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PROFESSIONAL READING

The heart of the work is an account of the campaigns of the divided Spanish Navy during the Civil War. It is a textbook example of what can go wrong if there is not a close and insightful relationship among policy, strategy, logistics, and available forces, with a clear contrast of what can go right if there is.

Willard C. Frank, Jr.

Cerezo Martinez, Ricardo. *Armada española, siglo XX*. 4 vols. Madrid: Ediciones Poniente, 1983. 415, 330, 392, 419pp. 7,000 pesetas

The fiftieth anniversary of the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39 is upon us, yet the activity of the Spanish and allied navies that fought that war at sea and provided Franco the logistic conditions of victory remains little known in Spain, let alone abroad. Apart from the World Wars, here was displayed the most extensive exercise of seapower of the first half of the twentieth century. It was also the most significant maritime dimension of a civil conflict since the American Civil War but with a great deal more foreign intervention at sea and ashore. Captain Cerezo, long a professor at the Spanish Naval War College, has combed his navy's operational archives to provide us with the first detailed and comprehensive story of the creation of the modern Spanish Fleet and the campaigns it fought.

As a weakened Spanish nation entered the twentieth century, Iberian minerals attracted the increasing attention of the competing industrial powers while the surrounding seas contained their vital trade routes. Memories of the long-vanished days of imperial power haunted as much as inspired Spanish military and naval leaders, for Spain no longer had sufficient

Dr. Frank, an Associate Professor of History at Old Dominion University, is currently engaged in writing on seapower in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939.

means to defend Spanish integrity and interests in the face of the great power rivalries that swirled through the era of the World Wars. The old Spanish Navy was destroyed in 1898, just as the international climate was heating up. It became the goal of a new generation of naval leaders to create a credible fighting fleet that would tip the balance among the naval rivals and thus give clout to Spanish diplomacy.

Cerezo's painstaking exposition of the difficult search for a coherent and effective naval policy forms what is perhaps the best developed section of the work. The search was burdened by chronic political instability, a tight budget, and a tendency for factions in government to use the navy as a political football. The Spanish Republic of the 1930s, in tune with prevailing ideals, constitutionally renounced force as an instrument of national policy and clung to the fading hope of the League of Nations. Apprehensive about Spanish debility in a world of hungry dictators and fearful democracies, naval officers would have accepted almost any government that would provide direction. Force levels always remained far below what naval leaders deemed the minimum necessary to hold the balance at least between the fleets of France and Italy.

Cerezo pounds home the theme of the weakness of the navy and the incoherence of building programs. Yet the Spanish Fleet by 1936 was the most powerful in the world aside from those of the major powers that fought the Second World War. Largely the result of a cooperative effort by certain ministers and admirals, the new navy before 1914 centered around battleships to balance foreign fleets and torpedo boats for close defense, the emphasis shifting in the 1920s to a mobile squadron of large cruisers and destroyers and a growing submarine force to control sealanes. This navy gained experience in colonial campaigns, but was clearly insufficient to stand alone against a major maritime opponent. With a vision of prodding Spain back into the ranks of the first-class powers, Spanish naval officers then, as Cerezo now, pointedly contrasted Spanish naval weakness with the might of the major navies. It was a forlorn dream. The navy cannot be separated from the internal conditions of the nation that creates and supports it, as Cerezo recognizes in his preface, and the political and economic conditions of the time precluded Spain from again ranking among the great naval powers. An outsider might be surprised that Spanish officers should set their sights so high, yet take for granted the stature that naval powers of the second rank that clung to great-power status, such as Italy and France, claimed for themselves. These were just the states that appeared to be the most likely to extend or defend their interests at Spain's expense. Spanish naval apprehensions were justified, but the means to provide for a powerful naval establishment that would guarantee Spanish security simply were not there.

Less satisfactory is Cerezo's account of the bitter social conflicts that exploded into revolution in the navy and the nation. Despite his sincere

efforts to be objective, the emotional imperatives of the era have not let him go. He ignores the shared responsibility of the officer corps in snapping the bonds between the bridge and the lower deck. He cites no evidence for either a masonic or a communist plot, yet trots out both. He fills fifteen pages detailing the Republican executions of naval officers during the early weeks of the Civil War, but passes off in one thin undocumented paragraph the equally horrendous execution of multitudes of leftist sailors by Nationalist tribunals. Cerezo does not put to rest much of the folklore perpetuated by the victors about the revolution in the fleet, yet the angry partisan has won this round over the dispassionate scholar.

The heart of the work is an account of the campaigns of the divided Spanish Navy during the Civil War. It is a textbook example of what can go wrong if there is not a close and insightful relationship among policy, strategy, logistics, and available forces, with a clear contrast of what can go right if there is. The armed struggle ashore was a close match, and both sides quickly became dependent on the continuous flow of seaborne support from abroad, the control of sealanes gaining decisive importance. The Republic retained the bulk of the surface fleet and the entire submarine force, but revolutionary imperatives purged this potentially formidable armada of most of its officers, dissolved the naval staff, and relied on incompetent Soviet naval advice for operational direction. Republican leaders were ignorant of the disastrous strategic consequences of abandoning the key island of Mallorca to the enemy or of removing an effective blockade in the Strait of Gibraltar in order to provide a temporary naval presence in northern ports. The latent power of the Republican navy was not focused, and this impressive fleet soon became an inert and demoralized mass bypassed by the hard contest being waged around it.

By contrast, the Nationalist navy started out with a quite inferior assortment of ships. Yet capable officers and an effective staff system at Franco's headquarters coordinated ends and means and developed a clear mission focused on the control of traffic. Successful concentration allowed the area of control to expand from the Straits to encompass in time the entire vast network of maritime communications. The disparity in effectiveness between the two Spanish Fleets encouraged Italy and Germany to risk sending their navies to intervene on the Nationalists' behalf, and they did so with near impunity. Aid to the Nationalist war machine flowed without interference, while supplies destined for the Republic became progressively choked off. By not diverting their sights from the objective when prospects seemed bleak, the Nationalist navy by 1938 produced decisive effects on the land war. The long and weary business of blockade had paid off.

These volumes, despite their bulk, fall short of a definitive treatment. The reader has to dig out meaning from heaps of data mostly served up as chronology and laden with excessive repetition. Cerezo has produced a

valuable and incisive strategic analysis, but we find it tucked away as an article in *Revista de Historia Naval* (No. 6, 1984), where it might have served to provide structure for the larger work. He allows himself to make sweeping assertions based on inadequate evidence, or conversely is satisfied simply to report conflicting data and interpretations and then to remain aloof from making a judgment. Having only mastered Spanish language sources, he is unable to probe very far into the interventions of those foreign nations that gave the conflict characteristics of a coalition war. He misses, for example, the active role of German U-boats or the self-blinding assumptions of Soviet naval advisers. The texts of documents appended to each volume are too often inaccurately copied. Much more care should be expected with editing and production.

This overwhelming assemblage of semidigested data may put off some readers. Yet a close reading will demonstrate once again that when one is constructing and employing a navy, the qualities of mind that one cannot easily tally on a ledger sheet are those of decisive significance. The ships and weapons, though necessary, are merely the tools.

Luttwak, Edward N. *The Pentagon and the Art of War. The Question of Military Reform*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984. 332pp. \$17.95

Ed Luttwak is both a provocative thinker and a clear and forceful writer. This book is no exception and the subject he focuses on (what the dust jacket calls "our outmoded military establishment") lends itself to his talents. Luttwak tends to make rather pungent, broad judgments and recommends more change than is likely to be forthcoming. Also, curiously for someone who has been immersed in defense detail, Luttwak's book is an outsider's evaluation which lacks the perceptions most of those with extensive military service share.

The subtitle of the book is: *The Question of Military Reform* and that is in fact the book's thrust. In eleven

chapters, Luttwak proceeds from an initial discussion of "the anatomy of military failure" and the "lessons of defeat . . . unlearned" to the "enormity of the [U.S.] defense establishment," a chapter on the Soviets, one on why the "materialist bias," then two chapters on "the officer surplus," three chapters on "the great budget game" and its consequences and effects, with a final chapter called "toward reform." Putting it another way, he has an assessment of Vietnam and recent military operations off Lebanon and on Grenada, followed by something of a broad net assessment (including intellectual attitudes toward military problems), branching over to a figure-laden discussion of a senior officer-heavy officer structure, on to the interplay between budget and strategy, and ending with a specific recommenda-

tion for a really “purple suit” joint staff.

Luttwak’s criticism of the Vietnam War is very pointed. “By 1968 there were 110 generals and admirals actually in Vietnam, 64 of them for the Army alone; a small number were actually in command of forces in the field, but most were in Saigon, along with hundreds and hundreds of colonels.” In discussing Desert One he renews his continuing criticism of what he calls “the ‘unified’ model” which patches forces together—some for you and some for you, meaning some for everybody. He has scant praise for the Grenada operation either, saying that “ever since Korea, each test of combat has revealed gross deformations in the making of strategy, in the absence of operational art, and in tactics made willfully clumsy.” Luttwak is arguing that the very structure of our national defense is defective and its very size makes that difficult to grasp. The problem becomes even more acute when we have to take the enormity of the Soviet defense effort also into account.

He argues that the immense size of the defense effort spurs us to pick on small, understandable items to criticize, like the cost of toilet seats or hammers. Perhaps his most telling (or at least interesting) criticisms, buttressed by figures, have to do with what Luttwak calls “the officer surplus.”

In 1945, with more than 12 million under arms, the ratio of enlisted to junior officers stood at about 10:1 and has more or less remained so since. But the middle and senior rank (colonel-

captain) picture has been very different: 1945, 100 enlisted, 1.3 such officers; 1950, 100:4.0; 1952, 100:2.9; 1958, 100:4.3; 1960, 100:4.7; 1969, 100:4.5; 1973, 100:5.8; 1983, 100:5.3. Luttwak says this inflation represents a redundancy to allow mobilization expansion to the large numbers à la 1942 but thinks this not very likely to happen. In the meantime, he says, these officers inflate staffs and create new staff layers whose main effect is to stifle the efficient development of new weapons systems. He especially focuses in on the Air Force Systems Command. He says: “During the twenty-year period 1965-1984 . . . the Air Force has developed a grand total of only two bombers, one of them merely a converted fighter . . . ; only three fighter-class aircraft . . . ; only one transport aircraft and a single trainer.” He has harsh words, too, for the now defunct Navy Material Command and the Army’s Materiel Development and Readiness Command, calling the M-1 tank “very advanced and very desirable in every way—except in combat” and criticizing the Navy for having too few convoy escorts.

When he turns to the budget process he condemns the vast energy expended which could be better applied to making strategy and reorganizing defense, and says that our expenditures on our forces reveals “a fundamental imbalance in American strategy”—by which he means that “instead of seeking to establish land-power parity, which is the required counterpart to strategic-nuclear parity, the declared goal is to build a ‘600-ship Navy’” He

considers "naval operations . . . largely irrelevant . . . for Soviet military action in the major continental theaters of war . . ." He especially condemns the large carrier.

In chapter 11, he comes to his reforms. "Absolutely the first priority is to provide a central military staff" of "national defense officers" who would opt for joint careers, and place that staff under a Director. The operational chain would be through SecDef direct to the unified and specified commands. Only "national defense officers" could hold such commands. Luttwak thinks this change would provide better "joint" advice.

Luttwak does not really tangle with some thorny questions, like the apparent operational disconnect between the joint staff and the unified and specified commands. I find no real attention to what the new joint staff would really do that would be so much better than we do now. Luttwak apparently thinks that having career "national defense officers" both in Washington and at the unified and specified commands will create like thinking both at the center and in the field. Since he believes a thoroughgoing world war III is "imaginary" but that minor regional contingencies are likely, the author is not concerned with how a worldwide contingency or war would be coordinated or prepared for.

His book is readable and provocative. On his reform "solution" and related questions, however, the Senate 1983 hearings are more useful.

Rearden, Steven L. *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: Vol. I, The Formative Years, 1947-1950*. Washington: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1984. 667pp. \$25

The creation of a unified national security establishment turned out to be a much tougher proposition than anyone supposed it would be. But a start was made in 1947 and the story of the first two secretaries was one of somewhat more success than failure—though the shortfalls were serious and frustrating. But this history of those first two Administrations is a clear success.

The author of *The Formative Years* has good experience, appropriate credentials and a sound attitude on what official history can and should be. He is a graduate of the University of Nebraska and holds a Ph.D. from Harvard. He is experienced as a teacher at Harvard and Boston College, as a consultant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and as a researcher at Johns Hopkins University. His research seems to be painstaking and his writing style clear, economical and readable.

Formative Years is organized along topical lines. Its first part covers the initial structuring of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and next comes the treatment of the external national security problems it faced in its first four years. Finally, it handles the domestic problems—largely ones of trying to get the services to live together in harmony and of helping divide the scarce dollars of the immediate postwar years.

Rearden shows that the problems facing James Forrestal and Louis Johnson during those early years were immense, more so than is typical for a large and new organization. It was a time of political upheaval all over the world and of revolutionary technological change. It fell to those two men to try to build an effective new national security structure in the face of those uncertainties. The author concludes that they did about as well as could be expected. They took the first steps towards centralized control of the larger armed forces that emerged from World War II, and laid the foundations that led to further rationalization and centralization in the subsequent years. But neither Forrestal's gradualist consensus-building leadership, nor the forceful and direct methods of Johnson ever really overcame the insecurities within the armed forces to the point where unification became any more than a hope for the future.

Steven Rearden has done a capital job on *Formative Years*. His documentation is impressive and heavily weighted with primary sources. He seems to understand that his function was to describe and interpret, not to glorify and he gives us something on the warts. His organization is sound and his prose is a pleasure to read.

The first volume of *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense* establishes a standard for those to follow. It shows that official history *can* be good history and it should be read by the serving armed forces officer. The book is an essential acquisition for all

scholarly libraries and one worthy of the personal collections of the students of military history or national security studies.

DAVID R. METS

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Buss, Claude A., ed. *National Security Interests in the Pacific Basin*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1985. 350pp. \$27.95

A collection of papers given at a 1983 Hoover Institution conference on Security in the Pacific Basin, this book is a first-rate *tour de horizon*. The participants include many well-known names in Asian matters—Roger Swearingen, Paul Wolfowitz, James Gregor, Douglas Pike, to name a few—as well as some that, at first glance, seem a bit out of place in a book on Pacific Basin security matters: retired Admiral Inman and Dr. Edward Teller. To Dr. Buss' credit he has fashioned a most interesting compendium from this diverse group.

Part I of the book deals with "Great Power Confrontation" and sets an overall theme: "The reality of global confrontation is a dominant factor in the decision making processes of the United States, its allies and friends as they seek solutions for their bilateral and regional problems." Part II examines U.S.-Soviet relations and their effect on the Pacific Basin nations. Some of the more interesting observations:

- "Hostilities are not likely to occur in the vast Pacific except as a

consequence of wars started outside the region." (Buss)

- "The United States can no longer go it alone in Asia, or in other portions of the globe—nor should it." (Admiral Long)

- "... the most important single element for stability and growth in . . . this decade . . . will be how the United States manages the economic competition." (Inman)

- "The favorable security picture in the Pacific is . . . not a product of the region's inherent peacefulness, or an absence of force, but rather what seems to be an effective balance of forces." (Wolfowitz)

Part III discusses Northeast Asia, characterized by Dr. Buss as the Pacific Basin area where national security issues are most sensitive. Roger Swearingen leads off with "Security Implications of Siberia and the Soviet Far East" which focuses on Siberia as (1) an economic/strategic "treasure house," (2) a commercial center and (3) a strategic-military complex.

This is followed by a discussion of Japan's defense posture, in which Yoichi Masuzoe presents reasons for the reluctance of the Japanese Government to take a larger responsibility for defending Japan and then examines whether more will be done in the future. Masuzoe's conclusions will disappoint those hoping for significant changes in Japan's defense posture. Lastly are two excellent contributions by Korean authors covering Korean national interests (Koo Youngnok) and the Republic of Korea and the

major powers (Han Sung-Joo). The discussant section features a comment from Edward Olsen.

In parts III and IV, discussion of Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asian security remind the reader of the vast ranges of problems not only between regions, but also between countries within a region. Although written before the recent differences between New Zealand and the United States papers, by Henry Albinski, T.B. Millar, Richard Kennaway and Desmond Ball provide thorough and reasoned analyses of our ANZUS partners. Ball's paper—"U.S. Installations in Australian Agenda for the Future"—provides a detailed description of the principal U.S. installations in Australia and discusses major domestic issues raised by them as well as offering controversial proposals for future Australian policy decisions.

In Southeast Asia, Dr. Buss feels that our most skillful diplomatic management will be required to formulate effective security policy because, unlike other regions of the Pacific community, "[i]n Southeast Asia, because of the diversity and complexity of the area, it is difficult to generate anything approaching consensus on priorities of national interest or common measures for their protection."

Against this backdrop, Douglas Pike discusses Indo-Chinese security in terms of ASEAN while Lie Tek Tjeng writes on Jakarta's view of the regional power balance. Malaysian issues are discussed by University of Malaysia Professor Chandran Jeshu-

run. Short papers present the views of Singapore and Thailand. These are followed by "The Politics of Philippine Security" by Salvador Lopez. Reflecting Dr. Buss' opening remarks, these papers and the discussants' comments reflect unhappiness with U.S. policy and concern with the future, particularly ASEAN's course.

Discussions on Salvador Lopez' paper by James Gregor and Stephen Jurika elicited the following rebuttal by the former Philippine Ambassador to the United States: "You know the trouble with colonialism? It is so much better to talk about it with the colonist than with the colonized. It is nicer, so much more pleasant. You can stand at the top of the stairs and talk to us below. But the fellow down below is something else. And we Filipinos have been there for 400 years! I hope that gives you an idea of why I feel as I do. And why many Filipinos feel as I do. We want you to get the hell out of there!" While not all of part IV is this heated, there is certainly a wider range of opinions here than elsewhere.

Part V deals with China, particularly within the context of the Taiwan issue. In Dr. Buss' words: "If the total security of friendly nations in the Pacific Basin is to be strengthened, due consideration must be given to the interests and policies of U.S. allies and, above all, to the security and welfare of Taiwan." Jonathan Pollack analyzes China's role in Pacific Basin security, giving an excellent assessment of China's strategic role and discussion of China vis-à-vis the superpowers,

other Asian communist states and the Pacific community. Next are three papers on Taiwan, discussing that country's policies, economic development and perspective on the Pacific Basin. Ralph Clough closes out with a discussion of recent trends on Chinese foreign policy, reinforcing the conventional wisdom that "[d]ifferences over Taiwan will be the most untractable problems in U.S.-PRC relations" while observing that "Chinese leaders find it difficult to admit, even to themselves, that the main obstacle to reunification is not U.S. policy . . . but the conviction of [the Taiwanese] that the status quo is preferable to submitting to Beijing's control."

National Security Interest in the Pacific Basin is a wide-ranging book. The variety of topics and styles is well balanced by Dr. Buss' comments and introductions. This, and the attention to detail always evident in Hoover Institution Press books, makes this volume a welcome addition to the literature on the Pacific Basin. Dr. Buss' book is recommended equally to the general reader and the serious scholar; there is sufficient material for both.

RICHARD S. CLOWARD
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American Enterprise Institute

Hoyt, Edwin P. *The Militarists: The Rise of Japanese Militarism Since WW II*. New York: Donald I. Fine, 1985. 256pp. \$18.95

As history has shown it is difficult to predict what may rise from the

war-torn ruins of a defeated and devastated nation. Oftentimes such nations have surprised even the most optimistic predictions and achieved far more than ever was conceived possible within a short period of time. If one lesson may be learned from such drastic progress it is that it is far easier to destroy a person than it is to destroy a people. In his book, *The Militarists: The Rise of Japanese Militarism Since WW II*, Edwin Hoyt closely and articulately examines the spirit of such a people—the Japanese. Through an examination of Japanese culture and postwar political and economic progress, Hoyt proposes that despite the devastation of World War II the Japanese spirit has endured and, more importantly, perpetuated its traditional tendency towards militarism.

In *The Militarists*, Hoyt specifically cites the creation and evolution of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to imply that there indeed exists a possibility that Japan is on the road to creating a formidable military force which could conceivably lead to regional and global instability. The very existence of Self-Defense Forces, Hoyt explains, is a direct contradiction to its U.S.-imposed “peace constitution” which outlaws Japan’s right to develop a warfighting capability. It is more than just the development of a military force, however, that leads Hoyt to his alarming conclusions. Rather, it is his interpretation of the self-image of the Japanese nation itself. It is the parallels between current political rhetoric and pre-World War propa-

ganda that create the perception of a Japan which is struggling to reattain a position of power in the world.

Clearly, the concept of the “rising sun” has already manifested itself in Japan economically since 1945. The question Edwin Hoyt attempts to answer is whether the same vigor and resilience of spirit will be redirected toward a revitalized and potentially aggressive military. His conclusions are as fascinating as they are distressing.

THOMAS B. MODLY
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Blair, Bruce G. *Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1985. 341pp. \$32.95 paper \$12.95

Ford, Daniel. *The Button: The Pentagon’s Strategic Command and Control System—Does It Work?* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985. 270pp. \$16.95

Shortly after the end of the Second World War there was a great flurry of interest in something called “push-button warfare.” Such great strides had been made in weapons and in electronics during that war that it seemed inevitable that a combination of such developments would lead to a global chessboard where two players could fight each other by remote control. Yet, at least one speaker of that era would attempt to dramatize the ridiculous aspect of such an idea by confiding to amazed audiences that yes, half of the equipment necessary to implement the concept

of pushbutton warfare had been designed, built, tested, and was even then in operation. He would then gleefully hold up a pushbutton—*attached to nothing*.

The image of that unattached pushbutton kept recurring during the reading of these two books on the subject of nuclear command and control. Both of them tell us in effect that if a President under attack were to “push the button,” nothing much might happen. They lay before us in great detail the vulnerabilities of the systems, that the great chess players have been assuming all along would function effectively. The authors remind us again and again that systems for the command and control of nuclear warfare are so complex that it is a wonder that they function in the first place, that they probably will not work well under the stress of sudden, heavy loading, and that under attack they might not work at all.

The two books cover much of the same material, but differ in their approach and in their ultimate conclusions. Daniel Ford, *The Button*, has taken a journalistic approach (portions of the book first appeared in *The New Yorker*) by visiting defense sites, interviewing officials, and describing what he saw and heard. Bruce Blair, *Strategic Command and Control*, who was then with the Brookings Institution and is now with the Defense Communications Agency, has written more of an “insider’s” book, relying heavily on congressional testimony and on his analysis of defense budgets. Both describe the

vulnerabilities of our existing command and control system in enough detail to convince any Soviet nuclear strategist that it ought to be a high priority target system.

However, the authors draw somewhat different conclusions from their analyses. Ford sees the vulnerabilities of our nuclear command and control system as both the cause and the reflection of a U.S. first strike strategy, which he claims is the strategy preferred by U.S. military planners. Blair attempts to avoid the dead end of such a strategy by recommending that we adopt the alternative strategy of riding out an enemy attack, and that we use our command and control system not to launch an immediate second strike under attack, but to enhance the survival of the nuclear forces. His proposal of “no immediate second use” is an attempt to relieve the intense pressure on the President that would be created by the perception of an imminent enemy attack. He describes the great difficulties that will arise at that critical moment when the national command authorities consider shifting from negative control of nuclear weapons to positive control. The difficulties include both organizational inertia and military overeagerness. Ford describes these same difficulties more colorfully by using such terms as safety catches, hairtriggers, and loaded dice.

When the history of the nuclear era is written, the 1980s will be remembered as the decade that command and control became recog-

nized as a central player. This recognition probably results from an appreciation of the likely effects of electromagnetic pulse and the deployment of Soviet SSBNs off our coasts. Our attention has been drawn to current vulnerabilities by the short time now estimated to be available for decision makers to assess the nature of an attack, to select a course of action, and to deliver the necessary orders, before our command and control system begins to be picked apart. But according to Blair, our nuclear command and control systems have throughout the nuclear age been more vulnerable and less capable than our nuclear strategists assumed them to be. He doubts that we have ever been capable of carrying out any of our nuclear strategies. And as for the present Administration's goal of fighting a protracted nuclear war, both authors consider such a strategy to be hopelessly beyond the capabilities of present and perhaps even of planned command and control systems.

Both authors paint a bleak picture, so bleak that Secretary of Defense Weinberger has found it necessary to assert that the two books contain "a great number of inaccuracies and poorly founded judgments." But whatever the facts, there is a difference between having a system that is vulnerable and having one that is totally incapable. The reader may find that in learning that his remarkably sophisticated command and control system may be seriously degraded by an

attack, he has also learned that the system that is now in place is remarkably sophisticated. And since rational decision makers on the other side cannot be assured that it will be totally incapable, the strategy of deterrence may continue to succeed. In the response quoted above to an inquiring senator, Secretary Weinberger encapsulates in a single sentence the "official" view of system vulnerabilities and of these two books: "I can state unequivocally that the present system, despite its current limitations, supports our national policy of deterrence and does not force us first to absorb a nuclear attack as suggested in Blair's conclusions or resort to the preemptive strike, implied as necessary by Ford."

These books describe how command and control vulnerabilities would undermine escalation control strategies by reducing the ability of either side in a conflict to perceive what level of conflict is being pursued by the other, how the same vulnerabilities tend to increase the pressure for the militarization of outer space, and how difficult it is for the individual services to procure command and control systems in a way that insures their overall coherence. But the most important issue raised by these books concerns the pressures placed on policy decision makers on both sides during a crisis between superpowers. As Ford points out, the military wisdom of striking first is reinforced by the recognition that one's own command and control system is so vulnerable that it is

reasonable to assume that it has been made a major target system by an opponent as a means of reducing damage to himself. The implications for rational decisionmaking by political leaders during a crisis are immense. Both authors argue that the vulnerabilities of some of our weapons systems pale to insignificance when compared to the impact of vulnerabilities of our nuclear command and control system. Ford is content to describe and deplore this state of affairs, while Blair at least advances an alternative strategy.

FRANK SNYDER
Naval War College

Stares, Paul B. *The Militarization of Space U.S. Policy, 1945-1984*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1985. 352pp. \$25

Even the most casual observer of defense decisionmaking is aware that outer space is an integral part of Soviet and American military activity. According to Stares: "For those familiar with the history of the US military space programme, there must be a strong sense of *deja vu*. The very same weapon systems that are currently being developed were all proposed in a remarkably similar way during the 1950s and 1960s." The impetus for the development of space weapons being a direct result of fears caused by the launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik in 1957. The anticipation that the United States would respond militarily to this threat led to proposals for a variety of space systems and weapons, including anti-

satellite (ASAT) weapons and space-based ballistic missile defenses.

Yet, Stares finds that while space developed as an important component of the U.S. military posture, the level of U.S. ASAT effort remained rather restrained, even after the U.S.S.R. began testing a satellite interceptor in 1968. Soviet interest in ASAT was similarly restrained and the tests that began in 1968 ceased in 1972 and were not to resume until 1976. Stares suggests that during this time ASAT was not a high-priority development project in either country. The fact that an arms race did not develop in space leads Stares to the first of the three questions around which he centers his study: "*Why were space weapons never extensively deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union when all the conditions were apparently ripe?*" On the basis of the findings presented in his study, Stares challenges the widely accepted theory that the absence of an arms race in space was the result of a tacit agreement reached between the United States and the U.S.S.R. not to interfere with the other's space systems because of the mutual benefits gained from reconnaissance satellites in strengthening the system of stable mutual deterrence. Instead, he hypothesizes that the absence of an arms race in space was not the result of the recognition of the benefits of satellite reconnaissance but rather: "the result of a convergence of national interests, military disincentives and technical constraints, which were buttressed at important times by formal agreements."

However, new perceptions of national interests, military incentives, and technical possibilities cause Stares to conclude that the chances of space remaining demilitarized are remote. He bases his prognosis on two recent developments: First, the active pursuit of ASAT systems by the Soviet Union and the United States. Second, the development of technology to create laser and particle beam weapons, whose most commonly noted missions are for ASAT and BMD. Stares concludes that the introduction of weapons for use in or from space does represent a qualitative departure from the dominant pattern of the past 25 years. This change leads to the second question around which his study is based: "What changed in the late 1970s to now make an arms race in space appear inevitable?" Stares hypothesizes that by the late 1970s, the factors that had served to restrain the development of an arms race in space began to change. According to Stares, the incentives for both sides to develop ASAT weapons increased: "as the services began to appreciate the 'force multiplier' effect of space systems for their traditional missions . . . satellites began to facilitate battlefield surveillance, tactical targeting and communication. They offered the chance of improving the lethality of weapons systems and the effectiveness of military forces generally. The net effect was twofold: the dependence on space systems increased, as did the threat they posed to terrestrial forces. Because satellites were both important to an

adversary and threatening to one's own forces, they became doubly attractive as military targets."

By the late 1970s, because of a combination of changes in national interests, military incentives and technical opportunities, ASAT restraint and arms control appeared to be of less and less military benefit whereas an active ASAT policy promised greater military benefit. According to Stares, the Reagan administration's policy represents a qualitative departure from the more restrained policy of previous Administrations and the beginning of a new era in U.S.-Soviet space activities.

This leads to the third question around which Stares focuses his study: "What are the likely implications of the development and use of antisatellite weapons?" In his conclusion, Stares outlines the possible results of an unrestrained ASAT competition. First, he notes that the drain on funding for space projects caused by higher military space expenditures may impose opportunity costs on the civil/commercial exploitation of space; furthermore, civil/commercial satellites are likely to be considered "fair game" for ASAT attacks in wartime. Second, Stares finds that as the West's level of dependence on space assets for war-fighting continues to increase, Soviet ASAT capabilities will increasingly threaten our ability to perform military support functions, such as global C³, navigation, and surveillance. Finally, Stares concludes that an unrestrained ASAT competition may undermine the strategic defense

initiative. If a shift to strategic defense is deemed mutually desirable, dedicated ASAT weapons may be used to attack the vulnerable space-based components of a BMD system. Any of the above actions would have a potentially destabilizing effect on the military balance. If one side perceived that its satellites were vulnerable to attack, in times of heightened tension there would be increasing pressure to conduct military missions dependent upon satellites before these satellites were destroyed.

Stares is not sanguine over the role that traditional arms control, with its emphasis upon qualitative and quantitative restrictions, might play in curbing the ASAT threat. Instead, he suggests that the United States and the U.S.S.R. might agree to certain cooperative measures in space, commonly referred to as "rules of the road." An analogue suggested by Stares is the U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement, which provides for rules of behavior for naval activities and also for consultative channels for resolving disputes.

This is a well-written, well-researched work and should serve as a needed corrective to the conventional wisdom on the military use of outer space. We are now engaged in debate over the role of the military in outer space and the extension of the arms race into space. Stares' book should be read and his recommendations carefully considered as a basis for informed participation in this debate.

LOUISE HODGDEN

Newport, Rhode Island

Rust, William J. *Kennedy in Vietnam: American Vietnam Policy, 1960-1963*. New York: Scribner, 1985. 241pp. \$15.95

Boettcher, Thomas D. *Vietnam: The Valor and the Sorrow*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1985. 472pp. \$27.50 paper \$14.95

Both of these works are contributions to the growing volume of Vietnam literature which attempts to reevaluate the roles played by senior advisors throughout the course of U.S. involvement and which consequently rejects the popular notion that the military establishment led the body-politique down the war-path.

William J. Rust has given us a tightly written review of a crucial period during the Vietnam era which is often overlooked by many who prefer to dwell on the more turbulent years which followed Kennedy's "1000 days." Relying heavily on interviews with major and minor players throughout the government, Mr. Rust provides an interesting glimpse at "the best and brightest" without the glitter. He focuses on the events which culminated in the November 1963 Generals' coup and subsequent assassination of Diem and Nhu, clearly indicting the Kennedy inner circle for its explicit role in them. In so doing, he offers fascinating insight into the means by which President Kennedy often arrived at decisions, bypassing established and systematic lines of authority to accept the advice of ad hoc study groups or minor officials. The

fragmentation of centralized control which naturally ensued is best exemplified by an incident which was to have vital repercussions. On 24 August 1963, the State Department released a message to the embassy in Saigon acknowledging Diem's expendability if his volatile brother Nhu could not be edged out of the political picture. The message, of obvious import in the Administration's overall position in Vietnam, was released without the knowledge of the Secretary of Defense or the Director of Central Intelligence.

Thomas D. Boettcher's book is nominally a first-rate textbook-style history of Vietnam from the beginning of French colonialism until April 1975, but it is at its best in examining the often tumultuous relationship which existed between the soldiers and the statesmen as early as the 1954 Dien Bien Phu crisis, when "General Ridgway's frank appraisal of the problems . . . in Viet Nam turned Eisenhower away from a troop commitment" against the advice of Secretary Dulles, who was preparing to signal France "that the U.S. was willing to move on the matter." In an even more telling passage, Mr. Boettcher describes Robert McNamara as one "who . . . looked upon the generals as men who had stayed in uniform after the Second World War because they couldn't make it in the civilian world."

This book goes far beyond personalities, though. It is first and foremost an exhaustive historical work which stands among the very best available.

Mr. Boettcher has gone one step

further than standard pieces by giving us essentially a second book, printed in the margins of the main text, in which he provides the reader with what is best described as Vietnam trivia— anecdotes, quotations, photographs (over 500, superbly captioned), even an excerpt from the Soldier's Field Manual explaining the construction of Vietcong booby traps. This "book within a book" allows for a far broader understanding of the subject than that which is possible from a conventional history.

Mr. Boettcher's work should serve as the heart of any personal library of Vietnam literature. It is exceptionally well-documented and he uses personal interviews as effectively as Mr. Rust. While Mr. Rust's study is sometimes a little trite for serious history, "Max Taylor was Kennedy's kind of general," it is nevertheless an excellent account of a subject long overdue for dedicated independent analysis. Together with Mr. Boettcher's book, it is an attempt to interpret a crucial period in history which serves its purpose quite well.

LAWRENCE T. DIRITA
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

Dallin, Alexander. *Black Box: KAL 007 and the Superpowers*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 180pp. \$14.95

Armed with a fellowship from the W. Averell Harriman Institute, Columbia University, the author examined the various theories about what happened and what caused the Korean Airlines Flight #007 to end up

in Soviet Air Space. Interviews were conducted in Moscow, Washington and in Montreal, home of the International Civil Aviation Organization. The author talked with knowledgeable people and has answered many of the theories that have been posed about the incident.

While a variety of explanations have emerged from the events surrounding the flight and its path to destruction, there are basically four that are examined. The first is the notion that it was caused by some equipment failure or an in-flight hijacking. The next is it all came about because there was human error, an undetected mistake, incapacitation or undetected cause during the flight. The third surmise is that the aircraft's crew (Captain, Co-Pilot and Flight Engineer) wanted to save time/fuel and therefore were taking a shortcut through Soviet airspace. Lastly, the author examines the idea that the crew was on some surreptitious mission for some foreign intelligence agency. Dallin examines all of them and compares the facts against the theories or hypotheses offered. None of these theories hold up well when fitted to the known facts. The reader is left with either believing that the necessary documents are locked in some security safe somewhere or there were some vital verbal exchanges on the flight deck that only the in-flight recorder will ever reveal, and that rests somewhere on the chilly bottom of the waters off Sakhalin Island. In any event, the facts do not fit any of the theories put forward so far.

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Dallin devotes the remaining half of *Black Box* to examining the behavior of the two superpowers. He examines their actions and reduces them down to a handful of goals. The United States appears to have been concerned with labeling the Soviets as being totally devoid of morals and with any constraints of law. Dallin believes that data pictures an Administration that used the incident to generate support for itself and also for its defense programs. Lastly, the United States used the incident to initiate steps to reduce the likelihood of possible future recurrences. The Soviets, on the other hand, appear more concerned about what the controlling elite of the regime would think about the incident, pursuing a program of what Dallin labels "damage limitation." The attempt to limit the damage extends to the international community as well. They also attempted to undermine any U.S. allegation and also began to take those steps that would assure that a similar event, the penetration of their airspace, would not occur again.

The actual question of who destroyed the aircraft is clear. Also, the data shows that the Soviets knew what they were doing. An aircraft had entered their airspace and whether it was civilian or not was irrelevant. The reaction would be the same if it were military—bring it down one way or another. As Dallin states: "it is better to be safe (shoot it down), than to be sorry (let it leave the air space)."

The style is easy to read. The technical matters are reduced down

for the layman without being insulting. Anyone interested in how the powers handle incidents will find Dallin's work of great use. *Black Box* is excellent reading about a very tragic event.

PETER C. UNSINGER
 San Jose State University

Fisher, David. *Morality and the Bomb: An Ethical Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. 136pp. \$25

The author of this short work is described on the book's jacket as a "civil servant with the Ministry of Defense." From the evidence of the book itself, it is clear that he is also a person trained in the techniques of contemporary British philosophy and that he is a Christian with a strong concern both for ethical values and for clarity of thought on a difficult subject. His book, because of its sober style and undramatic conclusions, will not generate great excitement, and it may be neglected because the author is not prominent in the American debate on these matters. But that would be unfortunate because this is probably the best work on the most important moral dilemma of our time.

Fisher's book is particularly valuable for the way in which it addressed a major lacuna in the U.S. Catholic bishops' letter on war and peace, namely, the letter's failure to give a satisfactory account of how the Western reliance on nuclear deterrence is to be justified. He begins by laying out the basic structure of

mutual deterrence and explaining why it is unlikely to fail. Like the American bishops and the ultimately rejected report of the Church of England working party, *The Church and the Bomb*, (1982), Fisher works within the just war tradition of thinking about justification for the use of force. With regard to the two fundamental norms of *jus in bello*, he affirms the principle of proportion and applies it to policy issues in a standard way without exploring its deeper difficulties. He also upholds the principle of noncombatant immunity, but he does allow exceptions to it on the basis of what he calls "principled consequentialism." On the basis of these principles he holds that there is "a strong moral presumption . . . against any use of nuclear weapons." On the other hand, he scrutinizes the alternatives to deterrence and finds them less satisfactory and more risky. Then, in an important and subtle chapter in which he pays careful attention to the ethical dilemmas confronting both political leaders and military commanders, he argues that the moral justification of deterrence is impossible "if one believes that any use of nuclear weapons would be morally impermissible." But, in Fisher's view, "it is not possible to establish in advance that there are no conceivable circumstances in which use, in some form, might be morally licit." Since deterrence does not depend for its effectiveness on the risk of unlimited escalation, which would violate the principle of proportionality, it can be justified as a means of preventing

war in general and nuclear war in particular. In two final chapters, he goes on to consider the bearing of his moral argument on declaratory policy and on disarmament policy.

Morality and the Bomb is heavy going in some places since it is written for a philosophically sophisticated audience, but it will repay careful study by any person interested in our developing a morally sound approach to deterrence. It is one book which explains both why deterrence makes a vital moral contribution to our society and why arms control is a morally urgent task. Its one major limitation is that the author's understandable preoccupation with the British debate, in which deterrence came under a stronger theoretical challenge, leads him to treat the American religious debate less fully than it deserves. But he has made a distinguished contribution to our common understanding of the deeper moral issues.

THE REVEREND JOHN LANGAN, S.J.
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Dougherty, James E. *The Bishops and Nuclear Weapons: The Catholic Pastoral Letter on War and Peace*. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1984. 245pp. \$22.50

This study provides the most thorough and balanced assessment to date of the American bishops' pastoral letter on war and peace issued in 1983. The study, published under the auspices of the Institute for Policy Analysis of Cambridge, describes the dominant theological and political forces influencing the drafting of the

letter, assesses the growing impact of pacifism on the American Catholic Church hierarchy, and reviews the teachings of the Catholic Church on the morality of nuclear weapons. A major strength of the book is that it provides a sympathetic, balanced yet critical assessment of the bishops' work. Dougherty probes beneath the simplistic slogans which have dominated the religious debate on nuclear arms by seeking to uncover the strengths and weaknesses of the bishops' argument. "The bishops are to be admired," he writes, "for adopting a courageous prophetic stance, for raising some tough questions about their own government's policy and for introducing a strong moral tone into the national debate about nuclear strategies." At the same time, Dougherty questions many of the letter's emphases and policy recommendations which he believes ultimately tend to undermine U.S. strategic policy.

Dougherty observes that the problem of nuclear weapons cannot be easily encompassed within the traditions of pacifism and just war. Indeed, deterrence requires a wholly new type of moral analysis if it is to adequately come to terms with the problems posed by nuclear technology. The author suggests that many of the letter's limitations can be attributed to the absence of any well-developed body of moral theory or church teachings on deterrence. The bishops' effort to base a qualified endorsement of deterrence on a pacifist-just war dichotomy is, in Dougherty's view, wholly unsatisfactory.

According to the author, one of the major shortcomings in the letter is that it gives too much attention to the preservation of the world and insufficient attention to the problem of Soviet expansionism. As Dougherty rightly notes, nuclear weapons have served not only to prevent nuclear war, but to inhibit Soviet imperialism. A morally satisfactory approach to nuclear weapons must be inspired not only by the fear of annihilation, but also by the call for world justice. Indeed, as George Weigel has observed, the posing of survival as the highest moral good runs directly contrary to the church's teachings for two thousand years. Justice, not survival, must be the clarion call of the church. A moral nuclear strategy must not only seek to reduce the probability of nuclear war, but it must also promote the common good by inhibiting the expansion of totalitarian tyranny. A significant failure of the pastoral letter is its failure to adequately relate the nuclear dilemma to Soviet imperialism.

There are no easy answers to the moral paradox of deterrence. Deterrence provides a crude and morally troubling strategy of peacekeeping. To renounce deterrence would be irresponsible; to endorse it without qualification would result, in all probability, in grave injustices. James Finn has stated the problem well: "one must currently choose between the unsatisfactory and the still more unsatisfactory. Anyone who thinks otherwise has not grasped the strange and desperate quality of our situa-

tion." The bishops do of course give conditional endorsement to deterrence, but what troubles Dougherty is that the bishops call into question the instruments by which the United States has historically operationalized nuclear deterrence. As Dougherty notes, "there is no such thing as an effective nuclear deterrent force without an operational doctrine to govern its use. Yet what the bishops seem to be calling for is a morally acceptable deterrent without a militarily credible doctrine to support it." Dougherty thinks—and the reviewer agrees—that the pastoral letter would have been much stronger had the bishops explored in greater depth the meaning of traditional moral principles to the problems of nuclear strategy and devoted less attention to specific policy recommendations. By focusing on issues of operational character, the bishops venture into a highly complex arena in which they have limited technical competence.

Those who have followed the moral debate on nuclear strategy will find this book a stimulating and insightful study. While the book is written for those who are generally familiar with the bishops' letter and who have some background in the moral dilemma of nuclear weapons, it would have been helpful had the author presented a summary of the essential elements of the bishops' argument before examining key moral issues in the debate. Overall, however, this is a thoughtful, informed study which illuminates the

contribution of the pastoral letter to the nuclear moral debate.

MARK R. AMSTUTZ
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Koch, H.W., ed. *Aspects of the Third Reich*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. 611pp. \$29.95

No questions, no history. Huge chunks of the past are exempt from historical inquiry because no one wants to know about them. It is only when people ask questions, only where there is a problem, that a period, or an issue, will be addressed. In our time, for instance, formerly unexplored areas of our past have become relevant, and so there is now women's history, black history, world history, comparative history, the history of sexuality, the history of death. Investigation arises when people want the facts, and help in interpreting them.

The Third Reich never lacked for questions. This book of essays by German and British authors addresses the question: Are our customary views about Hitler's Germany still valid, or do we need to revise our conclusions in light of new evidence, new times, new problems? Was the Third Reich a modern, or an anti-modern phenomenon? Did it radically break with history, or can it be seen in terms of continuity? Did Hitler follow a master plan, or did he improvise? How much of the Third Reich is biography, and how much reflected broadly based contemporary wishes?

Ernest Nolte, dean of scholars of generic fascism, gives the overall answer: "the innermost core of the negative picture of the Third Reich needs no revision." What the essays in this book do mainly is to amplify, not alter, our knowledge of the period. Here are some points. *Mein Kampf* was a product of a particular time in Hitler's development. It is a fair indicator of the future, but Hitler was an improviser and new circumstances influenced him. Hitler's rise to power was helped by the absence in the Weimar constitution of any prohibition of parties whose explicit purpose was to overthrow the republic. Hitler could be, and was, entirely candid about his intention to take power legally in order legally to overthrow the democracy.

The organization of government was a management nightmare, with a confused, overlapping, and turf-obsessed hierarchy. Hitler alone stood as the integrating figure. His enormous popularity was decisive, and flowed from the skill and passion with which he expressed the deep longing for a classless, organic community that was, probably the most common characteristic of the Germans. It turns out that it was the leader of the army, dominated by this longing for *Volksgemeinschaft*, who took the initiative to establish the Fuehrer oath, hoping to establish a mystic relationship between the head of state and the armed forces as in the days of the emperors.

The genesis of the "final solution" is explained in terms of this unique authority of Hitler. A Fuehrer order,

the message that "the Fuehrer wished it," overrode law, humanity, and restraint, and carried through the genocide. There did not need to be, and there was not, a simple written order. Hitler's wish was enough. This is true, but narrow concentration on whether Hitler explicitly gave an order for the extermination of the Jews fails to take into account what scholars like R. Hilberg have shown: that the extermination came at the end of a process. Anti-Semitism became industrialized murder through the bureaucratic machinery of the modern state. First Jews were identified, then concentrated, then removed, and then, finally, killed—systematically, by the apparatus of the state. It was this process, well advanced by the time of the invasion of Russia, that enabled people to accept the final Fuehrer order.

The most original article here is by Nolte. He argues we must see the Third Reich anew, always in a broad historical context and never just as an isolated phenomenon, but no longer so dependent on the old totalitarian model which has, for the 1980s, lost much of its factual authority and interpretative vigor. Nolte proposes another historical connection in terms of the history of what he calls the "annihilation strategy" in Western politics. He shows that the idea of the annihilation of whole groups, one way or the other, goes back to the days of the French Revolution and Napoleon, to the industrial revolution, and, most importantly, was carried on in the Sovietization of Russia which Hitler

watched so carefully. In those times annihilation applied to classes or political groups (aristocrats, counter-revolutionists, opposing armies, capitalists, kulaks, etc.). The Third Reich applied it to "radical" groups, and the result was genocide. And, Nolte somberly adds, we still see annihilation strategies practiced in our day. Thus, the Nazi regime may be investigated "historico-genetically" within this trend of world history.

But whatever our perspective, this book shows there is no need to change our enduring negative judgments, our final moral denouncement, of the Third Reich. Nolte concludes: ". . . from the history of the Third Reich there must result the fundamental insight that the absence of *annihilating* measures towards political, economic, social or biological groups is the great distinction of that society which, with all its weaknesses, we call the liberal one."

GEORGE W. BAER
Naval War College

Terraine, John. *A Time for Courage: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939-1945*. New York: Macmillan, 1985. 816pp. \$29.95

A unique one-volume history of RAF European Operations during World War II by one of Britain's leading military historians whose works have earned him the Chesney Gold Medal—the highest award of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies.

While the central focus of the book is on the RAF during the war in

Europe, the book begins with the origins of the RAF toward the end of World War I, its struggle for survival against the disarmers, the other Services, and the budget cutters in Whitehall; and, its appearance at the beginning of World War II as a modern air force which, in the opinion of its author, was to hold "... for much of the time the place of honor on the right of the line, as the Black Prince and his men did at Crecy." This volume is hard to put down despite its weight and length as Terraine assesses and analyzes the role of the RAF, its missions, organization, equipment, aircraft, its leaders and their personalities and its enemies. It is a critical analysis of the RAF's leadership, policies, plans and organization for war, and its conduct of the war in relation to its prewar preparations and the harsh realities of battle. Meticulously researched, brilliantly written with lucid detail, the author discusses the period of preparation for war; the development of new systems, weapons and organizations; strategic, tactical and doctrinal development and change; the predominant role of the bomber and Bomber Command in RAF thinking; an analysis of the "knock-out blow" thesis; the strengths and weaknesses of its leaders; and how the test of battle showed so much was wanting.

The main themes examined in detail in *A Time of Courage* include the expansion of the RAF for war; the decisive victory of Fighter Command in the Battle of Britain, including a sharp rebuke of Leigh Mallory and a

strong criticism of his own countrymen for not recognizing even posthumously the great deed of Air Marshal Dowding, the leader of the Few, who saved England in the summer of 1940; the RAF's role in the Battle of the Atlantic; the victories in the Desert and Mediterranean where the methods of Army cooperation and air support were forged and prepared the way for Overlord; and, the pyrrhic victory and glory of Bomber Command though the author admits to being displeased with the morality of the methods adopted by Bomber Command. But indicative of both the objectivity of the author and his willingness to draw conclusions, he points out that possibly the greater immorality was to lose the war to Nazi Germany.

This is must reading not just for students of airpower and World War II, but strategists, historians and even our present-day military reformers. This is military history the way it should be written.

BENSON D. ADAMS
Bethesda, Maryland

Hough, Richard. *The Great War at Sea, 1914-1918*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1983. 353pp. £14.50

Richard Hough has provided a highly readable and powerful appreciation of the global dimensions and revolutionary character of the Great War at sea, which proved in many respects the decisive strategic arena. Moreover, it was a conflict which, at least in prefatory competition,

mirrors all too sharply the conventional confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union; i.e., a beleaguered global maritime power challenged by the naval expansion of the predominant continental power.

The undiminished controversy engulfing both the strategic and tactical conduct of the war has accorded great significance to unprecedented scale and scope, as well as the impact of revolutionary weapons evident in naval warfare—the maneuvering and fighting of turbine-driven dreadnoughts of unimagined size, speed, and firepower; the impact of the mine, torpedo, and submarine; and the unfulfilled promise of combined operations. These all served in varying degrees to cast the strategic potentialities of balanced naval power beyond the grasp of most statesmen, and its tactical implications outside the corporate experience of captains and senior commanders.

In assessing the evolution of these developments, Hough deftly juxtaposes two navies of sharply contrasting traditions and purposes.

With particular facility for tactical and technical considerations, Hough effectively develops the frustrations and failures typifying emergence of the “new” naval warfare: the quixotic attempt to relieve Antwerp; the suspense and ineptitude of the chase of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*; the tragedy of *Coronel* and the undisputed victory at the Falklands; the lack of a “second Trafalgar”; and a host of colorful, if occasionally obscure, developments;

e.g., Room 40 and the captured German ciphers, German raids on the English coast, and the legendary exploits of British submarine commanders in the Baltic and Mediterranean, as well as of the fabled Q-ships.

Materiel, leadership, and the frictions of war comprised the essential elements of this great conflagration, and it is here that Hough’s narrative power soars: the outgunned but better protected Germans’ intent upon attrition of elements of the Grand Fleet; the faster and more powerful British desirous of the decisive victory but constrained by the plodding caution of Jellicoe; the prudent but able German leadership of Scheer and Hipper; and a plethora of operational and technical failures. While judgments of operational decisions will remain contentious, Hough generally defends Jellicoe’s cautious approach as successful in thwarting Scheer’s objective of piecemeal attrition, instead confronting the German commander with the full weight of the Grand Fleet. For as Churchill noted, Jellicoe was the only man who could have lost the war in an afternoon.

Jutland was, and has remained, the greatest naval battle in history, replete with the inextricable question of who “won.” Strategically the British were clearly triumphant. Despite extraordinary violence, the Grand Fleet was ready for renewed action the next day; the Germans, with many units barely afloat, could not muster an effective force for months. But more importantly, there was little inclination to mount

another serious challenge. With the Germans thus confined to port, the British tightened their control of the world's oceans, moved rapidly to correct the technical deficiencies evident at Jutland, eventually contained the U-boat menace, and, with the surrender of the German Fleet, experienced the greatest naval triumph in history.

Hough's insights and expository powers in the tactical sphere should not obscure serious limitations with regard to strategic and policy considerations. For example, insufficient interest is evident in the organizational developments and policy battles of the prewar years in which, even after the 1911 decision in favor of a Continental strategy toward Germany, a policy for the optimum employment of naval power might have been salvaged. Concomitantly, efforts at naval staff development and actual war planning are inadequately appreciated. This skewed perspective is particularly evident in the author's treatment of the Dardanelles campaign, which has served as a foil for various strategic perspectives since. He attributes little merit to the effort, but not through appreciation of the strategic dilemmas confronting policymakers by early 1915. Rather, the enterprise is dismissed as a "sideshow," a misunderstanding of seapower (the "true" nature of which is obscure), and as a *naval* expedition promoted by the impulsive and erratic Churchill. Hough's lengthy enumeration of technical difficulties and tactical malfeasance is valid; but the critical

strategic question of widening the war militarily to accommodate the political dimension of war aims and termination is cursorily dismissed, yet ultimately comprises the strategic imperative of maritime power in global war.

These deficiencies notwithstanding *The Great War at Sea* is well worth the read. Its treatment of men in action is a model of the art, and its exposition of the radical alteration of naval war from the romantic ideal of Trafalgar to the exigencies of a modern global maritime campaign superb. There is much to learn here about the Elephant and the Whale.

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Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

Ulanoff, Stanley M., ed. *American Wars and Heroes: Revolutionary War through Vietnam*. New York: Arco, 1985. 378pp. \$19.95

This book is an adaptation—or perhaps more accurately, an abridgement—of *American Military History*, which is an ongoing project of the Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army.

As is true with many official histories, this is long on description and short on analysis, especially when social and economic considerations might be involved. But in fairness, a lot of military history is compressed into a single volume. Also to be expected is the focus on land operations, although sea and air come into their own from time to time. One interesting example can be drawn from the discussion of Gen. Ulysses

S. Grant's operations in 1862 to take Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River. Grant proposed a joint Army-Navy expedition, with him commanding 15,000 men "... supported by armored gunboats and river craft of the U.S. Navy under Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote." This success was quickly followed by the surrender of Fort Donelson, the significance of which was described as follows: "The loss of the two forts dealt the Confederacy a blow from which it never fully recovered. . . . Foreign governments took special notice of the defeats. For the North the victories were its first good news of the war. They set the strategic pattern for further advance into the Confederacy. In Grant the people had a new hero and he was quickly dubbed 'Unconditional Surrender' Grant."

In reading the circumstances surrounding the origins of the Spanish-American War, one is struck by the possible similarities to ambiguous crises involving naval forces in foreign ports and waters. Are these forces there to protect American lives and property, or are they hostages to the designs and aspirations of conspirators or politicians who are uninterested in mediation or the peaceful settlement of disputes? Nonetheless, the Naval War College comes in for some complimentary words, being singled out as having "... provided the Navy with a strong corps of professional officers trained in the higher levels of warfare and strategy, including the far-ranging doctrines of Mahan."

The book ends with the war in Vietnam, and takes no sides in the current and sometimes heated debate over "who lost Vietnam," which is a blessing. The conclusion does sum up neatly the book as a whole, and concludes on a modest note. "In Vietnam, the United States Army fought a war of contrasts. . . . In a way it was two wars, a military campaign involving a compendium of all the Army had learned from the Revolution through Korea and at the same time a vast civic action project, using the men and tools of war in the task of winning the confidence and support of a people. For the United States, Vietnam was a limited war in the classic sense of the American Revolution, the War of 1812, the Indian wars, the wars with Mexico and Spain, and Korea. In the same way that history cannot prophesy, only illuminate, this war of contrasts produced no clear pattern for the warfare of the future."

The writing style is understated, but very clear; the maps and charts are helpful; the detail does not get in the way of the larger strategic picture. In sum, the book makes for a "good read."

ROBERT S. JORDAN
Naval War College and
the University of New Orleans

Lavery, Brian. *The Ship of the Line*.

Volume I: *The Development of the Battlefleet 1650-1850*.
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983. 224 pp. \$29.95

Volume II: *Design, Construction and Fittings*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984. 191pp. \$29.95

At last there is a study of British warship design and development in the sailing era which can match the work of Howard Chapelle on the U.S. Navy and Jean Boudriot on the French Navy. Without question, Lavery's two-volume, richly illustrated study is the definitive work on the British ship of the line. Unlike Chapelle or Boudriot, Lavery has illustrated his work with original manuscript drawings, original builder's models, prints, paintings, and documents, making it even more attractive and interesting to the historian. For the first time, Lavery has described each ship and class, showing precisely how and why changes were made. This carefully documented study makes it impossible for any responsible historian in the future to repeat the old commonplace that there were no significant technological changes in warship design between the eras of Drake and Nelson.

Of the two volumes, volume I, covering the general historical background contains the more interesting and useful information for readers of this journal. It includes a succinct 150-page summary of British naval history between 1588 and 1845. Volume II is devoted to technical developments in hull design, construction, sails, rigging, armament, decoration, and fitting.

As Drake and Hawkins revolutionized the English Navy by converting

it to gunnery by 1588, so Cromwell and the leaders of his navy revolutionized it with the use of the broadside by the time of the first Dutch war. These innovations seem to have been the cumulative effect of several gradual developments over more than a half century, involving changes in ship-based practices, methods of securing guns, and the allocation of gun crews as well as hull-design changes to achieve greater speed. Then, the flag officers in tactical command began to use their fleets or squadrons as a unit, instead of in a *melée*, ship on ship. Once these complex trends came together and became part of the many compromises which must be made between armament, speed, cost, and other factors, then the ship of the line became a recognizable and established concept.

Before the next phase in development could proceed in the years after 1653, some basic questions needed to be answered: What is the best size for a ship of the line? Are three decks better than two? How much fire-power should ships of various sizes have? The answers to these questions were first formulated in the shipbuilding program of 1677. But the design initiative begun here was lost quickly largely because of political interference from Parliament, poor naval administration, and rash experimentation. By 1697, an era of stagnation had set in which perpetuated attitudes and practices that were not changed until the War of 1739-48 demonstratively proved the inadequacy of British ship design.

In the first 30 years of the 18th century, British warships tended toward greater breadth, depth and height above water. From the 1740s onward, these trends were reversed, so that by the Seven Years' War, British warships were more weathery, more stable, and more heavily armed than their predecessors. What changed most, however, was size. Compared with those built only a little earlier, by 1763 British warships were longer, heavier, and more suitable for global naval warfare. With Britain's victory over France that year, a new period of conservatism set in. Between 1763 and Britain's defeat in the American War in 1783, the Royal Navy emphasized standardization rather than progress. Size and layout changed little during this period. Though carronades were introduced along with copper sheathing, the Royal Navy was not saved from total defeat by these small innovations, but rather by the strategic failure of her numerically superior enemies. The Franco-Spanish-Dutch coalition failed to take advantage of its members' joint strength; collectively they employed their preferred strategy from the past when they were each weaker powers. It was a mistake to think, as they once had, that they could cause more damage by avoiding action than by fighting. At the moment of Britain's greatest weakness, she avoided disaster by luck.

The French Navy was the decisive force in the allied victory of 1781 which led to American independence. Although 13 American colonies were lost, the rest of the British Empire was saved to grow into an even more formidable power. The defeat jarred the Royal Navy from its rut. The British built more and larger ships of the line.

The great change in tactics brought to a head by Nelson also carried with it a change in design. For the old line of battle, ships were built to be strong at the sides only, their weak bows and sterns protected by the next ship in the line. The new tactics changed this, exposing the weakest parts to the full force of a broadside. Ships now exposed their sterns, the weakest part of all. In order to remedy this, the open galleries, festooned with carvings, were removed and replaced with a closed stern that allowed more protection and permitted the effective employment of stern armament. By 1816, rounded sterns with diagonal bracing were used. This last innovation allowed British ships to retain their strength despite their increasing size. In the 1820s and 1830s further improvements were made to increase speed, to employ iron in construction, to modify underwater lines, and to arrange the decks in a new manner. By 1840, the ship of the line had reached the peak of its technology, on the very eve of its obsolescence.

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