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
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PROFESSIONAL READING



“The main strategic aim of the ‘maritime alliance’ must be to keep Russia in the landlocked position that has always handicapped her. This means commanding the sea-lanes of the world, notably the chokepoints through which not only Russian but most major shipping must pass.”

Clark G. Reynolds

Gray, Colin S. *Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Defense of the West*. New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1986. 81pp. \$8.95

If Julian Corbett, Herbert Richmond, or even Alfred Thayer Mahan could be restored to life long enough to read this book, they would no doubt simply pass it off as all too familiar stuff (except, of course, for the nuclear dimension). For as strategic pundits of the early 20th century, they spoke and wrote the very same language as Colin Gray. Trouble is, the verities of that exceedingly fruitful era of strategic philosophy have long since been eclipsed by the dramas of two world wars and high-tech weaponry.

Unlike his intellectual forebears, however, Gray does not approach the subject from a historical perspective; quite the reverse. He attacks the problems facing Western strategy-makers on generally contemporary grounds, carefully and painstakingly considering each school of strategic thought, weighing their strengths, illusions, misconceptions, and prospects before tipping his own historical hand at the finish by invoking Corbett’s

Dr. Reynolds received his doctorate in history from Duke University. He has taught at the U.S. Naval Academy, the University of Maine, and the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy. He writes widely in the fields of strategy and naval history. His books include *The Fast Carriers*, *Command of the Sea*, and *Famous American Admirals*. Dr. Reynolds is currently writing a biography of Admiral John H. Towers for the Naval Institute Press.

treatment of Napoleon and Nelson. Indeed, he argues, correctly in my opinion, "To date there has been too much theory and too little careful historical study or future-oriented middle and end-game analysis of the 'trailing edge' of prolonged conflict on all sides of the seapower-landpower debate."

Conclusion: "Superior seapower, protected by a sufficient strategic-nuclear counterdeterrent, is a prerequisite for the basic national security of an insular contemporary United States, as it was for the Britain of the Napoleonic era and well beyond. Then as now, however, success at sea needs to be married to competence on land."

In making his case Gray restores "geopolitics" as a respectable term—long tainted by the Nazi use of it via Karl Haushofer—in order to identify and explain the United States as a "continental-size" strategic island, whose strengths lie in her geographical position. For America's "oceanic trade (and power projection) routes of the world are the lines of internal communication of the U.S.-led maritime alliance." By contrast, Soviet Russia is a continental state, just as Imperial Russia was when geopolitician Halford Mackinder hailed her "heartland" as the key to control of the Eurasian "world island" and hence of the world.

Such a dichotomy seems almost trite, except that, as Gray demonstrates, it has been oversimplified and thus misunderstood by many recent schools of strategic thought. For example, argue the unilateralists and neoisolationists, the United States would be stronger and safer by acting alone or pulling back to her own shores to be a Fortress America. Instead, says Gray, America is a true world island whose strength and prosperity depend upon a global system of sea-lanes to friends, allies, client states, and markets whose support provides the outer defensive works. The guts of Gray's thesis is that this system will flourish only through the conscious practice of an *active* forward containment policy.

Such a dynamic application of containment is in direct opposition to the *passive*, defensive mind-set which has acted since the 1950s as a doctrinal straitjacket on American foreign and defense policy. Gray's view is a fresh one, articulating the perspective of a new generation of strategic thinkers less inhibited by the historical shock waves generated by Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, McCarthyism, the China tangle, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. To advance his views, however, Gray has first had to "gore the oxen of several schools of thought on U.S. national military strategy."

Most significantly, controlled nuclear escalation and NATO's strategy of flexible response have lost any credibility or military utility they might have once had. Since the prospect of thermonuclear devastation appeals to no one, "strategic air and missile power. . . must responsibly be regarded as a counterdeterrent, not as a reliable equalizer for theater defense deficiencies."

No longer the sword of the Republic, says Gray, nuclear weapons have been

relegated to the status of shield, albeit an indispensable one. He sees vertical escalation following upon reverses in a conventional Soviet attack in Europe as a fictional option that would backfire on the United States and NATO.

Nor would such miracle technology as promised by the SDI be likely to change the situation—unless, somehow, it “is able to produce some close facsimile of a leakproof ‘astrodome,’ and the Soviet defense network cannot.” This is a welcome position; someone has finally had the intellectual courage to say flatly that SDI is a thinly-veiled scheme to create a defensive deterrent, not unlike the ABM system, or the Maginot Line or even the Great Wall of China; throughout history, defensive deterrents have never really deterred.

This part of Gray’s argument is therefore aimed at the material strategists who see salvation in the high-tech hardware of our times rather than in sound, time-honored strategic principles. The strategic bombing chestnut has finally run its course, “Nuclear deemphasis,” says he, “is no longer a matter of choice.”

Fortunately, and Gray hammers home his thesis, “the global maritime alliance led by the United States has a markedly superior option as an alternative to the nuclear crutch. In principle at least, the West has the political, economic, and geostrategic assets, bound together and sustained by superior maritime strength, to compel the unstable empire of the Soviet Union, with its potentially very fractious minorities at home, and its sullen, even hostile, satellites abroad, to wage a prolonged non-nuclear war that Moscow should not anticipate being able to win.”

What Gray advocates is putting the principle into practice. Instead of contemplating the short war now assumed by many, he believes that Western strategists must convince Russia that any conflict begun in Europe will be both a long war and a global one. The main strategic aim of the “maritime alliance” must be to keep Russia in the landlocked position that has always handicapped her. This means commanding the sea-lanes of the world, notably the chokepoints through which not only Russian but most major shipping must pass.

Conventional American and allied land, sea, and air power should be employed in shoring up the peripheral lands (or Rimland, as Nicholas Spykman called it four decades ago) which deny the Soviet Union control of the Eurasian coastal ports and egress therefrom to the open sea. Holding the northern flank of Norway as set forth in the U.S. Navy’s current Maritime Strategy is one aspect of this. In this way, the West denies Russia the ability to undertake a “maritime siege” of the Americas, launched from captured ports.

The defense of Western Europe remains the primary strategic aim, and for this reason Gray insists that “it is politically essential and militarily efficient for NATO-Europe to provide the overwhelming majority of the ready and

rapidly mobilizable ground forces for local defense." The Western Europeans must not expect to rely on U.S. reinforcements to halt a sudden Russian offensive, a completely unfeasible undertaking. He consequently castigates the U.S. Army for following a doctrine built around the prospect of its fighting on the Central Front; the Army's "forward garrisons located and sized by what amounts to a political gridlock contribute to inflexibility in posture and policy."

Whether or not NATO armies can survive a Russian juggernaut, pro-Western military might must be expected to attack on a global scale, on all Russian flanks "in places and times of its own choosing"—in northern and southern Europe, as well as Africa and especially East Asia. Gray alludes several times to China as possibly contributing to this counterattack, but he does so only half-heartedly and this is the greatest shortcoming of his argument. The 'Mongol horde' which ravaged the Russias many centuries ago remains the greatest immediate fear of the Russian people and government. In my view, that source of immense conventional military force and manpower must be exploited to the full and not merely seen as the "security-tie dalliance" which Gray assigns it.

Gray's program in fact is the resurrected and time-tested strategy of concentration practiced most successfully by Britain during the 18th and early 19th centuries and by the Anglo-American alliances of the 20th. That is, while the navy wins absolute control of the sea—isolating and blockading the continental enemy's homeland (and, in World War II, air forces winning control of the air, for bombing)—a major allied army or coalition of armies invades and defeats the enemy army. Russia today, Gray observes, has assumed the strategic role of Napoleonic France and of Imperial and Nazi Germany (to which I would add Japan, whose main armies were neutralized by the Communist Chinese and Russian Armies in 1944-45). Gray argues that between Hiroshima and the mid-1960s, Western superiority in nuclear weapons provided the substitute for an effective allied continental army. But with the nuclear option now strategically impotent, a superior conventional army (and tactical air force) has again become a fundamental prerequisite for the success of the Western maritime strategy.

Crucial to Gray's grand strategy for the West is his perception of the enemy. He seems convinced—probably correctly—that Soviet Russia is committed primarily to a defensive strategy, i.e., the survival of the Soviet state, the party, and the homeland itself. Hence its reluctance to engage in a mutually-destructive thermonuclear exchange (arguments he could have strengthened by drawing on recent essays by Michael MccGwire). He sees little difference in this respect between tsarist and communist Russia. Arguable, however, is his belief that "the motives for outward pressure [are] endemic in the domestic stability requirements of that system."

If he means that Russia entertains an inevitable quest for territory, he contradicts himself. Beyond filling out the occupation of her continent to the eastward in the same manner as the United States did to the westward, both during the last century, Russia has never aspired to the complete conquest of the Eurasian landmass or to overseas colonial expansion. The use of foreign ports of call or even having minor allies like Cuba does not an empire make. What is different about the present Communist police state is that it has sought buffer zones—Eastern Europe, North Korea, (North) Vietnam, Afghanistan—to insure both external and internal security.

To be hostile to the United States does not mean, inferentially, that expansionism is endemic to the Russian system. *Drang nach Osten* and *Lebensraum* were the “geopolitical excuses of a constricted German state for which time was running out as Russia finally matured into the colossus which, unless stopped by Germany, would supplant her as the major continental European superpower. By contrast, Russia, by gaining Eastern Europe, eliminated the German menace and is determined to maintain her dominance there. The overrunning of the rest of Europe is not the cornerstone of Soviet strategy, although, as Gray admits, Russia would certainly welcome Western Europe into her political-economic sphere.

The suspect reliability of the buffer states and subject peoples, Gray strongly infers, is a distinct weakness in the Soviet security system and therefore an asset to a Western strategy of a prolonged war. This is a highly questionable assumption in that it is devoid of solid historical precedent or contemporary evidence. Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan provide dramatic examples of just how effective absolute police controls over native as well as subject peoples can be during a long war and in spite of serious economic deprivation, social disruption, and aerial bombardment. Even the avowed American war aim of unconditional surrender played into the hands of Herr Goebbels in convincing the people to fight to the death for “the Fatherland.” So too did Stalin recast World War II into the “Great Patriotic War” for “Mother” Russia. Authoritarian ideology, that rhetorical facade of modern tyrants, is easily laid aside in the sacred cause of “home” defense.

The question is a major one addressed by neither Gray nor the other schools of strategy that he “gores.” What would the war aim of the West be? Should it be announced now, in order to enhance our deterrence credibility? And what reaction would it generate among our allies and enemies?

If past American practice is any guide, that war aim will be the elimination of the Communist system in Russia. Woodrow Wilson insisted on, and got, a democratic revolution inside Germany before he would negotiate an armistice (surrender) with any German government in 1918. So too the defeated Fascist regimes of the 1940s were dismantled and supplanted by American-style democracy. Such an avowed goal might stiffen police control inside Russia, or it might have the Wilsonian effect of rallying the people of

Eurasia to our side. These are matters so essential to the shaping of Western strategy that they must be addressed directly.

The notion of controlling and stopping a Russo-American ground war in Eurasia is an extremely doubtful possibility. A limited war for short-term gains cannot be reconciled with the mortal animosity between two foes battling for the minds of men. Furthermore, high-tech weapons, conventional as well as nuclear, have a momentum all their own. Decades of "cold" warring, dating at least from the Red scares of 1919, have accumulated deep frustrations on both sides that, once unleashed, will simply disallow compromise.

Yet, the greatest weapon of superpower America is its eminently-exportable liberal-capitalistic ideals with their universal appeal to individualism and the human spirit. These can and do work over time in reshaping global attitudes just as they did in creating the American Republic. The most viable strategy for realizing this long-term goal is the very maritime strategy advocated by Colin Gray. His monograph should be mandatory reading for any intelligent discussion about Western strategic options for the foreseeable future.

Gregor, A. James. *The China Connection: U.S. Policy and the People's Republic of China*. Stanford, Calif.: The Hoover Institution Press, 1986. 280pp. \$7

Since the early 1970s, enthusiasm for the "China connection" in the United States has taken on the proportions of a growth industry. Entrepreneurs expect access to the world's largest single market; practitioners of academia establish exchange programs with a gusto that rivals an NFL linebacker blitzing a quarterback; America's farmers see China as a relief valve for their burgeoning surplus; and U.S. soldiers, sailors and airmen have entered into sustained contact with the world's largest military establishment. However, the mismatch between our expectations of what an abiding

relationship with China will yield and what we have realized to date, is perhaps even larger than it was in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Perhaps it is for this reason that The Hoover Institution selected the U.S.-China "connection" as the subject for the first volume in its U.S. Foreign Policy Series. The goal of this endeavor is a "clear, cogent analysis" of U.S. interests and involvement in key countries and regions of the world. It is against this yardstick as well as that of the mismatch between expectation and realization that Professor Gregor's work should be measured.

His monograph is organized and informative for the reader who is not familiar with the subject. After a brief overview of China's land and its people, Gregor sketches the history of

U.S. involvement with China and the creation of the PRC. Successive chapters deal with the development of the PRC's foreign policy through 1969 and rapprochement with the United States. To his everlasting credit, Gregor shuns the shibboleth of "the China card." Instead, he conveys the sense that the United States and PRC forged their current linkage in the crucible of geopolitics and that the Sino-American rapprochement grew just as much from strategic necessity as political opportunity.

Gregor then spends a good deal of time examining the PRC as a "security asset." After a brief description of the U.S.S.R.'s view of the geostrategic environment, he considers the conventional and nuclear capabilities of the PRC as well as Western arms sales to China. Although it is difficult to analyze U.S. interests and involvement in China without considering the competitive nature of the Sino-Soviet relationship, it probably deserves more attention than it gets in this book. In the same fashion, Gregor also does not do justice to the Sino-Japanese relationship and its impact on his subject. Japan cannot help but wonder if China's dealings with the United States suggest that the PRC's reconciliation with the West is more tactical than substantive. However, his treatment of the Taiwan issue is measured and informative.

If there is, as some suggest, a cyclical tradition in Chinese history, then China never changes but only reworks its form. Perhaps this is why the most important chapter of this

book addresses the "Transformation" of the PRC. The dominant theme in this book is the idea that China is desperately trying to consolidate its position in the international system as well as its domestic political and economic structure. That process cannot go forward without some costs of opportunity for all concerned. However, Professor Gregor is a bit optimistic over our ability to comprehend exactly what China is consolidating. Most of us remember the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. However, few Americans appreciate the shifting strategic perspectives, bureaucratic resistance, shattered institutions, concerns about militarism, and vexing bilateral policy differences that marked the PRC's formative years. The vision of thousands of Chinese students marching through the streets of Shanghai and Beijing in late 1986 raises some of these very same fundamental issues again. But of even more importance is the question that Gregor does not ask: What are the limits of these changes?

Gregor argues that the real issue for the United States is to assess the benefits and costs—strategic, economic and political—of its "China connection." His work would have been of more value than it is if he had examined in more detail how this computation would affect China's capacity to achieve the consolidation that it is seeking. The issue of strategic cooperation is one example in this regard. Though some progress has been evident, the author cautions that it is still very difficult to convert

shared interests and concerns into political and institutional mechanisms for defense cooperation, not to mention an operational military relationship. Americans need to be reminded that China has historically rejected a purely military interpretation of security. Instead, it has used a combination of psychological and political means in pursuit of its strategic goals. The current leadership in Beijing seems to recognize this and has made good use of the tactic of ambiguity to enhance China's position and not stretch the boundaries of change beyond their elastic limit.

Gregor's conclusions challenge many of our more warm and comfy notions of the importance of China. He cautions that Beijing's interests may diverge with ours as we move away from China's periphery. He argues that the PRC has the potential to work considerable mischief among our allies in East Asia. He contends that neither nation will be vital to the other's economy for the remainder of this century. Finally, he warns that maintaining the "China connection" may ultimately prove to be of secondary importance to the future policy of the United States toward the Pacific and Asia. Gregor thereby makes a strong, albeit implicit, case for the United States to avoid thinking about China as it has in the past, a past that has been marked perhaps more by myth than reality. China is a friend, not an ally. We need to recognize that as well as the fact that it probably does both of us some good to keep some daylight

between us. One final note for the reader who is not a "China hand": read this and any other book like it with the understanding that our knowledge of China, though growing day-by-day because of such work as Professor Gregor's, is still cramped by the formal, rather restricted nature of our access to its institutions.

JAMES F. GIBLIN
Captain, U.S. Navy

Olsen, Edward A. and Jurika, Stephen Jr., eds. *The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986. 368pp. \$39.50

This collection of papers was originally presented at a conference on "The Role of the Armed Forces in Contemporary Asia" held at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, in 1982. As the title suggests, the various authors focus on the domestic role of Asian armed forces in their societies.

In revising and updating the 16 papers for inclusion as book chapters, the editors sought to establish unity by having each chapter address the origin of the armed forces' status in their host society and then assess what the military is doing with the power it has accrued by virtue of that status. An extended introductory chapter by editors Olsen and Jurika establishes the framework of the book and provides a short sketch of the subsequent chapters. Those chapters are then divided geographically into East Asia, Southeast Asia,

and South Asia. In place of a conclusion, a cross-regional analysis by Sheldon Simon aggregates the specific conditions in the various Asian countries by assessing prospects for regional cooperation instead of conflict.

As might be expected in a collection that covers countries ranging from China to Afghanistan, the quality is at times uneven and the updating since 1982 has not always been thorough. Nevertheless, the book provides valuable insight into the military's role in the domestic affairs of countries which are of increasing strategic importance to the United States.

Besides Olsen, Jurika, and Simon, contributors include Douglas Pike on Vietnam, James Buck on Japan, and June Teutel Dreyer on China.

The Armed Forces in Contemporary Asian Societies would be a valuable addition to the libraries of students of Asian affairs. It also provides good background for those wishing to learn how the military influences Asian society. But, as the editors caution, leave your cultural relativism at home when you examine these disparate military structures, and the good and bad they have brought upon their nations.

R.S. CLOWARD
Captain, U.S. Navy

This compact volume by British specialists in Asian affairs does a good job as far as it goes. The trouble is, it does not go far enough. The topics included in its brief survey of major powers, medium powers, and regional issues in East and Southeast Asia are perfectly adequate, but the coverage is not. Though the book was published in 1986, the scope of data seems to terminate in 1983-84. Consequently, some of the chapters are able to withstand such evident delays in publication, while others do not fare as well. The chapters that are most seriously overtaken by events are those dealing with Korea, Australia, ASEAN, and Soviet policy. In neither the Soviet nor the Korean chapters is the 1984-86 improvement in U.S.S.R.-DPRK military ties covered. Both suffer accordingly. The Australian and ASEAN chapters are hurt by the nonexistent coverage of New Zealand's shift in nuclear policy and its consequent damage to the ANZUS Pact. The ASEAN chapter also has no coverage of the transfer of power from Marcos to Aquino and the subsequent implications for regional security. Other chapters also are weakened because of the relevance of these events to all the major powers' policies in Asia. Though leaving out the Philippine events may be understandable, depending on the actual date of publication within 1986, the absence of coverage on the other topics is a serious flaw.

As a result, what would otherwise have been a useful survey of evolving strategic affairs in the Western

Leifer, Michael, ed. *The Balance of Power in East Asia*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 157pp. \$27.50

Pacific, is not quite so useful. As one who has experienced delays in having one's work published, I can sympathize with writers' and editors' frustrations over slow publication processes. However, the fact remains that any volume on contemporary strategic affairs that is not brought reasonably up-to-date prior to publication is inevitably handicapped by its omissions. Accordingly, while this volume can be recommended for specialists who can fill in the gaps for themselves and can benefit by the British perspective on a region where Great Britain is no longer a major actor, novices in Asian security affairs need to be more cautious in assessing these analyses.

EDWARD A. OLSEN
Naval Postgraduate School

Barnaby, Frank. *The Automated Battlefield*. New York: Macmillan, 1986. 180pp. \$18.95

The vision of the automated battlefield is more aptly described as a battlespace where the opposing forces will be located, tracked and targeted by systems that employ high capacity data-links, computer-assisted intelligence evaluation, and automated fire control of weapons with pinpoint accuracy and enhanced lethality. All this occurs increasingly in real time due to the enabling factors of microelectronics and materials. This battlefield of the near future may become so lethal as to be turned over to robots and func-

tionoids. Consider the parallel accomplishments—here today—of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV) and the powerful Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS).

Frank Barnaby provides a contextual setting for a discussion of the potential and the implications of military technologies that are, for the most part, here today. Technologists lost in the trees of their art, and military practitioners who are wedded to tradition ignore this book at their peril. Futurists, explorers of warfighting concepts, and those interested in the interactions of technology and military strategy will find much to chew on.

Barnaby describes a disastrous tank battle of the future with the lament that the tankmen heeded not the warnings of the technologists. Nor could these leaders face the idea that their tanks could have been made obsolete by technological advances. Tanks are not the only potential military dinosaurs that Barnaby addresses in this book.

Automation, machines that think—functionoids, militarized robots, missiles, RPVs that operate on land, in the ocean, in the air, and in space—form the bases for the battlespace of the future. These techniques, coupled with weapons of enormously increased lethality, will force a reappraisal of tactics and procedures for waging armed conflict. The automated weapons of the future are being phased into the arsenals of the major powers and increasingly are being found in the Third World. Automation tech-

nology has an equalizing effect. Only cost slows the spread of high technology weapons. With this spread comes the spectre of nuclear (or biological) terrorism.

There is material of interest here to Army, Navy, and Air Force practitioners. Barnaby effectively explains the significance of the advances in computer technology. The reader is led to vantage points from which he can make his own assessments.

Barnaby advances the interesting idea that technology may lead to practical conventional deterrence. New technologies make defense much more cost-effective, indeed more obtainable, than offensive systems. Somehow there is a hint of a quest for technological "Maginot Lines." What is clear is that the tanker, the missileer, and the aircraft carrier proponent must continue to look for technological work-arounds on the broadest scale. Technology changes how warfare missions are carried out but not the mission itself.

There is an area about which Barnaby, a nuclear physicist, chooses to remain silent—biotechnology. It would seem that there is a parallel path where offense is incomparably more cost-effective than defense. Leaving aside the various manifestations of biological warfare, it just may be that "organic computing" may provide the size and capacity breakthrough needed to accomplish true robot warfare. The biotechnologists tell us that we are on the threshold of molecular-scale computers. These

technological changes may occur within the expected service life of present day aircraft carriers and manned bombers.

Buried in chapter six is an insightful criticism of American use of war games. Barnaby asserts that failure to consider human values has led in the past to exaggerated expectations from military approaches. That criticism might also be applied to the prognostications contained in *The Automated Battlefield*; however it is impossible to ignore the picture, hazy as it might be, of warfare in the computer age.

This book belongs on the professional military bookshelf and should be required reading for all involved in developing future force concepts and the structures to support them.

ALBERT A. BOTTOMS
Fort Belvoir, Virginia

Rallo, Joseph C. *Defending Europe in the 1990s—The New Divide of High Technology*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 136pp. \$18

Paul, Derek, ed. *Defending Europe: Options for Security*. Philadelphia, Pa.: Taylor and Francis, 1985. 351pp. \$18

Joseph C. Rallo aims to provide direction toward the feasibility of European political and economic union as a third superpower no longer grounded by American dominance. He seeks a security relationship in the European community with an enhanced role in NATO. He does not seek European union as a distinct

objective, favoring instead a "harmonization of member objectives" between governments and replacement of the outdated Common Agricultural Policy "by an equivalent commitment to a high technology industrial policy with its dual implications for defense and civilian applications." What he seeks in the Western response to the Soviet Union is a coordinating mechanism stronger than the European NATO structure, weaker than political union. Rallo's thesis falls in the general category of "toward literature," pointing to a distant goal without offering the specifics of a plan for attainment. The author's ponderous writing style requires special diligence by the reader, an effort not always worthwhile, and hence sharply limits the book's value to the strategist or policymaker.

Defending Europe is a report on the proceedings of a conference on "European Security Requirements" and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks held at University College, University of Toronto, on 6-7 May 1985. Both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries were represented. If participants overbalanced toward positions favored by peace activists, the discussions were nevertheless lively and substantive, offering considerable thought to the effects of technology on policy and strategy. General Bernard Rogers' "Long Term Planning Guidelines for FOFA" (Follow-on Forces Attack) met close scrutiny, including critical Soviet views. The undesirability of spending heavily on

FOFA emerged quite strongly. Most participants saw the Strategic Defense Initiative as pure fantasy; the deployment of cruise missiles and Pershings to Europe was more opposed than supported. The MBFR talks raised considerable discussion, largely on the frustrations of both sides over incompatible approaches to problems having both political and military complexities. As generally happens when East and West sit down together in discussion, the hard questions are raised by both sides; and they remain unanswered by both sides.

PAUL SCHRATZ
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Ivanov, S.P. (chief author). *The Initial Period of War: A Soviet View*. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1986. 311pp. \$9.50

The authors of this study state their purpose as "Based on the investigation and summary of data on the entry of the major capitalist nations and the Soviet Union into World War II—examining the more complex problems from the initial period of armed confrontations and in disclosing general trends in the preparation and conduct of initial operations, trends which were characteristic of World War II and have not lost their importance today." That task the authors certainly meet, albeit with characteristic historical license.

This study commences with a background of the evolution of initial

operations beginning with the French Revolution. In the nineteenth century, mobilization normally occurred after the declaration of war, but with World War I, mobilization came nearer the heels of the declaration of hostilities. World War I also introduced the airplane, armored cavalry and added mobility to land warfare. The initial period of World War II was generally characterized as the German-Italian-Japanese (Fascist Axis) offensive and the Anglo-French defensive.

According to the authors, the Anglo-French strategy was to channel the Fascist offensive eastward against the Soviet Union with the hope that Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union would destroy each other. France fell and, following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the English and Americans were all the more hesitant to enter the war in a big way.

Of course, there is truth in this assessment, yet no real enlightenment. One begins to see parallels between the past and the present when the discussion turns to the methods the Germans employed to mass an army and to use diplomacy prior to launching World War II. The recounting of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in many ways shows the lessons were well learned.

First, the Germans gradually placed their economy on a wartime footing. Mobilization took place in stages and with much political and operational deception. Offensive power was massed, concentrated,

and employed, encircling and destroying or capturing large formations before they could respond. Airborne troops attacked supply lines while aircraft assaulted other deep targets. The German Army met with remarkable success.

While the authors treat the deployment mistakes of the French quite evenhandedly, they work overtime in allowing history to be kind to Soviet mistakes. Rather than focusing on the inefficiencies of the Red Army and the alienation of Soviet citizens by harsh German policies, the authors tout the praises of the Soviet system. Correct they are in one regard, the Soviet system of centralized planning and programming is conducive to an efficient wartime economy.

But rather than concentrate on the expected historical discrepancies, the reader should see in this book the points of each strategy (Fascist or Anglo-French) given favor. For example, the Anglo-U.S. policy of having the Soviets provide the bulk of the manpower receives a tone of admiration; and in spite of the embittered rhetoric, the German-Japanese policies and methods are those employed by the Soviets today. Large standing armies, masses of armor, liberal use of espionage and disinformation—all of these are typical.

Regardless of the altered history and plentiful rhetoric, *The Initial Period of War* is, at minimum, a reasonable recounting of the diplomatic maneuvering and mobilization in the early days of World War II. At

best, it is a brief glimpse into the Soviet strategy of mobilization and the early part of armed conflict. The key themes one gets from that glimpse are that mass and maneuver will yield the desired results—either overwhelming victory or an early decisive engagement.

WILLIAM K. BAKER
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

Deist, Wilhelm, ed. *The German Military in the Age of Total War*. Leamington Spa, England: Berg Publishers, 1985. 362pp. \$42.50

For much of the 1970s, the West German Defense Ministry's Military Historical Research Office at Freiburg was a well-kept secret. Happily this is no longer the case. Its superb journal, *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* and its projected ten-volume history of the Second World War—now nearly half completed and contracted to Oxford University Press for an English-language edition—have firmly established the office and its major scholars.

This welcome anthology permits a group of distinguished historians, either affiliated with the office or closely associated with it, to present concise synopses of their larger German works to Anglo-American readers. It is first and foremost a collection that stresses the broader political, economic, strategic, and ideological setting of the military in Germany. In approach and analysis, the Freiburg group has truly led the way towards what one may reason-

ably call the "new" military history; drum and trumpet sagas, mercifully, are not its concern.

The "glue" that holds the contributions together is a general belief in Germany's failure in the twentieth century to bring aims and resources into proper relation to each other, as well as a constant overestimation of its own capabilities and a corresponding underestimation of the adversary's: hubris in full bloom. In the opening essay, Wolfgang Petter analyzes the disastrous armaments policy of Wilhelmian Germany and its concern with potential domestic opposition. Lothar Burchardt follows similar lines by suggesting that the Kaiser's government failed to put the nation on a secure war footing. Hitler would strive to remedy this failure by seeking a balance between production for the war and for the civilian population in order to maintain domestic stability. Rolf-Dieter Müller traces the German preparations for chemical warfare between 1919 and 1945, concluding that while Hitler's decision not to use it may be seen as "a model case of working deterrence," the discussions behind its development revealed a "shocking unscrupulousness" on the part of politicians, industrialists, and military leaders both in Germany and elsewhere. Müller's uneasy conclusion is that "unpredictable factors and individuals" accounted for its nonuse.

Wolfram Wette suggests that even Weimar Germany was beset by a fatalistic fascination with war, while Michael Geyer reiterates his thesis

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that Germany's soldiers sought "reconstruction through armament." By 1938, he argues, Germany was "an armed camp that could not possibly demobilize without major social and political repercussions—and the army did not want Germany to disarm."

Four essays tackle the Third Reich. Klaus Maier cogently makes the case that the *Luftwaffe* from the start saw its role as that of a "deterrent force" by "producing fear and political intimidation" among civilian populations. Bernd Wegener showcases his work on the *Waffen-SS* as the "military instrument of the National Socialist movement." Jürgen Förster once more traces the penetration of the *Wehrmacht* with National Socialist racial doctrine and its war of extermination in the East. Those who still believe that the army fought a "clean" war in the Soviet Union might take a look at the 707th Infantry Division which in a single month managed to shoot 10,431 of its 10,940 "captives." Along similar lines, Manfred Messerschmidt traces the manner in which military law and courts changed to embrace and to enforce this racialization of the armed forces. Whatever one may think of the relative "fighting power" of the German and American Armies, it is instructive to remember that whereas the U.S. Army managed to maintain discipline and morale with only one case of capital punishment, the *Wehrmacht* executed no less than 11,664 of its own men! Finally, Bernard Kroener returns to the theme of unlimited goals and "limited mobilisation of resources" by show-

ing how the *Blitzkrieg* concept was undermined by the competing demands of army and industry.

Naval history is accorded two entries. Jost Dülffer plots no less than five levels of decisionmaking and seven phases of the naval buildup under Admiral Raeder to suggest that while the navy again sought world-power status through Mahanian precepts, it was no more prepared in 1939 than it had been in 1914 to tackle the twin problems of disadvantageous geographical position and inferior fleet. Gerhard Schreiber demolishes the popular notion that Raeder's Mediterranean program of September 1940 could have brought victory: on the one hand, Britain's opposition was backed by the Dominions as well as the United States; on the other hand, it would have required compromises with, and concessions to, Italy, Spain, and Vichy France that Hitler simply was not willing even to contemplate.

In conclusion, this is a superb smorgasbord that should satisfy the most critical palate. Wilhelm Deist has served English-language readers well by assembling this collection of essays otherwise inaccessible, even in truncated form, to many scholars on this side of the "great common."

HOLGER H. HERWIG
Vanderbilt University

Bird, Keith W. *German Naval History: A Guide to the Literature*. New York and London: Garland, 1985. 1121pp. \$154

Keith Bird's guide to German naval history is volume seven in the series of military history bibliographies under the advisory editorship of Robin Higham and Jacob Kipp. The general editors hope that their series of international bibliographies will eventually reach more than 30 volumes devoted to military history in countries other than the United States and Great Britain. This volume is first in the series devoted to a single country's naval history.

More than half of Bird's volume is devoted to a series of nine bibliographical essays which review the literature in each period of German naval history, analyze current research themes, and make suggestions for future research which complete current themes. One of the essays, "The Origin and Role of German Naval History in the Inter-War Period, 1918-1939," appeared as an article in this journal, March-April 1979.

The lesser half of the book is an alphabetical listing of the 4,871 books and articles mentioned in the essays. This listing also serves as a kind of index with references, marred by occasionally faulty page citations.

Keith Bird has provided a magnificent piece of scholarship that represents a great step in providing a sound academic basis for the study of naval history. He deserves recognition for his achievement, and one hopes that others will follow his example and apply it to naval history in other countries. Only the astonishingly high price can prevent its wide usage.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College

Haley, P. Edward and Merritt, Jack, eds. *Strategic Defence Initiative, Folly or Future*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986. 112pp. \$24

As reflected in the preface, the editors' objective was to publish a compilation of opposing views on SDI in a single volume which might be useful for a wide audience; they have done just that. Unlike many recent efforts, they have spanned the entire general debate rather than focus on a particular aspect. Their topics begin with the relevant text from the 23 March 1983 Presidential address with supporting and expanding positions of high administration officials, including discussions of both strategic and technical feasibility, and the U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-NATO impact on international relations and foreign policy. In each case the editors offer formal presentations by internationally recognized authors from both the "pro" and "con" communities. Each of the articles could be considered causal on their respective topics, and the collection, therefore, becomes extremely useful for anyone wishing to survey the literature and debates on SDI. However, as with any attempt to survey a broad subject, potential readers are left to their own devices to build their depth; but the breadth is provided.

To compensate for this, the editors have written an exceptional introduction which provides a succinct conceptual placement of SDI in the body of deterrent theory, the international legal environment (ABM Treaty) and general framework of

the "nuclear dilemma." In my opinion, these 17 pages are so well-developed that they probably are a major strength of the book. While the essay collection reviews the SDI debate from 23 March 1983 forward, the introduction synthesizes the much needed historical perspective on defense in the nuclear age, tracing key Presidential decisions in the nuclear arena.

Overall, the book accomplishes its purposes, reads easily, and presents a reasonably balanced treatment of central issues. As such, it would be quite usable in colleges and universities or for the informed and interested public.

STEVE FOUGHT
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force

Snow, Donald M. *National Security: Enduring Problems of U.S. Defense Policy*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987. 272pp. \$35

This text presents a timely, concise overview of many aspects of the national security field such as America's military experience, the evolution of our country's defense policy, conventional military threats in Europe and the Third World, current nuclear strategy, deterrence, and arms control issues. Since it is an introductory work designed for a relatively unsophisticated audience, it is written to be easily understood, and it achieves this goal. In addition, for those who desire to know more, a brief list of suggested readings is included at the end of each chapter.

In short, this book has a good deal to be said in its favor.

On the other hand, even as an introductory text, it also has some problems. First, its terminology tends to be imprecise. For example, Snow uses terms such as "wars," "intervention," "commitment of forces," and "military involvement" as though they were interchangeable when, in fact, they have distinctly different meanings.

Second, the simplicity with which most issues are discussed becomes harmful unless the reader is aware of the drastic simplification of most subjects. To cite one instance, the maritime strategy is covered in just a single paragraph of twelve lines. That is truly being concise with a vengeance!

Third, there is little sense of the connection between national security policy and foreign policy. The focus on the former tends to be so narrow that the use of U.S. military forces to aid in achieving many foreign policy goals often disappears from view. Moreover, Snow's discussion concentrates on ground combat with next to no recognition of the existence of "gunboat diplomacy."

Fourth, Snow never really looks at the institutional setting within which national security policy is made. Yet for many writers, the institutional framework itself (e.g., the structure and operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) is a major "enduring problem." It hardly seems fitting to discuss the nature and difficulties of many policies without any consideration of how they were developed.

Finally, apart from a couple of pages on the SLBM forces, a person new to the field might conclude from reading Snow's work that the United States has no navy or at least that its navy has few functions or components worthy of note. In this regard, the text virtually ignores the 600-ship navy, carrier aircraft operations, ASW capabilities, amphibious warfare, and a good deal else.

Too much should not be made of the criticism here. This book covers a wide assortment of important subjects in a creditable manner. Still, for this reader, the extremely severe compression of the material is at best a mixed blessing.

JOSEPH M. SCOLNICK, JR.
Wise, Virginia

Wakin, Malham M. *War, Morality, and the Military Profession*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986, 521pp. \$17.95

This is a revised edition of an anthology originally composed by Colonel Wakin to meet the needs of the philosophy program at the U.S. Air Force Academy, but its usefulness is not confined to Colorado Springs. The editorial matter will be helpful in the classroom, but the lasting value of the book is the selection of first-rate articles on its two major themes: the moral character of the military profession and the morality of war. The first section makes the important point that moral values are inherent in the military profession and are not

merely external constraints on it. The second section provides a cogent progression of thought from the sources of just-war theory and pacifism, through the moral prohibition of the taking of innocent lives, to the contemporary debate over nuclear deterrence. The contemporary problem that does not get explicit treatment is the question of proper responses to terrorism, though the material on killing the innocent is clearly relevant to our moral evaluations of terrorism. The book would be much helped by the addition of a bibliography and representative essays by Paul Ramsey and James Johnson, who have been the most significant recent Protestant exponents of just-war doctrine. The essays in the book are of current interest, but they will also prove to be of lasting value. Bringing them together in this form should help academic moralists and reflective officers to understand each other better.

JOHN LANGAN, S.J.
Washington, D.C.

Wisotsky, Steven. *Breaking the Impasse in the War On Drugs*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986, 279pp. \$35

"The War on Drugs is clearly stuck, mired in paramilitary rhetoric that obscures understanding while worsening the problem. Enforcement does not work to control supply. Therefore we must intensify enforcement. That creates terrible black

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market pathologies at home and abroad. Therefore we must intensify enforcement even more, further worsening the consequences. This vicious circle represents a complete failure of courage and intelligence, perversely working against our own self interests." With these damning words, author Steven Wisotsky summarizes the central thesis of his impressive new offering, *Breaking the Impasse in the War On Drugs*. In Wisotsky's view, the U.S. enforcement-oriented campaign to eliminate the "drug problem" in our society is not only an abject failure, but actually serves to perpetuate the societal ills it so vigorously strives to cure. Consequently, this enormously expensive and increasingly militarized effort is inevitably doomed to fail.

Needless to say, Wisotsky's unwelcome conclusions are hardly likely to find much support in the passionately antidrug atmosphere of our time. Yet proponents of the popular enforcement crusade will be disappointed to discover that the author of this decidedly pessimistic verdict is no crackpot cultural dropout with a personal axe to grind. On the contrary, Steven Wisotsky is a professor of law at Florida's Nova University, an experienced member of both the state and federal bar, and author of numerous scholarly articles on a variety of legal topics. Moreover, as a thirty-year resident of South Florida, the book's author has lived and worked at the vortex of this Nation's massive drug enforcement effort for all of his adult life. Small wonder then, that Wisotsky would

choose to devote much of the past 5 years to teaching an annual law school seminar on drug law enforcement and would come to organize and edit the proceedings of last year's Nova University symposium on the war on drugs. Thus, when Mr. Wisotsky delivers his latest literary broadside against the current drug law enforcement scheme, he does so from the secure position of a legal scholar who has taken the time to do his homework first.

The results are impressive. Working from the premise that marijuana has already become a fully integrated feature of contemporary American society, Wisotsky chooses to focus on the booming cocaine industry to make his case. Relying heavily on government studies and reports, the author first provides an overview of the mushrooming black market in this drug, then proceeds to detail the many facets of the United States' determined campaign to eliminate its use. While these expositions do make interesting reading, the real meat of Wisotsky's work lies in the several chapters which follow. There the author hammers home the message that the war on drugs carries with it an enormous human cost, a cultural debit far more significant than the billions of dollars which the taxpayers must annually surrender to the cause. Indeed, Wisotsky argues that the real cost of the contemporary war on drugs is measured in terms of an assault on civil rights, a growth of domestic "Big Brotherism," tax evasion, corrosion of the work ethic, corruption of public officials, vio-

lence, disrespect for the law, corruption and destabilization of neighboring nations, and the emergence of the disquieting phenomenon of "narcoterrorism" throughout the hemisphere.

Wisotsky makes a convincing argument for radical reform of our entire drug law enforcement system. Still, his work is not without its rough spots. Conservatives will surely bristle at the suggestion that recreational drug use is not necessarily a bad thing, and pragmatists will bemoan the author's failure to provide solutions to the myriad problems likely to arise in the event that the present enforcement scheme is discarded. Moreover, much of the "latest" statistical information presented seems somewhat dated. While Wisotsky freely admits the presence of this built-in hazard in dealing with a topic as current as today's headlines, one must also note that fully three-quarters of the source material cited by the author is more than 5 years old. Finally, some readers will find Professor Wisotsky's style a bit too academic for their taste (this is the author's first work intended for general readership) and almost everyone is sure to be puzzled by his inclusion of a series of supply and demand curves far better suited to a first-year text on economics.

In the end, however, the several shortcomings outlined above do not significantly detract from the underlying validity of much of what Wisotsky has to say. There certainly can be no doubting that the United States is engaged in a furious struggle

to combat the production, importation, sale, and use of illicit drugs. Every day seems to bring news of still another "record" drug seizure or arrest, and our prisons are literally filled to overflowing as a consequence. Yet the harsh reality of the situation is that—in spite of our most strenuous efforts to prevent it—the supply of drugs is growing, their price is falling, and their availability in this country is running at an all-time high. Something is clearly wrong here.

More than a century ago Carl von Clausewitz cautioned that "no war should be undertaken . . . without first obtaining an answer to the question 'what is to be obtained by the same,'" and then using the goal thus arrived at to determine "the value of the sacrifices by which it is to be purchased." If Professor Wisotsky is to be believed, then the United States has neither a coherent goal for its war on drugs nor a genuine appreciation for "the value of the sacrifices" which the American people are being asked to make in its name. At the very least, this thought-provoking book demands the initiation of a thorough review of our current drug law enforcement policy, a policy which its author plainly believes is doing much more harm than good. Steven Wisotsky has posed some painfully probing questions for both the elected officials and voting public of this Nation. The search for answers cannot begin too soon.

CHRISTOPHER A. ABEL
Lieutenant, U.S. Coast Guard

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Sirriyeh, Hussein. *U.S. Policy in the Gulf, 1968-1977: Aftermath of British Withdrawal*. London: Ithaca Press, 1984. 297pp. \$24.95

In an examination of American policy in the Middle East, Hussein Sirriyeh has traced the origins of a geopolitical strategy which the United States put into play to fill the security void created by the evacuation of British forces from the Persian Gulf region in the late 1960s. Until 1968 the British Government had occupied a privileged position in the Gulf with its maintenance of an armed force of nearly 10,000 troops at several installations in the area. The formal recall of these forces saddled the American Government with an added security responsibility at a time when they were already overburdened in Vietnam. To deal with this problem, Washington policymakers opted for Nixonian collective security via U.S. military assistance to Gulf States, primarily Saudi Arabia and Iran.

The author states that the United States leaned toward Iran when extending military assistance of an advanced technological nature because historically Iran had been threatened by both Soviet and Iraqi aggression. Although Iranian military personnel were often unprepared to utilize such assistance, they nevertheless took delivery of much sophisticated weaponry which required the presence of numerous American technicians to train their national forces. By contrast, the armed forces of Saudi Arabia were not allowed equal access to the same advanced

weaponry, "mainly because the American Government viewed the anti-Israeli solidarity of the Arab states with suspicion." Even though the Saudi Government perceived threats to its own territory, the United States exclusively determined the defense needs of the respective Gulf States, regardless of their ability to finance such assistance. As noted by Sirriyeh, this attitude was hardly realistic, especially in light of American requirements for Gulf petroleum.

In the most lengthy and detailed chapter of his study, Sirriyeh has traced the significance of petroleum in the American strategy for Gulf security. By 1970, the United States was importing daily as much as 340,000 barrels of Arabian petroleum, substantially increasing this import by 1972. Nationalization of foreign oil holdings arose in 1968 and a Gulf States embargo resulted as an aftermath of the Arab-Israeli conflict in October 1973.

Fortunately for its domestic economy, the United States resolved the Arab-Israeli crisis of 1973. This accomplishment was applauded by both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, nations which rescinded their earlier plans for a major embargo of Gulf petroleum. The cordiality of Arab-American relations was further improved during the 1970s when the United States arranged the orderly purchase of foreign-owned oil properties by the Gulf States.

The American policy failure may also be measured in terms of the growing friendship between the

Soviet Union and the Gulf States—especially Iraq—during the 1970s, while Soviet influence in such peripheral nations as India, Afghanistan, and Somalia also increased. As a result, the United States cannot ignore the Soviet threat to the oil-tanker routes in the Gulf or the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, thus necessitating the maintenance of American bases in such strategic outposts as Bahrain and Diego Garcia. Fortunately, U.S. shortcomings in its Gulf policy are partially corrected through its transfer of modern technology which the Gulf States require for both trade and defense. As illustrated, the value of American exports to the Gulf States increased tenfold from 1971 until 1977, while the value of Gulf exports to the United States increased even more significantly during the same period.

Although his narration often reads like a *Who's Who* in the Federal Government, Sirriyeh's effort is a concise account of the events concerning the origins of American policy in the Gulf. The author exhibits a sound background in both the strategic and economic considerations contained in this particular policy, and he displays a masterful comprehension of the issues and events dealing with the "Oil Crisis" of 1973-74. Sirriyeh provides new insight into Arab-U.S. petroleum politics and concludes that the West—especially the United States—must readily fulfill the various technological needs of the Gulf States if it intends to assure its own strategic interests in this geopolitical region.

Middlebrook, Martin. *Operation Corporate: The Story of the Falklands War*, 1982. London, England: Viking Penguin Books Ltd., 1985. 430pp. \$18.95

Field Marshall Earl Wavell is credited with having advised a class at the British Staff College on the eve of World War II that, "the real way to get value out of the study of military history is to take particular situations and, as far as possible, get inside the skin of the man who made a decision and then see in what way you could have improved upon it." With this idea in mind, the Operations Department at the Naval War College had its students examine, in some depth, the 1982 Falklands war between Argentina and the United Kingdom.

Martin Middlebrook's history of this war was selected as the principal book for students to read as background for their seminar discussions. The relatively small scale of the forces involved, the nature of the weapons used, the bounded geography of the theater of operations, and the clear differences in the way each side laid out their plans and made their operational decisions, all helped to make this an excellent maritime case study.

In the introduction Middlebrook provides another key reason for using *Operation Corporate* as a text for studying the operations of the war. "I do not care to write about politics and diplomacy, but war—where decent young men of both sides die for patriotism, principle and the failure of politics. . . ." While the

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author lays out the issues and the politics and the diplomacy that led to this unfortunate war, his emphasis is on developing the operational course of the war from the opening moves of the Argentine forces in March 1982 to the final battle for Port Stanley 3 months later. The reader is able to examine the initial Argentine tactical moves as they transport their forces to the Falklands and capture Port Stanley. Middlebrook then creates a clear picture of the British strategic decisions, their initial operational moves, and the campaign plans they developed as it became increasingly evident that neither diplomacy nor mere forward deployment of military force would be sufficient to dislodge the Argentines.

A student of maritime operations can study and assess the appropriateness of the various British decisions and force moves from reading this book. Of particular value is the concise outline of the military campaign plan in chapter four. The plan's four basic phases of sea blockade, repossession of South Georgia, gaining of sea and air supremacy around the Falklands, and the repossession of the Falklands are clearly outlined. Subsequent chapters present, in considerable detail, the progress of each key maritime operation, its major battles and the crucial decision points. The reader can examine in depth the Argentine naval moves which led to the British decision to sink the Argentine cruiser *General Belgrano*. The effect on the military leaders of the sinking of *Belgrano* is also covered. Middlebrook quotes from one of the

Belgrano sinking is fully developed. Middlebrook's presentation enables the reader to examine the options available to the operational commanders of both sides at this crucial point in the war.

One of the key decisions in any maritime campaign is where, when and how the landing of ground forces will be conducted. Middlebrook thoroughly reviews the plans, preparation, and subsequent execution of the landing operation. Every element of this most complex of maritime operations is laid out in detail. The reader can review the key decisions, the wisdom of the command and control arrangements, whether the operational deception practiced by the British was successful, and whether various ships and forces were correctly employed. The detail enables the reader to see alternative options available to each side. One option on which the reader is certain to reflect is whether the Argentines could have prevented the British landing with a more carefully integrated use of their air, ground and sea assets.

Throughout the book Middlebrook intersperses his detailed narrative with extensive extracts from interviews with commanders, soldiers, and sailors on-scene. On occasion even the civilians present at a battle are quoted. This technique provides a very vivid sense that this war, like all wars, is ultimately a matter of men fighting, hurting, and dying. No historian's narrative can carry the impact of words such as those that Middlebrook quotes from one of the

helicopter crewmembers who arrived on-scene shortly after three bombs hit the destroyer H.M.S. *Coventry*. "*Coventry* had her hull upturned and was on fire. I was horrified. I had been in the Navy eighteen years and had never seen anything like that before." Nor have any of the students currently at the Naval War College. It is important that they be reminded that a war at sea is more than skillfully planned ship maneuvers, aircraft operations and moving symbols on cathode ray tubes. Ships get sunk, even fighting ships that have been handled with skill for days or weeks, as had *Coventry*.

The final third of *Operation Corporate* is taken up with the details of the ground campaign that led to the surrender of the Argentines at Port Stanley to a force of British Royal Marines and Army forces numbering about one-half their size. Middlebrook's careful and very thorough presentation of every aspect of this ground operation emphasizes that the successful conduct of the land phase of maritime campaign is crucial to achieving strategic objectives. In today's world of integrated warfare, seagoing officers must understand every aspect of a maritime campaign, including the plan for maneuver ashore.

Middlebrook concedes in his introduction that "a fuller description of the Argentinian side may one day be possible," but he was not given the access he needed to provide it in the first edition of this book. There are other books on the Falklands war

which discuss more fully such specific aspects of the war as the initial crisis, the political/diplomatic maneuvers, and the air war. But for the reader who wants to gain a complete, reasonably balanced picture of the conduct of all of the military operations, this book is a very useful start.

TIM SOMES
Captain, U.S. Navy

Milner, Marc. *North Atlantic Run: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Battle for the Convoys*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1985, 326pp. \$21.95

During World War II the Royal Canadian Navy became a convoy-escort force and did the job poorly, so Marc Milner tells us. The Canadians consistently lost their destroyers, corvettes, and frigates, as well as the merchantmen, their crews and the critical supplies they carried. They continued to lose men, ships, and cargoes until after the critical months of the Battle of the Atlantic, April and May of 1943.

Relying heavily on primary sources, Milner, perhaps unknowingly, reveals four reasons for the Canadians' failure to achieve what had to be a miracle. First, they were subservient, poor cousins to the Royal Navy of Great Britain. This condition seeped into all of the crevices and crannies in the miniscule RCN establishment. Its worst effects were psychological.

The psychological reason for the Canadians' failure was their subservience to the "gun club" mentality of

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the Royal Navy. The British, hence the Canadians, thought they would fight surface actions against Axis raiders with guns. This led the Canadians to acquire heavy "Tribal"-class destroyers under the absurd assumption that "several [Tribals] acting in concert posed a credible threat to a lone battleship." The many-gunned Tribals absorbed dockyard space, resources, and manpower badly needed by the depth-charge-throwing escort fleet which the Canadian Navy became.

When the operations of the U-boat made it clear that the war in Europe would be decided in the Atlantic, the Canadians' second problem arose—expansion. Canadian industry had to learn to repair and build vessels while the RCN grew to 50 times its prewar strength. This expansion, as Milner points out, created an almost endless and insuperable set of problems. That the Canadians did as well as they did is truly remarkable.

The third problem, Milner avers, was the RCN's difficulty in obtaining radar sets and radar operators for its escorts. The critical equipment did not come quickly enough nor in adequate quantity to let the Canadians do a proper job.

Lack of training for the men, crews and escort groups contributed to the fourth and most difficult problem which Milner recounts. Training from that of the highest staff officer to that of the lowest seaman had to be done with little time, few facilities, and hardly any ships. Inadequate doctrine, poor

equipment, and sheer weight of numbers almost pooped the Royal Canadian Navy during this period.

Unfortunately, Milner fails to put the Canadians' magnificent effort into a global perspective. He fails to show clearly the linkages between the Canadian, British, and American efforts in the war against the submarine. And too many words are devoted to the internal politics of the RCN during the war. The work's organization makes for occasional heavy going.

The problems and issues of which Milner writes, the questions he raises, and the still-remaining need for the Atlantic nations to understand submarine warfare, make his book valuable. As part of a growing body of excellent Canadian oceanic scholarship, Milner's work will, whatever its faults, stand as a classic for serious naval scholarship.

LAWRENCE CARROLL ALLIN
The University of Maine

Baker, A.D. III, ed. *Combat Fleets of the World 1986/1987: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Armament*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1986. 764pp. \$91.50

Brauzzi, Alfredo et al. *Almanaco Navale*. Genoa, Italy: The Istituto Idrografico Della Marina, 1986. 999pp.

Both of these yearbooks, *Combat Fleets 1986/1987* and *Almanaco Navale 1986*, are impressive compendiums of current world naval fleet information. *Combat Fleets*, an English

adaptation of the prestigious French *Flottes de Combat*, in existence since 1897, is rapidly becoming the English language rival to the British annual, *Jane's Fighting Ships*. It exceeds *Jane's* in detailed information, drawings and unique photographs, and this information reflects, in part, the French and American resources available. It appears this year in a new, larger format which allows for the reproduction of larger photographs and even more information. It is now a large, heavy volume providing impressive detail on not only ships but naval aircraft and armament systems. Of particular note are the ship line drawings with component callouts by Gassier (really outstanding), Simoni, Dumas and Baker—the last of the hardworking editors of this English edition. Strangely, none of these profiles are provided for the U.S. carriers, yet all other carriers are available. This book contains as much information as *Jane's*, costs nearly 40 dollars less, and is so good it should threaten the Naval Institute's periodic books on the U.S. (*Ships & Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet*) and Soviet (*Guide to the Soviet Navy*) Navies.

Almanaco Navale has also been around for a long time but is not well known in the United States since it is only available in Italian. It, too, has grown both physically and in content over the years. Its general arrangement has all countries in alphabetical order. Each country is then broken down, much as in the German *Weyers Flottentaschenbuch*, with ship statistics followed by photographs and line drawings. The latter are the most

extensive of any of the naval annuals and are excellent, often including underwater portions (particularly submarines) and ship plan forms. The book is worth examining for these alone. Included in this edition is a clever projection of the new Soviet 65,000-ton aircraft carrier (the *Kremlin*). It may prove to be very wrong but it displays considerable logical deduction. In addition, line drawings of the U.S. carriers, often including plan views, are included.

A separate appendix deals with hydrographic and oceanographic ships, a unique feature since these ships are folded into the regular national sections of the other yearbooks. There are appendices as well, the first on naval aircraft, shown initially by country (numbers and type), followed by selected three-view drawings of major designs. A third appendix covers missiles in a similar manner but with no graphics. A fourth briefly reviews gun armament, followed by appendices on torpedoes, naval shipboard radar, then an addendum and, finally, an index. All in all, it is an excellent volume.

Naval annuals have come a long way since the fifties when the only compendium on world naval forces available in English was *Jane's Fighting Ships*—an annual that began to approach its nadir once its extremely competent editor, Oscar Parkes, had passed from the scene. The ship profile artwork for which the book had been noted had degenerated badly, and much of the information was less professional than before.

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Today a new breed of technically-oriented editors has appeared, supported by organizations with resources. These men are doing an excellent job of describing the world's navies which are now much more complex than formerly. Ships have been joined by aircraft, electronics, missiles and various forms of nuclear power, all of which need some form of statistically-oriented description. Reported are the hardware components which implement the maritime policies of the world, too little understood by those both in and out of the service but which, because of the awesome power involved, excite great interest. So now there are several annuals available to English readers: *Jane's*, *Combat Fleets* and *Weyer's*, all of which are excellent, each in its own way. *Jane's* has recovered in quality under John Moore and is published on the best paper of the three. Both *Jane's* and *Almanaco Navale* present recognition silhouettes, presumably to help with whatever is on the horizon. *Jane's* are poor and not to a common scale; *Almanaco's* are very good and to scale, but one wonders about the real need for either. All of these books have become large, heavy tomes which would be difficult to use on any bridge or CIC. These types of books have moved in the direction of the ships they describe for they are not only bigger but very expensive—and not for the casual reader. Thus there are increasingly detailed descriptions available to fewer and fewer casual readers describing an increasingly complex set of interactive naval

systems. Impressive progress in doing this has been made, but one wonders what James C. Fahey would do. His first *Ships and Aircraft* cost 50 cents and could fit in your coat pocket. Yet each page contained a staggering amount of information. No such periodic review of the world's navies currently exists or, perhaps, can exist. I suspect Fahey would say that it could be done.

RICHARD CROSS
Alexandria, Virginia

Gibson, Charles Dana. *Merchantman? or Ship of War*. Camden, Me.: Ensign Press, 1986. 214pp. \$18.75

Written by a licensed master mariner (any ocean, any tonnage) who started his career during World War II, *Merchantman? or Ship of War* is succinctly described by its amplified title: *A Synopsis of Laws; U.S. State Department Positions; and Practices Which Alter the Peaceful Character of Merchant Vessels in Time of War*. In recognition of the fact that ships and their embarked crews are an entity, much of the content of this 214-page volume is devoted to the status of these seamen when, to meet military requirements, ships are requisitioned or operated directly by the U.S. Government.

The author presents, in the first 84 pages of the book, a brief account of the use by the Federal Government of privately-owned merchant ships during wars in which the Nation was involved up to the year 1918. The second section of 48 pages is an

evaluation of the practices followed during World War II. Gibson concludes that "American merchant seamen who served in oceangoing service during World War II performed their duties under a legal framework which, in light of all recognized international law, placed them into the role of combatants integrated within the armed forces of the United States." The book provides a source for legislative action in recognition of the hazardous nature of the merchant seaman's vocation in wartime and argues for benefits appropriate to those granted the honorably discharged member of the Armed Forces. Casualty rates sustained by the U.S. merchant marine in the first year of World War II were the highest of any group supporting the war effort.

Throughout the book, Gibson is judicial and rational in his presentation. He shows how much the Navy has depended upon merchant shipping in time of war and quotes administrative orders which authorized military and naval commanders to give orders to merchant ships and to have disciplinary control over merchant seamen in overseas areas. He also deals at length with the difficult problem of determining when—and in many cases if—merchant ships become part of the military force.

As a layman rather than a qualified practitioner of maritime law, Gibson showed courage in undertaking this formidable task that, to this reviewer's knowledge, has not been attempted before. Because of the

technical and legal basis of the book, its appeal is unavoidably narrow and of questionable interest to the general public. Also, despite the author's effort, the book is not without warts: there are an inexcusably large number of misspelled words; the author's system for citations is erratic and incomplete; and the bibliography is not annotated. Yet, Mr. Gibson must be credited for his pioneering spirit and energy in assembling such a volume of diverse documents on this subject. While his purpose in compiling the book is transparent, an attempt to bolster the case for giving military veteran status and benefits to merchant seamen of the World War II era, it still does not detract from the technical value of the book.

LANE C. KENDALL
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Ret.)

Krieger, Michael J. *Tramp: Sagas of High Adventure in the Vanishing World of the Old Tramp Freighters*. San Francisco, Calif.: Chronicle Books, 1986. 143pp. \$35

Plan an evening to sit down with this book. A pipe, snifter of brandy, friendly fireplace, and a good atlas are appropriate. Prepare yourself to embark on a journey into an aspect of seafaring that is marked by high adventure, hard work, little glamour, and even less profit.

As you page through this comfortable, well-layed out book, you will be enthralled by the text and the photographs, especially the photographs. Tales of the past, both real

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and fictitious, will leap into your mind as you travel the Mediterranean, Norwegian Sea, Baltic, Indian Ocean, and into the "dog-holes" of the Pacific.

Tales of the sea abound, and many of them take place on tramp steamers. One that might easily be representative of *Tramp* is Captain F.C. Hendry's short story titled "Easting Down." This example is no better than the likes of those posed by Joseph Conrad, Jan de Hartog, and Angus MacDonald, or the true tale of Captain Carlsen in the *Flying Enterprise*. However, it is an excellent slice of that which Krieger and photographer Judy Howard depict so beautifully in *Tramp*.

In this particular example, Captain Hartnell, his third mate, Mr. Birnie, and a rebellious—at least single-minded—deckhand named Kelly dare to replace the screw and tail shaft at sea on a 5,000-ton tramp. This old girl had the misfortune of losing those appurtenances in a daring passage from Cape Town to Port Pirie, South Australia, by way of the "Roaring Forties." The master's goal: beat out a competitor for a cargo of zinc concentrate. The decision to pursue a passage off the beaten track and the determination of the three heroes is demonstrative of the importance of cargo to the continued existence of a tramp. The excitement, adventure, and true seamanship which prevail in this story, I invite the reader to pursue. This narrative illustrates that which *Tramp* depicts so successfully and beautifully.

Tramp is a superb book, especially the photography by Judy Howard. The narrative is excellent, but tends to be more travelogue than maritime text on how the tramp business works. It is the photographs that carry the images of the beautiful lines of cruiser and counter sterns, plumb bows and, by today's standards, tiny holds serviced by relatively miniscule booms. Tramps are, at once, a business, a romance, and a way of life.

One criticism, which must be taken with a grain of salt, for this reviewer loves all ships—particularly the delightful selection made by this author and his photographer—is that although the book's title is *Tramp*, included are ships such as *S.T. Crapo* and *George A. Sloan*, which are not truly in the tramp trade.

That notwithstanding, this is a superior book which will be treasured and enjoyed by anyone who has ever wished for, or delighted in, ". . . a merry yarn from a laughing fellow rover, and quiet sleep and a sweet dream when the long trick's over."

J.A. PESCHKA, JR.
Captain, U.S. Navy

Wilson, George C. *Super Carrier: An Inside Account of Life Aboard the World's Most Powerful Ship, the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy*. New York: Macmillan, 1986. 273pp. \$19.95

It is easy to be overwhelmed and captivated by the obvious on an aircraft carrier: its size, day and

night flight operations, and the flight deck ballet—the constant movement, the noise, the screaming, the lurching aircraft, the lights, and the brightly colored jerseys worn by the flight deck specialists. It is easy to see the obvious and fail to see or understand that the aircraft and the hundred or so men working the dangerous flight deck are but a small fraction of the world of the aircraft carrier. It is easy to miss that this is an all-male world, and that the 5,000 or so men of the crew do not go home to their families each night and often do not go home at all for 6 or more months at a time. It is easy to miss that, while they are gone, they are for all practical purposes in a black hole—unable to help or even communicate, save by letters with their wives, children, families and friends left ashore.

The military is often referred to as an instrument of a nation's foreign policy. If this be true, then the aircraft carrier is surely at the business end of that instrument, and the men who work so hard to keep her there, ready to respond, are more than the strength of the ship; indeed, they represent the very on-line strength of our Nation. *Super Carrier* is a story of such men, of a great ship, and of a 7-month-long cruise.

George Wilson is senior military correspondent for *The Washington Post*. On 27 September 1983, he, like thousands of sailors, kissed his wife good-bye on Pier 12 at the Norfolk Navy Base and went off on a 7-

month cruise in the U.S.S. *John F. Kennedy* (CV67). The cruise was to be typical, with a carefully laid out schedule that fell apart almost immediately. There was promise of wonderful, exotic ports to be visited (most were cancelled); a trip through the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean (it never happened); and the opportunity to watch one of the Navy's top carrier admirals operate his forces (with a lot of help from above). The men of *Kennedy* were young, most not yet 22, and a typical cross-section of America. Many were away from home for the first time, and virtually all were struggling with loves, worries, problems, and fears. All were routinely carrying out a work schedule that would have been beyond the comprehension of their landlocked compatriots.

Mr. Wilson's great talent as an experienced observer and chronicler of people and events, sharpened by 7 months of total involvement, gives this book a realism that can perhaps be fully appreciated only by carrier men and the loved (and sometimes not-so-loved) ones they have left behind. Despite the fact that early in the cruise he moved out of ship's company spaces and threw his lot in with the more glamorous air wing, the author has captured the overall essence of life aboard a carrier: from the loneliness of the young sailor in a 250-man berthing space, to the aggressiveness of the fighter and attack aircrews; from the surefooted, often cocky competence of the

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“Yellow Shirts” responsible for the movement and safety of aircraft, to the pilot concerned with the thought of “one night-landing too many”; from the awesome responsibilities of the captain of the ship and the admiral, to the frustrations they both felt when they had to dump carefully laid action plans and execute ones they knew to be dangerously flawed.

The narrative that covers the preparation for, and the execution of, the 4 December 1983 air strike against terrorist targets in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon is excellent and should be required reading for all action officers in the operational chain of command from the White House to the on-scene commander. The loss of life and equipment, the agony of a POW, the selection of poor targets, inadequate time to plan properly and brief the aircrew being sent into an extremely dangerous environment, the insistence from “on high” on a time and target that was tactically stupid—Mr. Wilson lays it all out very clearly. No one can argue that better training and better weapons are needed—we always need better training and weapons—but the overarching failure on 4 December 1983 was the failure in the structure and function of the chain of command.

In his epilogue, Mr. Wilson makes several suggestions for improving life aboard ship for the deployed sailor. Some, like bringing television into the ship’s entertainment system, have merit. Opening up telephonic communications between the crew

and the telephone system in the United States also deserves study, though there are both security and morale implications. On the other hand, the workload for the crew while a ship is at sea is unlikely to diminish. It is up to the commanding officer to deal with the attendant morale problems—indeed, morale of the crew is the commander’s principal responsibility—through rope yarns (stand-down periods), liberty policy, and other means at his disposal. Wilson also properly questions the vulnerability of the aircraft carrier to attack by the Soviets in the year 2000. It is a question that applies equally to all our military installations, both at home and abroad. Since the close of World War II and through Korea, Vietnam, and numerous Third World crises responses, not one aircraft carrier has been lost or even damaged by enemy action. In the same period we have left or otherwise lost the use of land bases in Malta, France, Thailand, Libya, Morocco, Lebanon and other countries, and U.S.-built bases in Vietnam are now in the hands of our enemies along with billions of dollars in equipment we had to leave behind. Mr. Wilson is correct, we need to continue to address the vulnerability issues, but we also need to keep these issues in perspective.

Mr. Wilson earned the justification to write this book about the aircraft carrier and its crew and their families. That he wrote with such insight makes this an important book for the military reader as well as the general public. That he

wrote with such compassion properly underscores the many sacrifices that the Navy and Marine Corps families must endure, and to those men and their families, he provides some much needed recognition and hopefully some understanding.

C. E. ARMSTRONG
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

Grant, Zalin. *Over the Beach*. New York: W.W. Norton Co., 1986, 311pp. \$18.95

This is a true story of the air war over Vietnam. Zalin Grant has produced a highly readable and accurate, if not flattering, account of what it was like to fly from the decks of an aircraft carrier into combat over Hanoi and Haiphong. The principals in his story are the Navy pilots of Fighter Squadron 162, and what a mixed bag they are. The personality conflicts within the squadron rival the best of "Dynasty," "Dallas" and "Falcon Crest" put together.

For the most part, the story covers the period from mid-1966 to early 1968 and the two cruises of the aircraft carrier U.S.S. *Oriskany*. It was the period of the most intense aerial combat over Vietnam. Together with the disastrous ship-board fire that killed 44 men, it was anything but glamour and glory. During the second cruise the *Oriskany* air wing—Air Wing 16—lost over half of the original complement of aircraft. (This reviewer was there, as

operations officer of light attack Squadron 164.)

Throughout the narrative the author weaves in personal and political controversy from firsthand interviews with squadron pilots, a POW and a Navy widow, to the heavy infighting between top Navy brass and Secretary of Defense McNamara. Grant's harsh light of truth spares no one. Yet the story remains, fundamentally, one of fighting pilots in combat.

Despite the personal rivalries and human frailties that abound in this story, there is one virtue that pervades—courage. It is the lion-hearted courage of the warrior in battle, it is the courage of commitment to duty by men of character, courage so commonplace that it has become not understated, but simply not stated at all. It is expected. While individual flying skills and personalities vary and become the gist of this tale, it remains fundamentally a story of brave men doing their duty.

Grant is an author who knows his Vietnam. His credentials include Army service in Vietnam and 5 years as a journalist "in-country." He also knows his Navy pilots. They may have been the boys of "Top Gun" when flying was fun and games, but in combat they are the men of war, flying difficult and dangerous missions.

Over the Beach is a story of real men in combat. Grant tells it the way it was.

ROBERT B. ARNOLD
San Diego, California

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Coonts, Stephen. *Flight of the Intruder*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1986. 368pp. \$15.95

I did not want to read this book, let alone review it. Most firsthand accounts of the Vietnam War appear to be either self-serving testaments or written just to make a buck. I don't think anyone who flew over North Vietnam during either of the two air wars believes that anyone else can adequately describe the experience. Besides, from the moment the book was published, everyone who is anyone in the literary world has given it rave reviews—what if I didn't like it? But, since I was asked to review *Flight of the Intruder*, I did read it and I am better for it. It's a good book.

Every air wing had a Jake Grafton. Everyone in the air wing imagined that he was a Jake Grafton. Tiger Cole is appropriately professional and cool. Those of us who preferred just one engine and one seat are glad he was not in the cockpit when we screwed up, but we missed him on those nights when there were just too many things to do at once. The XO took a hit from the author. Since XOs usually become COs, I wonder if Coonts had a score to settle. But the characters are real, and names can be attached to all of them. Bonds were made that will last forever and there were some people who could not stand each other. That's the way it was. It's a good book.

The guilt and frustration of the war that Coonts speaks of marked us all. The guilt seemed to come from the fact that even though good people

were lost, for what at the time seemed nothing, the flying was great. The frustration was felt everytime you launched with enough destructive power to cause the adversary to quit, or at least listen to reason, but you knew that you would hang if you dared to use it properly. How many, who kept two bombs "for themselves," will cringe when they read about Jake's maverick run on the party headquarters? It's a good book.

The real value of this book is reliving the flying. The realism is extraordinary. Coonts' recollection of detail after years away from the cockpit is uncanny. Either he took notes at the time or he spent a lot of nights in bed, awake, recalling what it was like. His description of the mechanics of combat flying should be read and reread by the next generation of carrier aviators. Our sister services will understand that even though the flying over the beach was about the same, we always had to find and land on that deck—not runway—deck. Coonts covered all the missions worth mentioning in 300-plus pages. Single plane night raids, Alpha Strikes, Iron Hand, working with an FAC, tanker missions, they're all there. A combat tour consisting of two cruises, totaling over a year at sea and hundreds of flying hours, would give you just about enough stories to fill a 300-page book. But there were long periods of routine combat missions flown by the rest of the air wing that Jake does not seem to have been aware of. The chapter on Grafton and Cole's ejection and rescue in

Indian country gives the Air Force rescue crews the credit they richly deserve, but after spending an evening engrossed in the flying, it seemed a bit contrived. But, the book claims to be a novel. Whatever, it's a good book.

The scenes of liberty will bring back memories, some never to be relived. For God's sake, they've paved the streets of Olongapo. Somehow the smell could not be captured in print, nor the gastric distress that lingered when you dined in town. I hope the gut-wrenching emotion of this book is not lost on the casual reader, or overplayed in the inevitable movie. My thanks to Stephen Coonts for giving us *Flight of the Intruder*. It's a damn good book.

DON A. GERRISH, JR.
Captain, U.S. Navy

Ferrell, Henry C. *Claude A. Swanson of Virginia: A Political Biography*. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1985. 294pp. \$28

This is a detailed, thoroughly researched, and quite unexciting study of the long political career of Franklin Roosevelt's first Secretary of the Navy. Appointed Navy Secretary in 1933 at the age of 71, Swanson served until his death in July 1939. Ferrell properly emphasizes Swanson's career before his appointment when the Virginian was, successively, Congressman (1893-1905), Governor (1906-1910) and then four-term Senator. In the Senate, Swanson built a reputation as an

astute politician and as an expert in the field of naval affairs. As Navy Secretary, Swanson concentrated on building political support in Congress for Navy expansion. Ferrell disputes the claims of Swanson's critics that, as Senator, the Virginian was a spokesman for a party "machine" which catered to corporate interests and that, as Navy Secretary, Swanson was too feeble to have a major impact on Navy affairs. Characteristic of Swanson's approach to politics was his observation that "No sane man would slap a tiger in the face when his other hand is in the tiger's mouth." This pragmatism was the hallmark of all of Swanson's public life.

THOMAS HONE
Arlington, Virginia

Muirhead, John. *Those Who Fall*. New York: Random House, 1986. 285pp. \$18.95

John Muirhead's memoir of piloting B-17s out of Italy in 1944 ranks with and adds a new dimension to Murray Peden's *A Thousand Shall Fall* and Beirne Lay's *Twelve O'Clock High*. Flying and eventually leading missions into Germany, Italy and Romania, Muirhead evokes an extraordinarily vivid sense of the exhilaration and fear of tight formation flying and combat with rapacious Me-109s. The reader is struck by the courage of these very young men as they fought weather, equipment malfunction, flak, and fighters on the way to such infamous targets as

Regensburg and Ploiesti. To these men, surviving 50 such missions seemed too remote a possibility to even dream about. The story has been told by others, but rarely with such insight into the character of these men and the sources of their strength.

For the military historian, this memoir is an interesting revelation of the state of the aircraft and the precombat flight training that was prevalent in 1944. Muirhead's additional duty as an assistant maintenance officer and as a training and check pilot for newly joined replacement pilots illustrates a sharp contrast to today's practices.

Nearing Ploiesti on his 30th mission, Muirhead's aircraft lost an engine and was shot down as he fell behind the protective firebox of his squadron. He and his crew became POWs in Bulgaria where they were treated with indifference and incompetence. They survived with their intellects intact.

This is a thoughtful memoir with little of the youthful camaraderie and the "we band of brothers" flavor of the popular accounts of this time. As Muirhead says: "to remember war is not so much to reveal its brutal matrix as it is to try to understand it." The glory he found was in the survival of an enduring spirit which he shares with us.

FRANK C. MAHNCKE
Silver Spring, Maryland

Allen, Thomas and Polmar, Norman.
Ship of Gold. New York: Macmillan,
1987. 256pp. \$17.95

One of the sad events of WWII occurred on 1 April 1945 in the midst of an impenetrable fog in the Formosa Strait, when the U.S.S. *Queenfish* (SS-393) sank the former Japanese cruise-liner *Awa Maru* without even seeing her. She had been given safe passage for a round-trip from Japan to Indonesia to carry vitally needed supplies to Allied POWs still held there, despite the certainty that an unscrupulous and desperate Japan would also use the ship to carry cargo forbidden by the agreement—which, in fact, it did. The *Queenfish* had received notification about the specially privileged Japanese ship, but through a failure of internal communications this was not made known to her skipper.

He reported the facts when he discovered what he had done and was summarily ordered back to base, relieved of command, and court-martialed. Having borne his punishment in stoic silence, he is remembered by submariners of our Navy as a man who did not flinch when the going became rough.

Now the incident has been turned into a novel, a modern shoot-'em-up with oriental overtones. *Queenfish* has become the *Tigerfish*, and the *Awa Maru* has been renamed *Osaka Maru*. Her contraband cargo becomes the secret national treasury of Japan, 75 tons of pure gold. Sunk to the bottom of the Formosa Strait, the gold is a mecca for adventurers and they all arrive there together: Formosa-based

Chinese pirates, the Armed Forces of the Republic of China, a consortium of Japanese bankers with mafia-like (but totally Japanese) motives and connections, the CIA, the U.S. and Soviet Navies (of course), and an unbelievable number of inscrutable Chinese and Japanese operatives who speak sparsely and go to their exotic deaths with samurai-like unconcern, as, for that matter, do some American CIA types.

Even the *Glomar Explorer* is resurrected to participate in lifting the gold-laden *Osaka Maru*, all 11,700 tons of her, from the floor of the Formosa Strait a thousand feet below. Maybe she could do it. Steel weighs less in the water than in air, but as a guess the *Awa* (or *Osaka Maru*) might require a lift of about 10,000 tons—much more than the *Glomar Explorer* was supposedly capable of.

Nonetheless, she does it, and then everyone converges on her, not least of these being the consortium of nations fearing the effect of 75 tons of gold on the world economy. Lurking underwater are two nuclear submarines, the Russian *Petroverdets* and (by no coincidence) the new *Queenfish* (SSN-651). Also in the vicinity is the Russian command ship *Pirmorye*, the People's Republic of China's destroyer *Anshan*, the pirate junk *Golden Moon*, and assorted aircraft of all the nations involved.

The public these days wants excitement—plausibility, verity, historical truth, logic—all are nothing before the demand for excitement and release from reality. To many readers of novels, a scenario's true plausibility has little bearing on its popularity. There needs, indeed, to be a logical relationship between points "A" and "B," and then between "B" and "C," along with a certain degree of cuteness, intrigue, sex and blood, and sufficient trivial detail to signal "authenticity." But there seems to be little requirement for logical progression from point "A" to point "Z," and that's the problem with this book. The yarn is pure fantasy. Yet, this reviewer must admit to enough interest in the story and plot to have struggled to suspend his fundamental disbelief that it could happen.

Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen need no introduction to those reading this review. Their biography of Admiral Rickover will long outlive them, the accuracy of most of its deductions and speculations established. *Ship of Gold*, however, diminishes their stature. Technically they know their stuff, but no one can truly accept the massive, extraordinary, implausibility of the whole fantastic yarn.

EDWARD L. BEACH
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)