

1986

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Harry G. Summers Jr.

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Recommended Citation

Summers, Harry G. Jr. (1986) "War: Deter, Fight, Terminate, The Purpose of War is a Better Peace," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 39 : No. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol39/iss1/2>

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War: Deter, Fight, Terminate The Purpose of War is a Better Peace

Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., US Army.(Ret.)

War Termination

The original means of strategy is victory—that is, tactical success; its ends, in the final analysis, are those objects which will lead directly to peace All these ends and means must be examined by the theorist in accordance with their effects and their relationships to one another.

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*¹

One of the most frustrating aspects of the Vietnam War is that, as far as the “means” of war were concerned, the American Armed Forces succeeded in everything they set out to do. At the height of the war, they were able to move almost a million servicemen and women a year in and out of Vietnam, feed them, clothe them, house them, supply them with arms and ammunition, and generally sustain them better than any combat force had ever been sustained in the field. To project a force of that size halfway around the world was a logistics and management task of enormous magnitude, and the United States was more than equal to the task. On the battlefield itself, the Armed Forces were unbeatable. In engagement after engagement, the forces of the Vietcong and of the North Vietnamese Army were thrown back with terrible losses. Yet, in the end, it was North Vietnam, not the United States, that emerged victorious. How could the United States have succeeded so well, yet failed so miserably?

That disturbing question led General Creighton Abrams, then Army Chief of Staff and former Military Assistance Command Vietnam Commander, to form a Strategic Assessment Group within the Army General Staff in the spring of 1973 to reexamine “ends and means . . . in accordance with their

Colonel Summers, an infantry veteran of the Korean and Vietnam wars recently held the General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Military Research at the Army War College. He is the author of *On Strategy* (Presidio/Dell) and *The Vietnam War Almanac* (Facts on File), and is now the senior military correspondent for *U.S. News & World Report*.

effects and their relationship to one another.”² Among this group’s important contributions was the reassessment of the spectrum of war. In 1962 the previous distinctions between war and peace dropped out of Army *Field Service Regulations* and a spectrum of war was substituted where “the dividing line between cold war and limited war is neither distinct nor absolute,”³ a concept subsequently proven fallacious by the Vietnam War. In an attempt to devise a theory more in line with the real world, the Strategic Assessment Group came up with new terminology to define the Army’s roles. The peacetime utility of military forces in preserving the peace through deterrence was categorized as “conflict prevention.” The warfighting utility of military force was labeled “conflict control” and the need to define “victory”—the political end to be achieved—was incorporated into the concept of “conflict termination.” These terms, with their clear distinction between war and peace, are now contained in Army official doctrine and are used by the Department of Defense in their strategic planning guidance. In February 1980 they were used by Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer to describe the strategic requirements for the 1980s: “In the most basic sense, the strategic requirements of the 1980s are to prepare for the ‘Three Days of War’: to *deter* the day before the war; to *fight* the day of war; and to *terminate* conflict in such a manner that on the day after war, the United States and its allies enjoy an acceptable level of security.”⁴

Since the end of the war in Vietnam, much work has been done within the military to understand these strategic requirements but most of the effort has concentrated on the *means* of strategy. A general consensus on how to deter war has been developed and much has been written on *conflict prevention*. At least from the military perspective, it is well understood that conflict prevention depends on a credible capability for *conflict control*. As Clausewitz had said, “Combat is the only effective force in war; its aim is to destroy the enemy’s forces as a means to a further end. That holds good even if no actual fighting occurs, because the outcome rests on the assumption that if it came to fighting, the enemy would be destroyed. . . . All action is undertaken in the belief that if the ultimate test of arms should actually occur, the outcome would be favorable.”⁵ Because this connection between deterrence and warfighting is well recognized within the military, much work has also been done in recent years on conflict control—on how to fight on the air, land and sea battlefields of the future. But, although Clausewitz had warned that one must take care “not to take the first step without considering the last,”⁶ the fact is that of the three categories of the spectrum of conflict, *war termination* has been virtually ignored. In our fascination with the means of strategy, we have neglected the study of its ends—“those objects which will lead directly to peace.”

The Legacy of Korea and Vietnam

There is such a thing as seeing another come to grief, yes, even to destruction, without being one whit wiser yourself, because you do not understand how it happened; and you do not understand, either because you do not see the principle he has violated, or because you miss the application of it in his case, and consequently to your own.

Alfred Thayer Mahan⁷

One of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan's greatest contributions to military thought was his encouragement of the use of history to illuminate theory. Following his example, an examination of the history of our most recent wars illuminates why we have problems today with the concept of war termination. There have been those who claim that it was the attractiveness of unconditional surrender and the hubris resulting from our overwhelming victories in World War II that have blinded us to the realities of military theory and caused us to confuse ends and means. It is thus ironic to note that the Army's pre-World War II *Field Service Regulations* provided a sound frame of reference for the termination of war. "The conduct of war is the art of employing the Armed Forces of a nation in combination with measures of economic and political constraint for the purpose of effecting a satisfactory peace. . . . The ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces in battle. Decisive defeat in battle breaks the enemy's will to war and forces him to sue for peace which is the national aim."⁸

Although this 1939 definition carried us into total war in World War II, it also accommodated the later requirements of limited war since it did not necessarily require the total submission of the enemy. What was required was the application of sufficient military force to cause the enemy to sue for peace. In World War II this linkage dropped out of our war theories,⁹ for the national aim was no longer forcing the enemy "to sue for peace" but rather for his unconditional surrender. The destruction of the enemy's armed forces was therefore no longer a *means* to an end so much as an *end* in itself. Unlike the earlier definition, this World War II definition could not accommodate the problems we faced in Korea after the Chinese intervention.

Because of this doctrinal deficiency, our war theories became cloudy and confused. The first point of confusion was over the concept of war termination—over the meaning of "victory." With his frame of reference formed by his experiences in World Wars I and II, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur saw victory only in messianic terms—the total destruction of the enemy's armed forces and his unconditional surrender. In his testimony before the Senate during the Great Debate on the Korean War, General MacArthur called for just such a victory in Korea. He said, "I believe if you do not [seek such a victory], if you hit soft, if you practice appeasement in the use of force, you are doomed to disaster."¹⁰

Rejecting such an apocalyptic view, Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut questioned General of the Army Omar Bradley, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on what constitutes victory in war: "General, in the course of our history, I believe there have been a number of instances in which we accomplished our objectives without what might be called a final and complete defeat of the enemy, such as was visited on Germany. Certainly in the War of 1812 we fought the British on the sea and our own mainland to maintain the security of our commerce and the safety of our nationals. We didn't insist on a military victory over England as essential, did we? . . . Now in the Spanish-American War when we accomplished the liberation of Cuba, we didn't proceed to Madrid to capture Madrid, did we? . . . We negotiated a treaty after accomplishing our objectives. I am reminded of one war, and one perhaps less well known in 1798 to 1800, when we fought a limited naval war against France to protect our commerce and our shipping . . . Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, who had insisted on an all-out war with France at that time, was retired as Secretary of State, and the President, Mr. John Adams, President Adams, accomplished a settlement of that thing through negotiation and by treaty.

"The point that I want to make, General, to find out if you are in agreement with me, is that when you say that the object of war is victory, you must have a definition of what constitutes victory, don't you?"

To which General Bradley replied, "I think you must, and you vary from being willing to accept a rather small thing that you start out to correct up to an objective which we set in World War II of unconditional surrender. There are many variations in between the two."¹¹

Elaborating on this theme, Senator William Knowland of California commented: "The fact of the matter is, is it not, General, that we did not settle the controversy with the Spaniards being left in control of half of Cuba; we did not settle the Greek War with the Greek communists being left in control of a substantial part of Greece; and we did not finish the War of 1812 with the British being left in control of New Orleans. While it is true that we did not carry the war into their home countries, nevertheless, we did clear up the particular situation in which we were involved."

Again General Bradley replied, "We restored it in some cases to the status quo when we started the war and won our point. That boils down then to the question of what our point is."¹²

Senator Bourke K. Hickenlooper of Iowa again raised the issue of victory with Secretary of State Acheson, "I understand that it is our policy to have a victory in Korea; it's our policy to have peace in Korea. [It is] what we expect to do to accomplish it, that bewilders me." Secretary Acheson replied that US strategy was to limit the geographic boundaries of the war "as the least dangerous and most effective way of coming to a situation where both the attack stops and the desire to renew it stops" and to wear down the enemy by

attrition so that "they will suffer very disastrous losses to themselves, and a great many harmful results will happen to them in the way of the losses of their trained manpower, and the absorption of the resources of China in a fight which is of no real profit to China."¹³ Secretary Acheson went on to say that it was the US intention to gain victory not on the battlefield but through discussion and agreement.

Another point of confusion was over the definition of limited war. General MacArthur complained that "my whole effort since Red China came in there has been to get some definition, military definition, of what I should do."¹⁴ Commenting on a statement by then Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk that, "What we are trying to do is maintain peace and security without a general war . . .," MacArthur replied, "That policy seems to me to introduce a new concept into military operations . . . the concept that when you use force, you can limit that force The very term of 'resisting aggression,' it seems to me that you destroy the potentialities of the aggressor to continually hit you When you say, merely, 'we are going to continue to fight aggression,' that is not what the enemy is fighting for. The enemy is fighting for a very definite purpose—to destroy our forces in Korea."¹⁵

It is important to note that, General MacArthur's comments notwithstanding, the US strategy in Korea after the Chinese intervention was not so much one of limiting the means as it was one of tailoring the political ends so that they could be accomplished within the military means that our political leaders were willing to expend. In the Korean War, limited war was defined in terms of limited objectives. As our post-Korean *Field Service Regulations* stated, "The nature of the political situation at any time may require employment of armed forces in wars of limited objective. In such cases, the objective ordinarily will be the destruction of the aggressor forces and the restoration of the political and territorial integrity of the friendly nation."¹⁶ As Senators McMahon and Knowland and Secretary of State Acheson had said, and as our 1954 doctrine acknowledged, in neither the past nor the present was victory defined only as total destruction of the enemy. Victory was the achievement of the political ends for which the war was being waged.

As Clausewitz had written: "In war many roads lead to success, and that they do not all involve the opponent's outright defeat. They range from the destruction of the enemy's forces, the conquest of his territory, to a temporary occupation or invasion, to projects with an immediate political purpose, and finally to passively awaiting the enemy's attacks Bear in mind how wide a range of political interests can lead to war, or . . . think for a moment of the gulf that separates a war of annihilation, a struggle for political existence, for a war reluctantly declared in consequence of political pressure or of an alliance that no longer seems to

reflect the state's true interests. Between these two extremes lie numerous gradations. If we reject a single one of them on theoretical grounds, we may as well reject all of them, and lose contact with the real world."¹⁷

In Korea, the Army had learned the right lesson—that political considerations may require wars of limited objective—but it drew the wrong conclusions from that lesson. In what appears today to have been almost a fit of pique, the 1954 *Field Service Regulations*, while introducing the concept of "wars of limited objective," removed victory as an aim in war. As the manual said, "Victory alone as an aim of war cannot be justified, since in itself victory does not always assure the realization of national objectives."¹⁸ Defining victory only in terms of total victory, rather than more accurately as the attainment of the objectives for which the war is waged, was a strategic mistake. It not only obscured the fact that we had won a victory in Korea (where the status quo ante was restored and has been maintained for over 30 years); it also went a long way toward guaranteeing a lack of victory in Vietnam.

Testifying before the Senate in 1966, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell D. Taylor—then serving as Special Consultant to the President—said that we were not trying to "defeat" North Vietnam, only "to cause them to mend their ways," and went on to liken the concept of defeating the enemy to "Appomattox or something of that sort."¹⁹ This change in orientation was reflected in the 1968 successor to the *Field Service Regulations* which stated that "The fundamental purpose of US military forces is to preserve, restore, or create an environment of order or stability within which the instrumentalities of government can function effectively under a code of laws."²⁰

Unfortunately, we were opposed by an enemy who was fighting by the old rules. "The basic law of the war," wrote North Vietnamese General Van Tien Dung, who led North Vietnam's successful 1975 blitzkrieg, "was to destroy the enemy's armed forces,"²¹ a statement remarkably similar to Clausewitz' basic proposition that "the aim of war should be what its very concept implies—to defeat the enemy."²² One of the terrible lessons of Vietnam is that we were not defeated by new and esoteric theories of revolutionary war or by wily oriental stratagems; we were defeated because in the search for relevance, we had lost sight of our own strategic fundamentals. In Vietnam as in Korea, we did not understand the sea change that had occurred in US military policy as a result of the national policy of containment.

Faced with a long-term cold war with the Soviet Union and its surrogates, US Ambassador to the Soviet Union George F. Kennan argued in 1947 that national policy should be, not a head-on attack on communism, but instead the containment of its expansion to allow communism's own internal contradictions to weaken its imperialistic designs. In terms of political,

economic and psychological power, containment worked beyond our wildest expectations. The Moscow-controlled communist monolith has long since disintegrated into contending power centers. Communist economic policies have been a dismal failure everywhere they have been applied, and communist nations have increasingly been forced to turn to capitalist methods in order to stave off economic disaster. Against every tenet of communist ideology, communist “worker states” now wage war both on their own workers and on each other. While in overall terms containment has served America well, in military terms it has had unanticipated consequences.

First applied, as was discussed earlier, in late 1950 on the battlefield of Korea after the intervention of Chinese communist forces, the United States made the deliberate decision not to attack the Chinese homeland. Because our national policy was the containment, not the defeat of communism, the military strategies in support of that policy required the rejection of the strategic offensive (rollback or liberation) in favor of the strategic defensive (containment). This change in military strategy resulted in a lack of battlefield polarity, where US military objectives were not in balance with the adversary's. General MacArthur's complaints quoted earlier that his mission was to “resist aggression” while the enemy's mission was to “destroy our forces” could have been repeated verbatim during the Vietnam War. They revealed the truth of the formulations Baron Colmar von der Goltz developed in the late 19th century. He pointed out that the best one could hope to attain from the strategic defensive was “victory on the battlefield without general results for the campaign or war.”²³ In other words, the best the military could hope to attain with the strategic defensive was a stalemate on the battlefield while other elements of national power—diplomatic for example—would have to be used to achieve the political objective. This is precisely what happened during the Korean War where, after a two-year battlefield stalemate, an armistice was achieved through diplomatic negotiations. This is also what happened during the Vietnam War—a battlefield stalemate led to the Paris Accords of 1973.

Current Army Doctrine

Since war is, among other things, a political act for political ends, the conduct of a war, in terms of strategy and constraints, is defined primarily by its political objectives The scope and intensity of modern warfare are therefore defined and limited by political purposes and military goals. The interactions of military operations, political judgments, and national will serve to further define, and sometimes limit, the achievable objectives of a conflict and, thus, to determine its duration and the conditions for its termination.

Field Manual 100-1, *The Army*²⁴

While the 1981 version of the Army's basic doctrinal manual, Field Manual 100-1, *The Army*, recognized the importance of conflict termination, its

discussion of this important concept was deficient. In an attempt to correct this and other shortcomings, the manual is now in the process of revision. According to the current working draft, conflict termination implies the attainment of the political objective for which war is being waged. Like warfare itself, this political objective is dynamic, and may change during the conduct of a war depending on circumstances and the course of events. For example, during the Korean War the initial political objective was the restoration of the *status quo antebellum*. After the Inchon invasion and the collapse of the North Korean Army, this objective changed to the liberation of the entire Korean peninsula. After the Chinese intervention, however, the objective once again changed to restoration of the *status quo antebellum*, an objective achieved by the 1953 Armistice Agreement.

Because this objective is normally limited, the political objective acts as the true limiting factor in warfare. Total destruction of an enemy's armed forces and his unconditional surrender—as in World War II—is not only an anomaly in the history of warfare, but is no longer feasible in a conflict with a nuclear power. The potential destructiveness of a strategic nuclear exchange confronts both the United States and any potential nuclear-armed adversary with the possibility that escalation involving nuclear weapons could result in the destruction of the very objectives either side seeks to attain or preserve.

When the United States had nuclear superiority and a clear capability for escalation dominance, conflict termination could be achieved by implied threats on the part of the United States to escalate the conflict to the nuclear level. With the advent of nuclear parity, however, conflict termination rests not on escalation, but on deescalation. It is a process aimed at bringing any conflict to an end on terms favorable to the United States while at the same time preventing escalation to higher and more dangerous levels of warfare.²⁵

Naval Power and the Close of a War

One of the driving factors in developing this doctrine is that the Army, alone of the Services, has never had the illusion that it could go it alone. In the 1950s, there were those in the Air Force who believed that with the strategy of massive retaliation, the United States could provide for its security with airpower alone. Today, there are some who take the extreme position that America's security interests can be safeguarded solely by a maritime strategy. But the Army knows that American geography dictates that national security must be a joint enterprise. In the discussion of strategic realities that undergirded the concept of conflict termination detailed above, the current working draft of the Army's doctrinal manual emphasized that "The first reality is that, technology notwithstanding, the United States remains an insular power. In order to project its influence, it must deploy its forces overseas. The effect of this reality is that, in any operation outside America's

shores, Army forces must operate jointly with those of the other Services. The Army is dependent on the ability of the Navy and the Air Force to move it to the point of decision and to support and sustain it once deployed.”²⁶

While the Army understandably opposes reliance on maritime strategy alone as the basis for American national security, it supports maritime strategy as an important and integral part of our overall national military posture. In order to place arguments on maritime strategy in historical context, it is useful to reexamine classic accounts of such strategies. In the 1911 edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, the renowned British military strategist G. F. R. Henderson examined the fundamental nature of maritime strategy. He begins by stating the negative aspects—that in and of themselves, maritime strategies do not lead to rapid war termination, especially against a continental power. “Exhaustion is the object of its warfare”; he wrote, “but exhaustion, unless accelerated by crushing blows, is an exceedingly slow process A state, then, which should rely on naval strength alone, could look forward to no other than a protracted war, and a protracted war between two great powers is antagonistic to the interests of the civilized world.”²⁷

Having said that, however, he goes on to emphasize that “An Army supported by an invincible Navy possesses the strength which is out of all proportion to its size.” Using the example of the Napoleonic wars—an example that applies directly to US experience in World Wars I and II—he explains that “The army . . . was first and foremost the auxiliary of the fleet; and only when the naval strength of the enemy had been destroyed was it used in the ordinary manner, i.e., in the invasion of the hostile territory and in lending aid to the forces of confederate powers.”

“Surprise and freedom of movement are pre-eminently the weapons of power that commands the sea,” wrote Henderson. In words that foreshadowed General Douglas MacArthur’s master stroke at Inchon in the Korean War, Henderson notes that “if an army lands within reach of a precarious line of communications it may compel the enemy, although far superior in numbers, to renounce all enterprises against distant points.” Three-quarters of a century ago, Henderson concluded his treatise on maritime strategy with observations all too relevant to America’s strategic situation today. “Overwhelming numbers, adequately trained, commanded and equipped, are the only means of assuring absolute security. But a numerical preponderance, either by land or sea over all possible hostile combinations is unattainable, and in default the only sound policy is to take timely and ample precautions against all enterprises which are even remotely possible.”²⁸

War Termination Today

With these historical examples in mind, we can now turn to an examination of current concepts of war termination. One of the positive benefits of our

experience in Vietnam has been the rethinking of the fundamentals concerning the use of US military forces. In a speech before the National Press Club on 28 November 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger spelled out six major preconditions for the commitment of US combat forces abroad.

- The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies

- If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces of resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all. Of course, if the particular situation requires only limited force to win our objectives, then we should not hesitate to commit forces sized accordingly

- If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have and send the forces needed to do just that. As Clausewitz wrote, "No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he intends to conduct it." War may be different today than in Clausewitz' time, but the need for well-defined objectives and a consistent strategy is still essential. If we determine that a combat mission has become necessary for our vital national interests, then we must send forces capable to do the job and not assign a combat mission to a force configured for peacekeeping.

- The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed—their size, composition and disposition—must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably change during the course of a conflict. When they do change, then our combat requirements must also change. We must continuously keep as a beacon light before us the basic questions: "Is this conflict in our national interest?" "Does our national interest require us to fight, to use force of arms?" If the answers are "yes," then we must win. If the answers are "no," then we should not be in combat.

- Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. This support cannot be achieved unless we are candid in making clear the threats we face; the support cannot be sustained without continuing and close consultation. We cannot fight a battle with the Congress at home while asking our troops to win a war overseas or, as in the case of Vietnam, in effect asking our troops not to win, but just to be there.

- The commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort.²⁹

“The tests . . . have been phrased negatively for a purpose,” Secretary Weinberger went on to say, for “they are intended to sound a note of caution—caution that we must observe prior to committing forces to combat overseas. When we ask our military forces to risk their very lives in such situations, a note of caution is not only prudent, it is morally required.”³⁰ While some have denounced this caution as a legacy of the lost war in Vietnam, it is in fact much more positive than the military’s reaction 30 years earlier to the war in Korea.

With this “Weinberger doctrine,” the United States has taken heed of Clausewitz’ admonition “not to take the first step without considering the last.” His emphasis on the importance of clearly defining our political and military objectives before we commit US forces to combat is long overdue. Further, war termination is given the emphasis it deserves and winning is correctly defined as the realization of the objectives we set out to attain.

The relationship of maritime strategy to the security of the United States was put in proper perspective over four decades ago here at the Naval War College. Written in 1942 in the darkest days of World War II, the Naval War College text *Sound Military Decisions* emphasized that “The final outcome is dependent on ability to isolate, occupy, or otherwise control the territory of the enemy. The sea, though it supplements the resources of land areas, is destitute of many essential requirements of man, and affords no basis, alone, for the secure development of human activities. Land is the natural habitat of man. The sea provides routes of communication between land areas. The air affords routes of communication over both land and sea. These facts inject into military operations certain factors peculiar to movement of military forces by land, sea, and air.”³¹ Now, as then, the task for the strategist is not so much maritime strategy or continental strategy or airpower strategy but combining these strategies in order to provide for security of the homeland, the protection of American interests in the world, and the termination of any conflict in which we may become involved on terms favorable to the United States.

In our current fascination with technology and with the material aspects of war, it would do us well to recall what those authors in Newport long ago believed to be the essential preconditions for such successful strategies. While acknowledging the need for physical and moral power, they particularly emphasized the need for mental power, “a creative imagination and the ability to think and to reason logically, fortified by practical experience and by a knowledge of the science of war . . . the ability to distinguish between preconceived ideas and fundamental knowledge [and] intellectual honesty, unimpaired by the influence of tradition, prejudice, or emotion”³²

Notes

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3. US Army Dept. Field Manual 100-5, *Field Service Regulations-Operations* (Washington: US Govt. Print. Off., 19 February 1962), pp. 4-5.
4. US Chief of Staff, US Army, *White Paper 1980, A Framework for Molding the Army of the 1980s into a Disciplined, Well-Trained Fighting Force* (Washington: 25 February 1980), p. 1.
5. Clausewitz, p. 97.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 584.
7. Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasting with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1911), p. 11.
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9. FM 100-5, 15 June 1944, p. 32.
10. US Congress, 82d Cong., 1st sess., Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, *Military Situation in the Far East*, Hearings (Washington: US Govt. Print. Off., 1951), p. 40.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 960-961.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 1083.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 1800.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40, 68.
16. FM 100-5, 27 September 1954, p. 6.
17. Clausewitz, p. 94.
18. FM 100-5, September 1954, p. 7.
19. US Congress, 89th Cong., 2d sess., Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "To Amend Further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as Amended," *Vietnam Hearings* (Washington: US Govt. Print. Off., 1966), pp. 440, 460.
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21. Van Tien Dung, "Great Spring Victory," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, v. 2, FBIS-APA-76-131, 7 July 1976, p. 52.
22. Clausewitz, p. 595.
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24. US Army Dept. Field Manual 100-1, *The Army* (Washington: US Army Adjutant General Publications Center, August 1981), p. 7.
25. Draft Chapter 3, "Roles and Missions of the Army," Field Manual 100-1, *The Army*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 31 August 1984, pp. 16-17.
26. Draft Chapter 2, "Strategic Environment," Field Manual 100-1, *The Army*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 29 May 1984, p. 8.
27. G. F. R. Henderson, "War: General Principles," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed., v. 28 (London: 1911), p. 308.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 309-311.
29. Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," *Defense* 85, January 1985, p. 10.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Sound Military Decisions* (Newport, RI: US Naval War College, 1942), p. 46.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

