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## Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Intelligence and Policy

Anthony J. Mohr

Roy Godson

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action between tactics, strategy, national organization, and politics throws light on the relationship of these subjects to universal history, and thus has clarified many points which were previously obscured or misunderstood. This work has been written not for the sake of the art of war but in the interest of world history . . . . For the art of war is an art like painting, architecture or pedagogy, and the entire cultural existence of peoples is determined to a high degree by their military organizations, which in turn are closely related to the technique of warfare, tactics, and strategy."

For Delbrück, *The Modern Era* ends with a discussion of Napoleonic strategy. The research for the final volume had nearly been finished in 1914 when war broke out, but the book itself was not completed and published until 1919. Since that time, there have been many advances in the field of military history and our knowledge about some issues has improved in detail, but the general thrust of Delbrück's work has not been seriously challenged. It remains the most detailed analytical study of the relationship of warfare to politics, covering 2,000 years of history. Most importantly for us at the Naval War College, Delbrück stresses the essential idea which is so important to our courses and research work: military and naval affairs are political matters, inextricably intertwined in the cultural and economic substance of nations.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF  
Naval War College

Godson, Roy, ed. *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Intelligence and Policy*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986. 192pp. \$14.95

What sort of full service intelligence does the United States need for the rest of this century to carry out national security policy? What sort of intelligence policy is required to achieve it? These are the questions addressed in *Intelligence and Policy*—the final volume of a seven-part series that stems from a colloquium that involved 70 White House, Capitol Hill and CIA professionals.

This book consists of five essays—each written by one of the colloquium participants—on intelligence and the Presidency, intelligence and foreign policy, intelligence in formulating defense policy, covert action and counterintelligence as an instrument of policy, and the effectiveness of congressional oversight. Following each selection are comments by some of the other colloquium participants. At times they are more interesting and more readable than the main chapters. While Gary Schmitt's essay on oversight is so turgid that the reader fights every page, the subsequent discussion is sharp and provocative. The participants give concrete examples, including the revelation of AM LASH—the Cuban insider involved in the Kennedy administration's plots to assassinate Fidel Castro—and Jimmy Carter's disclosure to the Sandanistas of CIA data on Nicaraguan gunrunning to El Salvador. More than in the main essay, the discussion explains the dangers arising from some Congress-

men who seek political mileage by attacking the CIA and leaking classified information. "Select committees are supposed to attract the cream of the congressional crop. If quality control cannot be maintained by enforcing congressional rules, perhaps the criminal justice system should take care of the problem."

The quality of the essays ranges from excellent to just decent. Richard Pipes' tract on foreign policy is one of the best. In only five pages, he makes three original points: first, in its preoccupation with secrecy the intelligence community is overlooking a wealth of information about the U.S.S.R. that is available from open sources; second, Pipes urges the CIA to concentrate on long-term trends rather than on short-term predictions; finally, the intelligence community must not echo the medias' focus on personalities and events as opposed to processes. Pipes says it really is not so important who succeeds a Soviet premier. "What is important is what factions are battling right now for power in the Soviet Union, what they represent, and what kind of policy dominates their corporate identity." Such information is more accessible than many believe. In the general discussion, a Soviet defector explains that mid-level Soviet officials, "men in their 40's who really fashion the substance of policy," are "readily accessible to western collectors." He argues that this group, known as the *Nomenklatura*, should be approached and utilized.

Dr. Mark Schneider's piece on defense policy abounds with examples

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of intelligence failures in the strategic nuclear area. Reading it produces a chilling cognizance not only of growing American vulnerability to a Russian first, second, and perhaps even third strike, but also of a persistent inability to recognize Soviet trends. The author says, "Unquestionably, the decisions of the last two decades on U.S. strategic forces were made against a backdrop of intelligence estimates that generally failed to give the defense planner an accurate assessment of the Soviet threat." Among other mistakes, this country has "bent over backward to downplay the Soviet military buildup," failed to predict the characteristics of the fourth generation Soviet ICBMs, and failed to detect the massive increase in Soviet civil defense efforts in the late 1960s. According to the author, American analysts and policymakers have not been able to appreciate the raw data and make proper use of it. One participant observed that by trying to fit the enemy's actions into a matrix that comports with American value structures, we lose the ability to interpret realistically the intent of hostile societies. In the latter half of the 20th century, as the margin of error for survival narrows, this shortcoming is becoming especially dangerous.

Angelo Codevilla and Roy Godson provide one of the better overviews of covert action and counterintelligence as an instrument of policy. They latch onto hard examples to demonstrate that "when the stakes are high, covert action can be useful as an adjunct to public efforts, and to

the will to use military force, if needed." The writers argue that in the coming decade, the United States will often find itself dealing with the Soviet Union from a position of overall military inferiority. This will force America to struggle primarily by "nonmilitary means" in order to keep the Communist world "off balance, preferably quarrelling internally. Lacking force, deception, coups d'etat, upsetting the enemy's internal councils, and proxy warfare become less options than necessity." Moreover, a small investment of resources and political capital in covert activities "can pay big dividends when such investment is part of a coherent, success-oriented plan pursued not only by the CIA, but by the government as a whole." The writers explain how covert actions could have been used during the Polish crisis in 1980-81 by using "black" propaganda and double-agent operations, withdrawing assets of the Polish government by public defection. Perhaps the greatest usefulness for covert propaganda may be within the U.S.S.R. itself, on behalf of nationalist and religious causes.

*Intelligence and Policy* is not an easy book to get through. Except for the importance and excitement of the topic, the reader might sink into the prose, never to be heard from again. Nevertheless, books like this make a contribution, especially with respect to a topic about which Americans feel so ambiguous. This country has never felt at home with the tactics that often are necessary for an effective intelligence operation. How can

we harmonize such behavior with American democracy in a manner that does the least damage to our values? Bureaucratic euphemisms aside, that is the question studies like this must answer.

ANTHONY J. MOHR  
Beverly Hills, California

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Andrew, Christopher. *Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community*. New York: Viking, 1985. 604pp. \$25

Although Christopher Andrew has not posed the question of why tales of British spies are so much more interesting than tales of American ones, he has provided the answer. British espionage is a branch of romantic literature; American espionage is sordid criminology. The illicit sex, the upper-class connections, the exclusive clubs, the devotion to style (British pomposity creates a delicious setting for the fall of the powerful) seem to create fictional heroes out of British spies. We willingly suspend disbelief. Even the sordid fate of the Oxbridge triumvirate, Philby, Burgess, and Maclean, ending their lives in a tasteless Moscow high-rise without access even to Harrod's, does not seem to dull the fascination with which we await each opening and closing of the door at MI 5, or for a clue to the secrets of the black chamber.

Christopher Andrew has the sense of the drama of the personalities behind the door and their importance in the story. He raises and lowers the