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## "La Puissance Maritime—Castex et la Strategie Navale," "Castex, Le Strategie Inconnu"

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German version of his book, first published in 1967. As a result, the invaluable literature published on the topic over the past two decades has gone unnoticed. This is especially critical for the latter third of the book, which deals with Hitler and his military paladins. It simply is dated and flawed. The publishers would have done well to omit it, or at least to have had the author rework it. In addition, they would have done well to include some maps and to check the spelling of well-known German political and military planners. This notwithstanding, the first two-thirds of the work dealing with the military under Wilhelm II is superb and offers English-language readers a welcome addition to the growing body of literature dealing with civil-military relations.

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Coutau-Bégarie, Hervé. *La Puissance Maritime—Castex et la Stratégie Navale*. Paris, France: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1985. 311pp.

Coutau-Bégarie, Hervé. *Castex, Le Stratège Inconnu*. Paris, France: Economica, 1985. 261pp.

Two recent books give, at last, an opportunity to understand in its fullness the thought of the greatest French naval strategist, Admiral Raoul Castex (1878-1968). A thirty-year-old historian, Hervé Coutau-Bégarie has rightly reestablished

"the unknown strategist"—unknown in France where care has always been brought more towards continental strategy, but also in countries where the maritime strategy is traditionally honored (Castex's work has never been translated into English).

An 1898 graduate of the French Naval Academy, Raoul Castex began to write as early as 1904. A student in the Naval War College in Paris at the outset of World War I, he spent his years in that conflict in the Mediterranean. Promoted to flag rank in 1928, he published five volumes entitled *Theories Stratégiques* between 1929 and 1935—theories directly originated from the lectures he gave at the French Naval War College. In 1937 Castex was considered for the position of Chief of Staff of the French Navy, but the appointment went to Admiral Darlan. Slowly eased aside by his successful competitor, he had to resign a few months before France's collapse in June 1940. He retired to his country house and continued to write till his death in 1968. A sixth posthumous volume, *Mélanges Stratégiques* was printed in 1976.

In his analysis of Admiral Castex's ideas, Hervé Coutau-Bégarie gives the greatest credit to the synthesis achieved between concepts strongly opposed up to then:

- The historical school, which seeks to isolate immutable constituents out of the military history, must be combined with the material school that emphasizes technical data, and from that union, extract strategic guidance.

● The search for the destruction of the enemy's organized forces is not exclusive of waging war on its lines of communication.

● There is no absolute determinism in the confrontation between the land and the sea. Castex preaches an adjustment to the natural constraints in setting up an amphibious military force. A maritime power must be able to project its forces ashore while the continental power has to deploy a maritime capability. Victory will reward the one who, a master in his own element, will be able to encounter his opponent on his own element.

In his thoroughly documented and perfectly legible survey, Hervé Coutau-Bégarie goes well beyond the mere analysis of Admiral Castex' unrecognized thought. He follows the same intellectual path that Raymond Aron entered in his famous *Clausewitz, Philosopher of War*.

Beyond the lapsed part of Castex' work, Hervé Coutau-Bégarie makes the best use of the concepts which are still relevant according to him. He uses them as a foundation for a better understanding of maritime strategy and geopolitics in the nuclear age and of the Soviet challenge with its Red flag now deployed on the seven seas.

The importance of Hervé Coutau-Bégarie's two books lies in the result of the trilateral research conducted upon Castex—his life, his works and the lessons of his works. The first book really deserves to be translated into English so that a thought which "represents perhaps the best synthesis between Mahan and the Jeune Ecole," according to Theodore Ropp,

could be at last recognized. At the same time, a second element could also be recognized, the shrewd quality of the updating work achieved by a young French scholar as impassioned by the maritime strategy, as Castex himself was.

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Delbrück, Hans. *History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History: Vol. III, The Middle Ages*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. 711pp. \$55

Delbrück, Hans. *History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History: Vol. IV, The Modern Era*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985. 487pp. \$75

The translation of the first two volumes of this work was noticed in the *Naval War College Review* (Winter 1979, pp. 104-105 and March-April 1981, pp. 109-111). With the publication of the translation of volumes 3 and 4, Brigadier General Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., U.S. Army (Ret.) has completed his monumental task and done great service to students of military philosophy, theory and history. Delbrück's work is indeed a classic which every serious student in these areas should read, and it is now made far more accessible in an English translation. However, Delbrück's intent was not merely to write for specialists in the narrow realm of military history. As he wrote in the introduction to the fourth volume, "Recognition of the mutual inter-