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Why Grenada Was Important

Alberto R. Coll

Grenada was important for the same reason that the Third World is important. It has become fashionable among some analysts to downplay the importance to the United States of the Third World in general and of small Third World countries such as Grenada in particular. According to this viewpoint, the United States should have a clear list of "vital interests." Atop that list, in descending order of priorities, would be Western Europe and Japan, China, the rest of the Far East, the Middle East, and then at the bottom, and implicitly out of the appropriate reach of American intervention, the Third World and places like Grenada. The problem with this approach is that it gives away the store rather too easily. It is far better for the United States to consider all regions of the world important, even while in our policy decisions we may allocate different degrees of resources and attention to them, than to draw a specific list of vital and non-vital interests which may send the wrong signals to Moscow about our concern for Soviet expansion around the globe. One should not forget Dean Acheson's unfortunate exclusion of South Korea from America's defense perimeter in a speech in June of 1950, followed a few weeks later by North Korea's invasion.

In the world of 1987, Grenada and even a faraway country such as Chad constitute, if not vital, important interests. To ignore them or to downplay the significance of their surrounding regions falling under Soviet domination or influence is shortsighted. One of the long-term goals of Soviet strategy is to create a number of regimes throughout the Third World with substantial political and military ties to Moscow that can serve as stepping-stones for the further spread of Soviet influence and power. While Chad itself may not be vital, it is important to the degree that it can serve as a stepping-stone for the further spread of Soviet influence and power to places like Sudan, Somalia, and Egypt. And while Grenada itself could be ridiculed as a small island, even though its location in the Caribbean makes it strategically valuable, it also was important as a stepping-stone to the further spread of Soviet influence and power to other countries in the region. Should the United States ignore this dynamic of Soviet strategy, it could easily wind up in 50

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or 60 years with Western Europe, Canada, Japan, and a few other states on its side, but vast regions of the Third World lost to American influence and under heavy Soviet control.

Soviet "Gradualistic Opportunism"

Throughout the Third World, including the Western Hemisphere, the predominant Soviet strategic approach, since the early 1970s, has been what I call "gradualistic opportunism": the long-term, cautious but relentless expansion of Soviet influence and power whenever the opportunities present themselves. Gradualistic opportunism is subtle and dangerous. It avoids direct challenges to high-profile U.S. strategic interests that might trigger a tough American response. Thus, the Soviets carefully avoid threats against the Panama Canal, and seem to pay heed to U.S. warnings against stationing nuclear missiles in Cuba or MIG-23s in Nicaragua. Deprived of a single sufficiently powerful justification for responding to Soviet actions, successive American administrations have watched helplessly as the Soviets have slowly turned Cuba into a massive fortress behind which Castro is free to sponsor subversion and revolution throughout the hemisphere, as the Soviet naval presence in the Caribbean grows, and as Nicaragua becomes another pro-Soviet military fortress and focus of subversion in Central America.

A key instrument of Soviet strategy in the hemisphere, and the single most important outside player in the Grenadian experiment with Leninism, is Cuba. The critical dynamic of Cuban foreign policy is Fidel Castro, his powerful personality, and his self-image as a "world-historical" figure entrusted by fate with the mission of expelling the hated United States from Latin America. Castro also knows that only by casting himself as an enemy of "Yankee Imperialism" and making himself uniquely useful to Moscow can he receive the inordinate amounts of economic and military support that have enabled him to accomplish what few dictators have done in the twentieth century, to remain in power for nearly three decades. Castro's policies in the hemisphere have a distinct and valuable complementary fit with the goals of Soviet strategy: the relentless pursuit of political and covert military warfare against U.S. allies and friends for the purpose of weakening American power and influence, ceaseless political and psychological warfare against the United States itself, the promotion of Marxist revolution, and the nurture of Leninist pro-Soviet regimes.¹ Moreover, because of its linguistic, cultural, and racial affinities with much of the Western Hemisphere, Cuba is a far more effective agent of these policies than the Soviets themselves can ever hope to be.

In Grenada and the rest of the Caribbean, tremendous opportunities for Soviet and Cuban strategy have opened up ever since Great Britain abdicated its colonial responsibilities in the 1960s and 70s, withdrawing its presence

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from the area. Most of the newly independent mini-states are hardly self-sufficient economically; their budding parliamentary political systems are susceptible to demagoguery, corruption, and violence; and their military weakness makes them highly vulnerable to outside subversion. It is in this broad context of Soviet gradualist strategy and the vacuum created by the withdrawal of British power that the events of Grenada in 1979-1983 are best understood.

The Beginnings of a Leninist Dictatorship

The New Jewel Movement was founded in the early 1970s as a coalition of populist, nationalist and Marxist groups, but after 1974 it took a clear Marxist-Leninist orientation. Its two principal figures were Maurice Bishop, a charismatic young lawyer born into a prominent Grenadian family and educated at the University of London, and his future rival, Bernard Coard, a highly orthodox Marxist-Leninist theoretician with a graduate degree in economics from Brandeis University. Both believed that the New Jewel Movement should become a classic Leninist "vanguard party" through which a small cadre of intellectual revolutionary leaders would awaken the oppressed Grenadian masses and lead them to a radical transformation of society.

In 1979, Bishop had his opportunity. Since becoming independent, Grenada had been ruled as a parliamentary democracy by Sir Eric Gairy, founder of the Grenadian Labor Party and one of the leaders of the movement for independence from Great Britain. After coming into power, Sir Eric had become increasingly corrupt and heavy-handed. In imitation of the Duvaliers' dreaded "Tonton Macoutes," he created his own special Praetorian Guard, the vicious "Mongoose Gang," to help him stay in power—one of its earliest victims was Bishop's own father, whom it murdered. Gairy also became fascinated with UFOs, and in March of 1979 he traveled to New York to deliver an address on the subject at the United Nations. While he was away, the New Jewel Movement took over the government with hardly any opposition from Grenada's miniscule security forces.

Immediately after its coup, the New Jewel Movement set up an alliance of convenience with the middle class, while simultaneously working behind the scenes to establish a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship.² As part of this dual strategy, Bishop appointed several prominent businessmen to such "soft" Cabinet posts as the Ministries of Tourism and Aviation, to convey to the Western World a pluralist image. The key posts of Interior, Defense, and Education went to committed Party members. The economy was gradually centralized, with the eventual objective of nationalizing all agriculture and transforming it into a collectivized system along Soviet lines. Political control and repression were increased systematically. A massive campaign of indoctrination and "re-education" was launched to alter popular values and

attitudes, and create a new "socialist revolutionary" consciousness supportive of the regime. Aware that in Grenada, a heavily religious country with over 80 percent an active, believing population, the Christian Church would present problems, the New Jewel Movement requested Cuba to send a team of experts to advise Grenadian Party leaders on how to deal with it. After a detailed study, the Cuban delegation recommended a two-pronged strategy. Church leaders were to be closely surveilled, their phones tapped, their sermons monitored; at the same time, the regime was to cultivate links with Christians sympathetic to socialism or to the New Jewel Movement, and whenever possible, send groups of them on visits to Cuba to impress them with how well the Castro government supposedly got along with the Catholic and Protestant Churches. The second prong of the strategy had an international connection in that the New Jewel Movement also was advised to nurture links with Christians in the United States and Western Europe having pro-Marxist and pro-liberation theology leanings, so as to reinforce the perception that it had a positive attitude towards Christianity.³

The Militarization of Grenada

For Grenada's small neighbors and the United States, the most menacing aspects of the Bishop regime were its militarization of the island and its ties with the Soviet bloc. When the U.S. invasion took place in October of 1983, the following items had already been delivered or were on order from the Soviet bloc:⁴

- 10,000 assault and other rifles
- 4,500 submachine and machine guns
- 11.5 million rounds of 7.62mm ammunition
- 294 portable rocket launchers with more than 16,000 rockets
- 84 82mm mortars with more than 4,800 mortar shells
- 12 75mm cannon with 600 shells
- 15,000 hand grenades, 7,000 land mines
- 150 radio transmitters
- 160 field telephone sets
- 23,000 uniforms

The weapons found on the island in October of 1983 were sufficient to equip a 10,000-man army, and documents captured by U.S. forces revealed plans for an army of 4 Regular battalions and 14 Reservist battalions. Such a projected army would have put between 15 and 25 percent of Grenada's population under arms and made it perhaps the world's most militarized state. All these figures are best put in perspective if one recalls that Grenada's population was barely over 100,000, with about half of the people under the age of 15.⁵ Moreover, Grenada's closest Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) neighbors, St. Vincent and St. Lucia, had no military forces at

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all, and the remaining Caribbean mini-states had only small police or military contingents numbering a few hundred each.

As Prime Minister Tom Adams of Barbados was to explain after the U.S.-OECS invasion: "The discovery of a sufficient store of ammunition to kill everyone in the Caribbean and of weapons and equipment not only of defensive but with offensive capacity will surely raise the question of the past government's intentions. Why did Grenada need motorised rubber landing craft? What would it have done with the 50 Armoured Personnel Carriers it had agreed to obtain from the Soviet Union, a number probably greater than that possessed by all the CARICOM armies combined? . . .

"Grenada, already under Bishop one of the perhaps dozen most militarised states in the world in terms of population under arms, would have become the most militarised if plans to expand the PRA had gone through in terms of agreements already signed. Can all these factors be ignored in assessing the threat posed to Eastern Caribbean countries, against which their Treaty entitles them to defend themselves?"⁶

The extensive network of secret agreements with the Soviet bloc, discovered after the invasion, surprised most Western observers. Cuba was to provide manpower, especially semi-skilled personnel for the construction of the Point Salines airport, and numerous political advisors to assist the NJM in building its dictatorship. The U.S.S.R. was to provide technical and military equipment. East Germany, capitalizing on its well-known specialty in the fields of intelligence and "internal security," undertook to create a first-rate Grenadian security service, complete with the latest communications and wire-tapping equipment; as part of the agreement, East German technicians were to overhaul and modernize the country's entire telephone system. Meanwhile, Czechoslovakia would send explosives; Bulgaria, uniforms; Hungary, medical kits and equipment; North Korea, small arms and some construction personnel. North Vietnam, with the considerable expertise it gained in its treatment of American POWs and the forced "re-education" of millions of South Vietnamese since 1975, was to provide consulting services on dealing with recalcitrant elements and "re-educating" the Grenadian "masses."

Finally, of course, there was the huge airport under construction at Point Salines, which when fully operational would have been capable of handling the largest military aircraft in the Soviet and Cuban arsenals. It had a clear economic dimension, for it would have enabled Grenada to entice those Western European and American tourists whose foreign exchange it badly needed. But the NJM also saw it as a magnificent military asset that would enhance Grenada's value to Cuba and the Soviet Union. There is little doubt that eventually the airport would have been used regularly by Cuban and Soviet aircraft, making the United States' overall strategic position in the eastern Caribbean far more vulnerable.

Grenada's Foreign Policy

Curious for a country of Grenada's miniscule size and geographical location away from the major crossroads of international politics, the NJM launched an activist, global foreign policy it described as "proletarian internationalism." Its four key components were close political and military identification with the U.S.S.R, Cuba, and Nicaragua; support for pro-Soviet, Marxist political movements in the Caribbean and beyond; a strong anti-Israeli stance combined with the assiduous pursuit of the goodwill of Arab states, especially Libya and Syria; and cultivation of economic ties with Western Europe, Canada, and the United States, in the hope that capitalist money in the form of tourism, trade, foreign aid, and international loans might be tricked into financing the ongoing Leninist revolution.

While aligning itself politically with the West's enemies, the Bishop regime tried to secure Western economic cooperation. It exploited Grenada's ties to Great Britain as a member of the Commonwealth and a former colony to seek British technical and economic aid, and similar support from Canada and the European Economic Community (EEC). Moreover, the NJM took advantage of reservoirs of anti-Americanism in the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe to portray itself as a beleaguered victim of American imperialism.

Within the United States itself, the NJM was successful in developing a strong pro-Bishop lobby. Among the captured "Grenada Papers" is a telephone book containing the names of valuable contacts and trusted supporters in the United States; it is one of the few items not released to the public, supposedly to protect the privacy of those involved. A top assistant to Rep. Ronald V. Dellums (D-Cal.), Ms. Barbara Lee, sent reports on the activities of anti-Communist Grenadian political dissidents in the United States to the NJM. Bishop sympathizers with access to influential black groups such as the Black Caucus and Transafrica played a role in the invitation which both of these organizations extended to Bishop to visit the United States.⁷

The Bishop regime eventually learned what North Vietnam learned in the 1960s: that the Achilles heel of U.S. foreign policy might be the open nature of American society and, in particular, the news media. As Maurice Bishop prepared to depart on his trip to the United States in June of 1983, he was briefed by Gail Reed, the U.S.-born wife of Cuba's Ambassador to Grenada, Julian Torres Rizo, who obviously knew the United States quite well.⁸ On the basis of her advice, Bishop portrayed himself quite successfully to the U.S. media as a populist social reformer eager for American friendship and tourists. Following Ms. Reed's advice, Bishop also contacted, immediately upon his arrival in Washington, Ramon Parodi, head of the Cuban Interests Section, who advised him extensively on the bureaucratic ins-and-outs of the

National Security Council in preparation for his meeting with National Security Advisor William P. Clark and Under Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam.

Was Bishop's meeting with the National Security Advisor indicative of a desire to loosen the ties with the Soviet Union and move closer to the United States? There is no evidence to support such speculation, but much to suggest that it was a tactical move designed to give his regime some badly needed economic and political breathing space, both domestically and internationally. Within Grenada the economic situation was deteriorating, the regime's popularity was sagging, and members of the ruling Politburo were beginning to suggest that Bishop himself was to blame for the revolution's stalling. More than ever before, Grenada needed American tourists and, as a precondition for this, a better image in the United States. A *detente* with the Reagan administration would serve these purposes, and might even lead to the United States dropping its opposition to International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans to Grenada. In his meetings with U.S. officials, Bishop pressed for the "normalization of relations" and exchange of ambassadors.⁹ The Reagan administration was understandably cool to these overtures. As both Clark and Dam told Bishop, actions were more important than words, and Bishop had taken no action to indicate a genuine desire to move away from the Soviet bloc. The "normalization" of relations for which Bishop was so eager would have sent the American people the wrong signal; it would have suggested, as Bishop and his comrades were counting on it to do, that there were no dangerous developments in Grenada of serious concern to the U.S. national interest. Bishop's proposals were a one-way street which would have enabled him to continue his pro-Soviet course and his militarization of the island, with the added benefits of IMF loans and U.S. tourists and trade.

Grenada's Relationship to Soviet Strategy

The Soviet Union's strategy of "gradualistic opportunism" in Grenada was cautious. Having been as surprised as the United States by the ease with which Bishop came to power, the Soviets quickly realized the character of Grenada as a low-risk investment with tremendous potential for a large payoff. Had Bishop or his successor, Bernard Coard, completed the island's militarization and consolidated a Leninist regime, it would have become very costly for the United States to destroy it, and the Soviets would have acquired a most valuable client state in America's strategic backyard at a very low cost. Aware of American sensitivities, the Soviets proceeded carefully, shipping the bulk of their military supplies through Cuba, counting on other East bloc surrogates to supplement their own assistance, and avoiding unnecessarily alarming gestures that might have given the Reagan administration justification for a tough response. Thus, when Bishop visited Moscow in April

of 1983, Yuri Andropov made a point of not seeing him, much to the Grenadian's annoyance. The Soviets also explicitly did not provide financial aid towards the construction of the airport, with Foreign Minister Gromyko agreeing with the Grenadians on the obvious advantages of getting the IMF or another Western source to pay for it. The Soviets clearly downplayed state-to-state links with Grenada, preferring what they called "party-to-party" relations. The latter were a subtler, more discreet mechanism than the former, insofar as they received less attention from the international media, yet, given the Party's control over the State, they were equally effective as an instrument of foreign policy.

In a most revealing report to the NJM leadership dated 11 July 1983, Grenada's Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., W. Richard Jacobs, explained: "The Soviets have been burnt quite often in the past by giving support to Governments which have either squandered that support, or turned around and become agents of imperialism, or lost power. One is reminded of Egypt, Somalia, Ghana and Peru. They are therefore very careful, and for us sometimes maddeningly slow, in making up their minds about who to support. They have decided to support us for two main reasons. 1. Cuba has strongly championed our cause. 2. They are genuinely impressed with our management of the economy and state affairs in general."¹⁰

The Ambassador went on to articulate what must have been in the minds of other top NJM leaders: in order to receive from Moscow the economic support and political attention they craved, they would have to become valuable as a force for drawing other states and revolutionary groups into the Soviet orbit: "By itself, Grenada's distance from the USSR, and its small size, would mean that we would figure in a very minute way in the USSR's global relationships. Our revolution has to be viewed as a world-wide process with its original roots in the Great October Revolution. For Grenada to assume a position of increasingly greater importance, we have to be seen as influencing at least regional events. We have to establish ourselves as the authority on events in at least the English-speaking Caribbean, and be the sponsor of revolutionary activity and progressive developments in this region at least. . . . The twice per year meetings with the progressive and revolutionary parties in the region is therefore critical to the development of closer relations with the USSR. In order to keep both the Embassy and the Soviets informed of the outcome of such meetings, perhaps a good model would be for a member of the CC [Central Committee] to pay a visit to the USSR after each such meeting. The mission of such a person could without difficulty be mixed with other activities. We must ensure though that we become the principal point of access to the USSR for all these groups even to the point of having our Embassy serve as their representative while in the USSR."¹¹

The Soviets, presciently as it turned out, worried about those Caribbean states that were alarmed by Grenada's course, and the possibility of a regional military effort against the Grenadian regime. Both the Soviets and the

Grenadian Ambassador agreed that the best way to neutralize such a threat would be through the classic tactics of peaceful coexistence, non-aggression pacts and other conciliatory diplomatic overtures. One should remember that this diplomatic offensive was to be pursued in tandem with a strategy of support for revolutionary and antidemocratic movements in those same countries whose governments were to be reassured of Grenada's friendly intentions: "Equally important is our relationship with those neighbours who the Soviets regard as our potential adversaries. We have not been making a big deal of the Regional Defence Force but the Soviets never fail to mention that to their mind this is one of the most serious future dangers that we face. It is perhaps possible to use the CC [Central Committee] on some kind of good-will mission to the other islands as a preliminary to the signing of some type of treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with them. It seems to me too, that we need to maintain a high diplomatic profile in these islands."¹²

The Ambassador pinpointed two countries, which because of their economic weakness and political instability, would be vulnerable to efforts on Grenada's part to push them into a closer alignment with the Soviet Union: "Of all the regional possibilities, the most likely candidate for special attention is Surinam. If we can be an overwhelming influence on Surinam's international behaviour, then our importance in the Soviet scheme of things will be greatly enhanced. To the extent that we can take credit for bringing any other country into the progressive fold, our prestige and influence would be greatly enhanced. Another candidate is Belize. I think that we need to do some more work in that country."¹³

One of the ways in which the Soviets applied in Grenada the lessons they learned in Egypt, Somalia, and Peru in the 1970s was by pursuing a policy of "multiple channels." Instead of relying exclusively on Bishop, they cultivated ties with Bernard Coard and other NJM leaders as well. They also pressed the NJM to "institutionalize" its rule through a well-organized Party that would control effectively the key instruments of power. If Bishop ever decided to sever the Soviet connection, as Sadat of Egypt or Barre of Somalia had done, or if he became incapable of consolidating a pro-Soviet dictatorship in Grenada, the Soviets would then have "multiple channels" through which to exert their influence and still achieve their objectives. The Soviets clearly were more comfortable with Coard than Bishop. Because of his charisma and popularity, Bishop was bound to feel less dependent for his power on the U.S.S.R., and hence be less reliable from the Soviets' viewpoint, than a dour *apparatchik* such as Coard.¹⁴

As Grenada's economic troubles mounted during the late summer of 1983, and popular dissatisfaction with the revolution increased, a bitter power struggle broke out among the top NJM leadership. Coard successfully outmaneuvered Bishop at the Party's Central Committee meeting on 12 October and had

Bishop stripped of the office of Prime Minister and placed under house arrest. While no evidence of direct complicity has surfaced, the Soviets did not seem displeased with the turn of events. Bishop himself, in his last days, spoke with great fear of an "Afghanistan Solution" and an "Afghan line."¹⁵ On 19 October, after a group of his followers freed him from his home, Bishop led the crowd to Fort Rupert, where they seized a vast store of weapons and began to make preparations to retake the government. The counter-coup, however, was ruthlessly cut short by Bernard Coard and his loyal ally, Hudson Austin, commander of Grenada's armed forces, who dispatched troops and several Soviet-built armored cars to the Fort. After firing indiscriminately on the crowd, Coard's forces captured Bishop and his closest followers and executed them on the spot. Several hundred other Grenadians were also killed or wounded. A 24-hour, "shoot-on-sight" curfew was proclaimed, and all travel and communication links with the outside world were cut off. Six days later, on 25 October, the United States and several members of the OECS invaded Grenada.

Lessons for the Future

Before addressing the long-term strategic and political lessons of Grenada, it is important to note some of the immediate implications. A radical, pro-Soviet regime was removed from the heart of the Caribbean. The Soviet bloc was humiliated, and Cuba reined in; on 26 October, Surinam's strongman Desi Bouterse ordered over 100 Cuban advisors out of his country. The successful U.S. action dealt a psychological blow to Castro and to pro-Castro political movements throughout the Caribbean. Given the almost mystical significance which Marxist-Leninists ascribe to "the correlation of forces" and "the tide of history," it was appropriate to sow doubts about whether history was on the side of Castro and the Soviet Union. Moreover, the United States sent the U.S.S.R. a long-overdue signal of its continuing strategic concern over Soviet penetration in the Caribbean.

The long-term lessons are also significant.

The Importance of Timely, Decisive Action. The bloody events of 19-25 October provided the United States and its Caribbean allies with a "window of opportunity." In international politics, time is often of the essence. It was important to act while the memories of the Coard faction's atrocities were still fresh, and the regime was weak and unsure of itself. Had the United States waited, this "window of opportunity" would have contracted and eventually disappeared.

The Usefulness of Selectively Applied, Overwhelming Military Force as a Regular Instrument of American Foreign Policy. The invasion may not have comported

with a strict reading of Defense Secretary Weinberger's standards for the use of force insofar as Grenada was not a "vital national interest."¹⁶ Yet, if one keeps in mind the dynamics of the Soviet strategy of "gradualistic opportunism" it is apparent that, given its low cost, the invasion was an appropriately selective, flexible use of military power which yielded important benefits to the United States and its allies in the Western Hemisphere.

Moreover, this time, unlike the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the United States set out from the start with *overwhelming force* for the purpose of incapacitating the adversary's forces. This Clausewitzian strategy obviously worked. As Harvard analyst Samuel Huntington has observed, the use of overwhelming force meant that no amount of tactical errors and shortcomings on the part of U.S. forces would endanger the ultimate achievement of U.S. objectives.¹⁷

The Difficulty of Dealing with Pro-Soviet Leninist Regimes in the Third World. Had the NJM not committed the rather unusual mistake of cannibalizing itself, it is likely that today the United States would face a heavily armed, pro-Soviet Grenada, actively drawing other states and political movements in the region towards the Soviet Union. Since the United States cannot count on always having the same good fortune it had in Grenada, it has to take seriously the difficulties posed by such regimes and look for ways to overcome them. First, the United States must realize the near impossibility of co-opting pro-Soviet Leninist regimes through economic instruments. Unlike many Western statesmen, Bishop and his comrades believed in the primacy of politics over economics. While eager for economic aid from the EEC, the United States and the IMF, they were determined to prevent those economic relations from altering their political and military alignment with the Soviet bloc. Nor were they about to allow economic ties between the West and Grenada to erode their domestic political dictatorship.¹⁸

Second, these regimes are most skillful in the realm of propaganda, public diplomacy, and psychological warfare. The success with which Bishop portrayed himself in the U.S. and Western European media as a populist reformer is illustrative of this, as were Grenada's efforts to "normalize" diplomatic relations with the United States and its Caribbean allies while it was covertly pursuing pro-Soviet policies in the region.

The Need for a Long-term Political and Economic Strategy in the Caribbean. The NJM's 1979 coup was made possible by two factors common to all the Caribbean states: economic weakness and political instability. These problems continue to afflict Caribbean societies, including Grenada, where in the free elections held in 1984 Sir Eric Gairy won a disturbingly large minority of the popular vote (30 percent). The United States needs a coherent

economic strategy to help promote economic development in the region. The further opening of American markets to Caribbean goods contemplated in President Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative is only a hesitant preliminary step that needs to be complemented by other, more active initiatives. Among these could be technical programs aimed at building an adequate infrastructure of roads, airport and shipping facilities, schools, and hospitals. This infrastructure, in turn, would enable the islands to attract foreign investment and tourism, and develop their economies. The current high unemployment rates throughout most of the Caribbean island states are a persistent invitation to political demagoguery and instability.

In addition, the United States needs an active political strategy to promote the strengthening of the still fragile democratic institutions and practices bequeathed to the English-speaking Caribbean states by England. Through the National Endowment for Democracy, the U.S. Information Agency, and private sector organizations such as the American Bar Association, the United States can play a constructive role in encouraging pro-democratic political forces in the Caribbean which, over the long term, represent the best deterrent against a future repetition of the Grenadian tragedy.

The Importance of Maintaining the United States' International Economic Power and Influence. American strategy in the 1980s and 90s needs to be cognizant of what I would term the Eisenhower Doctrine: the view that American national security and influence in world affairs depends as much on economic as on military power. This is as true in 1987 as it was in 1952. One of the United States' most effective weapons against Bishop was the use of American influence in multilateral economic organizations such as the IMF to deny Grenada the loans it badly wanted. It played no small role in the regime's economic difficulties and the internecine struggle to which such difficulties eventually propelled it.

Looking to the future, the United States should strive, as part of its overall global strategy, to maintain its domestic economic strength and the influence in international economic institutions that derives from such strength. This means several things. Firstly, the growing needs of the military budget should not be addressed without regard for its impact on the federal budget deficit and the relationship of that deficit to the economy's competitiveness and strength. Difficult decisions will be called for to balance carefully the requirements of military readiness with the need for a sound national economy.

Secondly, the United States should continue to pursue a policy of energy independence, while explicitly shifting its energy import needs from Middle East countries to more reliable, friendlier sources such as Canada and Mexico. Two of Bishop's sources of economic aid were Iraq and Libya, states whose economic and political power depend directly on the power of OPEC

in the international economy. One of the U.S. goals should be the weakening of the OPEC cartel. Few steps would be as damaging to the pro-terrorist regimes of Libya, Syria and Iraq, and to the Third World Leninist states they often support. And there are few instruments as effective in bringing about OPEC's slow demise as a determined American policy that lessens U.S. energy dependence on foreign sources in general and on OPEC in particular. In this context, it is disturbing that in 1986 the United States consumed 40 percent more imported oil than in the previous year, and that in early 1987 the Reagan administration at one point was seriously considering halting further purchases for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and selling some of the Reserve's supplies.¹⁹

The United States Should Not Allow International Criticism to Demoralize It or to Becloud Its Understanding of Its Global Responsibilities. The United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS), and many Western European allies condemned the American invasion of Grenada. It would be wrong for the United States to lash back at such criticism, as if all the critics were uniformly anti-American or totally unsympathetic with the United States' predicament. While the votes of the Soviet bloc and some Third World states represented just such attitudes, many other states voted against the United States on the basis of principles and motives which the United States can respect, even if it ultimately disagrees with their specific application. The members of the OAS and the British Commonwealth, for example, consider the principle of nonintervention very important as a pillar of their own national security; they believe that the precedent of condoning armed intervention is dangerous because it could be used by one of their own powerful neighbors against them in future regional disputes. Some of the governments that condemned the U.S. action also did so for the less elevated, but politically understandable, motive of appeasing powerful left-wing constituencies at home. Many international lawyers in the United States and elsewhere were also skeptical or outright critical of the invasion, even if there were a few, like Eugene Rostow, who reminded his colleagues that "international law is not a suicide pact."²⁰

The invasion was morally defensible. In view of the military helplessness and political vulnerability of the Caribbean ministates, the gradual military buildup in Grenada and Bishop's sponsorship of revolutionary, subversive activities in the region represented a threat of growing intensity. When Bishop was murdered and replaced by an even more radical faction, the threat's potential reached an even higher level. A decision by the OECS members to wait until Grenada actually overthrew one of their own governments or engaged in overt hostile action against them would have been impractical. Had Grenada reached its goal of a 10,000-man army, had its forces acquired the direct support of Cuban and Soviet air power, and had it

acquired another close regional ally through its sponsorship of internal revolution within another Caribbean state, its neighbors would have been hard put to contain it or to prevent it from pressuring them into closer cooperation with the Cuban-Soviet axis.

When the hour of decision strikes, the United States must act, cognizant of its global responsibilities and guided by a much broader moral and strategic calculus than that which our critics would impose on us. If the votes of Great Britain and Canada were shaped by their concern for the Commonwealth's abstract unity, it is because both countries are essentially regional powers with sharply limited global responsibilities. The United States, on the other hand, carries most of the burden of upholding the global balance of power, as well as the historic responsibility of shifting the correlation of forces against the West's adversaries whenever and wherever it is feasible and appropriate to do so. Similarly, the United States could not take the OAS's concern for non-intervention as seriously as its own concerns and those of Grenada's immediate neighbors over the prospects of increasing subversion, intimidation, and the spread of Cuban-Soviet influence. Finally, the admittedly valid issues raised by many international lawyers had to be embraced by an even broader moral and legal calculus that took into consideration the brutal and undemocratic nature of the Coard regime, the threat it posed to other Caribbean states, the limited duration of the American presence in Grenada, and the strenuous efforts to reduce to a minimum civilian casualties and collateral damage during the military operation. While enduring the criticism of allies and friends with respect for their judgment, the United States must carry out its obligations with the requisite determination and skill. We should remember that, at the end of the day, the global and regional correlation of military, political and economic forces is a far more powerful deterrent to the West's adversaries than the approval or disapproval of international organizations. This is one of the main lessons of Grenada, as well as a major reason Grenada was, and continues to be, important.

Notes

1. Mark Falcoff, "The Cuban Revolution and the United States: A Longer Perspective," Mark Falcoff, ed., *Small Countries, Large Issues*, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1984), pp. 1-12; see also Pamela Falk, *Cuban Foreign Policy* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985); and Edward Gonzalez, "The Cuban and Soviet Challenge in the Caribbean Basin," *Orbis*, Spring 1985, pp. 73-94.

2. The bulk of the sources for my study of Grenada's communist regime comes from the large store of government documents captured by U.S. forces on the island. Two excellent collections of these documents have appeared so far: Paul Scabury and Walter A. McDougall, eds., *The Grenada Papers* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1984); and Jiri Valenta and Herbert J. Ellison, eds., *Grenada and Soviet-Cuban Policy: Internal Crisis and U.S.-OECS Intervention*, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986). The original documents are presently available for study at the National Archives in Washington, D.C.

3. "Report of the delegation sent to Grenada by the America Department with the aim of starting the gathering of sources for the characterization of the religious situation in the country, and the contacts for further cooperation between the PCC and the NJM regarding the question," dated 13-24 August, 1982, in *The Grenada Papers*, pp. 133-141.

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4. Stanley Arthur, "Grenada and East Caribbean Security," *Conflict Studies*, no. 177, 1985, p. 20.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
7. For a look at some of the activities of the pro-Bishop lobby in the United States, see the documents in *The Grenada Papers*, pp. 153-171.
8. *The Grenada Papers*, pp. 172-174.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 178-180. Among the captured documents is an unsigned and undated set of notes, presumably prepared for Maurice Bishop, suggesting tactics to be adopted in his meeting with U.S. National Security Advisor Clark, and warning Bishop that "the psychological struggle will be fierce, but, of course, very sophisticated. We must definitely win that struggle." *The Grenada Papers*, pp. 175-177, at 176.
10. *The Grenada Papers*, pp. 200-201. Ambassador Jacobs sent copies of his report to Maurice Bishop, Bernard Coard, Foreign Minister Unison Whitchman, and NJM Politburo member Ewart Layne.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 207-208.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 208.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Jiri and Virginia Valenta, "Leninism in Grenada," *Grenada and Soviet-Cuban Policy: Internal Crisis and U.S.-OECIS Intervention*, pp. 3-37.
15. See "Noted on the Political Bureau Meeting of 12 October 1983" and "Letter from Vincent Noel to Central Committee," dated 17 October 1983, in *The Grenada Papers*, pp. 320, 331.
16. "We should engage our troops only if we must do so as a matter of our own vital national interest. We cannot assume for other sovereign nations the responsibility to defend their territory—without their strong invitation—when our own freedom is not threatened." Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power" (based on remarks to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 28 November 1984), in *Defense*, January 1985, pp. 1-7, at 4.
17. Samuel P. Huntington, "Playing To Win," *The National Interest*, Spring 1986, p. 15.
18. ". . . Grenada illustrates the often displayed willingness of the Soviets and Cubans to allow client states to draw upon Western sources of aid. Although one school of foreign policy thinking holds that such aid can be used to wean Marxist regimes away from the Soviet Union, this is not what the Soviets and Cubans believe. They regard the political order as utterly fundamental to the ideological identity of a given regime . . . Such terms as "normalization of relations" or "ideological pluralism" mask a careful understanding of the sources of political power. This indicates a lesson for U.S.-Cuban relations as important as any that could have been derived from the brief episode of Leninism in Grenada. Mark Falcoff, "Bishop's Cuba, Castro's Grenada: Notes Toward an Inner History," *Grenada and Soviet-Cuban Policy: Internal Crisis and U.S.-OECIS Intervention*, p. 74.
19. In January 1987 the U.S. Department of Energy acknowledged that the decline in U.S. production in 1986 was over 700,000 barrels a day, compared with a previously estimated decline of 200,000. Meanwhile, some analysts were forecasting a rise in oil imports to a level above 50 percent of U.S. consumption by 1990. *Barron's*, 20 April, 1987, pp. 9, 36.
20. Eugene V. Rostow, "Law is not a Suicide Pact," *The New York Times*, 15 November 1983, Sec. A, p. 35. The strongest case for the legal appropriateness of the United States' action has been put forth in John Norton Moore, *Law and the Grenada Mission* (Charlottesville, Va.: Center for Law and National Security, 1984). See also John Norton Moore, "Grenada and the International Double Standard," *American Journal of International Law*, v. 78, 1984, pp. 145-168. For a critique of the invasion, see Christopher C. Joyner, "Reflections on the Lawfulness of Invasion," *American Journal of International Law*, v. 78, 1984, pp. 131-144.

