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Arms Control: Myth Versus Reality

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resolved them he can be excused because they are not easily tractable. His final note is realistic and sound, which is to work on the problems and manage them, for however small the chance they will be solved, there is much hope they can be kept in bounds or under control.

RODNEY W. JONES
Georgetown University

Staar, Richard F., ed. *Arms Control: Myth Versus Reality*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1984. 195pp. \$14.95

This compendium is the product of a conference held at and sponsored by the Hoover Institution in the latter part of 1983. Attended by over 60 governmental and nongovernmental experts in the field, the contents are a series of conference papers and commentaries on those papers.

The tone of the work is uniformly antiarms control, in the sense that the writers consistently challenge the notion that the arms control process per se is beneficial to the United States or that the results have generally served American interests. Rather, the recurring theme is the "myth" in the subtitle—that one can expect outcomes of value from strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union. The "reality" is that the Soviets have quite different—from the US perspective devious—purposes when entering into these negotiating fora, and that for cultural and other reasons, they are likely to abridge and even negate American expectations. The Soviets have, in a word, a contrasting agenda.

Although I largely agree with the positions argued in these pages, I was somewhat overwhelmed and disappointed with the unrelenting litany against strategic arms negotiations as they have become a part of the strategic landscape. There is, within these pages, very little disagreement or debate; the authors are clearly playing from the same sheet of music to a homogeneous crowd. The effort, and the intellectual task of interpreting it, would have been more challenging and stimulating had the other side of the story been presented and counterargued.

As in any multiauthored work, there are variations in both tone and quality. Generally speaking, the more ideologically committed papers were the weaker. Mark B. Schneider, an arms control counsel within OSD at the time of the conference, produced a paper "The Future: Can It Be Resolved?" that is little more than cheerleading for the Administration position at the time, including the uncritical presentation of contradictions in that policy, e.g., he argues that ICBMs are highly vulnerable at a time when silo-basing MX is being advocated. At the other end of the spectrum, Edward Teller's "Defense: Retaliation or Protection" and Richard Pipes' "Diplomacy and Culture: Negotiation Styles" are very scholarly, dispassionate works.

Because it forcefully takes a position which has not always been given adequate attention in Washington, this book merits attention and reading, especially among those who take a contrary position. Those

already suspicious of arms control outcomes will have their positions reinforced and their arsenals of argumentations augmented, if not their horizons expanded greatly. The initially neutral observer will find a forceful and articulate rendering of this Administration's position.

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Wallensteen, Peter et al., eds., *Global Militarization*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Special Studies on Peace, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution, 1985. 240pp. \$24.95

This stimulating book rewards careful reading by the observer and practitioner of military affairs—not because it is a book about war, but because it is about underlying social, cultural and economic shifts in the global interstate system that help to explain the phenomenon of militarization.

For example, Keiichi Matsushita, in his chapter, "The Urban Type of Society and International War," argues that war between developed industrialized states is the least likely form of conflict; rather, conflict springing from the context of a mature urban type of society, whether developed or developing, is more characteristic of the present situation. The problems that terrorism pose to developed societies, therefore, are not necessarily attributes of industrialization any more than such problems can be attributes of a rural orientation in Third World states or societies. Both developed

and developing societies are becoming vehicles for—and targets of—forms of warfare that spring from the urban social context—and the gigantic concentrations of peoples into megalopolises, such as Cairo, Mexico City, and Tokyo are occurring everywhere, not just where industrialization has advanced the farthest.

In his chapter, "Global Conflict Formations: Present Developments and Future Directions," Johan Galtung goes further to assert that the real division of the world is not on a North-South or East-West axis, but rather on a "North-West and South-East" axis with the North-West losing ground to the South-East. His thesis is that the industrial center of gravity is shifting, with concomitant shifts in power relationships that are only beginning to be understood—hence the confusion in the United States and Western Europe as to why they are less and less able to control the world economy and the power relationships that flow therefrom. Galtung argues that the capitalist world economic structure has not in fact changed very much. Rather, its spread has brought to bear the same techniques of economic cooperation, competition, and exploitation that have been around a long time. The only problem is that the North-West countries do not much like it when these techniques are used for the benefit of others rather than for themselves.

There are chapters discussing militarization in Thailand, in Chile, and in Ghana, that point up differences and similarities as to how the