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"If we have learned nothing else from this unique experience, we should have learned one lesson. Our effectiveness as a global power will increasingly depend on our effectiveness in bridging the gulf between our world and the world where most of the globe's people will live."

The Honorable L. Bruce Laingen

Christopher, Warren et al. *American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985. 443pp. $25

November 1985 marked the sixth anniversary of the seizure by student militants of the American Embassy in Tehran. The events of that traumatic day, and those that followed over the next 14 months, preoccupied our government and the American people as few events in history have. They reshaped and significantly, if not decisively, determined the outcome of the Presidential elections of 1980. That result and the many other consequences of that dramatic event in Tehran are yet to be fully felt, not least by Iran itself.

This book, *American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis*, is an exhaustive examination of the management of that crisis, billed as "The inside account of how American Diplomacy met an extraordinary challenge." The product of a study launched by the Council on Foreign Relations in 1982, it is made up of nine separate papers/chapters discussed in the course of that study by their authors, all of whom were insiders in the Carter administration's handling of the crisis. There is occasionally some rationalization in defense of policy, but very little. It is a determined and generally objective effort on the part of

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these principals to examine the "diplomatic, economic, and legal issues at stake in the crisis, the negotiations to resolve it, and possible lessons for the future."

Few Americans will ever forget the felt pain of that long crisis: the enormity of Iran's challenge to previously accepted norms of international behavior; the compounding of the costs to American strategic interests in the area, already felt in the Shah's collapse; the frustrations felt in trying to find means to deal with the crisis that took account of those interests without hurt to the hostages themselves; the way the American public embraced those hostages, thanks to the American media—the latter's role in the crisis touched on, but is too large an issue in itself to find space in this book.

The whole affair, as the then Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher points out in his eloquent introduction to the book, is "a story of almost incredible complexity." And as former Senator Abraham Ribicoff notes in his final chapter on "Lessons and Conclusions," it was as well a "crisis of the future," in the way it so dramatically posed the new and difficult challenge faced by the United States in the threat of terrorism—particularly state-sponsored terrorism of the kind the Tehran crisis symbolized.

The book is an impressive source book, written by those at the working level just below the President who provided Carter his policy options. Three chapters by Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East, are as succinct accounts of the intense and sustained involvement by top policymakers in the course of the crisis as can be found. Gary Sick, his counterpart on the National Security Council staff, and whose more recent book, *All Fall Down*—in itself a monumental contribution to our understanding of both the revolution and the hostage crisis in Iran—reviews the military options in the crisis and the tragic failure of the rescue mission. Three chapters by two senior Treasury officials and a Citibank banker recount the economic and financial aspects of the settlement in probably more detail than the average reader would ever want to know. But in doing so they effectively convey both the singular and tireless efforts of those involved in getting agreement on disposition of the frozen Iranian assets and the extremely important leverage that those frozen assets represented in achieving an acceptable resolution to the crisis. There is also an excellent chapter by Oscar Schacter discussing the legal issues involved. For the long reach of history, perhaps nothing will matter more than the way the Carter administration's handling of the crisis dramatized the importance of the rules of law and diplomacy that were at stake, not simply for this country but for the international community at large. In doing so this chapter, and indeed the book as a whole, is a reminder of the limits that present themselves to a country in dealing with terrorism inflicted upon it—especially a country such as ours, committed and responsible as a Great Power to the rule of law. We have had a dramatic and telling reminder of that in the recent TWA 847 crisis in Beirut.

The lessons are legion in this book's pages. The "deceptively attractive" nature of economic sanctions in confronting such crises. The difficulty of getting effective multilateral cooperation, on these or other sanctions, despite the rhetoric that abounds. The danger of a government's entire focus becoming hostage to a terrorist crisis, as ours did so often in the Tehran affair. The hard choices in considering a resort to force, especially when geography is against one as it was in Iran. The difficulty, as Gary Sick points out, of reconciling the contradiction between the protection of innocent human lives and the preservation of national honor, apparent again with such pain in the Beirut TWA 847 crisis. The utility of having friends among the nonaligned, in this case the Algerians. The need for a deeper and more perceptive understanding of the root causes of terrorism, and whether better ways can be found to get at those causes. As Harold Saunders observes: "If we have learned nothing else from this unique experience, we should have learned one lesson. Our effectiveness as a global power will increasingly depend on our effectiveness in bridging the gulf between our world and the world where most of the globe's people will live."

For most Americans, however, the most lasting impression from that crisis will be in the human domain—the way in which, as Secretary Christopher said in his salute to the Algerians as the hostages arrived in Algiers, 52 men and women and their families "emerged from the chasm of fear" and emerged as well in an unprecedented national celebration of freedom regained, an event of no small impact on our national psyche. Perhaps if this book is deficient in any aspect, it is in its very limited focus on the hostages themselves, their families included, and on such questions as the government's obligations to them in the post-release period—medical, psychological, and indeed financial. The hostages have yet to see any action to this date to provide some kind of "compensation" to them, despite a recommendation to this effect by a Presidential Commission in 1982. On these matters and on all the other human costs inherent in a terrorist crisis, there remains much to learn.

Moineville, Hubert. *Naval Warfare Today and Tomorrow.* New York: Basil Blackwell, 1984. 141pp. $19.95

Rear Adm. Hubert Moineville, French Navy (retired) originally published this book in 1982 under the title *La Guerre Navale: Reflexions sur les affrontements navals et leurs avenir.* In the three years since its first appearance, it has deserved far more attention in the English-speaking world than it has received. The present excellent translation by Comdr. P.R. Compton-Hall, RN, Director of the Royal Navy Submarine Museum at Gosport, Hampshire, now makes the book readily accessible to English readers. Admiral Moineville has added a short postscript to the English edition, written in 1982, on his immediate reaction to the Falklands War.

This book is a short and unpretentious-looking book but, in fact, it is a remarkable and ambitious study. It is a rare work among naval studies that reflects the nature of modern naval warfare and expresses a general concept that is tied neither to some particular naval construction program nor to the blind repetition of age-old naval concepts. It is an experienced naval officer's attempt to analyze logically the current situation, the various possible types of confrontation, the likely aims of participants, and the range of roles for navies as well as changes in technology and their effect on planning naval operations.

Moineville's book is divided into four topical sections: the possibilities of naval confrontation today; general characteristics and context of naval operations; development of forces and naval strategy; and some thoughts on the conduct of naval action. Each of these sections logically builds upon its predecessor and creates a clear and concise examination of the subject.

The book culminates with some general conclusions on the main features that would characterize a battle between naval forces of the future. First, Moineville notes, the battle will take place against a background of strategic deterrence. Effective means of reconnaissance will allow each side to be well informed about the dispositions and movements of each other's surface units. At the same time, however, knowledge and current intelligence about the capabilities and characteristics of enemy equipment and resources will not be as precise as in the past. When the battle occurs, it will have a very technical character. Indeed, Moineville points out, that with the increasing importance of self-guided missiles, the part played by the expertise of those who are fighting has decreased in relation to those who design and produce the missiles. Additionally, computerized information about the enemy will be crucial. With this in mind, the hit advantage will undoubtedly lie with the one who fires first, since the hit probability of a missile is greater than with ordinary gunnery systems. Structural design and damage control will also be of the utmost importance in order to

ensure that a single missile will not sink a ship.

The site of the battle will be a key factor and it will be important to try to choose a location where land-based aircraft, fixed acoustic arrays and submarines can be directly involved in support of ship and sea-based aircraft. Speed and range will continue to be as important as always, but it will be important to try to create the ideal situation in which an enemy is held outside his own range of weapons but within one's own reach. Moreover, weapons will be used in an environment of electronic warfare and electronic countermeasures.

All of these factors suggest the need of technical compatibility at a variety of levels, from issues of allied interoperability to tactical command within the variety of one's own forces. One is faced by a conundrum in which the development of policy may be impeded by techuical factors. Technicians, scientists and designers require policy decisions for further developments, but these decisions are difficult to make until problems in technical compatibility are solved.

Concluding his work, Moineville enumerates three main impressions which come from the multitude of naval developments since 1945: First of all, the range of political purposes which naval operations can serve has widened. Secondly, the range of confrontation that naval support of political objectives can bring about has widened at both ends on the scale of violence. Thirdly, technical developments have also widened and diversified for navies. "Ultimately, then," Moineville writes, "the naval game remains interrelated with our technological explosions and the political changes that shake our world. It is very complex, highly technical, continually changing and very difficult, but it is also very important."

This is a book for any student of naval affairs. It is simple and straightforward enough for the beginning student, and at the same time, thought provoking for even the most advanced theorist. Moreover, it is the most concise and complete statement of the present state of naval warfare available to the general public.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
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Cable, James. *Britain's Naval Future.* Anuapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1983. 220pp. $24.95

James Cable retired from a British diplomatic career in 1980. He now writes and lectures on international and naval affairs. He became well-known, in Western naval circles at least, after writing the excellent *Gunboat Diplomacy* (1971), one of the first analyses of the achievement of political ends by the use of limited naval force.

Like his earlier book, *Britain's Naval Future* is elegantly written with wit and logic and a virtually flawless attempt to present impartially all relevant facts and arguments. In his introduction, Cable notes that in the many British defence white papers

published since 1945, there has been much discussion of political, economic, technical and institutional factors, but rarely a sentence, let alone a sustained exposition, on strategy. Forecasting in the political climate typical of Western industrial democracies—the battle for government funds between welfare and defence requirements—will inevitably lead to more cuts in Britain's defences. Cable says that it is essential that a proper strategy be argued out before major structural changes are forced upon the armed services. He fears that the British Ministry of Defence may now be institutionally incapable of initiating this argument and, therefore, offers his book as a stimulus.

While acknowledging that Nato and other alliances are important to Britain, he states that any strategy must be based on enduring national interests. In Britain, these are all to do with being an island-state off a continent of other sovereign states with different national interests. After a brief historical survey, he notes that the Soviet Union is the latest in a long line of continental states which have posed a threat to Britain. The major differences now being the new dimension of nuclear weapons and for the first time since the days of the Vikings, the continental power has a significantly larger navy than Britain (and here Cable is only considering the Soviet Northern Fleet).

Stating that a democratic electorate needs to be presented with a strategy that is comprehensible, plausible and adaptable, Cable begins by posing the question "what can the Royal Navy do?" He answers this by an exhaustive analysis of several broad scenarios of war and "violent peace," which are qualified where appropriate to produce subordinate contingency events. Together they describe what the Royal Navy can and cannot do in war and in peace to prevent or limit war, or otherwise further national and alliance interests.

One chapter deals with Britain's nuclear deterrent and concludes there is one scenario which cannot be ignored—where this force of four SSBNs would repay its extensive costs, not all of which are economic. On the Royal Navy's contribution to Nato, he considers it is best employed in the defence of the sea lines of communications terminating in or near Britain and in reinforcing Nato's northern flank and islands. He emphasizes the importance of Norway to Britain's defence and adds that a demonstrable peacetime capability to reinforce the northern flank is a valuable deterrent in itself. Showing his grasp of all aspects of the "violent peace," Cable contends that pictures on TV of British ships shadowing a Soviet amphibious force in a time of high crisis, would be an invaluable stiffener to the resolve of politicians faced with Soviet threats and blandishments.

Other scenarios include situations arising from foreign pressure against British seaborne trade and her distant dependencies, and the gloomy possibility of the collapse of the Nato

alliance. Cable states that it is an irony of history, but in the latter case, the Royal Navy's role would become that of a "riskflotte," as envisaged by Tirpitz for the Imperial German Navy in 1900.

In his final chapter, Cable looks at the four major components of Britain's current defences—namely the nuclear deterrent, the defence of the United Kingdom itself, the presence of a British Army Corps and supporting forces in Nato's central front, and the Royal Navy. The Navy is mainly disposed in the Eastern Atlantic but is flexible enough to operate over wider ocean areas. He concludes that the first two components are essential for national survival, and that the Air Defence of the UK also makes a vital contribution to Nato. He concludes however that the other two components (the Army in Germany and the Royal Navy at sea) are incompatible in view of the inevitable relative decline in defence funding. Picking his way carefully he proposes that the army should be withdrawn from Germany and reorganised in order to maintain funding for, and hopefully strengthen, the Royal Navy. This strengthened naval capability would include projecting elements of the army ashore to assist in the defence of the northern flank and islands.

Nonetheless, he admits that it will be a difficult task to persuade the Nato allies, the British electorate and, not least, the army itself of the vital necessity for this change. But feels it must be attempted.

Cable completed his book early in 1982, just before the South Atlantic War between Britain and Argentina. Before publication and without altering his original text, he wrote a special preface including some first thoughts on this war. Here he asks whether anything in the war made nonsense of the rest of the book. Except for the one point that he (like the Argentinian Government) failed to forecast that Britain would fight to recover the Falkland Island dependencies, he concludes that the war does not affect his arguments. He warns about drawing hasty conclusions from the war, which he thinks cannot be paralleled in the range of options available to Britain, and the dependencies' distance giving time for consideration of these options. However, he feels that the war did reinforce some of his points; namely, the value of versatility in the shape of a navy, the movement of warships giving time for negotiation, the fallacy of the single scenario, and that island-states need navies.

Like Cable, I hope this book is read by many of those who can influence British defence policy. Even for those who are not in this position, it is a joy to read for its elegance and its thorough approach to strategic analysis.

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Commander, Royal Navy

Olsen, Edward. *U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity: A Neo-International View*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1985. 193pp. $24.95

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Professor Olsen calls for a revised US policy towards Japan based on neo-internationalism. The foundations of neo-internationalism rest upon reciprocity in defense and reciprocity in trade. He sees the two seemingly separate issues of defense and trade as, in fact, closely linked. Since the United States has in effect subsidized Japanese defense, this has bolstered Japan's ability to compete economically. As the author states in a recent *Christian Science Monitor* editorial comment, "Japanese officials know Japan is vulnerable to U.S. linkage of these issues. Consequently, this is precisely where the U.S. ought to target its pressures on Japan." What would then happen is that, "With neo-internationalism as a guiding principle, the United States should invite Japan to the table for talks on a wide range of subjects to solicit Tokyo's views on an acceptable regional and global strategy. This would signal to the Japanese people and their Asian neighbors that Washington is giving practical effect to its frequently heard rhetoric about making Japan the cornerstone of U.S. Asia policy."

A reasoned and amply documented book, *U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity* briefly reviews the history of US-Japanese strategic relations since World War II, devotes considerable space to an analysis of the present state of the relationship and concludes with a set of policy recommendations for the United States as well as an estimation of their impact on Japan and other interested regional countries.

Though critical of what he terms "existing U.S. oversensitivity to Japanese sensibilities," Olsen avoids "Japan-bashing" and seeks to provide an informed, unemotional critique of the challenge Japan poses to productive bilateral ties. (But it should be noted that Olsen is not above suggesting that, "skillfully administered shokku [shock], carefully signalled to receptive Japanese leaders, could work wonders in motivating Tokyo," a thought that might not sit well with those who argue extra understanding and sympathy for Japan's positions on contentious issues.)

One of the by-products of continuing debate on US-China policy has been a stimulation of interest in the most important US bilateral relation in Asia, that with Japan. Critics may argue with Olsen's view that, "most of what the United States has done to influence Tokyo has been simplistically one-sided," but the fact remains that Japan has only reluctantly inched in the direction Washington has asked, and without "indication of the existence of the true mutuality of interests that the United States ostensibly seeks."

In the face of the pressure put on US-Japanese relations by trade differences, it may well be the time for Washington to "initiate changes that will stimulate the sort of strategic and economic interdependence that will put U.S.-Japan relations on a firm footing in the 1990's and in the next century." Professor Olsen's arguments that it is possible to nudge Japan toward a truly reciprocal

commitment to mutual defense of the global interests it shares with the United States offer a basis for these changes while avoiding either a "Japan-bashing" or "Japanophile" approach.

U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity is a professionally written book whose author sticks to his goal of evaluating the past, present and future course of US-Japan security relations. This short book—154 pages of text and 193 pages in all—is another Hoover Institution Press quality effort, with excellent editing and error-free text. One small word of caution: it presupposes general knowledge of the region and the issues. Beyond that, the book is eminently readable and provides a clear, beneficial contribution to the ongoing and crucial debate as to the future course of our vital US-Japan relationship.

R.S. CLOWARD
Captain, US Navy
American Enterprise Institute

Lind, William S. *Manuever Warfare Handbook*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985. 133pp. $16.50

Kross, Walter. *Military Reform: The High-Tech Debate in Tactical Air Forces*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985. 240pp. $7.50

The debate over military reform continues to play a key role in defense planning and budgeting, yet the concept of military reform remains an enigma. To many, it represents a panacea that will correct the deficiencies of America's fighting forces. To others, military reform poses a threat to all that is good in the military. While the truth is somewhere in between these views, military reform remains a mystery to those that seek to understand it. Based on a theory of warfare both subtle and, of necessity, lacking in concrete rules, military reform has taken many different facades. In its most recognizable form, however, it has come to be associated with two critical areas—maneuver warfare and the debate over high-technology weapons. It is into these two areas that William Lind and Walter Kross, in two widely divergent books, have attempted to end the confusion.

William Lind, longtime critic and supporter of the Marine Corps, has written his book for Marines. Although narrow in its focus, *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* attempts to explain the principles of maneuver warfare and, for the first time, apply those concepts to the realities of tactics. Beginning with a thorough explanation of the theory of maneuver warfare, Lind draws heavily on previously published writings by Marine officers to offer concrete examples of maneuver warfare as it may be applied down to the squad level. He then provides chapters on amphibious operations and Marine Corps education and training. Of particular note is his annotated bibliography, which provides an excellent means for professional expansion. Finally, the author devotes almost half his book to a series of tactical lesson plans written

by Col. Michael D. Wyly, US Marine Corps, former head of the Tactics Department at the Amphibious Warfare School. *Maneuver Warfare Handbook*, by providing the first collection of concrete "how to" examples of maneuver warfare for Marines, is a potentially valuable book. Lind's recent political reputation and his occasional tendency in his book to criticize the Marine Corps, however, could alienate the audience he is trying to reach. Additionally, some of his examples are dated and may lead overly critical readers to miss important points. Rather than being a handbook, the book should be considered a guide, offering under one cover a succinct, easily read beginning for those Marines who seek to apply maneuver warfare at the tactical level.

Walter Kross attempts to clarify the military reform debate by concentrating on the controversy over high-technology weapons, in particular those of the Tactical Air Forces. Unfortunately, he never quite succeeds. Following a too brief look at the military reform movement—which he labels the "Reformers" and inaccurately describes as a few bureaucrats located outside the Department of Defense—Kross takes the reader through two lengthy chapters in which he displays a firm grasp of the quantitative arguments against the procurement of anything but high-technology aircraft. A careful reader may occasionally garner bits of praise for the "Reformers," but they are quickly hidden in his analysis of current defense policy as proposed by the "Defense Planners," obviously the besieged protagonists.

While the author's arguments may be correct, they suffer from his haphazard explanation of the fundamental elements of the reform movement. The OODA decision cycle developed by Col. John Boyd, the cornerstone of military reform, is mentioned but inadequately defined. William Lind is quoted, largely out of context, but his theory of maneuver warfare is poorly examined and mistakenly equated to war with movement. Kross' book begins with admirable motives, to finally define the arguments involved in the military reform debate, but his biases too quickly become evident. Carefully read, it does offer a picture of the current debate over high-technology weapons that surrounds the defense budget and even offers insight into the pros and cons of military reform. As such, it may achieve the author's purpose, to give Washington decision makers an appreciation of the argument. The military practitioner searching for a clear understanding of military reform would do well to look elsewhere.

Lind's and Kross' books examine different corners of the military reform debate. Neither, however, provides a comprehensive examination of the full ramifications of the debate nor do they integrate the disparate elements. Both are narrow in their focus, aimed at specific sectors of the defense establishment.

But both hold value for those sectors. Where Lind seeks to challenge conventional thinking, Kross seeks only to put forth the questions. The need continues for a book able to do both.

RICHARD S. MOORE
Captain, US Marine Corps

Volkman, Ernest. *Warriors of the Night: Spies, Soldiers and American Intelligence.* New York: Morrow, 1985. 443pp. $17.45

There is no reliable history of the American intelligence community. Without a solid factual baseline we cannot judge the plethora of books which feed an all too poorly guided public interest. Books are usually of two types. Either they call for reform, or they market sensation. Volkman makes the conventional nod to the need for change, but basically his book is traffic in tales.

As an indictment of American secret intelligence it is not convincing. As a call for reform it is fatuous. Even the author's conviction seems sometimes to flag. This is not just because the stories Volkman tells are familiar and well digested. In fact, he tells them well. It is not just that the opinions he rehashes are conventional and stylish. The problem lies deeper. The essential weakness of this book, and the others like it, is that it begins from imperfect standards for judgment. Volkman, like most commentators, does not have a clear idea of what American intelligence operations should be because he has only a partial grasp of what American intelligence operations have been. Hence, he can only guess at the institutional development of the various organizations in the community and must base his narrative on personalities and anecdotes.

A delphic sentiment opens and closes his book: "American intelligence has been operating in a flawed democracy, and one of the costs of that democracy may be that its intelligence is equally flawed." Apparently this mysterious statement means that Americans respect "facts" more than evaluation; technology more than wisdom. Volkman says we must restore the human dimension to the mountains of data generated by machines, both through human sources in the field and in terms of manageable analysis. No doubt this is true enough, bur it is tepid tea, all the weaker as Volkman shows plenty of examples of solid, useful evaluation. In his own illustrations political masters ignore, misuse, or abuse the products of their intelligence services. But is this natural political behavior somehow a "flaw" in the democracy? It is hard to understand the point. The record of nondemocratic states is no better. That America has not pursued human espionage as systematically and as ruthlessly as the Soviet Union is less a "flaw" of our culture than a professional decision. Humint is an appropriate and successful method for the Soviets in America, but does the reverse so equally apply?

Volkman's laments seem to stem from a platonic position that perfect knowledge, invariably accurate assess-

ments, sound utilization, and approvable behavior are the norms. Such idealism which expects everything is perpetually disappointed by reality. It is profoundly unhistorical. Hence, it is an impossible standard for critical judgment, or reliable narrative.

In short, what is missing is deep sociological and institutional understanding of the fundamental interactions of our society and its intelligence operations. There are in fact many ways to this. For instance, Harry Howe Ransom has explained the wild swings between permissiveness and public accountability, between acceptability and denial, in terms of a dichotomy in American thinking between war and peace. When relations with the Soviet Union are hostile, secret intelligence operations are unleashed. When things appear calm, when we move into a peace compartment, the rein is pulled. On the question of what facts are available and relevant to commentators, until we have comprehensive institutional histories, we are left with tales of episodes and personalities. To make enlightened judgments about secret intelligence and its place in the American democracy we need better tools of information and insight than we are given here.

A favorite model of mine is Professor Harry Hinsley's official history of British intelligence in the Second World War. When the first volumes appeared, the English establishment gasped in dismay. It was a history without names. Men and women who had waited for decades for their wartime achievements to be confirmed by Her Majesty's Stationery Office found their work described in terms of an organizational process. Brilliant exploits disappeared in a faceless bureaucratic record. Yet once the shock passed, Sir Hinsley's message was clear. In the story of the organization of intelligence it is the intelligence of the organization that is decisive. So well were matters ordered, so well was a great pool of talent channeled, that in the course of the war even should the quality of command diminish the quality of intelligence would improve. With this record, and helped by this perspective, serious analysis of British intelligence in the period begins.

Here, until the agencies give us more to go on, commentary on the American way of spying will remain fragmented and impressionistic. Public oversight and professional planning will lack the wisdom, and perspective, of what the French call "the long wave." And the intelligence communities themselves will have to accept the public impressions of incompetence that Volkman reflects. They will have to suffer (or even perhaps benefit) from periodic demands for change. Outside the curtain we will all remain, with Volkman, critics in the night.

GEORGE BAER
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Shultz, Richard H., and Godson, Roy. *Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy*. Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984. 211pp. $19.95 paper $12.95

It is not a new technique—it is found in Sun-tzu's *The Art of War* and Kautilya's *Artasastra*. The suggestion is that one can confuse an opponent and split any alliance he may possess by planting "stories." The technique has been around for years and many would argue that it is the normal technique of statecraft. With the trend toward information societies, one can appreciate the role that states and interest groups play in forming opinions in target groups. However, when it involves faslehoods, half-truths, suggestions or manufactured evidence that will get the target, person, or group to believe in the veracity of the message and will consequently result in some form of action beneficial to those conducting the operation, we call that disinformation. It can be overt and/or covert, but in a democracy, it is considered unsportsmanlike behavior. The authors have examined the Soviet use of such "propaganda" techniques in the 1960-80 time frame to achieve their objectives.

The book has essentially four parts. The first deals with the broad topic of disinformation and is descriptive in nature. For anyone unfamiliar with the topic, the section will provide clear descriptions and several examples that illustrate what comes into play with this game. The Soviet apparatus is described, as is their methods to meet their foreign policy objectives through information and disinformation. The authors then examine how Moscow uses overt propaganda and front groups and this is followed with a section on the covert operations of disinformation. Again, the examples are excellent. All this is then tied into the parry and thrust of their foreign policy and objectives, depending upon the stimuli from world events or American reactions. The next section is the authors' content analysis of the Soviets' work in the period 1960-1980 to achieve their ends, with the emphasis on the disinformation. Lastly, the reader is provided with some special insight into disinformation techniques by interviews conducted with some very experienced people.

Ladislav Bittman, a former member of the Czech intelligence establishment from 1954 until 1968, was actively involved in several active measure operations, or disinformation. His area of operations was Europe and he provides considerable insight into Soviet activities and their use of the eastern satellites. Another experienced person, but, with a different area and style of operation is Stanislav Levchenko. He operated from Tokyo and fronted as a newspaperman. His work dealt with politicians and members of the press. These interviews provide a good deal of insight into the "how its done." And if you are of the school that there exist many gullible souls and then can be easily had, these interviews will confirm it. But both men do their jobs so well that naiveté is not an excuse.

While propaganda is expected and does have its uses, it is usually identified as such and the receiver can act accordingly. The problem in a democracy is the public expects their

journalists to be objective and wise to manipulation. Totalitarian states simply trust no one and act accordingly. *Dezinformatsia* provides the reader with insight into how one uses lies, incomplete information or misleading information to weaken their adversary. Besides the general reader, this should be required reading for students in schools of journalism.

PETER C. UNSINGER
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Nacht, Michael. *The Age of Vulnerability: Threats to the Nuclear Stalemate.* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985. 209pp. $26.95 paper $9.95

This broadly gauged evaluation of the dilemmas of nuclear armaments will be found useful by students and the lay public as an introduction to the subject and to basic terminology and concepts. Experts on the subject will find it somewhat disappointing because of its survey character and lack of depth on issues of current concern. It is, however, readable and lucid and does not suffer the common failing of making the subject sound more esoteric than it is.

The title is an apt description of Nacht's central preoccupations with the nation's vulnerability to nuclear weapons and the stalemate between the superpowers that arises from the mutuality of that vulnerability. He explores a series of threats to the stalemate—or to the stability of mutual deterrence—from which nuclear war could arise. He sees these destabilizing factors as the insecurity of Soviet leaders, the new assertiveness of US strategic policy, the high accuracy and first-strike potential of new offensive weapons and of the warfighting doctrines that go along with them, the failure of arms control agreements to stabilize weapons competition, the increasing frictions between the United States and its allies, and the trends that indicate the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries is proceeding.

There is a deep ambivalence in this book that is never really resolved, on two counts. The first is with the vulnerability issue related to hard-target weapons. Nacht recognizes this as theoretically destabilizing and not something to be complacent about—or at least not something that political interplay in a democratic society will allow leaders to ignore. But he appears to disbelieve in the final analysis that leaders on either side could really decide to initiate nuclear war. There is so much second-strike power available that it would be suicidal for either to launch an attack. So the stalemate is really stable. But if so, why worry? Why rehearse the other destabilizing factors? One is left with the feeling that the stability problem is not so simple, and that Nacht feels that too.

The other point has to do with the disappointment over the results of arms control. The tension here is that Nacht is a believer in the classical virtues of arms control, but knows that the scorecard of actual agreements (he exempts the ABM Treaty from this shortcoming) has yielded

very little that measures up to what those virtues are supposed to be. He is quite honest about that so that one can fully sympathize with his quandry. It is not quite so easy to follow how he seeks to resurrect arms control with his concept of "threat control," which supposedly is a more realistic objective, but once again he does not seem quite so sure: "If arms control is to play a constructive role in foreign and defense policy, it must be seen for what it is intended to be: threat control. Each side seeks to reduce the threats to its own society and, in military terms, to minimize the vulnerability of its forces. In the latter case, arms control is but one of several means—others include deception, mobility, and defenses—to satisfy this objective. Insofar as arms control can contain threats, especially threats against a country's capability to retaliate, it is a valuable diplomatic instrument that could help reduce the uncertainties of force planning. If arms control is to succeed, it must demonstrate through negotiated agreements that both sides have the political will to reach mutually satisfactory formulas that control the threats to them. If arms control achieves threat control, then all kinds of political payoffs are also within grasp. If, however, major threats continue unabated despite arms control negotiations and agreements, political opposition will eventually halt the process altogether. In short, for arms control to succeed and even continue to exist, it must control threats." To control threats may be too big a burden for arms control, unless we restrict the meaning to the technical threat of first-strike advantage. That is where the rub now lies. Unfortunately, between real adversaries it takes threats to impose the desire for threat control as the basis for agreement. That is no simple task, and there seems with technological advance to be no final stopping point. The final threat to be controlled is not the weapons; it lies in the ambitions behind them. To Nacht's credit, he recognizes this. Much of his book is written (in a way that would please George Kennan) to chasten American propensities to expect that the Soviet Union can be made to change by the external exertion of a properly chosen policy that lies within our means.

The most original part of Nacht's book comes at the end with his discussion of geographical nuclear proliferation and the grim alternatives this poses for the United States. While he suspects the Soviet Union will also lose rather than gain from proliferation, he clearly points out that the costs of US security management will rise greatly and that in certain places—the Middle East or Persian Gulf being the easiest to visualize now—that proliferation will increase the likelihood of US-Soviet confrontation. In fact, the stability of the superpower stalemate could hardly not be threatened by the multiplication of other nuclear powers, however small they otherwise seem on an international scale.

The issues Nacht wrestles with are real and if he has not somehow

resolved them he can be excused because they are not easily tractable. His final note is realistic and sound, which is to work on the problems and manage them, for however small the chance they will be solved, there is much hope they can be kept in bounds or under control.

RODNEY W. JONES
Georgetown University

Staar, Richard F., ed. *Arms Control: Myth Versus Reality*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1984. 195pp. $14.95

This compendium is the product of a conference held at and sponsored by the Hoover Institution in the latter part of 1983. Attended by over 60 governmental and nongovernmental experts in the field, the contents are a series of conference papers and commentaries on those papers.

The tone of the work is uniformly antiarms control, in the sense that the writers consistently challenge the notion that the arms control process per se is beneficial to the United States or that the results have generally served American interests. Rather, the recurring theme is the "myth" in the subtitle—that one can expect outcomes of value from strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union. The "reality" is that the Soviets have quite different—from the US perspective devious—purposes when entering into these negotiating fora, and that for cultural and other reasons, they are likely to abridge and even negate American expectations. The Soviets have, in a word, a contrasting agenda.

Although I largely agree with the positions argued in these pages, I was somewhat overwhelmed and disappointed with the unrelenting litany against strategic arms negotiations as they have become a part of the strategic landscape. There is, within these pages, very little disagreement or debate; the authors are clearly playing from the same sheet of music to a homogeneous crowd. The effort, and the intellectual task of interpreting it, would have been more challenging and stimulating had the other side of the story been presented and counterargued.

As in any multiauthored work, there are variations in both tone and quality. Generally speaking, the more ideologically committed papers were the weaker. Mark B. Schneider, an arms control counsel within OSD at the time of the conference, produced a paper "The Future: Can It Be Resolved?" that is little more than cheerleading for the Administration position at the time, including the uncritical presentation of contradictions in that policy, e.g., he argues that ICBMs are highly vulnerable at a time when silo-basing MX is being advocated. At the other end of the spectrum, Edward Teller's "Defense: Retaliation or Protection" and Richard Pipes' "Diplomacy and Culture: Negotiation Styles" are very scholarly, dispassionate works.

Because it forcefully takes a position which has not always been given adequate attention in Washington, this book merits attention and reading, especially among those who take a contrary position. Those

already suspicious of arms control outcomes will have their positions reinforced and their arsenals of argumentations augmented, if not their horizons expanded greatly. The initially neutral observer will find a forceful and articulate rending of this Administration's position.

DONALD M. SNOW
Naval War College

Wallensteen, Peter et al., eds., *Global Militarization*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Special Studies on Peace, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution, 1985. 240pp. $24.95

This stimulating book rewards careful reading by the observer and practitioner of military affairs—not because it is a book about war, but because it is about underlying social, cultural and economic shifts in the global interstate system that help to explain the phenomenon of militarization.

For example, Keiichi Matsushita, in his chapter, "The Urban Type of Society and International War," argues that war between developed industrialized states is the least likely form of conflict; rather, conflict springing from the context of a mature urban type of society, whether developed or developing, is more characteristic of the present situation. The problems that terrorism pose to developed societies, therefore, are not necessarily attributes of industrialization any more than such problems can be attributes of a rural orientation in Third World states or societies. Both developed and developing societies are becoming vehicles for—and targets of—forms of warfare that spring from the urban social context—and the gigantic concentrations of peoples into megalopolises, such as Cairo, Mexico City, and Tokyo are occurring everywhere, not just where industrialization has advanced the farthest.

In his chapter, "Global Conflict Formations: Present Developments and Future Directions," Johan Galtung goes further to assert that the real division of the world is not on a North-South or East-West axis, but rather on a "North-West and South-East" axis with the North-West losing ground to the South-East. His thesis is that the industrial center of gravity is shifting, with concomitant shifts in power relationships that are only beginning to be understood—hence the confusion in the United States and Western Europe as to why they are less and less able to control the world economy and the power relationships that flow therefrom. Galtung argues that the capitalist world economic structure has not in fact changed very much. Rather, its spread has brought to bear the same techniques of economic cooperation, competition, and exploitation that have been around a long time. The only problem is that the North-West countries do not much like it when these techniques are used for the benefit of others rather than for themselves.

There are chapters discussing militarization in Thailand, in Chile, and in Ghana, that point up differences and similarities as to how the

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militarizing institutions in the Third World affect their societies. Switzerland and Poland in 1980-82 are also discussed as alternatives to show how formal militarization need not be necessary to avoid social conflict.

Finally, in his concluding chapter, "Incompatibility, Militarization, and Conflict Resolution," Peter Wallensteen points out that nonstate actors are playing an increasing role in global conflict, but that the major interstate actors (Iran, Egypt, the USSR and the United States for example) still confront each other as if war was still their monopoly. Even the use of the term "state-sponsored terrorism" presupposes the primacy of the territorial state as the major actor.

In fact, if we link the notion that global conflict derives from the robust urbanizing process, then the distinctions between "state" and "nonstate," between "external" and "internal" conflict, will diminish. This will increase the current confusion among the major "North-West" industrialized states as to how to deal with a seemingly endless series of threats and humiliations. Those unpleasant experiences reflect not only changes in the nature of the international political system, but more fundamentally, shifts in the center of gravity of the global economy. In other words, global militarization does not presuppose that a universal empire is evolving. Rather, in the view of the editors of this book, it presupposes just the opposite: greater diversification of national economies according to capitalist principles and practices, with accompanying political, cultural and social pluralism, as people everywhere are drawn into urban concentrations.

ROBERT S. JORDAN
Naval War College and
the University of New Orleans

Crankshaw, Edward. *Putting up with the Russians*. New York: Viking Penguin, 1984. 269pp. $17.95

The international tensions and troubles of the 1930s and the years of World War II stimulated a great surge of interest in the Soviet Union. After 1945 there occurred a veritable explosion in the field of Soviet studies which paralleled and indeed was partly inspired by the coming of the atomic age.

Among the most insightful and wise of these scholars was Edward Crankshaw—a British journalist, author and commentator. His published works reveal the range of his interests and of his creative mind. Yet the major emphasis of Crankshaw's intellectual and scholarly efforts was concentrated on Russia and the Russians—from 1947 to 1984 he wrote eight books on the Soviet Union.

During World War II he served for nearly two years in Moscow with the British military mission. Thereafter, he was drawn, as if by some irresistible force, to things Russian. One of Crankshaw's earliest published writings appeared in the *Observer* in 1947. In this article Crankshaw presented an argument which he would return

to many times during the next 37 years. The article was entitled, "Russia's Weakness and Our Duty." It was Crankshaw's conviction that "one of the most damaging illusions of modern times is the belief in Russia's invulnerable might." He continued with what would be another of his persistent and strongly held opinions that "The Soviet Union, for all the magnificence of its achievements, is not a brand-new realm. Under entirely new management it is still Eternal Russia."

Putting Up with the Russians is a carefully selected collection of "articles, essays, lectures, prefaces, reviews, etc." on the Soviet Union. Part I consists of newspaper articles or essays which span the years from 1947 to 1984 and comprises nearly two-thirds of the volume; part II contains mostly book reviews. What is remarkable is how well these analyses stand up despite the fact that they range over nearly four decades of events. It is a delight to reread these commentaries on the Soviet Union and again to be informed and guided by a wise and literate observer.

Most of the selections are short articles of four to six pages in length, and constitute what can be best described as think pieces. Many are as relevant today as when they were first set down on paper. Throughout the writings are judgments and arguments which Crankshaw repeated persistently: the need for coexistence between the USSR and the West, especially with the United States; the weaknesses of the Soviet Union; the inevitability of rivalry between the USSR and the United States, regardless of the political form the Soviet Union might assume; the inevitability of Chinese and Soviet enmity. That there would be a relationship of hostility between the Chinese and the Russians was argued by Crankshaw as early as 1950.

Some of Crankshaw's harshest judgments remained largely unchanged over his entire career. In the introduction to this work he set forth as clearly and directly as possible one of his major theses: "Nothing . . . that has happened in Afghanistan or Poland or Angola, or in the way of a shift in the balance of armaments, in the least way changes the picture of Russia built up over the past forty years—an intolerable, disgraceful regime imprisoned by its own past, an imperial power run by men who got where they are by conspiracy and still think of the world in terms of a gigantic counter-inspiracy . . . . " Yet, in 1947 Crankshaw insisted on the need "to find a way of living side by side with . . . Russia . . . . " He noted its "mindless inefficiency." In 1950 he argued that "the effect of the new bomb may, in fact, reduce the risk of war," and that "the present aims of Soviet foreign policy, which is a belligerent policy, may be summarized as an effort to achieve without war certain objectives of a kind traditionally achieved by war: the ruin of the Western economy; the integration of the satellites with the Soviet economy; the penetration of Asia; the overthrow of sovereign governments in non-communist countries."

Contained in approximately three dozen articles are an examination of the problems faced by the Soviet Union since the end of the war in 1945, and the actions taken by Moscow in response to these difficulties. Among the subjects which Crankshaw comments upon are China, Czechoslovakia, Revisionism, East Europe, nuclear weapons, détente, nationalities, ideology, and others. Crankshaw was not always right in his analyses of Soviet policies and actions, but his insights and judgments were thought provoking, cogently argued, and were seldom matched in their wisdom.

Throughout his life Crankshaw held firmly to a number of convictions about the Soviet Union, "I wanted to show that while the Bolshevik regime was even more vile than it was possible for anyone who had not experienced it to imagine, that although it would make mischief on every possible occasion and find it hard to resist every opportunity for easy expansion and subversion, there was next to no danger of the Kremlin launching a formal war and it could always be stopped by a clear declaration of the line it must not cross—backed by sufficient force to make that declaration credible."

Crankshaw offered his views on many of the powerful political figures of the Soviet system. On Stalin he observed: "Stalin was an adept at using, or abusing, a doctrinaire theory of history as a smokescreen to cover his imperial designs." As for the great founder of Bolshevism, Lenin, Crankshaw commented that "The most remarkable thing about him was his changeless conviction that he alone among all men was right." Lenin, in Crankshaw's judgment, was not an original thinker—"His whole contribution was to practice." Commenting on Brezhnev at the time of the 1968 invasion into Czechoslovakia by Soviet forces, he characterized him as the "brainless wonder of our age. You have to look to Alabama or California to find his equal."

Crankshaw commented that "Mr. Andropov (as compared to Western political leaders) . . . is irresponsible (that is, he is not responsive to Soviet citizens). He is *Kremlin Man* . . . . And *Kremlin Man* is different from all other politicians, speaking his own language and basing his conduct on assumptions radically different from those of the rest of mankind." Crankshaw apparently believed that Gorbachev was the most likely successor in the near future and raised several fundamental questions about him and the other new leaders: "What we do not know, and may not know for some time to come, is the way the Gorbachevs are thinking—they and what must be a host of their contemporaries . . . . Are they so coloured by their lifelong environment and corrupted by their rivalries that they are incapable of launching any radical attempt to make the Soviet Union work and bring it into the brotherhood of Nations? Or have they minds of their own?"

Putting Up with the Russians provides a fine epitaph for the extraordinary contributions made by Edward Crankshaw. Perhaps we should not mourn

the passing of a wise and good man who gave to us brilliant insights on many of the significant issues of the times. But the death of Edward Crankshaw leaves a void, and the publication of this book in 1984 coincident with his passing, reminds us of what he gave to us, and what in turn we have lost because of his death.

HENRY M. SCHREIBER
Naval War College

Hood, Ronald Chalmers III. *Royal Republicans: The French Naval Dynasties between the World Wars.* Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985. 221pp. $25

When British naval guns under Vice Admiral Somerville's command roared out on the powerful French Fleet at Oran and Mers-el-Kebir in the early evening hours of 3 July 1940, an enigmatic chapter in the history of the French Navy neared its tragic close. In *Royal Republicans*, Ronald Hood seeks to illuminate the period between the two World Wars and to explain those factors which influenced the French Navy to play its curious role during those years.

The French Navy has not had a happy history. Even after its major triumph in helping to secure American independence off Yorktown, the French Fleet was destroyed within a few months. Neglect of the fleet and subordination to the army had been a constant in this history. In World War I, the navy was again relegated to a minor role of protecting the sea lanes and ensuring that the army received the necessary supplies and reinforcements from abroad. To add to the navy's frustration, the navy's shipyards were handed over to the army for four years to manufacture army weapons. The armistice of 1918 left an embittered and resentful French Navy which was to grow in alienation from and suspicion of the republic it served.

Hood divides his analysis into three major areas: (1) the sociological underpinnings of the French Navy, especially the line officers (the *grand corps*); (2) the monastic education and inward orientation of the *grand corps* together with their intellectual leanings; and (3) the growing politicization of the navy, its sympathy for authoritarian rule including the fascism of Franco and Mussolini, and the preponderant role played by admirals in the Vichy government.

A picture is painted of the *grand corps* as the aristocracy of the navy, graduates of the *Ecole navale*, frequently sons of naval officers, all from landed families, preponderantly from Brittany and the Midi, and bound together through the alumni association of the *Ecole navale*. Drawing extensively from the records of the alumni association, the author presents statistical data on social and geographic origins, nobility in the *grand corps*, marriages and academic preparation. The French naval household consisted of the father at sea or in the colonies, generally resided in the port cities (or in Paris in later years) with the mother exercising the major influence on the young son. Much of this influence was dedicated to the proper

schooling and preparation for entry into the *École navale*.

At the *École navale*, the curriculum focused heavily on the humanities, with an accompanying lack of emphasis on science and engineering. Graduates were meant to know a great deal about the classics and history; technicians could handle the details of running a warship. Over all this intellectual preparation, the Catholic ethic loomed large. To the naval officer of this era, professional and devotional duties were considered inseparable. (Never mind that the deployed officers frequently took up with a mistress or a native girl—one must recognize the difference between planning and operations.)

The author emphasizes the prevailing mind-set of French naval officers of this period. Latins were good; Anglo-Saxons were bad; the monarchy had led France to greatness; the republicans were trying to destroy that greatness; communists were very, very bad; and fascism, on the Italian and Spanish models, had its good points.

According to Hood, Morris Janowitz's thesis that the career military officers are natural adversaries of the democratic societies that spawn them fits the French experience much better than the American one; there was no real counterpart in the United States for the widespread rejection of the French republic by an aristocratic officer corps. In the French Navy, the 1930s saw a shift from wardroom polemics against the republic and the parliament to political activism. Rallying to the standard of Action Francaise, an extreme right-wing neomonarchist group, the *grand corps* participated actively in the Alliance de l'Action Francaise and supported the voice of the movement, the daily newspaper *Action Francaise*. The feeling grew that the only cure for the paralyzed and bumbling leadership of the Third Republic was authoritarian rule from above. Mussolini and Franco were admired as guardians of civilization.

The author devotes considerable space to the enigmatic figure of Admiral Darlan. Darlan was the consummate political opportunist, driven by an almost pathological hatred of the British and a hope, in 1940, that France would ultimately do better with a deal with the Germans than with the British. The fact that Darlan's greatgrandfather had been killed at Trafalgar may have had a bearing on his anglophobia, but the London Naval Conference of 1930 probably had the major influence on his thinking. Darlan and many other French naval officers felt strongly that Britain, through the conference, sought to ensure its dominance over all European navies.

Appointed as chief of naval staff in 1936 (curiously by the Popular Front government of Léon Blum), Darlan moved quickly to centralize his power. He brought his close friends into the top leadership, completely reshuffled the navy bureaucracy, and even proposed that he personally write the fitness reports on all captains. Walking both sides of the

political street, Darlan gained for the navy its largest budget to date from the detested Popular Front government, but he did little to tamp down the swelling sentiment within the navy against the Third Republic. In fact, Hood states that Darlan felt that the government was incapable of coping with the wartime crisis in 1939 and that a war cabinet with full powers should replace the parliament. With his anglophobia as a driving force, Darlan refused to throw in with the British at sea. Rather, when Marshal Petain formed the Vichy regime in 1940, Darlan was at his side as Minister of Marine. After the armistice, he told his admirals that the armistice benefited Frenchmen everywhere and assured them that "It is for us Frenchmen to profit from their [Germany's] hopes and, if we play the game with enough finesse, it is possible that we will come out of this adventure in good shape."

Darlan, of course, did not come out of the adventure in good shape, for he was assassinated in North Africa in 1942. Nor did his coterie of friends emerge from Vichy with laurels. The Vichy government, known as the "Society for the Protection of the Admirals," was indeed heavily laced with Darlan's followers. Ten admirals served at the cabinet or subcabinet level and later stood before the *Haute Cour de Justice* to receive their punishments as Nazi collaborators. Dreams, fostered by sincere convictions and bolstered by background, education, isolation, anglophobia and royalist hopes, turned into tragedy in the reality of the times. It is a sad and instructive tale.

Hood has done a commendable job in presenting this analysis. His thorough research, including his interviews with former naval officers and their families, makes this a book of value to historians and sociologists who may wish to delve further into this unfortunate chapter in the history of the French Navy.

EDWARD F. WELCH, JR.
Rear Admiral, US Navy (Ret.)

Croizat, Victor. *The Brown Water Navy: The River and Coastal War in Indo-China and Vietnam, 1948-1972.* New York: Sterling Publishing, 1985. 160pp. $17.95

The subtitle of Colonel Croizat's book is *The River and Coastal War in Indo-China and Vietnam, 1948-1972.* It is unfortunate that relatively little space in the book is devoted to telling the story of that war, and so much is taken up with dry, organizational matter that, quite frankly, reads as if it were lifted from poorly written command histories.

If anyone is equipped to tell the story of the Brown Water Navy in Southeast Asia, Colonel Croizat should be the one. He had a number of interesting assignments there during the period 1954-68. He participated in the evacuation of Haiphong after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. He served with the Franco-American Military Training Mission (TRIM), with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in Bangkok, with the Fleet Marine Force Riverine Warfare Study (South

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Vietnam), and finally with the Rand office in Saigon.

And the Brown Water Navy's story is worth telling. It is a story filled with drama, courage, self-sacrifice and, ultimately, tragic failure as the US Navy, unwittingly, contributed mightily in a process that created in *Communist* Vietnam one of the strongest military powers in the world.

One of the duties of a writer of history is to separate wheat from chaff. Colonel Croizat seems to have done this but, inexplicably, he has given us mostly the latter. A good editor, perhaps, could have saved him, but his book shows little evidence of having been edited at all.

Buy it for the pictures. Some of them, particularly the US Navy's, are quite good.

R.L. SCHREADLEY
Charleston, South Carolina

Fowler, William M., Jr. *Jack Tars and Commodores: The American Navy, 1783-1815*. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1984. 299pp. $17.95

Americans are a maritime people with vital interests upon the seas. During colonial times Great Britain's navy protected American seaborne commerce. During the War for Independence the French Navy provided the margin of victory at Yorktown. Yet, for a decade following the peace American leaders seemed to disregard these facts and the United States was without a navy. Some leaders went so far as to question the need for such a force, but the establishment of a navy was inevitable. Whether American political leaders realized it or not, the use of the North Atlantic was, and remains of vital interest to the nation. Sooner or later the United States has been drawn into every major war involving the North Atlantic.

In this fast-paced narrative Fowler chronicles the nascent years of the US Navy from the first debates over how to meet the threat posed to American trade by the Barbary Corsairs, through the quasi-war with France to the Barbary wars and the War of 1812. An underlying theme is that the navy grew to become the nation's "chief glory" and that it brought to the new nation and to itself a high level of international respect. This record stands in sharp contrast to the navy of the Revolution as described by Fowler in his *Rebels Under Sail* (1976).

As in his earlier work, Fowler's research and use of secondary sources is thorough and his writing is excellent. He has a particular knack for selecting the telling phrase, as for example, when he calls Edward Preble "as hard and sharp as the Maine coast from which he came," and for selecting just the right document to cogently support the interpretations which he interweaves with the text.

His focus is on naval operations but he does not neglect naval policy, administration, or life in the navy. He is best in dealing with the 1790s, very good on the first decade of the

new century, and weakest on the War of 1812. In his analysis of congressional debates and explanation of Federalist and Republican naval policy, the most sophisticated and concise in print, he tends to side with the Jeffersonians and to endorse their preference for guerre de cours. He sees the quasi-war as "outstanding [a] success" for the navy as its action in the American Revolution was a failure. Yet he believes that the US Navy came of age during the Barbary wars, not during the quasi-war as many historians believe.

It comes as no surprise that Fowler devotes more coverage to the "commodores" than to the "jack tars." Nor is it surprising that he finds far more unity within the officer corps than Guttridge and Smith did in their *The Commodores* (1968). It would be difficult to image a group as faction ridden as the one described by Guttridge and Smith accomplishing anything. Fowler may even verge on the other extreme since he virtually ignores the Perry-Elliott controversy which arose out of the Battle of Lake Erie and spawned cliques which plagued the navy for a generation. Fowler includes civilian shipbuilders and administrators in his assessments. He judges two of the first four navy secretaries—Benjamin Stoddert and William Jones—to have been excellent and the other two—Robert Smith and Paul Hamilton—to have been near-failures.

Though he focuses on naval leaders, he does not totally neglect the life of the sailor. Nor does he glamorize it. He pictures conditions on the lower deck as harsh, makes the point that few sailors served for many years, and reminds us that "the myth of the old salt is just that—a myth" but he concludes that "despite the unpleasantness associated with naval service, men did go to sea, and more important than that, they served well."

This is clearly the best survey of the early US Navy yet written and thus provides an excellent introduction to the era. The tables are informative and the maps models of utility. Naval history specialists may find little new in this book, but Fowler writes so well that they will certainly enjoy reading it.

JAMES C. BRADFORD
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Kiriakopoulus, G.C. *Ten Days to Destiny, The Battle for Crete, 1941.* New York: Franklin Watts, 1985. 408pp. $18.95

In 1941 the invasion of Crete was another of a series of spectacular German victories over the British which began with Norway in the spring of 1940 and progressed through Dunkirk, Egypt and the Libyan desert, and just prior to Crete, the debacle in Greece. The myth of an invincible *Wehrmacht* supported by an all-conquering *Luftwaffe* captured the imagination of almost everyone. Crete was the first airborne invasion of an island in the history of warfare. Hitler, in defiance of the Royal Navy's "control" of the Mediterranean had overflown that obstacle and snatched Crete with its Greek, British and Commonwealth defenders.

The capture of Crete was a tremendous propaganda victory for Hitler. As a sidelight, one of the ballyhooed heroes of the "Master Race" was trooper Max Schmeling who a few years before had been humbled in the ring at Madison Square Garden by Joe Louis. The plight of the Royal Navy was immortalized later by Noel Coward's *In Which We Serve*, a fictionalized film account of Lord Louis Mountbatten's loss of HMS *Kelly*.

There are kernels of truth to those 1941 myths. Schmeling did jump in Crete but was a malingerer and, Mountbatten's lost destroyer was only one of many British warships sent to the bottom attempting to evacuate the British forces; but as the author skillfully brings out, Crete was a Pyrrhic victory in the wrong place and at the wrong time for Germany. The victory was as much a disaster for the victors as for the vanquished, in the analysis of history.

Mr. Kiriakopoulus, a professor at Columbia University, has written much about World War II. This book is the result of his curiosity about the events that took place in 1941 in the land of his ancestors. His research was extensive and included interviews as well as archives.

Significantly, Crete was the graveyard of the German airborne concept. Never again did German paratroopers fight in the airborne mode. German casualties in the ten-day battle exceeded those suffered by the *Werhmacht* during all campaigns up to that time. It took two days longer to take Crete than it did to topple France in 1940.

In describing the events—the author uses narrative to lay the groundwork for subsequent analysis—Mr. Kiriakopoulus brings out that the Germans jumped into a hostile environment. The natives rose up to defend their soil and the tradition of individual and family defense of their homeland took a heavy toll among the troopers. There was little expectation among the assault troops of being speared by a farmer's pitchfork or shot while hanging in their harnesses. But this is what happened, what made the initial casualties so high, and delayed the eventual triumph.

The inevitability of a German victory comes through the pages even though the author implies a sentimental hope that the Allies could have snatched victory from defeat. The key is that only once does he mention the Royal Air Force. In that brief paragraph, he tells of ten Hurricanes being sent to Crete from Fighter Command in Egypt. Six were misidentified and shot down by friendly antiaircraft fire and two aborted after seeing the fate of the six and headed back to sea. Low on fuel, they were never seen again. The other two landed only to be destroyed on the ground by the *Luftwaffe* the next day. So much for Allied air support.

It was also the *Luftwaffe* which defeated the Royal Navy and drove it back to port. Ashore, the Allied troops under New Zealander Victoria Cross holder, Gen. Bernard Freyberg, were plagued with a

complex command system aggravated by a lack of communications. Shortages of artillery and of all kinds of ammunition was a significant factor in tactical defeats. A British or Greek unit would obtain an objective and then be forced back for lack of ammunition to conduct a proper defense. Meanwhile, the key airfield was lost, opening it to a constant flow of German aerial resupply and troop buildup.

Recurring tactical defeats led to the decision to evacuate. Evacuees included the British and Commonwealth troops who could disengage and make their way over the mountains to the southern beaches. No provision was made for the evacuation of Greek troops, although the King and his entourage were rescued by the Royal Navy. The valiant civilians who had gallantly defended their soil were left to the "tender mercies" of German reprisals. The post-invasion toll was high and hardly a family was spared some loss. Age or sex were not a bar to German revenge.

The author points out that the tactical victory, which was less than the propaganda of the time would have us believe, was a strategic blunder for both sides. Although it was probably a mistake for the British to attempt to defend Crete at the time (another Churchillian whim), it paid off in the future. The German airborne capability was almost erased, both in the sense of manpower and of vital air transports. Another two-week delay was tacked on to Hitler's invasion of Russia. The lack of air transport was later to prove critical in that campaign. But for the Germans, the strategic blunder was greater. First, as the author points out, Crete was not the key to control of the Mediterranean. Malta was. Crete, therefore, was not a vital objective. Further, the aforementioned losses and delays became critical in the invasion of Russia.

Thus, the title projects a double *entendre*. It surely portended destiny, but whose?

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Kotsch, William J. and Henderson, Richard. *Heavy Weather Guide*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1984. 399pp. $21.95

> She dipped into the hollow straight down, as if going over the edge of the world. The engine-room toppled forward menacingly, like the inside of a tower nodding in an earthquake. An awful racket, of iron things falling, came from the stokehold.

From the near hypnosis of Conrad's *Typhoon* to the near pedantry of some of the tables, Admiral Kotsch and Mr. Henderson have compiled and revised a fine second edition of this informative text. There is almost too much, at times, with instructive cases ranging from carrier task group operations, to merchant transits, to single-handed sailing. One wishes there were a ready reference section among the sea stories, to permit a shiphandler to find in short order the guidance applicable to his ship and situation. Paragraphs on staysails and

trysails are intermingled with those on handling destroyers and container ships to the distraction of a reader in extremis. That aside, this is a superior textbook with a wealth of data from buoy locations, to forecasting systems, to ship stability tables.

Despite increases in the complexity of naval warfare over the past 40 years, and the technological changes to naval ships which go with it, the power of a raging sea remains the same. So does the helplessness of indecisive and inexperienced men who face it. Today's forecasting techniques would have been deemed impossible just a few decades ago, but the capriciousness of a storm at sea seems to more than have kept pace. Faced with the annual hurricane season, naval leaders ashore too often issue self-protecting platitudes in early summer, then wait too long to sortie ships from east coast ports when the storm approaches—until the COs are forced into the most dangerous quadrant of the storm. The Navy is not alone in this. Witness the millions of dollars of beachfront housing built 10 feet below the high-water mark of our last big storm. As one admiral pointed out here at the War College, a task larger than learning new lessons is that of teaching old ones to new generations.

This past summer ComSecondFlt chose to avoid platitudes and simply restate one splendid set of old lessons for all his ships to peruse. His 181418Z JUL 85 message was a partial restatement of Admiral Nimitz' timeless letter to the Pacific Fleet, 14CL-45 of 18 February 1945. Appendix VII of *Heavy Weather Guide* contains that letter *in toto* along with all the comments it generated in the US Naval Institute *Proceedings* when it was declassified and published in January 1956. The topic of that letter was the horrendous damage done to Halsey's fleet off Luzon during the typhoon of 17-18 December 1944—790 men lost, 200 planes lost, three destroyers lost and 28 ships severely damaged. As both Nimitz and Halsey pointed out, "this was the Navy's greatest uncompensated loss since the Battle of Savo Island." Operational commitments to support MacArthur had caused Halsey to delay fueling until the small buoys were at 10-15 percent of capacity. Most had not ballasted because they were to refuel on short notice. Crews were exhausted and inexperienced at shiphandling in heavy weather. The wind was near 100 knots, the seas at 70 feet. Halsey states that *New Jersey* shook worse than she had when hit by 5″ gunfire. Regular Navy commanding officers had fewer than eight years out of the Academy, some less than five. Halsey awarded the Legion of Merit to Lt. Cmdr. Henry L. Plage, USNR, commanding the destroyer escort *Tabberer*, "who had been to sea exactly once before, for a short cruise during his ROTC course at Georgia Tech!," yet brought his ship through with only mast and radios gone and rescued survivors from the sunken destroyer *Hull* during the worst of the storm. One is reminded of Herman Wouk's vivid portrayal of Captain Queeg and his crew on the old destroyer-mine-

sweeper *Caine*, when he fell apart and was relieved by his XO during such a storm.

This fine text should be perused at leisure by the officer coming newly to command. Before passing the sea buoy he should tab those pages he may need when "operational commitments" to a hard-changing admiral practicing at war or facing the enemy ashore may leave him with no option but to sail, as the sea shanty says, "in the teeth of the boomin' gale!"

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Sinke, Ralph E.G., Jr. *Don't Cry For Us*. Dale City, Va.: REGS Enterprises, 1984. 140pp. $12.95

Don't Cry For Us is a book of poetry and vignettes written by a Marine Corps major who first fought in Vietnam as a private first class in 1966. The simplicity of the verse in this book is effective in establishing the theme of lost innocence and accelerated maturation in the laboratory of life—Vietnam. Many of the pieces in part I were written by Sinke as he recovered from battle wounds. The poem of the title is an unapologetic account of the Vietnam veterans' contributions to their nation. Like many of the poems in the book, it captures the pulse of a nation and a generation. It is angry, bitter, tired and sad—most of all, it is proud. The pride of the Vietnam veterans and the recent and long overdue acceptance of their gallant efforts provide Major Sinke with the material for his work.

From the lost youth, realities and sacrifices addressed in the initial poems, Major Sinke moves to the tragic homecoming of American fighting men in part II. The poems are sad because they tell of how the veterans became the object of the American people's confusion, frustration and hatred. The transference of their wrath to the veterans increased the guilt of the warriors and inflicted psychological wounds that complement their physical wounds.

Part III, "The Reconciliation," was written by Sinke the day after the dedication of the Vietnam War Memorial. It ties together loose ends, and is a reflection of pain and sacrifices which have lately been recognized because of our nation's collective guilt; it signals the end of an era and the ushering in of a new era of legitimacy and acceptance of our Vietnam veterans. "The Reconciliation" is a definitive explanation of the catharsis of the Vietnam War and its warriors. It makes as eloquent a statement about the meaning of the war as the Memorial Wall itself.

The title of the book, *Don't Cry For Us* is ironic because many of Sinke's pieces will bring the reader to tears. "Just Three Days" and "We Called Him 'Abe'" are emotional, gut-wrenching, soul-searching, beautiful and profound instances of Sinke's unabashed intensity and heart. Although Ralph Sinke is a United States Marine, his work transcends service. It is a book for men who fought in Vietnam and for Americans who only now, a decade after the war in Vietnam ended, have begun to

believe that the sacrifices of Vietnam veterans were equal to the sacrifices of other veterans in past wars. It is a book about the human spirit and heart in the crucible of war.

W.T. DeCAMP
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RECENT BOOKS

Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library

Annotated by
George Scheck and Mary Ann Varoutsos

Alnasrawi, Abbas. *OPEC in a Changing World Economy*. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985. 188pp. $22.50

In this study, Alnasrawi, an economics professor at the University of Vermont, surveys developments in the oil industry since the creation of OPEC in 1960. Following a brief overview of OPEC's performance and its impact on the world economy, the author examines oil-price determination using both historical and analytical approaches. He also presents a history of the organization's various unsuccessful attempts to regulate output during the 1960s and 1970s. Turning to OPEC's world role, he describes its relations with the industrialized countries (increased dependence) and with the Third World (increased interdependence). The concluding chapter treats OPEC in the 1980s and suggests some future trends.

Bethlen, Steven and Volgyes, Ivan, eds. *Europe and the Superpowers*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985. 164pp. $18.50

Based upon papers presented at a 1984 Munich conference by European and American scholars, these essays offer their perceptions on relations between the superpowers and the nations of Eastern and Western Europe. The topics include the political, economic, and military aspect of Europe's international relationships; the role of Nato and the Warsaw Pact; and Europe's goals, objectives and future. Also considered is the impact of Soviet and East European internal developments on present and future East-West relations.

Bullock, John. *The Gulf*. London: Century, 1984. 218pp. $21

This book offers a portrait of the Persian Gulf states of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Along with vignettes of the people, the discussion includes historical backgrounds and the economic, social, and political development of each of