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## The Militarization of Space U.S. Policy, 1945-1984

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reasonable to assume that it has been made a major target system by an opponent as a means of reducing damage to himself. The implications for rational decisionmaking by political leaders during a crisis are immense. Both authors argue that the vulnerabilities of some of our weapons systems pale to insignificance when compared to the impact of vulnerabilities of our nuclear command and control system. Ford is content to describe and deplore this state of affairs, while Blair at least advances an alternative strategy.

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Stares, Paul B. *The Militarization of Space U.S. Policy, 1945-1984*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1985. 352pp. \$25

Even the most casual observer of defense decisionmaking is aware that outer space is an integral part of Soviet and American military activity. According to Stares: "For those familiar with the history of the US military space programme, there must be a strong sense of *deja vu*. The very same weapon systems that are currently being developed were all proposed in a remarkably similar way during the 1950s and 1960s." The impetus for the development of space weapons being a direct result of fears caused by the launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik in 1957. The anticipation that the United States would respond militarily to this threat led to proposals for a variety of space systems and weapons, including anti-

satellite (ASAT) weapons and space-based ballistic missile defenses.

Yet, Stares finds that while space developed as an important component of the U.S. military posture, the level of U.S. ASAT effort remained rather restrained, even after the U.S.S.R. began testing a satellite interceptor in 1968. Soviet interest in ASAT was similarly restrained and the tests that began in 1968 ceased in 1972 and were not to resume until 1976. Stares suggests that during this time ASAT was not a high-priority development project in either country. The fact that an arms race did not develop in space leads Stares to the first of the three questions around which he centers his study: "*Why were space weapons never extensively deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union when all the conditions were apparently ripe?*" On the basis of the findings presented in his study, Stares challenges the widely accepted theory that the absence of an arms race in space was the result of a tacit agreement reached between the United States and the U.S.S.R. not to interfere with the other's space systems because of the mutual benefits gained from reconnaissance satellites in strengthening the system of stable mutual deterrence. Instead, he hypothesizes that the absence of an arms race in space was not the result of the recognition of the benefits of satellite reconnaissance but rather: "the result of a convergence of national interests, military disincentives and technical constraints, which were buttressed at important times by formal agreements."

However, new perceptions of national interests, military incentives, and technical possibilities cause Stares to conclude that the chances of space remaining demilitarized are remote. He bases his prognosis on two recent developments: First, the active pursuit of ASAT systems by the Soviet Union and the United States. Second, the development of technology to create laser and particle beam weapons, whose most commonly noted missions are for ASAT and BMD. Stares concludes that the introduction of weapons for use in or from space does represent a qualitative departure from the dominant pattern of the past 25 years. This change leads to the second question around which his study is based: "What changed in the late 1970s to now make an arms race in space appear inevitable?" Stares hypothesizes that by the late 1970s, the factors that had served to restrain the development of an arms race in space began to change. According to Stares, the incentives for both sides to develop ASAT weapons increased: "as the services began to appreciate the 'force multiplier' effect of space systems for their traditional missions . . . satellites began to facilitate battlefield surveillance, tactical targeting and communication. They offered the chance of improving the lethality of weapons systems and the effectiveness of military forces generally. The net effect was twofold: the dependence on space systems increased, as did the threat they posed to terrestrial forces. Because satellites were both important to an

adversary and threatening to one's own forces, they became doubly attractive as military targets."

By the late 1970s, because of a combination of changes in national interests, military incentives and technical opportunities, ASAT restraint and arms control appeared to be of less and less military benefit whereas an active ASAT policy promised greater military benefit. According to Stares, the Reagan administration's policy represents a qualitative departure from the more restrained policy of previous Administrations and the beginning of a new era in U.S.-Soviet space activities.

This leads to the third question around which Stares focuses his study: "What are the likely implications of the development and use of antisatellite weapons?" In his conclusion, Stares outlines the possible results of an unrestrained ASAT competition. First, he notes that the drain on funding for space projects caused by higher military space expenditures may impose opportunity costs on the civil/commercial exploitation of space; furthermore, civil/commercial satellites are likely to be considered "fair game" for ASAT attacks in wartime. Second, Stares finds that as the West's level of dependence on space assets for war-fighting continues to increase, Soviet ASAT capabilities will increasingly threaten our ability to perform military support functions, such as global C<sup>3</sup>, navigation, and surveillance. Finally, Stares concludes that an unrestrained ASAT competition may undermine the strategic defense

initiative. If a shift to strategic defense is deemed mutually desirable, dedicated ASAT weapons may be used to attack the vulnerable space-based components of a BMD system. Any of the above actions would have a potentially destabilizing effect on the military balance. If one side perceived that its satellites were vulnerable to attack, in times of heightened tension there would be increasing pressure to conduct military missions dependent upon satellites before these satellites were destroyed.

Stares is not sanguine over the role that traditional arms control, with its emphasis upon qualitative and quantitative restrictions, might play in curbing the ASAT threat. Instead, he suggests that the United States and the U.S.S.R. might agree to certain cooperative measures in space, commonly referred to as "rules of the road." An analogue suggested by Stares is the U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement, which provides for rules of behavior for naval activities and also for consultative channels for resolving disputes.

This is a well-written, well-researched work and should serve as a needed corrective to the conventional wisdom on the military use of outer space. We are now engaged in debate over the role of the military in outer space and the extension of the arms race into space. Stares' book should be read and his recommendations carefully considered as a basis for informed participation in this debate.

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Rust, William J. *Kennedy in Vietnam: American Vietnam Policy, 1960-1963*. New York: Scribner, 1985. 241pp. \$15.95

Boettcher, Thomas D. *Vietnam: The Valor and the Sorrow*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1985. 472pp. \$27.50 paper \$14.95

Both of these works are contributions to the growing volume of Vietnam literature which attempts to reevaluate the roles played by senior advisors throughout the course of U.S. involvement and which consequently rejects the popular notion that the military establishment led the body-politique down the war-path.

William J. Rust has given us a tightly written review of a crucial period during the Vietnam era which is often overlooked by many who prefer to dwell on the more turbulent years which followed Kennedy's "1000 days." Relying heavily on interviews with major and minor players throughout the government, Mr. Rust provides an interesting glimpse at "the best and brightest" without the glitter. He focuses on the events which culminated in the November 1963 Generals' coup and subsequent assassination of Diem and Nhu, clearly indicting the Kennedy inner circle for its explicit role in them. In so doing, he offers fascinating insight into the means by which President Kennedy often arrived at decisions, bypassing established and systematic lines of authority to accept the advice of ad hoc study groups or minor officials. The