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## U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity: A Neo-International View

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alliance. Cable states that it is an irony of history, but in the latter case, the Royal Navy's role would become that of a "riskflotte," as envisaged by Tirpitz for the Imperial German Navy in 1900.

In his final chapter, Cable looks at the four major components of Britain's current defences—namely the nuclear deterrent, the defence of the United Kingdom itself, the presence of a British Army Corps and supporting forces in Nato's central front, and the Royal Navy. The Navy is mainly disposed in the Eastern Atlantic but is flexible enough to operate over wider ocean areas. He concludes that the first two components are essential for national survival, and that the Air Defence of the UK also makes a vital contribution to Nato. He concludes however that the other two components (the Army in Germany and the Royal Navy at sea) are incompatible in view of the inevitable relative decline in defence funding. Picking his way carefully he proposes that the army should be withdrawn from Germany and reorganised in order to maintain funding for, and hopefully strengthen, the Royal Navy. This strengthened naval capability would include projecting elements of the army ashore to assist in the defence of the northern flank and islands.

Nonetheless, he admits that it will be a difficult task to persuade the Nato allies, the British electorate and, not least, the army itself of the vital necessity for this change. But he feels it must be attempted.

Cable completed his book early in

1982, just before the South Atlantic War between Britain and Argentina. Before publication and without altering his original text, he wrote a special preface including some first thoughts on this war. Here he asks whether anything in the war made nonsense of the rest of the book. Except for the one point that he (like the Argentinian Government) failed to forecast that Britain would fight to recover the Falkland Island dependencies, he concludes that the war does not affect his arguments. He warns about drawing hasty conclusions from the war, which he thinks cannot be paralleled in the range of options available to Britain, and the dependencies' distance giving time for consideration of these options. However, he feels that the war did reinforce some of his points; namely, the value of versatility in the shape of a navy, the movement of warships giving time for negotiation, the fallacy of the single scenario, and that island-states need navies.

Like Cable, I hope this book is read by many of those who can influence British defence policy. Even for those who are not in this position, it is a joy to read for its elegance and its thorough approach to strategic analysis.

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Commander, Royal Navy

Olsen, Edward. *U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity: A Neo-International View*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1985. 193pp. \$24.95

Professor Olsen calls for a revised US policy towards Japan based on neo-internationalism. The foundations of neo-internationalism rest upon reciprocity in defense and reciprocity in trade. He sees the two seemingly separate issues of defense and trade as, in fact, closely linked. Since the United States has in effect subsidized Japanese defense, this has bolstered Japan's ability to compete economically. As the author states in a recent *Christian Science Monitor* editorial comment, "Japanese officials know Japan is vulnerable to U.S. linkage of these issues. Consequently, this is precisely where the U.S. ought to target its pressures on Japan." What would then happen is that, "With neo-internationalism as a guiding principle, the United States should invite Japan to the table for talks on a wide range of subjects to solicit Tokyo's views on an acceptable regional and global strategy. This would signal to the Japanese people and their Asian neighbors that Washington is giving practical effect to its frequently heard rhetoric about making Japan the cornerstone of U.S. Asia policy."

A reasoned and amply documented book, *U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity* briefly reviews the history of US-Japanese strategic relations since World War II, devotes considerable space to an analysis of the present state of the relationship and concludes with a set of policy recommendations for the United States as well as an estimation of their impact on Japan and other interested regional countries.

Though critical of what he terms "existing U.S. oversensitivity to Japanese sensibilities," Olsen avoids "Japan-bashing" and seeks to provide an informed, unemotional critique of the challenge Japan poses to productive bilateral ties. (But it should be noted that Olsen is not above suggesting that, "skillfully administered shokku [shock], carefully signalled to receptive Japanese leaders, could work wonders in motivating Tokyo," a thought that might not sit well with those who argue extra understanding and sympathy for Japan's positions on contentious issues.)

One of the by-products of continuing debate on US-China policy has been a stimulation of interest in the most important US bilateral relation in Asia, that with Japan. Critics may argue with Olsen's view that, "most of what the United States has done to influence Tokyo has been simplistically one-sided," but the fact remains that Japan has only reluctantly inched in the direction Washington has asked, and without "indication of the existence of the true mutuality of interests that the United States ostensibly seeks."

In the face of the pressure put on US-Japanese relations by trade differences, it may well be the time for Washington to "initiate changes that will stimulate the sort of strategic and economic interdependence that will put U.S.-Japan relations on a firm footing in the 1990's and in the next century." Professor Olsen's arguments that it is possible to nudge Japan toward a truly reciprocal

commitment to mutual defense of the global interests it shares with the United States offer a basis for these changes while avoiding either a "Japan-bashing" or "Japanophile" approach.

*U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity* is a professionally written book whose author sticks to his goal of evaluating the past, present and future course of US-Japan security relations. This short book—154 pages of text and 193 pages in all—is another Hoover Institution Press quality effort, with excellent editing and error-free text. One small word of caution: it presupposes general knowledge of the region and the issues. Beyond that, the book is eminently readable and provides a clear, beneficial contribution to the ongoing and crucial debate as to the future course of our vital US-Japan relationship.

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Lind, William S. *Maneuver Warfare Handbook*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985. 133pp. \$16.50

Kross, Walter. *Military Reform: The High-Tech Debate in Tactical Air Forces*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985. 240pp. \$7.50

The debate over military reform continues to play a key role in defense planning and budgeting, yet the concept of military reform remains an enigma. To many, it represents a panacea that will correct the defici-

encies of America's fighting forces. To others, military reform poses a threat to all that is good in the military. While the truth is somewhere in between these views, military reform remains a mystery to those that seek to understand it. Based on a theory of warfare both subtle and, of necessity, lacking in concrete rules, military reform has taken many different facades. In its most recognizable form, however, it has come to be associated with two critical areas—maneuver warfare and the debate over high-technology weapons. It is into these two areas that William Lind and Walter Kross, in two widely divergent books, have attempted to end the confusion.

William Lind, longtime critic and supporter of the Marine Corps, has written his book for Marines. Although narrow in its focus, *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* attempts to explain the principles of maneuver warfare and, for the first time, apply those concepts to the realities of tactics. Beginning with a thorough explanation of the theory of maneuver warfare, Lind draws heavily on previously published writings by Marine officers to offer concrete examples of maneuver warfare as it may be applied down to the squad level. He then provides chapters on amphibious operations and Marine Corps education and training. Of particular note is his annotated bibliography, which provides an excellent means for professional expansion. Finally, the author devotes almost half his book to a series of tactical lesson plans written