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## Deep Black

F. Leith

William F. Burrows

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## 116 Naval War College Review

Vigor, P.H. *The Soviet View of Disarmament*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 189pp. \$25

With what appears to be new arms control initiatives coming from Gorbachev's Kremlin, it would seem that this book is just what the public needs for a better understanding of this important facet of Soviet-American relations. Unfortunately, because of the time lag in the availability of documents relating to arms control proposals and agreements, Vigor's analysis terminates with 1980, leaving the question of how applicable this volume is to more recent Soviet leadership. Nonetheless, it is an important compilation of past Soviet behavior in the conduct of arms negotiations. If his analysis is correct, it should serve as a general guide to the Soviet view of disarmament despite differences in leadership style.

The value of this book is in its occasional references to Soviet considerations that are often overlooked by the West. While the book is intended to depict a Soviet view, only brief mention is made of Soviet concerns with China, unrest in Eastern Europe, and nationalism within the non-Russian Soviet Union itself, all of which must certainly play important roles in the Soviet perception of just what constitutes national defense.

A final section on the Soviet attitude toward control provides a good discussion of the problems inherent in verification schemes, given the differences in the U.S. and Soviet political systems. Vigor's command of the Russian language enables him to explain in detail the

differences in interpretation of even seemingly simple concepts like the English 'control,' and Russian 'kontrol,' which continue to be translated incorrectly in verification proposals and agreements. Small wonder that verification remains one of the biggest stumbling blocks in the negotiation process.

The methodology used in the *Soviet View of Disarmament* is scholarly and sound and, while there are no surprise conclusions, it does serve as a thoughtful recap of virtually all arms control proposals put forth by the Soviet Union from the period 1917 to 1980. Its worth lies in understanding and evaluating current and future Soviet arms control proposals.

DALLACE L. MEEHAN  
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force

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Burrows, William F. *Deep Black*.  
New York: Random House, 1986.  
401pp. \$19.95

Taking his title from the deep black of space and the deep black character of U.S. intelligence and reconnaissance satellite programs, Burrows turns the bright light of an experienced aerospace reporter onto the subject. His book has three themes: a history of reconnaissance satellite and aircraft development, an analysis of the vital role played by these systems in national security and arms control verification, and revelation of all the details he can find of code words and system performance. The first is interesting, the second laudable, but the third is of question-

able utility and perhaps serves only to authenticate his work.

After sketching the history of the military's need to peer down at their opponents from balloons and aircraft, Burrows jumps into the interagency fights over control of overhead surveillance assets in the cold war. Eisenhower, and later Kennedy, would not allow the military to control these assets because that would have given them control of the interpretation of the product which could be "used" to further their budget requests. Following the U-2 and early photographic satellites, space surveillance and reconnaissance became so widely accepted and reliable that they were the cornerstone to verification of the SALT I and ABM agreements. Both agreements contained clauses about noninterference with "national technical means" of verification, a euphemism for satellites.

Burrows raises the question of why, if satellite surveillance is so crucial to national security, is the national program so cloaked in secrecy. His answers, which lie in the political arena, miss the most fundamental point: if the technical details of the capabilities of the systems were open, then the surveilled would know how to hide the very things we must see to maintain stability and mutual security.

The bulk of Burrow's work is devoted to describing what he believes to be the technical details of code words, bureaucratic connections, ground station locations, intercept capability, and photographic resolution. While this makes interesting

reading, it contributes little to understanding the value these systems have to the Nation. While Burrows does substantiate the case for overhead surveillance systems as a requisite to any successful arms control agreements, it is regrettable that he did not devote more of his efforts to developing that case fully. Had he done so, this would have been an important, rather than a merely interesting book.

F. LEITH  
Washington, D.C.

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Moore, John Norton. *The Secret War in Central America: Sandinista Assault on World Order*. Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, Inc., 1987. 195pp. \$17.95

This important book presents carefully documented and well-argued international legal justification for U.S. assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance forces (the "contras") as well as a well-documented account of the actions of the Sandinista regime which provoked our legal and political intervention. Supporters of U.S. intervention will find arguments of world order and legal principle transcending the more often-heard rationale of U.S. national interest, of anticommunism or of protection of human and democratic rights. Open-minded opponents will be disabused of the ideas that the Sandinistas are not the major source or funnel of support for Salvadoran and other Central American insurgents and that