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Eisenhower: At War, 1943-1945

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men were without heirs to carry on the tradition. In his later years, Lovett in particular had no use for the new professional foreign policy elites, the so-called "best and brightest," or the incredible partisanship of the Congress on foreign affairs issues.

Lovett's view that part of the United States' foreign affairs travails result from policy being made by servants of selfish ambition is not without some foundation. Isaacson and Thomas point out the pathetic examples of leaks and infighting surrounding the preparations for the 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev summit, while Paul Nitze continued to work tirelessly in the background to establish a meaningful and pragmatic agenda. In the end, Nitze, an old protégé of Dean Acheson, is identified as the only relic of a bygone age, an anachronism among the ambitious.

The U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the arms race, and the cold war have all been attributed to these men, the "Establishment"; but they accomplished a great deal in the post-World War II era. As Henry Kissinger correctly pointed out, "There was a foreign policy consensus back then, and its disintegration during Vietnam is one of the great disasters of our history. You need an Establishment. Society needs it. You can't have all these constant assaults on national policy so that every time you change Presidents you end up changing direction."

In the final analysis, *The Wise Men* is a reexamination of the legacy of six selfless gentlemen whose fortunes were not made in Washington, and

whose personal security was not dependent upon their positions in Foggy Bottom, an observation that lends insight into U.S. foreign policy leadership during the critical years after World War II. In the age of Irangate and recent political scandals, it is refreshing to read of a different breed of policymaker in our government, a breed hopefully not yet extinct.

WILLIAM BAKER
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Eisenhower, David. *Eisenhower: At War, 1943-1945*. New York: Random House, 1986. 977pp. \$29.95

David Eisenhower's book about his distinguished grandfather is the first in a series of three projected to cover the General from his appointment as supreme commander in Europe through his years in the White House. *Eisenhower: At War* covers the year and a half period from the planning and execution of the Normandy invasion through the German surrender. The book's dominant theme stresses the trials and tribulations of coalition warfare. Eisenhower, as the Supreme Allied Commander, could offer experience neither in combat nor as an operational commander comparable with Montgomery or Alexander; undoubtedly an American was chosen because the preponderance of men and materials would come from America. Europeans favored General Marshall, but he could not be spared from

Washington. Only Eisenhower had the genius, the tact, and diplomatic skills to massage the rivalries, cross-purposes, and massive egos of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, of Alan Brooke and Montgomery, of the Combined Chiefs, the strategic air power barons, and Stalin. For the NATO planner today, *Eisenhower: At War* offers a superb how-to on coalition warfare.

How does planning then compare with planning by the 16 members of NATO today? Can the impossible problems of command—the headaches of an “agreed” strategy built on differing national aims, of insistence on flawed doctrines of the past at the cost of vital support for a modern combined-arms strategy, of insistence on both a dominant maritime as well as a continental strategy, of acute problems of weapons standardization, and of working with unequal and competitive partners—can these headaches be resolved to the point of creating a highly efficient national force today for the security of Western Europe?

David Eisenhower stresses that the General’s actions were far more political than previously believed. Where General Eisenhower has often been criticized for political innocence that allowed him to “cede Berlin and Prague to the Russians,” David Eisenhower makes the opposite case, that it was his political sensitivity guiding him to do so. This clouds the real issue.

Eisenhower as a strategist was no Clausewitzian. Typical of American military leaders, he separated polit-

ical goals from military strategy. When policy failed, the military went to war, seeking victory as quickly, as thoroughly, and as cheaply as possible in terms of spending human lives, in a strictly military approach, free of political complications. Wars were fought as crusades of good against evil. Eisenhower sympathized with Churchill’s preoccupation with the political role of the military, “but as a soldier I was particularly careful to exclude such considerations from my recommendations.”

When Churchill suggested in early 1945 that the Allied armies go as far east as possible in Europe and stay there until the Soviet Union had complied with its part of the Yalta agreement, the correspondence between Marshall, Eisenhower, and Bradley demonstrated the political vacuum within which the American military strategy developed. Bradley concluded that “as soldiers we looked at the British desire to capture Berlin as complicating the war with political foresight.”

Churchill shrewdly observed in his *Memoirs of the Second World War*, “We can now see the deadly hiatus which existed between the fading of President Roosevelt’s strength and the growth of President Truman’s grip. In this melancholy void, one President could not act and the other could not know. The military chiefs . . . confined themselves to their professional sphere. The State Department had not been close enough to the heart of things to comprehend the issues involved. Indispensable political direc-

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tion was lacking at the moment when it was most needed.”

The political sensitivity which David Eisenhower stresses is something quite different. The intense and exceptional burdens carried by his grandfather aided considerably in establishing his political and diplomatic skills, but these were only casually interrelated with grand strategy, the political ends for which a war is fought.

British strategic goals included preservation of her overseas trade and the imperial lifeline through the Mediterranean to the Middle East, restoration of the balance of power in Europe, denial of Russian access to warm-water ports, and participation in a land campaign in Europe—after the Germans and Russians had bled each other sufficiently—so as to gain a voice in the settlement and restore the prestige lost at Dunkirk. American goals were hardly incompatible. To these ends Churchill favored an attrition strategy in a “peripheral” war in Sicily, Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia as the quickest route to Vienna, Prague, and Berlin. Churchill knew the approach from the south to be a sham which could lead only to stalemate in the Alps or Balkans, but it bought him time and delay of the U.S. drive for a frontal assault across the channel.

The lack of both a coalition strategy and clear postwar aims, aggravated by the absence of joint doctrine, greatly complicated the battle of war. Young Eisenhower develops well the difficulties in gaining temporary control of the

strategic air forces for battlefield support during and after Normandy; he offers much less about the role of the Pacific-minded Navy. Key to much of the above is the Berlin issue. His grandfather’s decision not to send American troops racing ahead of the Red Army to capture Berlin is vigorously defended. His argument merits close study alongside the more generally accepted view that Berlin carried far greater military and political significance than accorded by Eisenhower, but to the reviewer the argument is unconvincing.

David Eisenhower originally planned a book on the second Eisenhower administration but found his research would have to delve into his grandfather’s “war background” and its “formative significance” for his later career. *Eisenhower: At War* therefore offers an excellent source of information about the Eisenhower Presidency and, of prime interest to the military reader, his actions as President in reorganizing the Defense Department.

Readers may recall his message to Congress in presenting the 1958 Amendments to the National Security Act. “Complete unity in our strategic planning and operational direction is vital. It is therefore mandatory that the initiative for this planning and direction rest not with the services but directly with the Secretary of Defense and his operational advisors, the JCS. . . .

“No military task is of greater importance than the development of strategic plans. . . . Genuine unity is indispensable at this starting point.

No amount of subsequent coordination can eliminate duplication or doctrinal conflicts which are intruded into the first shaping of military plans."

Although the 1958 Act established strategic planning as the responsibility of the JCS, the "first shaping" of plans and doctrinal development is not now accomplished by the Chiefs. It is delegated to the services. The services never seemed to accept the fact that the law specifies development of *joint* doctrine. Air Force spokesmen in recent years have lost much of the zealotry behind the quick, easy victory through air power alone, and have come a long way in support for combined arms concepts on the modern battlefield. But Army and Navy planners, engrossed in refurbished concepts of continental or maritime warfare, produce not joint or national strategies but tactical uses of the sea and land services operating under certain assumed political conditions. Overlooked is the fact that a nation cannot be both a "sea power" and a "land power," nor can one power be disregarded in a national strategy developed by the other.

Eisenhower: At War offers an outstanding primer on the problems confronted by the unified commander and his staff and is worthy of careful study by those who will eventually serve in such assignments.

PAUL R. SCHRATZ
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Newman, Aubrey S. *What Are Generals Made Of?* Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1987. 314pp. \$18.95

Twenty-seven years have passed since General Newman retired. That's a long time. The Army looks different than it did on his last day of active service. Why, then, one may ask, would he presume to write about what leadership—particularly senior leadership—requires in today's Army?

The author, with no surprise to those familiar with him, anticipated such a question. The book, he writes, is "no more than one man's solution to special leadership problems told in day-to-day incidents and actions." That is the key to the book's value. This is not another tome on organizational theory or a shallow approach to self-improvement. This is an experienced and distinguished soldier talking to today's leaders about things that still matter. His recollections and anecdotes bring the wisdom gleaned from 35 years of active service into clear focus.

All of the book's chapters, except three, were selected from General Newman's column, "The Forward Edge," a regular feature of *Army* magazine. Here, they have been organized to focus on two themes: First, the qualities and factors leading to star rank; and second, "how to function in that state."

Before you decide whether to read the book, consider several excerpts that typify the insights General Newman provides:

- "You can't fool soldiers—there are too many of them."