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Putting up with the Russians

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militarizing institutions in the Third World affect their societies. Switzerland and Poland in 1980-82 are also discussed as alternatives to show how formal militarization need not be necessary to avoid social conflict.

Finally, in his concluding chapter, "Incompatibility, Militarization, and Conflict Resolution," Peter Wallenstein points out that nonstate actors are playing an increasing role in global conflict, but that the major interstate actors (Iran, Egypt, the USSR and the United States for example) still confront each other as if war was still their monopoly. Even the use of the term "state-sponsored terrorism" presupposes the primacy of the territorial state as the major actor.

In fact, if we link the notion that global conflict derives from the robust urbanizing process, then the distinctions between "state" and "nonstate," between "external" and "internal" conflict, will diminish. This will increase the current confusion among the major "North-West" industrialized states as to how to deal with a seemingly endless series of threats and humiliations. Those unpleasant experiences reflect not only changes in the nature of the international political system, but more fundamentally, shifts in the center of gravity of the global economy. In other words, global militarization does not presuppose that a universal empire is evolving. Rather, in the view of the editors of this book, it presupposes just the opposite: greater diversification of national economies according to

capitalist principles and practices, with accompanying political, cultural and social pluralism, as people everywhere are drawn into urban concentrations.

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Crankshaw, Edward. *Putting up with the Russians*. New York: Viking Penguin, 1984. 269pp. \$17.95

The international tensions and troubles of the 1930s and the years of World War II stimulated a great surge of interest in the Soviet Union. After 1945 there occurred a veritable explosion in the field of Soviet studies which paralleled and indeed was partly inspired by the coming of the atomic age.

Among the most insightful and wise of these scholars was Edward Crankshaw—a British journalist, author and commentator. His published works reveal the range of his interests and of his creative mind. Yet the major emphasis of Crankshaw's intellectual and scholarly efforts was concentrated on Russia and the Russians—from 1947 to 1984 he wrote eight books on the Soviet Union.

During World War II he served for nearly two years in Moscow with the British military mission. Thereafter, he was drawn, as if by some irresistible force, to things Russian. One of Crankshaw's earliest published writings appeared in the *Observer* in 1947. In this article Crankshaw presented an argument which he would return

to many times during the next 37 years. The article was entitled, "Russia's Weakness and Our Duty." It was Crankshaw's conviction that "one of the most damaging illusions of modern times is the belief in Russia's invulnerable might." He continued with what would be another of his persistent and strongly held opinions that "The Soviet Union, for all the magnificence of its achievements, is not a brand-new realm. Under entirely new management it is still Eternal Russia."

Putting Up with the Russians is a carefully selected collection of "articles, essays, lectures, prefaces, reviews, etc." on the Soviet Union. Part I consists of newspaper articles or essays which span the years from 1947 to 1984 and comprises nearly two-thirds of the volume; part II contains mostly book reviews. What is remarkable is how well these analyses stand up despite the fact that they range over nearly four decades of events. It is a delight to reread these commentaries on the Soviet Union and again to be informed and guided by a wise and literate observer.

Most of the selections are short articles of four to six pages in length, and constitute what can be best described as think pieces. Many are as relevant today as when they were first set down on paper. Throughout the writings are judgments and arguments which Crankshaw repeated persistently: the need for coexistence between the USSR and the West, especially with the United States; the weaknesses of the Soviet Union; the inevitability of rivalry between the

USSR and the United States, regardless of the political form the Soviet Union might assume; the inevitability of Chinese and Soviet enmity. That there would be a relationship of hostility between the Chinese and the Russians was argued by Crankshaw as early as 1950.

Some of Crankshaw's harshest judgments remained largely unchanged over his entire career. In the introduction to this work he set forth as clearly and directly as possible one of his major theses: "Nothing . . . that has happened in Afghanistan or Poland or Angola, or in the way of a shift in the balance of armaments, in the least way changes the picture of Russia built up over the past forty years—an intolerable, disgraceful regime imprisoned by its own past, an imperial power run by men who got where they are by conspiracy and still think of the world in terms of a gigantic counter-inspiracy" Yet, in 1947 Crankshaw insisted on the need "to find a way of living side by side with . . . Russia" He noted its "mindless inefficiency." In 1950 he argued that "the effect of the new bomb may, in fact, reduce the risk of war," and that "the present aims of Soviet foreign policy, which is a belligerent policy, may be summarized as an effort to achieve without war certain objectives of a kind traditionally achieved by war: the ruin of the Western economy; the integration of the satellites with the Soviet economy; the penetration of Asia; the overthrow of sovereign governments in non-communist countries."

Contained in approximately three dozen articles are an examination of the problems faced by the Soviet Union since the end of the war in 1945, and the actions taken by Moscow in response to these difficulties. Among the subjects which Crankshaw comments upon are China, Czechoslovakia, Revisionism, East Europe, nuclear weapons, détente, nationalities, ideology, and others. Crankshaw was not always right in his analyses of Soviet policies and actions, but his insights and judgments were thought provoking, cogently argued, and were seldom matched in their wisdom.

Throughout his life Crankshaw held firmly to a number of convictions about the Soviet Union, "I wanted to show that while the Bolshevik regime was even more vile than it was possible for anyone who had not experienced it to imagine, that although it would make mischief on every possible occasion and find it hard to resist every opportunity for easy expansion and subversion, there was next to no danger of the Kremlin launching a formal war and it could always be stopped by a clear declaration of the line it must not cross—backed by sufficient force to make that declaration credible."

Crankshaw offered his views on many of the powerful political figures of the Soviet system. On Stalin he observed: "Stalin was an adept at using, or abusing, a doctrinaire theory of history as a smokescreen to cover his imperial designs." As for the great founder of Bolshevism, Lenin, Crankshaw commented that "The most

remarkable thing about him was his changeless conviction that he alone among all men was right." Lenin, in Crankshaw's judgment, was not an original thinker—"His whole contribution was to practice." Commenting on Brezhnev at the time of the 1968 invasion into Czechoslovakia by Soviet forces, he characterized him as the "brainless wonder of our age. You have to look to Alabama or California to find his equal."

Crankshaw commented that "Mr. Andropov (as compared to Western political leaders) . . . is irresponsible (that is, he is not responsive to Soviet citizens). He is *Kremlin Man* And *Kremlin Man* is different from all other politicians, speaking his own language and basing his conduct on assumptions radically different from those of the rest of mankind." Crankshaw apparently believed that Gorbachev was the most likely successor in the near future and raised several fundamental questions about him and the other new leaders: "What we do not know, and may not know for some time to come, is the way the Gorbachevs are thinking—they and what must be a host of their contemporaries Are they so coloured by their lifelong environment and corrupted by their rivalries that they are incapable of launching any radical attempt to make the Soviet Union work and bring it into the brotherhood of Nations? Or have they minds of their own?"

Putting Up with the Russians provides a fine epitaph for the extraordinary contributions made by Edward Crankshaw. Perhaps we should not mourn

the passing of a wise and good man who gave to us brilliant insights on many of the significant issues of the times. But the death of Edward Crankshaw leaves a void, and the publication of this book in 1984 coincident with his passing, reminds us of what he gave to us, and what in turn we have lost because of his death.

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Hood, Ronald Chalmers III. *Royal Republicans: The French Naval Dynasties between the World Wars*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985. 221pp. \$25

When British naval guns under Vice Admiral Somerville's command roared out on the powerful French Fleet at Oran and Mers-el-Kebir in the early evening hours of 3 July 1940, an enigmatic chapter in the history of the French Navy neared its tragic close. In *Royal Republicans*, Ronald Hood seeks to illuminate the period between the two World Wars and to explain those factors which influenced the French Navy to play its curious role during those years.

The French Navy has not had a happy history. Even after its major triumph in helping to secure American independence off Yorktown, the French Fleet was destroyed within a few months. Neglect of the fleet and subordination to the army had been a constant in this history. In World War I, the navy was again relegated to a minor role of protecting the sea lanes and ensuring that the army received the necessary supplies and

reinforcements from abroad. To add to the navy's frustration, the navy's shipyards were handed over to the army for four years to manufacture army weapons. The armistice of 1918 left an embittered and resentful French Navy which was to grow in alienation from and suspicion of the republic it served.

Hood divides his analysis into three major areas: (1) the sociological underpinnings of the French Navy, especially the line officers (the *grand corps*); (2) the monastic education and inward orientation of the *grand corps* together with their intellectual leanings; and (3) the growing politicization of the navy, its sympathy for authoritarian rule including the fascism of Franco and Mussolini, and the preponderant role played by admirals in the Vichy government.

A picture is painted of the *grand corps* as the aristocracy of the navy, graduates of the *École navale*, frequently sons of naval officers, all from landed families, preponderantly from Brittany and the Midi, and bound together through the alumni association of the *École navale*. Drawing extensively from the records of the alumni association, the author presents statistical data on social and geographic origins, nobility in the *grand corps*, marriages and academic preparation. The French naval household consisted of the father at sea or in the colonies, generally resided in the port cities (or in Paris in later years) with the mother exercising the major influence on the young son. Much of this influence was dedicated to the proper