Seapower and Projection Forces" by Admiral Harry D. Train II on the other, are quite enlightening.

Both editions offer a wealth of information, jargon-free, backed by ample charted data and illustrations which both the professional and the amateur will find helpful. Can the editors continue to find the level of outstanding contributors necessary to provide stimulating and comprehensive views each year within an essentially rigid format? To aid in this respect, a distinguished panel of defense authorities has been added as the *Annual*'s editorial board to assist in finding new issues and potential contributors. The start, to date, has been auspicious.

PAUL R. SCHRATZ
Arnold, Maryland

Valenta, Jiri and Potter, William, eds. *Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security*. Winchester, Mass.: George Allen & Unwin, 1984. 319pp. $40, paper $18.50

Valenta and Potter edited and contributed to a series of papers presented at a conference at the Naval Postgraduate School in 1980 which have been updated for publication. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union is a country where even the simplest things are classified, and security matters even more so, the authors are able to make perceptive analyses of the Soviet process for arriving at national security decisions. The studies range from conceptual bureaucratic models to case studies; e.g., Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. There are no definitive answers here, nor could there be, given the nature of the Soviet system. Nevertheless, the book marks, as the editors note, "the beginnings of wisdom." This is worthwhile reading for the serious student of Soviet affairs.

ARTHUR BEGELMAN
Arlington, Virginia

Sloss, Leon and Davis, Scott M., eds. *A Game for High Stakes: Lessons Learned in Negotiating with the Soviet Union*. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1985. 180pp. $24.95

According to Richard Pipes: "The emotionalism that surrounds the whole issue of these [nuclear] weapons transforms the process of nuclear-arms negotiation from what it ought to be—namely, matter-of-fact bargaining—into a quasi-religious ritual whose success is measured not by the results obtained but by the 'sincerity' with which it is approached." Although he did not write those words in review and criticism of the compilation of papers by Sloss and Davis, he well might have, for they accurately describe the general mindset of the contributors. The book does not offer, nor does it purport to offer, a comprehensive review of U.S.-Soviet negotiations, but sets forth

personal views of fourteen professionals who have face-to-face experience negotiating with Soviet officials. For a variety of reasons, each of the authors has a personal stake in the subject and as a consequence, their essays—let the reader beware—cannot be classified as objective analyses.

The authors of the papers, which range from four to twenty-eight and average about ten pages in length, are well known in the field. One of the current U.S. strategic arms negotiators, Max Kampelman, appears, as does Paul Warnke, Jonathan Dean, Herbert York, Edward Rowny, and Sidney Graybeal, all of whom headed delegations of negotiators on arms control at various times and at various levels. Others—such as the book's editor, Leon Sloss, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Howard Stoertz, Jr., Walter Slocombe, Raymond Garthoff, Robert D. Schmidt, R. James Woolsey, and Roger Fisher—have experience, or interest in the subject, or both.

Two important omissions detract from the value of the book. First, this is a compilation of opinions and recollections of advocates of, and in some cases apologists for, arms control negotiations with the Soviets. Absent are the views of those who believe that the asymmetries between the two political systems are of such magnitude as to render arms control an exercise of unilateral U.S. faith rather than of mutual interest between the parties. Not represented are strong criticisms of the likes of Foy Kohler, William Van Cleave, Richard Staar, Seymour Weiss, Richard Pipes, Uri Ra'anan, Irving Kristol, or Brian Crozier—to name just a few who are *not* currently in government service. One might respond that this is the report of a series of seminars that took place in May and June of 1984, and as such is limited to the contributions of the attendees. Well enough, but the seminar organizers, under the auspices of the Roosevelt Center for American Policy Studies, must acknowledge that to exclude virtually all of the serious critics of the process they were studying renders the product vulnerable to criticism on that point.

Second, there is an absence of context for the essays. That is, for the most part, negotiations with the Soviet Union are considered outside any overarching national security framework. Few considerations, even rips of the hat, are offered to vital questions of how arms control fits (or should fit) into national security objectives of the parties. Throughout, there is the entirely tacit assumption that any negotiated arms control agreement would naturally be in consonance with the overall U.S. security scheme or, one supposes, might be made to conform. It is not irrelevant to ask whether the Soviet Union approaches the subject of negotiating the instruments of national security in such a detached manner. Moreover, although the collection of essays does not broach the question, it seems fair to ask whether it makes a difference either to the substance or to the form of arms control, if the two parties view the negotiations

from radically different perspectives. These vital matters of context are not emphasized in the essays, and the usefulness of the book suffers as a consequence.

As in all advocacy pieces on arms control, there is an abundance of platitudes, banalities, contradictions, and self-serving assertion. For example, we are reminded at least four times that the Soviets are "chess players." In a remarkable passage, one author states, "But to maintain long-term cohesion in the NATO alliance, we should move toward a principle whereby all nuclear weapons capable of hitting any part of the territory of either alliance are covered in East-West arms control negotiations with direct European participation." To the knowledgeable this counsels: (1) acceptance of the Soviet definition of what constitutes strategic weapons, transparently concocted in order to drive a wedge into the NATO alliance, and (2) a fundamental reversal of the U.S. position that has been staunchly upheld since the Soviet definition was first presented at SALT I.

Fortunately, Leon Sloss has provided a great service to readers in his "Introduction and Findings" chapter. Indeed, everything of substance in the book, stripped of personal bias and cant, appears in this chapter. Prospective readers would be well advised, bearing in mind the reservations about the work set forth above, to read Sloss's chapter and do a quick riffle on the remainder.

ROGER W. BARNETT
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Segal, Gerald and Tow, William T., eds. *Chinese Defense Policy*. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1984. 286pp. $29.95

There is a deplorable paucity of truly informative, nonideological literature about the defense policy of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Gerald Segal and William T. Tow have helped to fill this void by producing an extremely tight (especially for an edited collection of conference contributions) and insightful volume that presents the facts in both a straightforward and readable fashion. This is the result of the editors' insistence that the contributors restrict, as best possible, their analysis to five major questions, or themes, that are central to the entire Chinese defense policy debate. These questions are: How strong is the People's Liberation Army (PLA)? Is there a new military doctrine? Is the PLA unified? Who threatens China? And who aids China's security? For the most part, the contributors remain within the bounds of these questions; however, in a few of the pieces the questions receive only scant treatment, or the writers equivocate, leaving the reader in doubt as to the writers' positions on the questions.

Although the five major questions serve as both a unifying factor and navigational aid for the contributors and readers alike, Segal's and Tow's real contribution as editors was to have the very best authorities on the subject of Chinese defense policy contribute to the volume. Clearly, Harlan Jencks, Bill Sweetman, Bruce