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Cover: The new submarine USS *Providence* (SSN 719) at sea off the East Coast. Commissioned in 1985, she is the 32nd of the *Los Angeles* class of attack submarine. Photo courtesy of the Commanding Officer.

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Naval Tactics And Their Influence on Strategy

Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., US Navy (Ret.)

A Strategy-Tactics Dialectic

A viewpoint almost taken for granted among Defense officials is that national policy determines military strategy, which in turn determines the quantities and allocations of forces. Let me offer a contrasting position:

"What actually halts the aggressor's action is the fear of defeat by the defender's forces, [even though] he is not likely to concede this, at least not openly.

"One may admit that even where the decision has been bloodless, it was determined in the last analysis by engagements that did not take place but had merely been offered . . . where the tactical results of the engagement are assumed to be the *basis* of all strategic plans, it is always possible, and a serious risk, that the attacker will proceed on that basis. He will endeavor above all to be tactically superior, in order to upset the enemy's strategic planning. The latter [strategic planning] therefore, can never be considered *as something* independent: it can only become valid when one has reason to be confident of tactical success . . . it is useful to emphasize that all strategic planning rests on tactical success alone, and that—whether the solution is arrived at in battle or not—this is in all cases the actual fundamental basis for the decision. Only when one has no need to fear the outcome—because of the enemy's character or situation or because the two armies are unevenly matched physically and psychologically or indeed because one's own side is the stronger—only then can one expect results from strategic combinations *alone*."

I have been quoting Clausewitz, of course. We should remember that Clausewitz dealt with ground warfare. The passage above is found in Clausewitz' discussion of defense, which he and other analysts believe is the

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stronger tactical posture on land. As will be seen, I hold that the tactical nature of ground war often differs from sea war. Specifically, there has been no corresponding tactical advantage for the defense in naval combat. Nevertheless, in this instance I am happy to take Clausewitz as my text, and assert that what he thought to be the link between tactics and strategy on the ground applies even more strongly at sea, if that is possible.

The reason that a discussion of tactics is appropriate when discussing contemporary strategy is that strategy must rest on the rock of combat capability. One builds decisions from the bottom up: tactics affect the efficacy of forces; the correlation of forces reveals what strategy our forces can support, and a supportable military strategy governs national aims and ambitions.

This is the opposite of the Secretary of Defense's "Defense Guidance," which starts with national goals and policies, which in due course defines strategy, and which takes largely for granted that existing forces will be able to execute it. The top-down approach is proper for deriving force requirements to guide procurement policies, but force requirements—if they exceed existing force levels—can only be built in the future. If one is concerned with present strategy, he must know current capabilities and design his strategy accordingly. If the forces are inadequate, then a strategy which is part bluff may be necessary, but it is important for everyone to understand that the strategy is in fact not executable, so that the part which is bluff does not become forgotten and lead to self-delusion. As a case in point, many will remember the 2½ war strategy that lingered on long after it was beyond our capabilities.

Firepower, scouting, and C2 are the three elements of naval force—the means—and attrition is the great end. In the background I can hear Peggy Lee singing her song, "Is That All There Is?" Yes, I think that is all.

Of course, the design of a current maritime strategy is not really so simple that it can be built from the bottom up. The process is dialectical, with policy and strategy goals juxtaposed against combat capabilities. But current strategy, I insist, must rest on a foundation of realistic force comparisons.

Perhaps the sense of urgency about tactical considerations will be made more real by starting with this: It is demonstrable both by history and theory that not only has a small net advantage in force (not the same as forces) often been decisive in naval battles, but the slightly inferior force tends to lose with very little to show in the way of damage and destruction to the enemy.

At sea, there has been no counterpart to prepared positions and the effects of terrain, nor anything corresponding to the rule-of-thumb, 3-to-1 attacker-

to-defender ratio. There are no mountains nor swamps to guard flanks, no rivers to cross or defend, and no high ground. A fleet tactical commander keeps no force in reserve and all his energy is devoted to attacking the enemy effectively before the enemy can attack him. At sea, offense dominates in a way foreign to ground commanders. When a tactical commander is not competitive he had better stand clear; because, as I said, he will have little to show for the loss of his force.

In peacetime, every strategist must know the true combat worth of his navy, as compared to the enemy, or he risks deep humiliation with or without bloodshed. That above all was the tactical lesson for Argentina in the Falklands, which found its navy outclassed by the Royal Navy. In wartime, every strategist must know the relative fighting value of his navy—so carefully nurtured and expensive to build and maintain in peacetime. When committed in battle, the heart of a fleet can be cut out in an afternoon.

Three Tactics-Strategy Interrelationships

The fighting power of forces available determines strategic combinations. This does little to explain why tacticians emphasize not only forces as orders of battle but also the very tactics of those forces as elements of sound strategy. The answer lies in the distinction between forces and force—the difference between an order of battle and fighting power at a scene of action against a specific enemy, or what Russian military scientists call the correlation of forces and means. Here are three examples of how tactics and strategy are interrelated. The first example is in the realm of force planning, the Washington arena. The second deals with naval operations, the battle arena. The third illustrates the danger when either the strategist or the tactician lays his plans without due regard for the risks he may thoughtlessly impose on his counterpart.

First, in the US and Nato studies of the military reinforcement and resupply of Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s, classical convoy tactics were used. The escorts formed a ring around the merchant ships. But the ASW screens so configured could not prevent the penetration of many torpedo-firing submarines. The Navy's strategists drew the conclusion that we should buy more ASW protection. Other strategists who toted up the Navy's hardware bill said there must be a better strategy, better meaning less expensive. One solution was to preposition Army divisional combat equipment in Europe and then fly the troops over to marry up with it. No one questioned the soundness of the convoy tactics on which the gloomy losses were based until the early 1970s. Then some work being done concurrently by the Center for Naval Analyses and a small Nato study group at SacLant concluded that if you opened out the merchant ship formation and imbedded the protection inside the convoys, the losses to merchant ships would be reduced by a factor of two or three.

These same studies of the tactical details of the convoy engagements revealed that the submarines ought to be able to find enough targets to unload all of their torpedoes on every patrol, unlike the experience of World War II when the average U-boat fired less than one-sixth of its torpedoes on a patrol. The number of torpedoes carried to sea, therefore, became a number of extreme importance. When the fact was appreciated, a more careful look was taken at the torpedo load of enemy submarines and it was decided that we had probably overestimated it, and in so doing overestimated the damage the subs could do over their lifetimes.

With the estimates of probable losses of merchant ships reduced dramatically, did convoying reenter as the preferred strategy? Not exactly, because there were too many other considerations—political, budgetary, and strategic, affecting the decision. The present attitude toward the desirability of convoying is, in some circumstances yes, in others no. Here the interrelationship with strategy enters the picture. If the maritime strategy described by Robert Wood and John Hanley in the previous issue of this journal is executable, then that will have a powerful and positive effect to reduce the need for convoying. If we are surprised as the allies were in World Wars I and II, then the strategist has some assurance that the tactics are in hand to convoy the most vital shipping—if we must.

Secondly, let us next consider a radically different example of the integration of strategy and tactics that shows up at the interface between land and sea, in what felicitously has been called "littoral warfare." Navies are built and supported in order to influence events on land. It is almost impossible to find an instance of two fleets going out to fight like boxers in a ring—may the best ships win, to the victor goes the spoils and command of the sea. Seldom has the inferior fleet failed to appreciate its inferiority, and so it has been only some matter of gravest consequence which drew the weaker fleet to sea, usually to its doom and with little harm to the stronger.

One of the tactical implications is that the larger fleet in case after case has been burdened with the forbidden sin of split objectives. Look at the 1942-45 Pacific War. Japan or the United States, whichever was superior and on the offensive, almost always entered into battle with prioritized but nevertheless dual missions—to shield the movement of some vital force and to destroy the enemy fleet. The whole Pacific strategy-tactics interface can be studied and understood in that context. The maxim that a fleet should first gain control of the sea before risking an amphibious assault turned out to be impossible to follow, because without the overwhelming strategic consequences of invasion the smaller fleet would not fight. Now look at the sea battles in World War I, in particular those in the North Sea. In this case the battles came about by some subterfuge, a strategic entrapment—the British hoping to lure the High Seas Fleet into a death trap and the Germans hoping to snare some detachments of the Royal Navy, and whittle it down to equality. Since

neither Britain nor Germany had a strategic motivation to come to battle at a disadvantage and since Scheer knew his fleet was decisively inferior, there was never a fight to the finish as strategists anticipated before the war. The German High Seas Fleet ended its days not with a bang but a whimper.

As the range of weapons and sensors increased, so did the direct, tactical interaction between land-based and sea-based forces. In my opinion there is no finer example than the Solomons Campaign of 1942-43 of ground, sea, and air forces all acting in concert, not coincidentally or serendipitously, but necessarily and vitally. A subject worthy of more study is the way these interactions on a wider, deeper battlefield will carry over into the realm of strategy and policy. Land-based aircraft and missiles already reach well out to sea. Sea-based aircraft have had an influence that is well known, and now missiles from the sea will also play a role. One of the tactical lessons of the Solomons is this: We do not plan to put the Marine Brigade into northern Norway merely to hold the land flank, but also to hold the maritime flank. The Marines and their accompanying airpower would fight from a vital piece of real estate that will support operations at sea as well as on the ground. It is hard to find a more apt example of littoral warfare in the making.

Thirdly, as an example, let us look at the Mediterranean, and ponder the problem of the Sixth Fleet Commander. He is very conscious of the need to attack effectively first, but he knows American policy is unlikely to give him the freedom to do so. He also knows that policy has often required a forward, and exposed presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. His survival at the onset of war rests on two *hopes* to offset these two liabilities. The first is that he will be given the freedom of movement in sufficient time to take a geographical position that will make a major attack on him difficult. The second is that his Rules of Engagement will allow him to act with measured force when certain circumstances demand it. Since the steps he must take are in the nature of denying the enemy tracking and targeting information—"antiscouting," a term I will define later—in my opinion both the location he must take and the actions he must be authorized ought to be tolerable at the policy level. Whether the *modus vivendi* now in effect is satisfactory both as to tactics (battlefield risks) and to strategy (political risks) I do not know. But it is important to see the conflict between the statesman's political objectives and the naval commander's tactical risks in a crisis. The tactician at the scene understands the primacy of diplomatic and political objectives. But an optimum political stance, such as a highly visible naval presence, can require a disastrous battlefield posture. The tactician and strategist both need agreement that to contain a crisis, the nation must be able to win twice, both politically and on the field of battle.

In days gone by my solution to the Sixth Fleet's tactical problem was to head west. To solve the strategist's problem of the embarrassment of retreating in the midst of crisis, my strategists were to make clear well in

advance of any crisis that when the fleet withdrew, that was not appeasement but a final war warning, the naval equivalent of mobilizing the reserves. I think now my solution was too pat. But if heading west is not the answer, then the strategist must collaborate with the tactician to find it. The tactical imperative at sea is to attack effectively before the enemy does so. This is simply too compelling a consideration for the strategist to wish away.

How Tacticians Think: The Processes of Naval Battle

Naval tactics derive from four theoretical underpinnings, each of which describes a process.

- Naval warfare is attrition-centered. Attrition comes from the successful delivery of firepower.
- Scouting (to be defined momentarily) is a crucial and integral part of the tactical process.
- Command and control (C^2) transform scouting and firepower potential into the reality of delivered offensive force upon the enemy.
- Naval combat is a force-on-force process involving the simultaneous attrition of both sides. To achieve tactical victory, one must attack effectively first.

Firepower, scouting, and C^2 are the three elements of naval force—the means—and attrition is the great end. In the background I can hear Peggy Lee singing her song, "Is That All There Is?" Yes, I think that is all. Napoleon himself knew how simple naval warfare was. Of his 115 maxims of war, only the last three refer to naval matters. "The art of land warfare is an art of genius, of inspiration," he wrote in his final maxim. "On the sea, nothing is genius or inspiration, everything is positive or empiric. The admiral needs only one science, that of navigation. The general needs all of the sciences, or a talent which is equivalent to all; that of profiting by all experience and all knowledge."

Every Navy reader will detect the irony in Bonaparte's final thrust, but I intend no disparagement of a sour old man venting his frustration against Nelson and the crippling seapower of the Royal Navy. Bonaparte was right. He saw that naval warfare is simpler in tactical essence and the complexity arises in the execution, even as he said, "The qualities required to command an army are born in one, but those to command a fleet are obtained only by experience." It is a venerable truth that seamanship was the first essential of success at sea, and in addition we believe that "on the land men fight with machines, but at sea machines are fought by men."

Of course, the four elements of naval combat are permuted in many ways, rather like physicists and engineers elaborate on and apply Sir Isaac Newton's laws of motion. We should explore a few of these formulations to establish the basis for richer discussions of tactic-strategy interrelationships.

How Tacticians Win: By Attacking Effectively First

Let us shift from viewing firepower delivery, scouting, and C^2 as processes and treat them as elements of naval force. I believe there is an antithesis to each.

Firepower and Defensive Force. The antithesis of firepower is the ability to destroy the attacker's missiles or torpedoes. Call it defensive force. We could talk about offensive and defensive power, but it is a useful cue to retain the asymmetry of defensive force as the defender's response to firepower. Navies historically (less evidently today) responded to enemy firepower by building survivability into the hulls of warships, which was called staying power in the days of the 16″ guns and 12″ armor belts.

Scouting and Antiscouting. In order to discuss the antithesis of scouting, which I will simply call antiscouting, it is time to define the basic term. Scouting is information gathering by any and all means—reconnaissance, surveillance, cryptanalysis, or any other type of what some call information warfare. But the scouting process is not complete until the information is delivered to the tactical commander. The correct image of a scout is J. E. B. Stuart riding up to Robert E. Lee and saying, "I have seen Joe Hooker starting to cross the Rappahannock at Germanna Ford and he will not be across for three more hours." Scouting is delivered tactical information about the enemy's position, movement, vulnerabilities, strengths, and (in the best of worlds) intentions.

Naval scouting consumes a lot of resources. A quarter, no less, of the British Grand Fleet and German High Seas Fleet at Jutland (measured in major caliber guns) were in the two scouting formations. If Beatty had thought more of his role as scout and screen for the Grand Fleet and less of his own firepower, he would have saved Jellicoe a great deal of tension later at "Windy Corner."

We may think of tactical scouting as consisting of four elements: detection, tracking, targeting, and post-attack damage assessment. The first three—detection, tracking, and targeting—form a chain, with as much redundancy built into the chain as possible. Antiscouting is actions to break the chain, or more commonly, to retard the enemy's rate of accumulating targeting information with sand in the eyes or smoke in the face. We could call this interference "screening," except that screening has come to be used ambiguously, denoting both antiscouting and defensive force (viz ASW or AAW Screens).

Command and Control, and Command and Control Countermeasures. Command decides what is wanted from the forces, while control transforms the want into realization. Communications (as signals) is embodied in control, indeed it is the principal instrument of on-the-scene control. As we saw, C^2 operates on its forces to scout, and to position and deliver firepower.

Command and Control Countermeasures (C^2CM) are the steps to limit the enemy's ability to decide (command) and disseminate decisions (control). Among some naval officers that is an unfamiliar and narrow definition. It is not anything that needs to be explored here. What is important is to think of each tactical commander allocating his forces among four functions:

Firepower Defensive force
Scouting Antiscouting

Meanwhile, the enemy commander is doing the same thing. Some, perhaps most, weapons systems from a fleet commander's point of view can be used for more than one purpose, and so an allocation of forces among these four roles is a major decision of his. One of the fascinating stories of these allocations is the evolution of US and Japanese carrier deckloads among fighters, scouts, and bombers through World War II, and how the tactical commanders split their assets among reconnaissance, attack, fighter escort and combat air patrol.

As the two opposing commanders make their allocations and deploy for battle, they are simultaneously making positioning and timing decisions. A naval battle "starts" well before the first weapons are fired. Both are taking a series of steps building toward a climactic decision, in which the winner will be the force which attacks effectively first.

What Tacticians Learn by the Study of History: Trends, Constants, and Contexts

Naval officers have not found the principles of war very stimulating. A more useful approach is to look for *trends*, such as the expansion of weapon range, the growth of battlefield dimensions, and the rise in importance of cryptanalysis. Concurrently, look for *constants*, such as the value of concentrated firepower, the key role of proper tactical doctrine, and the preeminence of sound leadership. In addition, one must see that the value of any study or research is limited by unpredictables: *contexts,* such as forces assigned, the weather, and matters of missions and tasks, all of which do not become clear until the battle is in the offing.

One must study the history of tactics to ascertain trends: what has changed, the constants or what has not; and the contexts, what is event-dependent. Here is a quick glimpse at four periods and the changes in the attrition processes that took place.

The Age of Fighting Sail, 1550-1810. Because the effective range of naval gunnery was under a half mile, it was impossible to concentrate more than two sailing ships on one of the enemy. Even that was rare against a well-organized, tightly spaced enemy column. So, concentration of firepower was built into the ship of the line herself by adding more decks of guns. Moreover, it was well understood that when both ships were handled competently, a

three-decker would not only destroy a two-decker, but the latter would lose without having done much damage to the former. A 3:2 advantage in firepower was overwhelmingly decisive.

The Big Gun Era, 1890-1930. By contrast, when the effective range of guns opened to eight or ten miles early in the twentieth century, it was possible to concentrate the firepower of the entire battleline. The focus of the tacticians of the period was on ways to concentrate the fire of his whole line on a portion of the enemy's line. "Capping-the-T" of the whole enemy battleline was the dream of every battleship admiral. Moreover, the advantage did not have to last for very long. Under conditions of good visibility, a ten-minute initial advantage would be decisive. It was further observed that a force advantage even as small as 4:3 would be decisive. Bradley A. Fiske (1905) and a Frenchman named Abroise Baudry (1914) showed how this worked with successive salvos. A little advantage rapidly became greater as the weaker force sustained damage at an increasingly greater relative rate. They called this the N-square effect. Lanchester (1915) transformed their laborious salvo calculations into simple, coupled differential equations.* He did so merely to illustrate the principle of cumulative disadvantage in a more elegant way, using his square-law equations. Almost simultaneously, the Russian Osipov (1915) discovered the Lanchester form, apparently on his own, and wrote 60 pages of analysis, including the comparison of theory with historical battles.

Baudry and Fiske illustrated with tables such as the one below. Sides A and B are two identical forces each with the firepower to reduce the enemy at the rate of 5 percent per minute. The table shows that if you give side A a mere four-minute advantage in opening fire, side B will be destroyed while side A retains more than half (57 percent) of its fighting power.

	Units of Residual Firepower and Staying Power	
End of Minute	**Side A**	**Side B**
0	10	10
2	10	9
4	10	8
6	9.2	7
8	8.5	6.08
10	7.89	5.23
12	7.37	4.44
14	6.93	3.70
16	6.56	3.01
18	6.26	2.35
20	6.00	1.72
22	5.83	1.12
24	5.72	0.54
26	5.67	0

*See Theodore C. Taylor, "Tactical Concentration and Surprise—In Theory," *Naval War College Review*, May-June 1985, pp. 41-51.

Baudry and Fiske built similarly simple tables to show the cumulative effect of preponderant force. Let A now have two warships to concentrate on one of B. Under the same conditions as before of firepower and staying power, the table of surviving fighting power looks like this.

	Superior Side A			Side B
End of Minute	Ship A_1	Ship A_2	$A_1 + A_2$ Force	B Ship
0	10	10	20	10
2	9.5	9.5	19	8
4	9.1	9.1	18.20	6.1
6	8.79	8.79	17.58	4.40
8	8.57	8.57	17.14	2.70
10	8.43	8.43	16.86	1.00
11.19	8.38	8.38	16.70	0

A "firepower kill" on Side B is achieved in only 11.2 minutes (unopposed it would take Side A 10 minutes), and Side A has 16.7 or 83 percent of its fighting power remaining. If the Lanchester "continuous fire" form is used, side A's surviving fighting power is slightly greater, 17.3 instead of 16.7. The reason is similar to the reason that compounding interest daily yields slightly more return than compounding annually.

The Age of the Aircraft Carrier, 1942-1975. In World War II, an attack by a carrier's air wing of dive bombers and torpedo bombers had the effect of one great salvo of the whole of a carrier's firepower arriving on the enemy in a pulse of destructive force. As a result, whichever carrier fleet commander attacked first did great damage. So for damage assessment it was either

A strikes B first, or

B strikes A first, or

A and B strike simultaneously.

A crucial question was, how much damage could an air wing do? No matter how lacking the consensus was before the war about battleship survivability, by the late 1930s there was common accord that a CV was a vulnerable target. For the moment, we will assume that one carrier's air wing had the net delivered firepower to sink one carrier in one attack. The theoretical results are displayed in this table:

	Aircraft Carriers—Pulsed Power Initial Number of Carriers (A/B)				
	2/2	4/3	3/2	2/1	3/1
A Strikes First	2/0	4/0	3/0	2/0	3/0
B Strikes First	0/2	1/3	1/2	1/1	2/1
A and B Strike Simultaneously	0/0	1/0	1/0	1/0	2/0
Lanchester	0/0	2.6/0	2.2/0	1.7/0	2.8/0

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When the stronger force, A, attacks first, the consequences are obvious and devastating. However, when the weaker force, B, succeeds in attacking first, then we see in the row "B Strikes First" that the inferior force can be outnumbered by as much as 2:3 and accept the disadvantage and win.

In the Pacific Ocean carrier battles in World War II, more frequently than not both sides located the other and launched their strikes before the enemy attack arrived. Under our as yet uncorroborated effectiveness assumption of one-for-one, the outcome should be as shown in the row, "A and B Strike Simultaneously." If we inspect the A/B = 3/2 column, we may readily see the dramatic way the outcomes change under the "Pulsed Power" model from the Lanchester (continuous fire) model of naval battle. In the carrier battle paradigm, A and B both lose two carriers and the outcome leaves A with one carrier and B with none. If both sides had been firing continuously, then the square law would have taken effect for the superior force, and A would have destroyed B while suffering little damage, expecting over two-thirds of his forces to survive (in the "Lanchester" row, see "2.2/0").

What happens when force A is able to counterattack after first sustaining a surprise attack by B? The theoretical results (again under our one-for-one hypothesis) are shown in the next table. We see that B, even when outnumbered 3:2 by A, a disadvantage that is overwhelming under continuous fire, will emerge from the battle with the same number of survivors ("1/1"). But, I emphasize, only if B were able to attack effectively, first.

Results After A Counterattacks

Initial Force (A/B)	4/3	3/2	2/1	3/1
Survivors (A/B)	1/2	1/1	1/0	2/0

Thus far the pulsed power model has been described as pure theory. What are the facts? To calibrate the carrier effectiveness model, I reviewed the five great carrier battles in the Pacific War—Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz Islands, and Philippine Sea. (The Battle for Leyte Gulf was not carrier vs. carrier, but a series of surface actions, sprinkled liberally with land-based and sea-based air attacks on gun ships.) None works out more handsomely than the Battle of Midway. The next table shows the initial forces and final results, with aircraft survivors thrown in for a bit of detail (carrier aircraft losses were brutal in all of these battles). The Japanese started with four carriers and ended with zero, because of American skill, courage, and luck which resulted in the first effective attack. The US Navy started with three carriers and ended with two.

Midway (June 1942)
Battle Synopsis

	Initial Forces		Actual Survivors	
	CVs	Aircraft	CVs	Aircraft
A. Japan	4	272	0	0
B. United States	3	233	2	126

The results are the same as theory would have predicted when calibrated at the one-for-one level of effectiveness. We see this in the next table. We let the Battle of Midway evolve as it did, in three steps: inferior B (the United States) attacked superior A (the Japanese) first and sank three carriers. After absorbing the attack, the remaining carrier of A counter-attacked B and sank one carrier. Then in one final reattack, B attacked A and sank its last carrier.

Theoretical Survivors

	After US Strike	After Japanese Counterattack	After US Mop-Up
A. Japan	1	1	0
B. United States	3	2	2

The four other Pacific carrier bartle results are similar. The pulsed power model, for all its simplicity, is an accurate descriptor of the carrier battles in 1942, under the assumption that the net destructive firepower of a carrier air wing was the capacity to sink one carrier in one artack. It may surprise some that as the war progressed, it took *more* than one air wing's attack to sink a carrier. In a mere two years, between December 1941 and the end of 1943, warships had built up their staying power and expanded their antiair warfare "defensive force" by 100-fold, as Bernard Brodie noted at the time.

Finally, the point needs to be emphasized again that it was superior scouting that allowed the first effective attack. Proportionately more resources are being devoted to detecting, tracking, and targeting the enemy. Also as a predictable trend, commanders at sea are going to devote more and more of their time and energy to the scouting process as opposed to firepower delivery.

Modern Missile Warfare, 1985. One thing that is plausible, if not probable, about modern naval combat is that some of today's warcraft carry "more than their weight" of deliverable firepower. Hypothesize a missile ship that has the net offensive capability to achieve a firepower kill on three identical enemy ships. We can draw up a chart similar to the one-for-one kill capability of carrier air wings which we used to describe the big Pacific battles in World War II.

Modern Missile Effect—Conjectured 3-for-1 Firepower

Initial Number of Ships (A/B)

	3/3	3/1	N/1
A Strikes First	3/0	3/0	N/0
B Strikes First	0/3	0/1	(N-3)/1
A and B Strike Simultaneously	0/0	0/0	(N-3)/0

With this simple table, we illustrate the paradigms of:

- What US and Japanese carrier air proponents *believed* would be the effectiveness of an airstrike in 1941,
- the often-held image of modern missile effectiveness with conventional warheads at sea, and
- the universally agreed image of modern nuclear warfare on land and at sea, in the absence of much improved (and some would say scarcely imagined) defensive force.

Although we have not the space here to develop all the logic of the case, a major conclusion is that when such a multiple kill capability exists, there are strong reasons to disperse forces and no reasons to mass them. The commander's goal is to concentrate firepower through modern communications and tactics, while operating from a dispersed disposition.

Tactics and Conventional Naval Combat

When the naval war is nonnuclear, the case for dispersal can be overstated. Without developing the model here, I believe two things continue to have a centripetal effect on naval formations in conventional war—the bread-and-butter environment of the great bulk of the world's warships.

One is scouting. Aggregated scouting capacity of the force may prove decisive in finding the enemy first, leading to first effective attack. In this instance, the aggregation of forces under a united command aims for superior scouting rather than superior firepower.

The other is defense. It may be the best tactic to mass defensive potential, enough to beat off any attack under the local circumstances in space and time. The modern decision to mass naval components together is not for the purpose of aggregating firepower, but to aggregate defensive force.

As far as the US Navy is concerned, our firepower is concentrated in very large ships. To offset the "modern missile effect," our fleet must have either a better firepower-scouting combination to reach out and strike first, or adequate defenses to stop the enemy first strike with residual firepower sufficient to let our counterstrike be decisive.

Evidently, the modern US battlefleet with its large hunks of firepower and strong AAW and ASW defenses implicitly plans on the second method, adequate defensive force. Here are four implications:

- US Navy carrier battle force attacks will be overt, but will employ antitargeting tactics.
- The massing of battle groups in mutual support is a tactic we will use for defensive reasons.
- To see whether a carrier battle force should attempt the operation, it is necessary to correlate the forces on both sides with capable analysis of all

eight elements: comparing our own firepower, defensive force, scouting and antiscouting capacities against those of the enemy.

- When the carrier battle force is not strong enough to fight its way in, it should not attempt the operation.

Tacticians Fight with Mind, Body and Spirit

My topic deals with the intellectual relationship between tactics and strategy. Nevertheless, the arena of the tactician is one of mortal danger, and that distinctiveness warrants some brief comments. Some of my friends believe that no modern tactical commander of a fleet at sea can be successful without knowing the technological details of his ships, aircraft, and missiles. This is conventional Navy wisdom as I have known it. While the statement is true in literal fact, enchantment with weapon or propulsion engineering and knob twisting is a snare that has trapped the US Navy officer corps in the past and may have us hooked even today.

Except for Adm. Arleigh Burke, I can think of no living American naval officer who is qualified from experience to contrast the qualities of commanders of fleets in combat with those of outstanding strategists. Yet, I believe that I can trace the evolution of the naval battlefield thoroughly enough to conclude that there will be even heavier demands on tactical commanders for sustained moral courage under pressure for weeks on end. Look for the combat environment of the Battle of Okinawa and its prolonged kamikaze attacks, as well as Bekaa Valley and its swift decision.

The tactician's style and frame of mind is not so different from the way of the warrior described and practiced by Miyamoto Musashi. The soldier's method, or form (badly mistranslated as "strategy" in *A Book of Five Rings*) has two parts: first, a bearing in all things, steady, relaxed, unremitting, alert, and vigilant without tension or paranoia. In battle, the warrior anticipates his enemy because he has studied him and understands him. Second, the warrior attacks to "cut" the enemy with essential simplicity. It is necessary to master only five strokes ("attitudes") and there are none but these five. Musashi also would say, "that's all there is." And flowing through the fiber of the book is the abiding theme of self-discipline, training, and practice, all as a single river of life-devotion.

The elegant simplicity of Musashi's "five cuts" extends beyond the training of the individual warrior. The tactician knows he must prepare his men for collective action. To do so in a very large organization requires massive continuity of training. A major revision of established methods is not something to be undertaken lightly. The notorious conservatism of the Navy is more understandable when one realizes that a technological or doctrinal transition is a major shift of momentum, more complicated in the execution—because of the retraining of many people—than even a change in

policy or strategy. Beyond that, a tactical commander must transform general methods—fleet doctrine—into a particular battle plan, his operation order. The best battle plans look almost absurdly simple and rather obvious after the fact. But their very simplicity is a distillation of considerations without end. Successful statecraft and strategy seem to me to rest on complexity: labyrinthine in their deliberate ambiguity, interlocking, multi-faceted elements, multiple echelons of reasoning, and depth of meaning. Successful tactics rest on simplicity: bringing control, unity, and order out of the ominous, lurking potential for chaos.

I may not have characterized fully how strategists perform their responsibilities. But I draw your attention to the essential asymmetry between strategy and tactics and the products of each. Strategists plan. Tacticians fight. You *have* a strategy. You *do* a tactic. There is something more physical and more spiritual in the tactician's realm. Perhaps that is why Douglas Southall Freeman said it is hard to predict who will succeed and who will fail in battle. Strategists need to know how tacticians succeed, even though strategists cannot do much more in peacetime than keep promising officers at sea sufficiently to nourish their proficiency and allow them to build up sound combat doctrine and train the fleet.

A Prescription: Consult Your Tactician

The beginning of this century was a Golden Age of tactical thought. In many countries, naval *tactics* (not strategy) dominated the writings of naval officers. From 1895, for two decades our Naval Institute *Proceedings*' prize essays were a whole succession of papers on tactics. Why was this so? Probably so much was written about battle because so few battles were fought. In a time of technological ferment that rivals even our own as to tactical consequences, naval officers debated the implications of the ram, torpedoes, better fire control, steam, wireless and the race between guns and armor. As a result, when World War I came there were very few tactical surprises and, in fact, most of the surprises wrought by naval technology were in the field of strategy—the distant blockade, the virtual end of the surface raider, and the rise of the U-boat as a war winning threat, were examples.

Therefore, it seems fitting to close with reference to the *Proceedings* 1905 Prize Essay by (then) Comdr. Bradley A. Fiske. Fiske entitled his essay "American Naval Policy." In it, he devoted no less than 24 of 80 pages to tactics, including the rich mathematical illustrations aforementioned of the cumulative effect of firepower. Fiske was an archetypal modern naval officer in four respects:

- He knew technology.
- He espoused tactical computations—operations analysis in its original sense.

- He argued that both would improve tactics, and tactics won battles.
- He saw that the capacity to win battles determined, in the end, a successful national strategy and policy.

As he said: "No naval policy can be wise unless it takes into very careful account the tactics that ought to be used in war; in order that the proper kinds of ships may be built and the proper kinds of organizations, drills, and discipline be devised to carry those tactics into good effect." The Navy has, in the last five years, revitalized interest by its officer corps in modern tactics, and when this interest is reduced to writing and new tactical doctrine falls into place, then there will be important effects on American military strategy, organization, and administration.

In this paper, first we saw, with Clausewitz' coaching, that current strategy in any war rests on genuine battlefield capability; followed by the knowledge of who should win if a battle takes place.

Last we saw, with the forceful advice of Bradley Fiske, that new weapons and winning tactics must fit like hand in glove, and all the military panoply of organization and training in peacetime in the last analysis should be designed to win battles.

In between, we acknowledged that strategy and tactics are companions-in-arms, influencing each other. And because of the need to establish more common ground between tactical thought and strategic planning, I have offered some tactical propositions—both as to theory and as to modern practice. The elemental processes of naval combat are firepower, scouting and C^2, along with their antitheses, defensive force, antiscouting, and C^2CM. Each opposing tactical commander deploys his force components at sea in a coherent, integrated way, with the objective of attacking the enemy effectively first.

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Editor's Note

Our last issue featured an article by Robert S. Wood and John T. Hanley, Jr., titled, "The Maritime Role in the North Atlantic." This work appeared through the courtesy of the Center for Naval Analyses and is included in a larger work: James L. George, ed., *The U.S. Navy—The View from the Mid-80s* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985).

War: Deter, Fight, Terminate
The Purpose of War is a Better Peace

Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., US Army (Ret.)

War Termination

> The original means of strategy is victory—that is, tactical success; its ends, in the final analysis, are those objects which will lead directly to peace . . . . All these ends and means must be examined by the theorist in accordance with their effects and their relationships to one another.
>
> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*[1]

One of the most frustrating aspects of the Vietnam War is that, as far as the "means" of war were concerned, the American Armed Forces succeeded in everything they set out to do. At the height of the war, they were able to move almost a million servicemen and women a year in and out of Vietnam, feed them, clothe them, house them, supply them with arms and ammunition, and generally sustain them better than any combat force had ever been sustained in the field. To project a force of that size halfway around the world was a logistics and management task of enormous magnitude, and the United States was more than equal to the task. On the battlefield itself, the Armed Forces were unbeatable. In engagement after engagement, the forces of the Vietcong and of the North Vietnamese Army were thrown back with terrible losses. Yet, in the end, it was North Vietnam, not the United States, that emerged victorious. How could the United States have succeeded so well, yet failed so miserably?

That disturbing question led General Creighton Abrams, then Army Chief of Staff and former Military Assistance Command Vietnam Commander, to form a Strategic Assessment Group within the Army General Staff in the spring of 1973 to reexamine "ends and means . . . in accordance with their

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Colonel Summers, an infantry veteran of the Korean and Vietnam wars recently held the General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Military Research at the Army War College. He is the author of *On Strategy* (Presidio/Dell) and *The Vietnam War Almanac* (Facts on File), and is now the senior military correspondent for *U.S. News & World Report*.

effects and their relationship to one another."[2] Among this group's important contributions was the reassessment of the spectrum of war. In 1962 the previous distinctions between war and peace dropped out of Army *Field Service Regulations* and a spectrum of war was substituted where "the dividing line between cold war and limited war is neither distinct nor absolute,"[3] a concept subsequently proven fallacious by the Vietnam War. In an attempt to devise a theory more in line with the real world, the Strategic Assessment Group came up with new terminology to define the Army's roles. The peacetime utility of military forces in preserving the peace through deterrence was categorized as "conflict prevention." The warfighting utility of military force was labeled "conflict control" and the need to define "victory"—the political end to be achieved—was incorporated into the concept of "conflict termination." These terms, with their clear distinction between war and peace, are now contained in Army official doctrine and are used by the Department of Defense in their strategic planning guidance. In February 1980 they were used by Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer to describe the strategic requirements for the 1980s: "In the most basic sense, the strategic requirements of the 1980s are to prepare for the 'Three Days of War': to *deter* the day before the war; to *fight* the day of war; and to *terminate* conflict in such a manner that on the day after war, the United States and its allies enjoy an acceptable level of security."[4]

Since the end of the war in Vietnam, much work has been done within the military to understand these strategic requirements but most of the effort has concentrated on the *means* of strategy. A general consensus on how to deter war has been developed and much has been written on *conflict prevention*. At least from the military perspective, it is well understood that conflict prevention depends on a credible capability for *conflict control*. As Clausewitz had said, "Combat is the only effective force in war; its aim is to destroy the enemy's forces as a means to a further end. That holds good even if no actual fighting occurs, because the outcome rests on the assumption that if it came to fighting, the enemy would be destroyed. . . . All action is undertaken in the belief that if the ultimate test of arms should actually occur, the outcome would be favorable."[5] Because this connection between deterrence and warfighting is well recognized within the military, much work has also been done in recent years on conflict control—on how to fight on the air, land and sea battlefields of the future. But, although Clausewitz had warned that one must take care "not to take the first step without considering the last,"[6] the fact is that of the three categories of the spectrum of conflict, *war termination* has been virtually ignored. In our fascination with the means of strategy, we have neglected the study of its ends—"those objects which will lead directly to peace."

The Legacy of Korea and Vietnam

> There is such a thing as seeing another come to grief, yes, even to destruction, without being one whit wiser yourself, because you do not understand how it happened; and you do not understand, either because you do not see the principle he has violated, or because you miss the application of it in his case, and consequently to your own.
>
> Alfred Thayer Mahan[7]

One of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan's greatest contributions to military thought was his encouragement of the use of history to illuminate theory. Following his example, an examination of the history of our most recent wars illuminates why we have problems today with the concept of war termination. There have been those who claim that it was the attractiveness of unconditional surrender and the hubris resulting from our overwhelming victories in World War II that have blinded us to the realities of military theory and caused us to confuse ends and means. It is thus ironic to note that the Army's pre-World War II *Field Service Regulations* provided a sound frame of reference for the termination of war. "The conduct of war is the art of employing the Armed Forces of a nation in combination with measures of economic and political constraint for the purpose of effecting a satisfactory peace. . . . The ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces in battle. Decisive defeat in battle breaks the enemy's will to war and forces him to sue for peace which is the national aim."[8]

Although this 1939 definition carried us into total war in World War II, it also accommodated the later requirements of limited war since it did not necessarily require the total submission of the enemy. What was required was the application of sufficient military force to cause the enemy to sue for peace. In World War II this linkage dropped out of our war theories,[9] for the national aim was no longer forcing the enemy "to sue for peace" but rather for his unconditional surrender. The destruction of the enemy's armed forces was therefore no longer a *means* to an end so much as an *end* in itself. Unlike the earlier definition, this World War II definition could not accommodate the problems we faced in Korea after the Chinese intervention.

Because of this doctrinal deficiency, our war theories became cloudy and confused. The first point of confusion was over the concept of war termination—over the meaning of "victory." With his frame of reference formed by his experiences in World Wars I and II, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur saw victory only in messianic terms—the total destruction of the enemy's armed forces and his unconditional surrender. In his testimony before the Senate during the Great Debate on the Korean War, General MacArthur called for just such a victory in Korea. He said, "I believe if you do not [seek such a victory], if you hit soft, if you practice appeasement in the use of force, you are doomed to disaster."[10]

Rejecting such an apocalyptic view, Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut questioned General of the Army Omar Bradley, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on what constitutes victory in war: "General, in the course of our history, I believe there have been a number of instances in which we accomplished our objectives without what might be called a final and complete defeat of the enemy, such as was visited on Germany. Certainly in the War of 1812 we fought the British on the sea and our own mainland to maintain the security of our commerce and the safety of our nationals. We didn't insist on a military victory over England as essential, did we? . . . Now in the Spanish-American War when we accomplished the liberation of Cuba, we didn't proceed to Madrid to capture Madrid, did we? . . . We negotiated a treaty after accomplishing our objectives. I am reminded of one war, and one perhaps less well known in 1798 to 1800, when we fought a limited naval war against France to protect our commerce and our shipping . . . . Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, who had insisted on an all-out war with France at that time, was retired as Secretary of State, and the President, Mr. John Adams, President Adams, accomplished a settlement of that thing through negotiation and by treaty.

"The point that I want to make, General, to find out if you are in agreement with me, is that when you say that the object of war is victory, you must have a definition of what constitutes victory, don't you?"

To which General Bradley replied, "I think you must, and you vary from being willing to accept a rather small thing that you start out to correct up to an objective which we set in World War II of unconditional surrender. There are many variations in between the two."[11]

Elaborating on this theme, Senator William Knowland of California commented: "The fact of the matter is, is it not, General, that we did not settle the controversy with the Spaniards being left in control of half of Cuba; we did not settle the Greek War with the Greek communists being left in control of a substantial part of Greece; and we did not finish the War of 1812 with the British being left in control of New Orleans. While it is true that we did not carry the war into their home countries, nevertheless, we did clear up the particular situation in which we were involved."

Again General Bradley replied, "We restored it in some cases to the status quo when we started the war and won our point. That boils down then to the question of what our point is."[12]

Senator Bourke K. Hickenlooper of Iowa again raised the issue of victory with Secretary of State Acheson, "I understand that it is our policy to have a victory in Korea; it's our policy to have peace in Korea. [It is] what we expect to do to accomplish it, that bewilders me." Secretary Acheson replied that US strategy was to limit the geographic boundaries of the war "as the least dangerous and most effective way of coming to a situation where both the attack stops and the desire to renew it stops" and to wear down the enemy by

attrition so that "they will suffer very disastrous losses to themselves, and a great many harmful results will happen to them in the way of the losses of their trained manpower, and the absorption of the resources of China in a fight which is of no real profit to China."[13] Secretary Acheson went on to say that it was the US intention to gain victory not on the battlefield but through discussion and agreement.

Another point of confusion was over the definition of limited war. General MacArthur complained that "my whole effort since Red China came in there has been to get some definition, military definition, of what I should do."[14] Commenting on a statement by then Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk that, "What we are trying to do is maintain peace and security without a general war . . . ," MacArthur replied, "That policy seems to me to introduce a new concept into military operations . . . the concept that when you use force, you can limit that force . . . . The very term of 'resisting aggression,' it seems to me that you destroy the potentialities of the aggressor to continually hit you . . . . When you say, merely, 'we are going to continue to fight aggression,' that is not what the enemy is fighting for. The enemy is fighting for a very definite purpose—to destroy our forces in Korea."[15]

It is important to note that, General MacArthur's comments notwithstanding, the US strategy in Korea after the Chinese intervention was not so much one of limiting the means as it was one of tailoring the political ends so that they could be accomplished within the military means that our political leaders were willing to expend. In the Korean War, limited war was defined in terms of limited objectives. As our post-Korean *Field Service Regulations* stated, "The nature of the political situation at any time may require employment of armed forces in wars of limited objective. In such cases, the objective ordinarily will be the destruction of the aggressor forces and the restoration of the political and territorial integrity of the friendly nation."[16] As Senators McMahon and Knowland and Secretary of State Acheson had said, and as our 1954 doctrine acknowledged, in neither the past nor the present was victory defined only as total destruction of the enemy. Victory was the achievement of the political ends for which the war was being waged.

As Clausewitz had written: "In war many roads lead to success, and that they do not all involve the opponent's outright defeat. They range from the destruction of the enemy's forces, the conquest of his territory, to a temporary occupation or invasion, to projects with an immediate political purpose, and finally to passively awaiting the enemy's attacks . . . . Bear in mind how wide a range of political interests can lead to war, or . . . think for a moment of the gulf that separates a war of annihilation, a struggle for political existence, for a war reluctantly declared in consequence of political pressure or of an alliance that no longer seems to

reflect the state's true interests. Between these two extremes lie numerous gradations. If we reject a single one of them on theoretical grounds, we may as well reject all of them, and lose contact with the real world."[17]

In Korea, the Army had learned the right lesson—that political considerations may require wars of limited objective—but it drew the wrong conclusions from that lesson. In what appears today to have been almost a fit of pique, the 1954 *Field Service Regulations*, while introducing the concept of "wars of limited objective," removed victory as an aim in war. As the manual said, "Victory alone as an aim of war cannot be justified, since in itself victory does not always assure the realization of national objectives."[18] Defining victory only in terms of total victory, rather than more accurately as the attainment of the objectives for which the war is waged, was a strategic mistake. It not only obscured the fact that we had won a victory in Korea (where the status quo ante was restored and has been maintained for over 30 years); it also went a long way toward guaranteeing a lack of victory in Vietnam.

Testifying before the Senate in 1966, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell D. Taylor—then serving as Special Consultant to the President—said that we were not trying to "defeat" North Vietnam, only "to cause them to mend their ways," and went on to liken the concept of defeating the enemy to "Appomattox or something of that sort."[19] This change in orientation was reflected in the 1968 successor to the *Field Service Regulations* which stated that "The fundamental purpose of US military forces is to preserve, restore, or create an environment of order or stability within which the instrumentalities of government can function effectively under a code of laws."[20]

Unfortunately, we were opposed by an enemy who was fighting by the old rules. "The basic law of the war," wrote North Vietnamese General Van Tien Dung, who led North Vietnam's successful 1975 blitzkrieg, "was to destroy the enemy's armed forces,"[21] a statement remarkably similar to Clausewitz' basic proposition that "the aim of war should be what its very concept implies—to defeat the enemy."[22] One of the terrible lessons of Vietnam is that we were not defeated by new and esoteric theories of revolutionary war or by wily oriental stratagems; we were defeated because in the search for relevance, we had lost sight of our own strategic fundamentals. In Vietnam as in Korea, we did not understand the sea change that had occurred in US military policy as a result of the national policy of containment.

Faced with a long-term cold war with the Soviet Union and its surrogates, US Ambassador to the Soviet Union George F. Kennan argued in 1947 that national policy should be, not a head-on attack on communism, but instead the containment of its expansion to allow communism's own internal contradictions to weaken its imperialistic designs. In terms of political,

economic and psychological power, containment worked beyond our wildest expectations. The Moscow-controlled communist monolith has long since disintegrated into contending power centers. Communist economic policies have been a dismal failure everywhere they have been applied, and communist nations have increasingly been forced to turn to capitalist methods in order to stave off economic disaster. Against every tenet of communist ideology, communist "worker states" now wage war both on their own workers and on each other. While in overall terms containment has served America well, in military terms it has had unanticipated consequences.

First applied, as was discussed earlier, in late 1950 on the battlefield of Korea after the intervention of Chinese communist forces, the United States made the deliberate decision not to attack the Chinese homeland. Because our national policy was the containment, not the defeat of communism, the military strategies in support of that policy required the rejection of the strategic offensive (rollback or liberation) in favor of the strategic defensive (containment). This change in military strategy resulted in a lack of battlefield polarity, where US military objectives were not in balance with the adversary's. General MacArthur's complaints quoted earlier that his mission was to "resist aggression" while the enemy's mission was to "destroy our forces" could have been repeated verbatim during the Vietnam War. They revealed the truth of the formulations Baron Colmar von der Goltz developed in the late 19th century. He pointed out that the best one could hope to attain from the strategic defensive was "victory on the battlefield without general results for the campaign or war."[23] In other words, the best the military could hope to attain with the strategic defensive was a stalemate on the battlefield while other elements of national power—diplomatic for example—would have to be used to achieve the political objective. This is precisely what happened during the Korean War where, after a two-year battlefield stalemate, an armistice was achieved through diplomatic negotiations. This is also what happened during the Vietnam War—a battlefield stalemate led to the Paris Accords of 1973.

Current Army Doctrine

> Since war is, among other things, a political act for political ends, the conduct of a war, in terms of strategy and constraints, is defined primarily by its political objectives . . . . The scope and intensity of modern warfare are therefore defined and limited by political purposes and military goals. The interactions of military operations, political judgments, and national will serve to further define, and sometimes limit, the achievable objectives of a conflict and, thus, to determine its duration and the conditions for its termination.
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> Field Manual 100-1, *The Army*[24]

While the 1981 version of the Army's basic doctrinal manual, Field Manual 100-1, *The Army*, recognized the importance of conflict termination, its

discussion of this important concept was deficient. In an attempt to correct this and other shortcomings, the manual is now in the process of revision. According to the current working draft, conflict termination implies the attainment of the political objective for which war is being waged. Like warfare itself, this political objective is dynamic, and may change during the conduct of a war depending on circumstances and the course of events. For example, during the Korean War the initial political objective was the restoration of the *status quo antebellum*. After the Inchon invasion and the collapse of the North Korean Army, this objective changed to the liberation of the entire Korean peninsula. After the Chinese intervention, however, the objective once again changed to restoration of the *status quo antebellum*, an objective achieved by the 1953 Armistice Agreement.

Because this objective is normally limited, the political objective acts as the true limiting factor in warfare. Total destruction of an enemy's armed forces and his unconditional surrender—as in World War II—is not only an anomaly in the history of warfare, but is no longer feasible in a conflict with a nuclear power. The potential destructiveness of a strategic nuclear exchange confronts both the United States and any potential nuclear-armed adversary with the possibility that escalation involving nuclear weapons could result in the destruction of the very objectives either side seeks to attain or preserve.

When the United States had nuclear superiority and a clear capability for escalation dominance, conflict termination could be achieved by implied threats on the part of the United States to escalate the conflict to the nuclear level. With the advent of nuclear parity, however, conflict termination rests not on escalation, but on deescalation. It is a process aimed at bringing any conflict to an end on terms favorable to the United States while at the same time preventing escalation to higher and more dangerous levels of warfare.[25]

Naval Power and the Close of a War

One of the driving factors in developing this doctrine is that the Army, alone of the Services, has never had the illusion that it could go it alone. In the 1950s, there were those in the Air Force who believed that with the strategy of massive retaliation, the United States could provide for its security with airpower alone. Today, there are some who take the extreme position that America's security interests can be safeguarded solely by a maritime strategy. But the Army knows that American geography dictates that national security must be a joint enterprise. In the discussion of strategic realities that undergirded the concept of conflict termination detailed above, the current working draft of the Army's doctrinal manual emphasized that "The first reality is that, technology notwithstanding, the United States remains an insular power. In order to project its influence, it must deploy its forces overseas. The effect of this reality is that, in any operation outside America's

shores, Army forces must operate jointly wit'ı those of the other Services. The Army is dependent on the ability of the Navy and the Air Force to move it to the point of decision and to support and sustain it once deployed."[26]

While the Army understandably opposes reliance on maritime strategy alone as the basis for American national security, it supports maritime strategy as an important and integral part of our overall national military posture. In order to place arguments on maritime strategy in historical context, it is useful to reexamine classic accounts of such strategies. In the 1911 edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, the renowned British military strategist G. F. R. Henderson examined the fundamental nature of maritime strategy. He begins by stating the negative aspects—that in and of themselves, maritime strategies do not lead to rapid war termination, especially against a continental power. "Exhaustion is the object of its warfare"; he wrote, "but exhaustion, unless accelerated by crushing blows, is an exceedingly slow process . . . . A state, then, which should rely on naval strength alone, could look forward to no other than a protracted war, and a protracted war between two great powers is antagonistic to the interests of the civilized world."[27]

Having said that, however, he goes on to emphasize that "An Army supported by an invincible Navy possesses the strength which is out of all proportion to its size." Using the example of the Napoleonic wars—an example that applies directly to US experience in World Wars I and II—he explains that "The army . . . was first and foremost the auxiliary of the fleet; and only when the naval strength of the enemy had been destroyed was it used in the ordinary manner, i.e., in the invasion of the hostile territory and in lending aid to the forces of confederate powers."

"Surprise and freedom of movement are pre-eminently the weapons of power that commands the sea," wrote Henderson. In words that foreshadowed General Douglas MacArthur's master stroke at Inchon in the Korean War, Henderson notes that "if an army lands within reach of a precarious line of communications it may compel the enemy, although far superior in numbers, to renounce all enterprises against distant points." Three-quarters of a century ago, Henderson concluded his treatise on maritime strategy with observations all too relevant to America's strategic situation today. "Overwhelming numbers, adequately trained, commanded and equipped, are the only means of assuring absolute security. But a numerical preponderance, either by land or sea over all possible hostile combinations is unattainable, and in default the only sound policy is to take timely and ample precautions against all enterprises which are even remotely possible."[28]

War Termination Today

With these historical examples in mind, we can now turn to an examination of current concepts of war termination. One of the positive benefits of our

experience in Vietnam has been the rethinking of the fundamentals concerning the use of US military forces. In a speech before the National Press Club on 28 November 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger spelled out six major preconditions for the commitment of US combat forces abroad.

- The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies . . . .
- If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces of resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all. Of course, if the particular situation requires only limited force to win our objectives, then we should not hesitate to commit forces sized accordingly . . . .
- If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have and send the forces needed to do just that. As Clausewitz wrote, "No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he intends to conduct it." War may be different today than in Clausewitz' time, but the need for well-defined objectives and a consistent strategy is still essential. If we determine that a combat mission has become necessary for our vital national interests, then we must send forces capable to do the job and not assign a combat mission to a force configured for peacekeeping.
- The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed—their size, composition and disposition—must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably change during the course of a conflict. When they do change, then our combat requirements must also change. We must continuously keep as a beacon light before us the basic questions: "Is this conflict in our national interest?" "Does our national interest require us to fight, to use force of arms?" If the answers are "yes," then we must win. If the answers are "no," then we should not be in combat.
- Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. This support cannot be achieved unless we are candid in making clear the threats we face; the support cannot be sustained without continuing and close consultation. We cannot fight a battle with the Congress at home while asking our troops to win a war overseas or, as in the case of Vietnam, in effect asking our troops not to win, but just to be there.

- The commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort.[29]

"The tests . . . have been phrased negatively for a purpose," Secretary Weinberger went on to say, for "they are intended to sound a note of caution—caution that we must observe prior to committing forces to combat overseas. When we ask our military forces to risk their very lives in such situations, a note of caution is not only prudent, it is morally required."[30] While some have denounced this caution as a legacy of the lost war in Vietnam, it is in fact much more positive than the military's reaction 30 years earlier to the war in Korea.

With this "Weinberger doctrine," the United States has taken heed of Clausewitz' admonition "not to take the first step without considering the last." His emphasis on the importance of clearly defining our political and military objectives before we commit US forces to combat is long overdue. Further, war termination is given the emphasis it deserves and winning is correctly defined as the realization of the objectives we set out to attain.

The relationship of maritime strategy to the security of the United States was put in proper perspective over four decades ago here at the Naval War College. Written in 1942 in the darkest days of World War II, the Naval War College text *Sound Military Decisions* emphasized that "The final outcome is dependent on ability to isolate, occupy, or otherwise control the territory of the enemy. The sea, though it supplements the resources of land areas, is destitute of many essential requirements of man, and affords no basis, alone, for the secure development of human activities. Land is the natural habitat of man. The sea provides routes of communication between land areas. The air affords routes of communication over both land and sea. These facts inject into military operations certain factors peculiar to movement of military forces by land, sea, and air."[31] Now, as then, the task for the strategist is not so much maritime strategy or continental strategy or airpower strategy but combining these strategies in order to provide for security of the homeland, the protection of American interests in the world, and the termination of any conflict in which we may become involved on terms favorable to the United States.

In our current fascination with technology and with the material aspects of war, it would do us well to recall what those authors in Newport long ago believed to be the essential preconditions for such successful strategies. While acknowledging the need for physical and moral power, they particularly emphasized the need for mental power, "a creative imagination and the ability to think and to reason logically, fortified by practical experience and by a knowledge of the science of war . . . the ability to distinguish between preconceived ideas and fundamental knowledge [and] intellectual honesty, unimpaired by the influence of tradition, prejudice, or emotion . . . . "[32]

Notes

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., and trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 143.
2. *Ibid.* A summary of the findings of the Strategic Assessment Group is contained in my "The Astarita Report: A Military Strategy for the Multipolar World," Occasional Paper, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 30 April 1981.
3. US Army Dept. Field Manual 100-5, *Field Service Regulations-Operations* (Washington: US Govt. Print. Off., 19 February 1962), pp. 4-5.
4. US Chief of Staff, US Army, *White Paper 1980, A Framework for Molding the Army of the 1980s into a Disciplined, Well-Trained Fighting Force* (Washington: 25 February 1980), p. 1.
5. Clausewitz, p. 97.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 584.
7. Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasting with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1911), p. 11.
8. War Department Field Manual 100-5, *Tentative Field Service Regulations-Operations* (Washington: US Govt. Print. Off., 1 October 1939), p. 27.
9. FM 100-5, 15 June 1944, p. 32.
10. US Congress, 82d Cong., 1st sess., Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, *Military Situation in the Far East*, Hearings (Washington: US Govt. Print. Off., 1951), p. 40.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 960-961.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 1083.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 1800.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40, 68.
16. FM 100-5, 27 September 1954, p. 6.
17. Clausewitz, p. 94.
18. FM 100-5, September 1954, p. 7.
19. US Congress, 89th Cong., 2d sess., Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "To Amend Further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as Amended," *Vietnam Hearings* (Washington: US Govt. Print. Off., 1966), pp. 440, 460.
20. FM 100-5, September 1968, pp. 1-6.
21. Van Tien Dung, "Great Spring Victory," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, v. 2, FBIS-APA-76-131, 7 July 1976, p. 52.
22. Clausewitz, p. 595.
23. Colmar von der Goltz, *The Conduct of War: A Brief Study of its Most Important Principles and Forms*, Joseph T. Dickman, US Infantry and Cavalry School, trans., (Kansas City, Kans.: Franklin Hudson, 1896), p. 32.
24. US Army Dept. Field Manual 100-1, *The Army* (Washington: US Army Adjutant General Publications Center, August 1981), p. 7.
25. Draft Chapter 3, "Roles and Missions of the Army," Field Manual 100-1, *The Army*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 31 August 1984, pp. 16-17.
26. Draft Chapter 2, "Strategic Environment," Field Manual 100-1, *The Army*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 29 May 1984, p. 8.
27. G. F. R. Henderson, "War: General Principles," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed., v. 28 (London: 1911), p. 308.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 309-311.
29. Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," *Defense 85*, January 1985, p. 10.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Sound Military Decisions* (Newport, RI: US Naval War College, 1942), p. 46.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

Global Order, Low Intensity Conflict and a Strategy of Deterrence

John Norton Moore

The Radical Regime Assault on Global World Order

It has taken mankind more than 20 centuries to achieve the fundamental insight embodied in the United Nations Charter that aggressive use of force is impermissible in international affairs and that every nation has a right of individual and collective defense against such aggressive use of force. This dual insight—which was the single most important advance in the history of conflict management—is the principal foundation of modern world order.*

There is today, a fundamental assault on that foundation. Led by totalitarian and radical regimes, this assault seeks mainly to expand certain belief systems by use of force and is driven by radical ideologies. The nature and seriousness of that assault has not been generally recognized in the democracies partly because the assault has been covert and indirect. Radical regimes understand that the prohibition of aggression serves in important instances for their protection and that such a prohibition has strong community support which would, in all likelihood, prove too substantial to confront head-on.

As such, these regimes have sought to justify their own aggressive use of force through a variety of ambiguous doctrines at the margin of conflict management law and politics. These have included the "Brezhnev Doctrine,"

*For a history of the international law of conflict management, see generally, Myres McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano, *Law and Minimum World Public Order* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961); and J.N. Moore, "The Development of the International Law of Conflict Management," chap. V in J. Moore et al., *Law and National Security* (forthcoming).

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or principle of "Socialist Self-Determination," by which the Soviet Union seeks to prevent any nation which has accepted a communist regime from ever departing from communism; doctrines of "war of national liberation," or "national unification" of divided nations, by which radical regimes seek to justify initiation of or support to Leninist or other radical movements; covert support to terrorist acts such as the seizure of TWA flight 847 or covert armed attacks which can simply be denied, as in the secret wars against El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala; reliance on factually preposterous claims of "invitation" to openly invade neighboring states, as in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; and the encouragement, through propaganda and disinformation, of the false belief that the democracies are no different in the use of force than the totalitarian and radical regimes that are attacking them.

This assault on the legal order is led by the Soviet Union, in cooperation with a network of communist states, national communist organizations and radical insurgent movements, and by a variety of radical regimes, which share many common objectives with this Soviet network.

It should be emphasized that not all communist nations and organizations are part of this network. The People's Republic of China obviously pursues its own interests which are in many respects hostile to Soviet interests, as in Kampuchea for example. China is also influential with a smaller network of communist nations and movements. Nevertheless, it may still share substantial sympathy with a variety of radical objectives and seems unable to renounce the threat or use of force in its relations with Taiwan.

Similarly, not all radical regimes are communist regimes. The fundamentalist theocracy in Iran is one of the most radical and revolutionary regimes in the contemporary international system but it is certainly not communist. Again, however, it shares with radical regimes in general a particular antipathy to the Western democracies and traditional Arab governments such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and a willingness to encourage terrorist and covert attacks against the United States and others. In some respects, however, Iran is prepared to resist Soviet use of force if it directly threatens the regime's beliefs, as is the case of Iranian assistance to partisan forces in Afghanistan.

The real world of totalitarian and radical regime behavior is complex and not explained by simplistic approaches which seek to lay all blame at the Soviet doorstep. That same real world, however, requires candid recognition of the substantial Soviet network of client states, radical insurgent and terrorist organizations and cooperating political organizations. The documents captured in the Israeli incursion into Lebanon and the OECS action in Grenada, as well as the radical regime cooperation in Nicaragua, show conclusively these extensive Soviet client interactions

and, even more alarmingly, the existence of a network of specialized functional cooperation.*

The Soviet Union provides financial support, political and intelligence support, military assistance, and an overall deterrent setting in which secret wars and terrorist attacks are tolerated. East Germany provides local police and internal security functions; Czechoslovakia, Vietnam, and Ethiopia supply Soviet-bloc or captured American weapons; Bulgaria, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and the PLO provide specialists in terrorism for the training of terrorists; and Cuba provides a wide variety of services including indirect subversion, covert guerrilla attacks and its own armed forces for use as expeditionary forces aboard that, as in Angola and Ethiopia, can be decisive in local conflicts.

Despite the lack of central direction, totalitarian and radical regime states engaged in an assault on the global order exhibit certain commonalities. Together these make up what I have termed the "radical regime syndrome." These commonalities, not all of which are inevitably present, include:

- establishing and maintaining a state-controlled, centrally planned economic infrastructure and a concomitant disdain for private property (this also includes a slavish adherence to collective agriculture despite all the negative experience);
- a failed economy illustrated by economic development lagging behind that of comparable regional states with relatively free markets;
- a single party political process, usually totalitarian, in which there is no genuine, broad-based political opposition to participate in free elections, and in which the party is merged with the state;
- a virtually absolute denial of human rights and political freedoms at home coupled with a pervasive and repressive internal security apparatus, a large number of political prisoners, and often a denial of the right to emigrate;
- hostility to the creation of independent labor organizations, and genuine collective bargaining;
- a high level of national chauvinism, which often includes prejudice against minority, ethnic or religious groups and frequently antisemitism;
- the existence of a "cult of personality," such as the USSR under Stalin, China under Mao, North Korea under Kim Il Sung, Libya under Muammar Qaddafi, Cuba under Fidel Castro, Iran under the Ayatollah Khomeini, and Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh;
- a high degree of militarization of society as indicated by percent of GNP allocated to the military, percent of the population in the military, and quite often the existence of a revolutionary cult illustrated by the constant

*See generally on this subject, Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, *Terrorism: The Soviet Connection* (New York: Crane, Rnssak, 1984).

wearing of revolutionary fatigues by national leaders, such as Castro in Cuba or the Sandinista Commandantes in Nicaragua;

- the use of pervasive political indoctrination at home through state-dominated or party-dominated schools, state organizations—such as the "Pioneers" in the USSR—and complete state control of the media;
- a firm belief in the importance of expanding the socio-ideological system through the use of force, and a willingness to subsidize and promote terrorism and indirect attack;
- hostility to pluralist democracy in general and those states in particular which do not share the beliefs of the radical regime, manifested in the radical regime's willingness to focus massive political effort against such "enemies of the people."

In reality, this radical regime syndrome is usually a formula by which the power holders, the privileged elites, perpetuate their hold on society. This hold is sustained only by a massive internal security and military apparatns, and pervasive political indoctrination. The radical regime assault on world order is, in part, simply an extension to the international plane of the politico-military strategies employed domestically by these regimes.

There have, of course, been a number of open assaults by totalitarian and radical regimes. These include the June 1950 attack by North Korea against South Korea, the 1974-75 assault by North Vietnam against the South after giving their solemn pledge to respect the territorial integrity of the Saigon Government as acknowledged in the Paris Accords, the attack by Vietnam against Kampuchea, and the ongoing Soviet attack against Afghanistan.

But the most dangerous technique of the radical regime assault, and therefore the most important for the West to comprehend, is simply to provide assistance to terrorist groups and full-scale guerrilla movements conducting politico-military attacks through covert programs. Modern techniques for disguising the origins of such sophisticated attacks are difficult to penetrate when originating in totalitarian and closed societies. Moreover, by keeping such attacks covert—indeed by openly denying any responsibility—a number of important advantages accrue to the attacking state or movement. First, they maintain the general protection of the legal order for their own interests. Second, they avoid the political cost associated with an unambiguous violation of the legal order. Third, when the origin of the attack is uncertain they make defensive response difficult and, in fact, focus world attention on its legitimacy. Finally, they focus attention on the social or human rights shortcomings of the attacked regime by popularizing some such deficiency as the reason for the attack. They also take advantage of differential world tolerance for *individual* aberrant behavior as opposed to equivalent *state* behavior.

A careful analysis shows that terrorism is predominantly directed against the pluralist democracies in general, and the United States, Nato members, and their allies in particular. This is the converse of what one would expect if terrorism were truly responsive behavior to redress social ills and lack of political freedom. Of great concern for the future of the world legal order, terrorism seems to be moving from a vaguely defined, general technique of political warfare against pluralist democracies to a focused methodology for achieving specific political effects. For example, given the official platform on national security of the Labor Party in the United Kingdom, the terrorist attack on Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the British Cabinet, if successful, might have achieved direct and substantial benefits for the opponents of Nato.

One can, moreover, observe an alarming escalation of terrorist targets in recent years including the assassination of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, the bombing of the American Embassy and US Marine barracks in Lebanon, the attempt to assassinate the Pope, the attempt on the Republican Senate cloakroom in the United States, the bombing attempt against the cabinet of South Korea while on a visit to Burma, the assassination of President Gemayel in Lebanon, and the taking of American hostages in Iran and, more recently, Lebanon.

Similar covert politico-military attacks were an integral part of the first stage in North Vietnam's attacks against South Vietnam, as well as in Libya's attack on Chad, and, today, the ongoing Cuban-Nicaraguan secret war against Central American states. Indeed, such attacks can be a highly successful strategy. By denying that any such attack actually took place (or is taking place) the perpetrators can express outrage at any response in defense—such as the mining of harbors in Vietnam or Nicaragua—and even, in a perversion of international legal norms, take the United States to the World Court as has Nicaragua. There, in sworn affidavits they boldly lie to the Court about their secret war which precipitated the regional response. Similarly, until the reformist and popular Duarte government in El Salvador, the attackers were able to focus attention on human rights shortcomings in that country rather than on the Cuban-Nicaraguan organized and supported secret war against El Salvador and neighboring Central American states.

Problems of Democracies in Responding to the Radical Regime Assault

There are several factors that make it difficult for the pluralist democracies to understand fully the nature of and take effective action against the serious totalitarian and radical regime assault on world order. These are not necessarily weaknesses of democracy. In many cases they are some of the very strengths that predispose democratic governments to peace and world order

rather than sharing the aggressive expansionism of the totalitarian and radical regimes. In the short run, however, such factors often make it difficult for democratic goverments to respond effectively. This, in turn, may encourage greater aggressiveness and undermine overall deterrence as totalitarian and radical regimes become emboldened at the lack of response.

One factor which sometimes makes it difficult for pluralist democracies to provide effective deterrence is the government's genuine willingness to respond to the wishes of the people who strongly seek peace. This is precisely the converse of the totalitarian regime's militarism of society. It is frequently manifested in a powerful tendency by the people to "mirror image"; that is, when the public and leaders alike tend to see other nations and leaders as peace-loving and pragmatic, thereby underestimating the ideological motivation and aggressive intent of the radical regimes. Disputes among nations are thus seen as accidents and misunderstandings to be resolved by improvements in third-party dispute settlement techniques, enhanced trade relations, more exchanges of people to promote enhanced understanding, or more direct negotiations to work out pragmatic solutions to difficulties. The conventional thinking is that Ho Chi Minh surely would have been willing to call off the attack on South Vietnam if he had been offered an ambitious multimillion-dollar Haiphong harbor project, and the Cubans and Sandinistas can surely be weaned away from the Soviets by simply giving them an enormous amount of economic assistance—on their terms of course.

Sometimes, of course, such measures can be successful and certainly they should be encouraged as techniques for conflict resolution. As a universal view of the world, however, those who would advocate almost total reliance on such methods fail to appreciate the nature of the threat facing the world today. They underestimate the seriousness with which totalitarian and radical regimes seek to expand their belief system by any and all means necessary, but particularly by the use of force. Furthermore, when misapplied in many conflictual settings they may even escalate the totalitarian assault.

A second factor impeding effective deterrence is the normal and vigorous exchange of conflicting opinion that characterizes the media and public discussion within the democracies. Because of the general aversion of democratic peoples to military solutions, this exchange, on balance, is likely to be skeptical of strong defensive (i.e., military) measures. Even when balanced, such an exchange may very well prevent development of a consensus necessary to pursue an effective deterrent policy. This normal process of vigorous debate and media discussion is, of course, often further weakened by the strong democratic tradition of skepticism of government and government solutions.

A third difficulty for the West is that most pluralist democracies, unlike the totalitarian or radical regimes, are governments of "checks and balances," in which a Congress or a Parliament must approve a particular course or policy.

Although this is a strength of the pluralist democracies, in ensuring careful deliberation and representative government, it does complicate the effective execution of foreign policy. It also holds the seeds of undermining deterrence when such legislative bodies are themselves targeted for political action or simply perceived as unwilling to support an effective response.

A fourth factor is that, to some extent, there exists a significant gap between executive branch leaders' extensive awareness of radical regime support for terrorism and subversion, and the general public's minimum knowledge of this reality. One reason for this phenomenon is that because such attacks are covert the Executive learns of them through intelligence means not available to the general public. A real concern for protecting intelligence sources and methods then has a chilling effect on how much the public can be told. Moreover, the public is often skeptical of government-revealed "truths" which it cannot verify and, therefore, it is disinclined to accept effective military solutions which may be required.

A fifth factor is the effect of totalitarian propaganda and disinformation,* or more broadly, the effect of political action. All available indicators—whether radio broadcast time, comparative levels of funding for political activities, or numbers of foreign students recruited for in-country "education"—suggest that totalitarian and radical regimes place a major emphasis on political action and propaganda. Indeed, this is endemic to the radical regime which follows the same approach with its own people. Certainly one of the principal lessons of Vietnam for our adversaries has been the importance of targeting domestic political audiences and national legislatures in a combined politico-military struggle.

There is every reason to believe that this is a lesson fully understood and widely applied by the Sandinistas in their effort to block an effective democratic response to the Cuban-Nicaraguan secret war in Central America. Nicaragua seems to have supported substantial political action in the United States, centered on campuses, church groups, and, most important the Congress. It has been implemented by direct calls from the Sandinistas to members of Congress on the eve of important votes on Capitol Hill, a Washington lobbying office for the Sandinistas, and frequent, controlled trips to Nicaragua by members of Congress and other groups targeted for political action. Arturo Cruz, a former Ambassador of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua to the United States and currently the leading democratic opponent of the "Commandantes," has indicated that there may be as many as 200 pro-Sandinista "solidarity groups" operating in the United States and 60 operating in West Germany. In contrast, we are so distrustful of any government information that we are often skeptical of the

*See generally on this subject, Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Ray S. Godson, *Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy* (New York: Pergamon, 1984).

credibility of the White Papers on Central America released by the Department of State.

Central America as A Case Study

It is widely understood today that the United States has a special stake and interest in Latin America. Yet, ironically, the decade of the 1970s witnessed a dramatic US withdrawal from the region concurrent with a dramatic Soviet and Cuban buildup in the area. During the 1970s the number of US military advisers in all of Latin America plummeted from 516 at the beginning of the decade to 70 in 1981. By 1981 the Soviet Union had 50 times more military advisers in Latin America than did the United States.

From 1962-1982 the Soviets provided more than twice as much security assistance to Latin America as did the United States, or roughly $4 billion for the USSR to $1.5 billion for the United States. Last year the Soviet Union gave $4.9 billion in assistance to Cuba and Nicaragua—nearly six times the $837 million in US assistance to *all* of Central America.

In 1970, Soviet naval vessels spent 200 ship days in the South Atlantic; in 1980, they spent approximately 2,600 ship days for a 13-fold increase. The Cubans have 2,000-3,000 military advisers in Nicaragua compared with 55 US trainers in El Salvador. There are even more East German military advisers in Nicaragua than US military trainers in El Salvador.

Not surprisingly, the result of this Soviet-Cuban policy has been a rapid military buildup in Cuba and, after the establishment of the new Sandinista government in 1979, in Nicaragua. On a per capita basis the Cuban military buildup has been 10-20 times greater than that of any other major nation in this hemisphere. Mexico, for example, with 7 times the population has a defense establishment only half the size of Cuba.

Despite this background of Soviet buildup in Cuba and Nicaragua, the United States actively sought good relations with the new Sandinista government when it took power in Nicaragua in 1979. The United States cut off military aid to Somoza in 1977, two years before the revolution and voted for an OAS Resolution endorsing the revolution. Further, the United States gave $118 million in economic assistance to the Sandinistas in the first two years of the new regime—more than triple the level of aid that it gave to the Somoza regime in the preceding 20 years. The United States also supported $292 million in World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank loans to the Sandinistas.

President Carter invited Daniel Ortega to the White House. A substantial Peace Corps commitment was rejected by the Sandinistas in favor of thousands of Cuban, Bulgarian, East German, Libyan, PLO and other Soviet-bloc and radical regime advisers. (There are approximately 11,000 such advisers today in Nicaragua.) On the point of US efforts to have good relations with the

Sandinistas, the bipartisan Kissinger Commission found that the United States undertook a patient and concerted effort to build a constructive relationship of mutual trust with the new government.

In response to these overtures of friendship the nine Commandantes began three policies that are the root cause of the challenge to Charter principles in Central America.

First, they began consolidation of a Leninist vanguard party to control Nicaragua and reneged on their 1979 pledge to the OAS to build a democratic, pluralist society that would be nonaligned and supportive of human rights. Their actions included:

- The nine Commandantes—who had been chosen three each from the three Nicaraguan Marxist parties at a 1979 meeting in Havana—began a purge of the many genuine democrats such as Arturo Cruz, who had fought against Somoza.
- The Commandantes began a massive campaign against the Miskito Indians. This included attacks on villages, destruction of houses, crops, and livestock, arrest of the Indian leadership, disbanding of the Indian's organization as "counterrevolutionary" and in some cases brutal killings and attacks. Of approximately 100,000 Indians at the beginning of these atrocities some 20,000 have fled Nicaragua and another 20,000 have been moved to "relocation camps."
- The Commandantes began to put in place the depressingly familiar apparatus of a totalitarian police state including suppression of labor movements, attacks on the Church and religious freedom, press censorship, a Cuban-style internal security system down to the bloc level, a merger of the Sandinista Party with the state, suspension of *habeas corpus* and detention of growing numbers of political prisoners without charges. The Pope was insulted by carefully orchestrated mobs when he sought to bring a message of peace to Nicaragua.
- Within nine months of taking power—as massive US aid continued—the Sandinistas made their first pilgrimage to Moscow. Their official anthem pledged "We shall fight against the Yankee aggressor, the enemy of humanity." We have recently seen some members of Congress—who had apparently not done their homework—surprised when Daniel Ortega went to Moscow immediately after he won the anti-contra vote in the House for his *fifth* trip to Moscow.
- Moreover, the UN voting record of the Sandinistas was aggressively aligned with the Soviet bloc. For example, in the 1983-84 session of the UN General Assembly they voted for a unified Soviet-Cuban position 96 percent of the time. They sided with the Vietnamese in the latter's invasion of Kampuchea, they refused to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and they worked to oust Israel from the United Nations.

- Although human rights abuses were legend under Somoza, as of today some 10 percent of the Nicaraguan population—people who stayed under Somoza—have fled the Sandinista revolution.

Second, the Commandantes began a massive military buildup even as the United States poured in economic assistance. Before any contra threat they had built up the Nicaraguan Armed Forces to nearly six times that of the Somoza National Guard. Today they are nine times that level and still escalating. At present they have some 350 tanks and armored vehicles compared with 3 tanks and 25 antiquated armored cars under Somoza, none in Costa Rica, 16 armored reconnaissance vehicles in Honduras, and less than 30 armored personnel carriers in El Salvador—a nation with a substantial military insurgency. A major airfield, capable of taking the largest aircraft in the Soviet arsenal, is being built at Punte Huete and Nicaraguan MiG pilots are being trained in Bulgaria.

Third, and most importantly for legal analysis, as the Sandinista revolution was being consolidated, the Cubans and Nicaraguans began to actively support "revolution without frontiers" in neighboring Central American states. In this connection, remember that Cuba had supported insurgencies and other operations designed to overthrow some 17 indigenous Latin and Caribbean governments during the first 25 years of its existence. Cuba began, in 1959, with attacks against Panama and Nicaragua. In fact, Cuba was condemned by the OAS for the serious attacks against Venezuela and Che Guevara's own diary detailed the unsuccessful attacks in Bolivia and elsewhere in Latin America.

The evidence of the Cuban-Nicaraguan attacks on neighboring Central American states is clear. By late 1980, the Carter administration, initially favorably predisposed to the Sandinista regime, had become alarmed by the evidence. Carter suspended US economic assistance to the Sandinistas and began a program of emergency military assistance to El Salvador and neighboring states. The evidence proving the existence of such attacks includes:

- In December of 1979 and May of 1980, Castro held meetings in Cuba to organize competing Salvadoran insurgent factions into a unified command controlled by the Unified Revolutionary Directorate following the Moscow line. In 1980 FARBUNDO National Liberation Front leaders of the Salvadoran insurgency traveled to Moscow, East Germany, Bulgaria, Ethiopia and Vietnam in order to obtain arms and snpplies for the insurgency. In response they received a major shipment of arms. It was primarily of US origin taken in Vietnam and Ethiopia and a total of over 700 tons of arms and ammunition. Weapons' serial numbers and defectors' reports show conclusively that the preponderance of weapons used by the insurgents are transshipped from Soviet bloc sources through Cuba and Nicaragua. The Department of State has issued detailed reports on weapons intercepts in

February 1981, March 1982, May 1983, and July 1984. The governments of El Salvador, Costa Rica and Honduras have confirmed this. Of particular importance is the 1980 report of the Costa Rican Special Legislative Commission detailing the arms flow to Costa Rica and Salvadoran insurgents.

Command and control of the insurgency, including daily orders, come from a headquarters complex near Managua, Nicaragua. The Kissinger Commission found "The guerrilla front has established a unified military command with headquarters near Managua." The statements of Sandinista leaders themselves confirm their intentions and assistance. As early as May 1980, well before the US Government ended its assistance to the Sandinista regime, no less an authority than Foreign Minister D'Escoto said, "You [the U.S.] may look at us as five countries, six now with Panama, but we regard ourselves as six different states of a single nation in the process of reunification."

In short, the evidence supports the finding that Cuba and Nicaragua are involved in the instigation, organization, training, financing, the preponderance of arms supply, command and control, and political and technical support to the ongoing insurgency in El Salvador. That insurgency is neither temporary nor small-time. It fields forces roughly one-fifth the size of the Salvadoran Army, it operates 67 offices in 35 countries and it has inflicted more than $1 billion in direct war damage on the economy of El Salvador.

These are not just conclusions of the United States Executive Branch. The governments of Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador have all documented Sandinista subversive efforts and covert attacks. The Kissinger Commission found that the Sandinistas together with the Cubans and Soviets "committed all-out support" to the Salvadoran insurgents. And Congress has repeatedly made similar findings. For example, Congress found in the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1983 that "activities of the government of Cuba and Nicaragua threaten the independence of El Salvador and threaten to destabilize the entire Central American region and the governments of Cuba and Nicaragua refuse to cease these activities."

The 13 May 1983 Report of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence found: "The insurgents are well-trained, well-equipped with modern weapons and supplies and rely on the sites in Nicaragua for command and control and for logistical support. The intelligence supporting these judgments provided to the committee is convincing. There is further persuasive evidence that the Sandinista government of Nicaragua is helping train insurgents and is transferring arms and financial support from and through Nicaragua to the insurgents. They are further providing the insurgents bases of operations in Nicaragua. Cuban involvement, especially in providing arms, is also evident."

And Congress as a whole found in the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1984: "By providing military support, including arms, training, logistical

command and control and communications facilities, to groups seeking to overthrow the government of El Salvador and other Central American governments, the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua has violated Article 18 of the Charter of the Organization of American States."

It is important to keep in mind two other points about the factual background. First, the Sandinista armed attacks against their neighbors began in August 1979. Yet there was no "contra" response until the spring of 1982, more than two and a half years later. Second, the Sandinistas have simply lied about their secret war against neighboring states. As one sample: Foreign Minister D'Escoto filed a sworn affidavit with the World Court declaring "I am aware of the allegations made by the . . . United States that my Government is sending arms, ammunition, communication equipment and medical supplies conducting a civil war against the Government of El Salvador. Such allegations are false."

The Cuban-Nicaraguan efforts to subvert other regional states through the use of covert politico-military attacks as described above, violate:

- Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter;
- Articles 3, 18, 20 and 21 of the Revised Charter of the Organization of American States;
- Article 1 of the hemispheric Rio defense treaty;
- Articles 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the United Nations Definition of Aggression;
- Article 3 of the 1949 General Assembly Essentials of Peace Resolution;
- Article 1 of the 1950 General Assembly Peace Through Deeds Resolution;
- Article 2 of the 1954 International Law Commission Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind;
- The 1965 General Assembly Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention; and
- The 1970 General Assembly Friendly Relation Declaration.

And with respect to Soviet involvement, they also violate:

- The 1972 Principles Agreement;
- Principle 5 of the Helsinki accords; and
- Even Articles 1, 2 and 6 of the Soviet Draft Definition of Aggression.

This pattern of ongoing aggression constitutes an armed attack justifying the use of force in collective defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and Article 3 of the Rio Treaty. Indeed, Article 27 of the OAS Charter, declares that such an attack is "an act of aggression against . . . [all] the American States" and Article 3 of the Rio Treaty creates a legal obligation on the United States to assist in meeting the armed attack. This obligation is parallel to that owed by the United States to Nato under Article 5 of the Nato Treaty in the event of an attack on a Nato member or under Article 5 of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Japan in the event of an attack on Japan.

A lawful response in defense may be overt, covert or both, as has been the case in virtually every conflict in which America has fought in this century. In World War II, no one regarded Allied support for partisan forces or covert operations in Germany as an illegal response to Axis aggression. Such activities in defense against an armed attack have never been and are not now "state terrorism." Indeed, to make such a charge is to undermine the most important distinction in the United Nations and OAS Charters—that between aggression and defense.

Some have argued that a covert attack cannot amount to an armed attack justifying a response in defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. This is wrong both as a matter of law and policy.

Kelsen writes "Since the Charter of the UN does not define the term armed attack used in Article 51, the members of the UN exercising their right of individual or collective . . . defense, may interpret armed attack to mean not only an action in which a state uses its own armed forces but also a revolutionary movement which takes place in one state but which is initiated or supported by another state." This conclusion is supported by McDougal and Feliciano in perhaps the best scholarly treatment of the subject, *Law and Minimum World Public Order* (1961). Indeed, even the Soviet Draft Definition of Aggression says "that State shall be declared the attacker which *first* commits support of armed bands . . . which invade the territory of another State, or refusal, on being requested by the invaded State, to take in its own territory any action within its power to deny such bands any aid or protection." And within this hemisphere the principle that states may respond with use of force to a covert attack through assistance to insurgents was affirmed at the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, serving as the Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty in response to the earlier problem of Cuban covert attack.

Some have conceded that the United States may respond in defense but have argued that support for contras is disproportionate. But why is it disproportionate for the United States to respond to an armed attack aimed at overthrowing a democratically elected government while not ruling out that same objective against the Sandinista military junta in Nicaragua? Remember, Nicaragua in its attack on El Salvador has no Boland Amendment or funds cutoff. That attack continues and is meant to replace the government of El Salvador before proceeding to Costa Rica, which will be, says Commandante Borge, "the dessert."

The Central American conflict illustrates fully the radical regime assault on world order and the difficulty of reaching an effective decision in response.

The Cuban-Nicaraguan war against their neighbors is a well-executed secret war supported by a network of radical regimes and accompanied by a

broad campaign of propaganda and disinformation. As in the first phase of North Vietnam's attack against the South, the existence of the secret attack is well enough concealed that democratic opinion is highly skeptical. In the West, moreover, there has been an intense focus on the general social, economic and political shortcomings of the regime under attack as well as increased attention on the propriety of using particular forms of assistance or defensive responses.

Because of the failure to appreciate this Cuban-Nicaraguan secret aggression, there is a confused, but nonetheless widespread belief in the West that an American defensive response is nothing more than an American "Brezhnev Doctrine." In other words, some critics argue that US policy is designed to prevent self-determination in Central and Latin America when, in fact, US policy is aimed at precisely the opposite objective—stengthening those institutions which would establish and guarantee self-determination throughout the region. This confusion between aggression and defense in turn undermines the deterrent effect of the legal order on the radical regime assault. In more specific terms, aid to contras should be thought of as one defensive option in responding to an armed attack where democratic objectives are to protect the right of self-determination of the attacked states, and the principle of the UN and OAS Charters prohibiting aggressive use of force.

Yet the issue is debated overwhelmingly as though it were the propriety of an American war of national liberation against a government we dislike. That is, it is debated as though there were no war begun by a Cuban-Nicaraguan attack.

Strategies for Strengthening Deterrence Against the Radical Regime Assault

There are several strategies available to the democracies if they are to respond effectively to the totalitarian and radical regime assault and if they are to strengthen deterrence.

First, it is important that the democracies act together in order to emphasize the value of the fundamental Charter distinction between aggression and defense and, thereby, coordinate strategies for strengthening world order. This strategy has at least three elements: emphasize the impermissibility of aggressive use of force, whether overt or covert, including the impermissibility of assistance to terrorist or insurgent groups across *de facto* political boundaries; emphasize the permissibility of defensive response, whether overt or covert, including necessary and proportionate response to any covert attacks such as terrorism or externally aided insurgent movements; and emphasize that one form of permissive response to an armed attack is overt or covert assistance to resistance or insurgent forces.

In connection with this last point, it must be understood that assistance to contras in Nicaragua, or resistance fighters in Afghanistan or Cambodia would in each case be a permissible response under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter to, respectively, a Cuban-Nicaraguan armed attack against El Salvador, a Soviet armed attack against Afghanistan and a Vietnamese armed attack against Cambodia.

As part of the effort to restore vitality to the prohibition of aggressive use of force we must vigorously resist radical regime efforts to legitimize terrorism. In the TWA flight 847 incident we were repeatedly told—as in virtually every terrorist attack—that the terrorists are acting out of some legitimate grievance. That, however, is the equivalent of the just war argument which has been decisively rejected by the United Nations Charter. We need no more resolve all the causes of terrorism before prohibiting aggressive terrorist attack than we need resolve all of the causes of war before prohibiting aggressive war.

Moreover, as TWA 847 illustrates, terrorism frequently involves neutral third countries, and involves attacks against innocent civilians. These attacks would be prohibited under the laws of war even in a lawful defensive use of force. And in the 847 incident, the attacks on civilian aviation also violate solemn international agreements. Most importantly, the brutal murder of an American serviceman, the looting and brutalization of hostages and the effort to single out those of Jewish faith would be war crimes even if committed pursuant to a defensive use of force. The 847 incident, like so many others, is a moral and legal outrage. The democracies must not become so numbed by the radical assault that they fail—as an important element in deterrence—to clearly understand, voice, and act against such outrages of terrorism.

Unless the pluralist democracies stand together in upholding the permissibility of effective defense against terrorist and covert guerrilla attack, they will be increasingly vulnerable to such attacks. Perhaps one technique for beginning to implement this strategy would be an expert level meeting between Nato countries. One possibility might be to raise the issue in a meeting of Nato representatives or a meeting of foreign office legal advisers. Perhaps such a meeting should be preceded by a decision, made by the heads of state, to hold expert level talks on strengthening the Charter framework for control of aggressive use of force. After Nato coordination, the issue could be appropriately raised through bilateral and multilateral discussions with like-minded nations—including such regional arrangements as the OAS.

Second, it is critical that the democracies make a major effort to educate their public, their media and their national legislatures on the nature of the totalitarian and radical regime assault on world order. This must include a more effective education on the nature of the terrorist and insurgent threat and assistance network. Such education will be more effective if undertaken by more than one democratic nation—possibly even with coordinated "white

papers." Parliamentary and congressional reports as well as bipartisan special commissions such as the Kissinger Commission report on the Central American conflict should also be encouraged.

Third, the democracies should encourage more vigorous media examination of totalitarian political action, propaganda and disinformation. A free and vigorous press is its own antidote to political action and propaganda. Efforts to encourage investigative reporting of front operations, terrorist assistance networks, foreign congressional lobbying campaigns and foreign political action programs are in the best tradition of democratic pluralism.

Yet another possibility for strengthening world order and neutralizing the totalitarian and radical regime assault is for the democracies to initiate "accountability" or "compliance" talks on world order principles. Human rights accountability talks have been undertaken with some success within the Helsinki process; success, not measured by Soviet compliance, but in raising the cost of Soviet noncompliance. Why not initiate such talks on world order issues within that process? It could be highly educational to hold public world order talks in which Nato, Warsaw Pact and European neutral and nonaligned nations participated. How would the Soviet Union explain to its Warsaw Pact allies an alleged legal right claimed under the "Brezhnev Doctrine" to deprive them of any sovereign right to select their form of government? How would it defend Soviet actions in Afghanistan? How would it defend before Nato and European neutrals a right to assist terrorist groups or "wars of national liberation"? If it did not legally defend such practices, how would it respond to disclosure of the facts of the covert assistance to terrorist and insurgent groups? Although some decision makers in the West may be so numbed by the assault on the permissibility of Western actions—such as US actions in Vietnam, Grenada and Central America, as to question how the West would fare in such talks—these actions are all defensible under fundamental Charter principles and are fundamenrally different from the ongoing totalitarian and radical regime assault. Indeed, the difference is fundamental to the Charter's structure—response in defensive versus aggressive use of force.

One example that illustrates the democracies' failure to understand the importance of ending the covert politico-military attack is provided by the history of repeated crises involving Cuba. The emplacement of intermediate-range missiles in Cuba precipitated the 1962 missile crisis. Soviet submarines at Cienfuegos precipitated another period of tension, as did stationing of MiG-23 aircraft in Cuba and the "discovery" of a Soviet brigade there. Finally, Cuban expeditionary forces in Ethiopia ended the Carter administration's effort at normalization of relations. Yet, in a span of over 25 years, Castro has covertly attacked some 17 nations in Latin America and the Caribbean, and has sustained a major effort at subversion against his neighbors—such as recruiting and training Jamaicans for an "education" that

turned out to be education for subversion and guerrilla attack. These covert armed attacks and efforts to subvert regional states, however, have never triggered a major crisis with Cuba comparable to one of the above. The message received surely is that support for terrorism, covert attack and subversion is considered tolerable by the West.

The present war in Central America was not triggered by the existence of MiG-23s in Cuba (although this is not to dismiss the seriousness of such weapons buildups), but by Cuba's successful capture of the Nicaraguan revolution in direct consequence of Castro's effective political organization and Cuba's focused military support and training for the Marxist-Leninist Sandinista faction. After seizing power the Sandinistas simply took control of Nicaragua, and in cooperation with Cuba, continued and escalated the policy of "revolution without frontiers."

As illustrated by the seizure of TWA 847, the radical regime assault on world order is a clear and present danger. The time is late for the democracies but they can and must cooperate more effectively to enhance deterrence against such an assault. The alternative is simply unthinkable.

Responding to Terrorism: What, Why and When

Lieutenant Colonel William R. Farrell, US Air Force

When one speaks of terrorism it is not always clear just what one has in mind. The man in the street has a sense of what it means, and like pornography, one knows it when one sees it. It is a phenomenon that is much more easy to describe than define. In some respects we may be better served by doing just that, rather than by trying to force the attributes into an arbitrary grammatical construct which will satisfy lawyers. This conclusion is not reached without some effort and justification.

A review of efforts by the United Nations since its inception has disclosed that the international organization has been unable to reach any mutually acceptable definition of the term. In such a body of diverse cultures and races, when the question, "What is terrorism?" is raised, there is always present some form of answer—though it is often colored by the purposes of those who raised the question initially. Where the United Nations has been successful is in dealing with manifestations of terrorism, i.e. hijacking, hostage-taking, etc., and not the phenomenon itself.

Related to the above is the fact that terrorism may be carried out for many different purposes. First, individual acts of terrorism may aim at wringing specific concessions, such as the payment of a ransom or the freeing of prisoners. Second, terrorism may also attempt to gain publicity. Third, terrorism may aim at causing widespread disorder, demoralizing society and breaking down the social order. Fourth, terrorism may target the deliberate provocation of repression, hoping to have the government self-destruct. Fifth, terrorism may be used to enforce obedience and cooperation. Sixth,

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terrorism is frequently meant to punish. Terrorists often declare the victim of their attack is somehow guilty.*

Other aspects also hinder the efforts to fully understand terrorism. The term itself is emotive and pejorative in its application. No one seems to readily call him or herself a terrorist. They refer to themselves as a revolutionary, a liberator, a freedom fighter. The term is just too negative. Even if we were to arrive at an acceptable definition, the application to a particular group would cause counterclaims and disclaimers. It is not by accident that both President Reagan and Qaddafi have called each other terrorists while denying the applicability of the term to themselves.

The physical manifestations of an act do not necessarily make it terrorism. There has been a tendency to label bombings, hijackings, kidnappings and hostage situations as terrorism just because, "that's what terrorists do." But this overlooks the fact that bank robbers, homesick Cubans looking for a free trip home, extortionists and others engage in these acts too. The outward manifestations are not the only gauge of what is and is not a terrorist act. More often it is more the "why" behind it than the act itself. Having said all this, it may be best to describe the attributes of terrorism without claiming to define it; the objective being to achieve comprehension of the phenomenon while allowing policymakers enough flexibility in developing their responses independent of confines of a legalistic definition.

Terrorism should be viewed as *purposeful* activity. It is a conscious policy choice of one group of people toward another. This activity is designed to create "a climate of fear which is intense and overriding." This creation of fear is central to the activity itself and not incidental. If one were to examine the crimes of rape or robbery, the use of force to create fear is not the purpose of the act. Monetary gain or physical domination is primary, the fear is incidental. In terrorism the fear is the prime purpose of the act. The fear is pervasive and continuing, such as that experienced by those flying planes in the early 1970s, those living in Belfast, Ireland, and those Turkish and Israeli diplomatic officials serving abroad, not to mention our own State Department personnel in certain Middle Eastern nations.

This purposeful fear-generating activity is seeking to resolve some form of political struggle and arrogate to the terrorist the powers of the state or authority. A belief in the justification of the end allows the harshest of means and permits no innocent bystanders. There are really no victims, only those who are with the terrorist or against him.

*Brian Jenkins of the Rand Corporation made this point most clearly with an illustration from the massacre at Lod Airport in 1972. He states that with terrorism there is a stronger connotation of guilt and punishment than in other forms of warfare or politics and a narrower definition of innocent bystanders. The victims of the Lod incident, many of whom were Christian pilgrims from Puerto Rico, were said by the terrorists to be guilty because they had arrived in Israel on Israeli visas and thereby had tacitly recognized the state that was the declared enemy of the Palestinians and, by coming to Israel, they had in effect entered a war zone. The organization was saying that those who happened to get shot, just because they were there, were nonetheless guilty or they would not have been shot.

While terrorism may appear to be a new activity, it has been going on for hundreds of years. It can be practiced by groups and governments—domestically as well as internationally. What makes it appear to be "modern" is more the result of the tools employed than the act itself. This coupled with the nature of the target is what should be of concern to governments. This should be viewed as the real threat and it is to this aspect that we now turn our attention.

Why Governments Must Respond

Terrorism is an affront to society and threatens the very foundation upon which it rests. Often the targets of terrorist attacks are the institutions and the personages holding power within a society. The strength of a society and its government depends in part upon the ability of agencies to provide for the safety and security of its people. In democratic states there is a need for public support, or at a minimum, acceptance of the activities undertaken by a government to insure the public welfare.

Based upon numbers alone, one might be tempted to argue that terrorism does not represent a great threat to the United States. Since the late 1960s there have been less than 500 Americans killed as the result of terrorism. Should you not count the loss of the 241 Marines and other servicemen in Beirut, the number is almost halved.* During each long holiday weekend, more Americans are killed on the highways in a matter of days than in the nearly twenty years since statistics concerning terrorism have been maintained.

One must focus on the nature of the target rather than the numbers. What is under attack is the sovereignty of the nation; the right to maintain embassies abroad; the right to have government representatives safely carry out their assigned duties; and the right of free democracies to provide for their populations. Terrorists have not sought out just any target. They seek those

*The incident at the Marine Headquarters in Beirut does not necessarily equate to an act of terrorism. It is more in line with a hostile surprise attack in a war zone for which the victims were ill prepared. A careful review of the Long Commission Report published in December 1983 provided a good deal of information which supports this view. At the time of the attack there were two occupying armies, four contingents of multinational forces, seven contributors to the United Nations peacekeeping force, and some two dozen extra legal militias operating in a country about the size of Connecticut. Over 100,000 people had been killed in the past eight years as a result of the violence. The government that received US support was viewed by many as yet one other faction of the many seeking power. Our siding with the government was seen as entry into factional warfare on the side of one of many participants. The shelling by the Navy at Suq-Al-Gharb in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces confirmed this in the minds of many engaged in the battles. What has been called in this country an act of terrorism may have rather been a warring faction, surprising and successfully penetrating the defenses of an enemy. The incident is easier to digest, however, if the victims are described by their leaders as having suffered at the hands of terrorists. Somehow the heavy responsibility for the lack of defense becomes more tolerable. The Long Commission Report has much value for the military individual if one reads beyond the talk of terrorism and focuses on poor intelligence, unclear chains of command, clarity of mission, communications, perceptions and organizational problems.

who represent what the government or democratic institutions seem to foster. Ambassadors, educators, military personnel, business people and members of the media all have been targets over the years.

It is no coincidence that Western societies have borne the bulk of terrorist attacks over the years. These are the nations that are most open, affording the terrorist fairly free movement, as well as the guarantee of media coverage for any significant event. To create and maintain the climate of fear described above, the nature and consequences of the terrorist act must be widely publicized. Further, the industrialized democracies of the West have achieved great technological advances which, while bettering society, have also made them much more vulnerable. Whole cities can be immobilized with the loss of key power grids and the ensuing disruption could be catastrophic. Centralized computer data bases pose an additional target for a terrorist group. The loss of records by a large bank or multinational corporation would have ramifications far beyond the dollar loss of the material itself.

The nature of the international environment today lends itself to the violence represented by terrorism. In a world faced with the real potential for nuclear conflict and the subsequent devastating aftermath, lesser, "safer" forms of warfare are desirable. These indirect means of conflict by various powers take on an attractive appearance and present an affordable choice. The once credible threat of massive retaliation proffered in the late 1950s and early 1960s for any transgression, however slight, has generally lost credibility. The United States has shown that it is very tolerant of violence directed against it. Terrorists, through the mid-1980s, were literally guaranteed no retaliation for attacks which kidnapped people, assassinated government representatives in the street, leveled US embassies and killed its occupants. However, the patience of the American people is showing signs of waning and the Government may take a different tack in the future.

One additional reason for concern regarding terrorism is that there are numerous deprived people in the world today. Some, such as the PLO, have sought the addressal of grievances through peaceful and violent means. Similar groups and causes have become tired of waiting for their needs to be met and have sought to take action on their own behalf. Populations such as these, and those who would aid or exploit their cause, will resort to terrorism when such is seen as meeting their needs.

How Should We Respond?

Having determined that there is a legitimate requirement to meet the terrorist challenge in some way, just what does the United States do? Do we go to the source if there is sponsorship by some government? Do we attack training camps where the terrorists learn their trade? Do we seek out the terrorists through undercover operations and strike them no matter where

they are on a given day? Questions such as these are of paramount interest to the policymaker and could well determine the methods of response—diplomatic, economic or military—to be employed.

There is general agreement that the nation has a right to defend itself when threatened by an aggressor. Beyond this one could say that a nation has a moral obligation to do just that and not allow its people to suffer unnecessarily. The policymaker realizes that the choices which confront him will not always be clear and readily discernible. What is legal may not always be moral and vice versa. Beyond this, what is considered both moral and legal may not be politically feasible. There needs to be an evaluation of all three factors as policy is formulated. However, there should be no response without some strong moral justification at its foundation. The populace in a democracy will not view as legitimate, immoral activities which are on a par with those of the terrorists. Claiming justifiable defense in the protection of democratic values while employing tactics which are similar to those practiced by the terrorists undermines public confidence. While there may be some immediate emotional release no matter what the response, thoughtful reflection over the long term will only tolerate action based on moral grounds.

While there may be strong inclinations to employ military force as the first and only response to a terrorist incident, care should be taken lest one acts too swiftly. Diplomatic action, alone or in concert with allies, which could conceivably impact successfully upon a terrorist group and/or its sponsor, should be considered and employed initially. Political or economic sanctions are also alternatives which demand consideration before military force is employed. Should these be insufficient or not feasible, the stronger option may then be employed. It is the perception of employing force as a last resort which helps ensure that popular support remains when all the shouting subsides.

Further complicating the decision process are the concerns for success, proportionality and discrimination. Actions undertaken more as a reflex action than as thoughtful calculation may lead to long-term consequences which will impact adversely on the nation or its people. Escalatory acts on the part of the terrorists against innocent Americans may well be the result of any action. Other groups may act in sympathy with the "injured" terrorists and either attack US assets or those of our allies. Therefore, when policymakers think in terms of success the thought processes must take a long-term view and be willing to endure potential consequences and ramifications.

Having suffered a series of terrorist attacks over a period of years, there is concern that a nation may respond to a particular act and that the response may be geared to the emotion and force built up during years of doing little or nothing. As such the response may not be proportionate to the act perpetrated. A large nation such as the United States must demonstrate the

restraint demanded of a superpower. While some may applaud the forceful actions of the small embattled nation of Israel, our position on the world's stage does not allow us that solution. Additionally, we must be sure to discriminate between the terrorist and those among whom he may take refuge. Every effort must be taken to insure that noncombatants are left uninjured, or in the worst case that their casualties are kept to a minimum. At some point the President or the Secretary of State may need to address a concerned nation or a skeptical Congress justifying a response to a terrorist act. Not all will agree to the arguments proffered in terms of degree of success, justification or scale (such as the US Government's forcing of the Egyptian aircraft carrying PLO terrorists to land on Italian soil). But any rationale that has as its basis plausible moral considerations coupled with a credible plan of action will at a minimum be condoned, if not fully approved.

Fully understanding just what terrorism is—and what it is not—is an initial step in the development of a government's policy of response. This done, a democratic nation is capable of determining the extent of the threat to itself and to similar sovereignties around the globe. It is upon this that the particulars of any action are built. Forming essential supports for its foundation are the legal, political and moral elements considered by the decision makers. When the leadership goes before the people and presents its justification for actions against terrorism, these three pillars will be evaluated to some degree of sophistication by all. While there will not be complete agreement on all aspects of the act there has to be acceptance that the evidence was credible and the response was fundamentally moral. The latter should be able to withstand the rigors of debate. If not, the terrorists will have scored the victory they sought.

The Chiefs of Staff and The Higher Organization for Defence in Britain, 1904-1984

John Gooch

The British chiefs of staff system first came into existence eighty years ago as part of a package of reforms designed to create a higher organization for defence. It was born of political pressures and created by civilians to fulfil political needs. The deficiencies of a monolithic military structure were clearly revealed during the Boer War (1899-1902), a campaign conducted without the benefit of any forward planning or intelligence such as European general staffs were equipped to provide. Thereafter military efficiency demanded that reservations be set aside and that the British Army be provided with a brain in the form of a general staff.

Politicians were also becoming aware of the need for specialized government machinery with which to consider defence policy. In Britain the customary solution to problems of coordination and of providing information across departmental boundaries was to create a committee of the cabinet.[1] Thus, after some experimentation, the Committee of Imperial Defence was born in 1902: a cabinet committee presided over by the prime minister, with flexible membership, which could discuss pressing defence issues of the day. In 1904, two years after its creation, the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) was provided with a permanent secretariat. At the same time—though not as part of the same measure—a board system was introduced into the War Office. One member of the board was the newly instituted chief of the general staff.[2]

The mere existence of a chief of general staff did nothing to guarantee the development of comprehensive military plans. Much depended upon personality, and the founding head proved a poor choice: lazy but socially well connected, Sir Neville Lyttelton's only real talent was his skill at lawn

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tennis. Of the first group of directors serving under him, most were no more distinguished; but within two years a cohort of highly able staff officers had entered the general staff. In consequence war planning improved markedly in quality. The Royal Navy at this time had no specialized general staff at all: planning was carried out by the First Sea Lord, assisted by a Director of Naval Intelligence, as, when, and however he preferred.

The architects of the new system saw the general staff as one component of a larger structure. The broad functions of collectively examining defence problems and creating a defence posture were to be performed by the CID, whose secretariat was originally intended to act as "a Great General Staff suited to our Imperial requirements."[3] The secretariat grew in power and influence, as secretariats will, by virtue of its position at the intersection between politicians and the military. Under the hand of Sir Maurice Hankey it became an active component in the higher organization of defence, producing papers, offering opinions and formulating cabinet decisions as minutes.[4]

Although machinery now existed to coordinate government policy on defence, this did not of itself mean very much. Everything hinged upon the nature and interests of the prime minister of the day, for it was he who called the CID into session, determined its membership and set or agreed to the subjects for examination. Balfour, under whose premiership it came into being, had an unusually philosophical turn of mind and regarded it as a problem-solving machine. His successors up to 1914 were in varying degrees uninterested in it. No one gave any thought to its role in war. More importantly, it was not used to integrate the two services in joint planning. Admiral Fisher effectively withdrew the Navy from its deliberations in 1906 when it began to trespass into matters he regarded as his own preserve.[5] The two services finally met at a celebrated CID meeting on 23 August 1911, held to consider naval and military planning for a war with Germany, at which the Admiralty unveiled a strategy of considerable ineptitude which was wholly at odds with accepted CID policy. As a result, Winston Churchill was imported into the Admiralty as First Lord to oversee the creation of a naval staff able to conduct proper planning.

When war broke out in 1914, the extent to which planning had been limited, the problem of command in war unforeseen and coordination dependent upon political authority was quickly revealed. Asquith tried to run the war by means of a series of large and unwieldy cabinet committees as successors to the CID; and, by 1915, war by cabinet government had completely collapsed.[6] In an ill-considered attempt to secure authoritative military advice, Asquith installed a soldier, Lord Kitchener, as Secretary of State for War in August 1914. Kitchener was totally unfitted for the post. Secretive, constitutionally unable to delegate authority and quite unfamiliar with the general staff idea, he confided in neither soldiers nor politicians.

Once, in August 1915, he refused to appear before the War Policy Committee on the grounds that such an action should be reserved for the cabinet alone; it subsequently became apparent that what he really objected to was the presence of a shorthand writer.[7] The vast bulk of the general staff left for the front in August 1914, and the "dugouts" who remained behind in their stead proved utterly incapable of standing up to Kitchener's forceful personality. They forebore to offer him any strategic advice, and he forebore to ask for it.

The Navy was afflicted by very similar problems. The 73-year-old Admiral Jackie Fisher was recalled as First Sea Lord in October 1914 and brought back to Whitehall an obsession with amphibious landings on the Baltic coast which he refused to discuss either with his own staff or with Kitchener's. His chief of staff, Admiral H. F. Oliver, was incapable of delegation and spent so much time allocating ships to different duties that he had little time left for strategy.[8]

Lack of determined leadership, service compartmentalization and an almost complete lack of forward planning created fertile soil for disaster. In an atmosphere of enthusiastic ignorance, and totally unencumbered by technical advice,[9] amateur strategists with Churchill in the van devised the Dardanelles campaign in 1915. Ill-conceived and spectacularly misconducted, the Dardanelles campaign did have one important long-term consequence: the report of the government enquiry into it, published in 1917, painted such a damning picture of the consequences of staff officers suppressing dissent that it acted as a spur to senior officers to speak their minds during the Second World War.[10]

Having at first paid too little attention to staff advice, the British now swung to the opposite extreme. In December 1916 Sir William Robertson took over as Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) and Kitchener's powers were whittled down until he became little more than a cipher. Backed by Douglas Haig, who had taken over command of the British Armies in France, Robertson informed the government that Flanders was the decisive theatre of operations and that no more troops should be diverted to useless sideshows. He then invited the government either to accept this policy or to formulate its own alternative. The government chose to accept professional advice. The bloody campaign on the Somme in 1916 was the consequence.

In December 1916, Lloyd George took over as premier; he believed the strategy of attrition advocated by the general staff to be wholly wrong. However, the Haig-Robertson axis prevented him from gaining full control of events. He found it difficult directly to contradict the strategic arguments put up to justify concentration on the Western Front because of his amateur standing.[11] Therefore, Lloyd George tried a number of political expedients. Eventually, over the winter of 1917-18, he broke the Robertson-Haig axis by skilful and contorted political manoeuvring, and was able to instal his own candidate, Sir Henry Wilson, who was prepared to back peripheral

operations, as CIGS.[12] Not exercising such a powerful political grip on the conduct of the war, the Navy posed no such problems of control, although its staff work remained uncoordinated and its administration grossly overcentralized.[13]

As both prewar and wartime experience had demonstrated in different ways, effective functioning of the chiefs of staff system within the higher organization for defence depended upon the active involvement of prime ministers, for only their authority was powerful enough to overcome friction and resolve problems. During the 1920s successive prime ministers were largely uninterested in defence matters and therefore a key element in the efficient functioning of the machinery was absent. One important development did, however, occur. During the Chanak crisis of 1922, the three chiefs of staff began to meet informally in order to be prepared to take combined action if called upon to do so.[14] Sir Maurice Hankey suggested making this a permanent arrangement, and the chiefs of staff subcommittee met for the first time in formal session on 17 July 1923. The prime minister did not attend, and the chair was taken by the senior head of service. Thus the link between premier and services, a critical one in the British system, was broken.

An enquiry set up in 1923 found against centralising control of the armed forces in a single ministry on a number of grounds: that it would be superimposed upon the extant tripartite service organizations, with resulting friction and duplication; that its head might rival the prime minister in power; and that the Dominions would never accept anything more than the CID, which was an advisory body.[15] This finding was agreeable to the Treasury, which feared the creation of a united service bloc beyond its control. During the course of the enquiry Sir William Robertson produced what would become the fundamental Service grounds for opposing the "dreadfully mischievous" proposal of a chief of combined staffs: "An important cornerstone in military organization is that he who makes a plan ought to be responsible for its execution."[16]

The chiefs of staff liked to suggest that their new committee was a success but it was generally perceived as a failure. One reason was the dispiriting economic climate of the 1920s. A second was that the chiefs of staff were given no guidance by the Foreign Office as to the political assumptions upon which war plans should be based other than a generalized warning about Russia and India. So they were left to devise their own. Not surprisingly, all three services usually differed. As late as 1937 the chiefs of staff were still complaining—with some justification—about the lack of clear political guidance by means of which to frame plans.

The heart of the problem, however, lays in the issues raised by airpower.[17] Its capacity to police the empire more cheaply than ground forces produced

clashes between the Army and the RAF over who would have command in the event of operations in theatres where both services would have to operate together, such as the Middle East. At another level, the capabilities of the aircraft were unproved. The so-called "bomber versus battleship" controversy, upon the resolution of which hinged the decision as to which service would have the lion's share in the defence of Singapore, rumbled on throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s. The dispute was resolved politically, and against the RAF, by Stanley Baldwin in 1932, but even then the question was regarded by the RAF as still an open one.[18]

Not only could the chiefs of staff not agree on how to use their own weapons, but they were also unable to agree on how other powers would use theirs. Responding in 1934 to a questionnaire on the likely shape of a future war with Germany, the chief of naval staff replied that he expected a classic big fleet action from which a victor would emerge, the CIGS expected enemy airpower to be used in support of the advancing German Armies, and the chief of air staff thought that the Germans would go on the defensive against France and use air attack over these fortifications.[19]

The failure of the chiefs of staff to reach anything approaching agreement on such issues as the capacity, role and control of airpower was partly the outcome of their having to grapple with novel and difficult problems without the aid of either machinery or techniques to help them. But one more factor should be noted. Writing in 1936, Admiral Lord Chatfield ascribed the difficulties of the past to the personalities who composed the Chiefs of Staff subcommittee after the war, "men who had risen chiefly by their forcefulness of character, whose general line of argument was 'what I say is right.'"[20]

With the ending of the Ten Year Rule in 1932[21] and the first steps towards rearmament two years later, the chiefs of staff were replaced by a system of direct cabinet intervention in defence through ministerial subcommittees. The first stage of Treasury control was now applied. Each department submitted its estimates separately, assuming that taken collectively and developed over five years they would provide a reasonable level of rearmament. An uncoordinated programme which overshot the financial target allowed the politicians to determine priorities according to nonstrategic—or at best semistrategic—grounds. Heavily influenced by Neville Chamberlain's economically based theory of parity deterrence, the government took the decision to put the bulk of the money into building a bomber force.[22]

The ineffectiveness of the Chiefs of Staff subcommittee was underlined in a different way by the Italo-Abyssinian crisis of 1935. Although confident that in the event of war Britain would win, the chiefs could not agree on how to act, and a bitter quarrel broke out in August 1935 over the correct tactical role of the RAF. The war raised the even more fundamental question of whether

the chiefs of staff had the authority to act executively as a battle headquarters. The then prime minister, Stanley Baldwin, said that he would be glad to consider this question and then, characteristically, did nothing about it. The chiefs of staff were never given cabinet approval to exercise executive powers, and it was widely assumed that in war the government would establish a ministerial committee of control. The public disquiet aroused by the Abyssinian crisis did result in the creation in 1936 of a Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, but the office lacked executive authority and its first incumbent, Sir Thomas Inskip, was not much respected within the services.[23]

At the outbreak of the Second World War Chamberlain's lack of wartime experience, and Churchill's plethora of it, soon became apparent. A small war cabinet was set up on the Lloyd George model, including the chiefs of staff and all three service ministers, but the military soon showed too much initiative for the newly installed First Lord of the Admiralty. After a war cabinet meeting on 21 September 1939, at which they resisted extending the war into the Balkans, Churchill wrote to the premier suggesting that politicians should be able to meet without servicemen present. Chamberlain responded by setting up the Military Co-ordination Committee, chaired by the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, Lord Chatfield, and comprising the three service ministers and the minister of supply, assisted by the chiefs of staff, to scrutinize proposals for presentation to the war cabinet. This body had a short and troubled life. Strategic differences were now debated three times instead of twice—in the Military Co-ordination Committee, the chiefs of staff committee and the war cabinet—and unresolved disputes were simply passed up the line because Chatfield lacked the political authority to resolve them.[24] The machinery functioned fitfully and ineffectively for some six months before the Narvik campaign demonstrated how poorly both elements of the higher defence machine were functioning. Shortly afterwards the German attack on France swept Chamberlain from office, and Churchill succeeded him.

Churchill moved swiftly and purposefully to revitalize the system. The war cabinet was slimmed down by dismissing the service ministers from it. The prime minister created and took for himself the new post of Minister of Defence; but instead of setting up a central staff to service him in his new role, he took over the military section of the war cabinet secretariat under General Hastings Ismay, who became what he liked to call his "handling machine." The Military Co-ordination Committee disappeared into the limbo in which it belonged and was replaced by a Defence Committee with two panels, one for operations and one for supply. In effect, Churchill had created a combined battle headquarters under the direct supervision of the head of government, through which he could exercise continuous direct and personal control over the formulation of military policy and the conduct of military operations.

A system so highly centralized as the one Churchill had created could pose as great a danger as the one it replaced. Sir Alan Brooke, newly installed in the summer of 1940 in command of the defence of the United Kingdom, certainly thought so. "It was a highly dangerous organization; had an invasion developed I fear that Churchill would have attempted as Defence Minister to co-ordinate the action of these various commands. This would have been wrong and highly dangerous, with his impulsive nature and tendency to arrive at decisions through a process of intuition, as opposed to 'logical approach,' heaven knows where he might have led us!"[25] No invasion ever came. But Churchill's fertile imagination required anchoring to the shores of reality if it were not to bear aloft all those who were within its power.

The appointment of two outstanding individuals ensured that the new integrated system worked to best effect. The first was Ismay. As head of the military secretariat, he, together with his deputies Hollis and Jacob, serviced the many formal and ad hoc committees and subcommittees spawned by the system; and as principal staff officer to the minister of defence, he attended all the meetings of the chiefs of staff committee. Ismay was thus in a position to act as a two-way communications channel, conveying information and impressions to and from the prime minister.[26] The second was Brooke. Under his chairmanship the chiefs of staff committee became the very necessary ballast which weighed down the Churchillian imagination.

Repeatedly the chiefs of staff had to stand their ground against Churchill in long, vigorous and exhausting debates before they could persuade him to abandon some cherished idea. Occasionally they simply withdrew support for a project before it had time to turn into a plan.[27] Sometimes, although rarely, Churchill overruled them on matters of policy.[28] Sometimes he ignored them.[29] Overall, however, the system produced good decisions. It did so because Brooke adopted three working principles and stuck to them. As chairman of the chiefs of staff, he believed they must always reach agreement; he did not believe in meddling with field commanders, and frequently stopped Churchill from doing so; and he always honestly spoke his mind, resisting Churchill's efforts to wear down his resistance to some pet idea with a battery of long dinners, late nights, brandy and cigars.

The hallmarks of the system of higher organization for war devised by Churchill were the separation of the military and the strategic from the other functions of government; the creation of a machinery of control which allowed direct—and indirect—communication between the prime minister and his chief military advisers; and a staff system which put those responsible for advising on strategy in direct control of the armed forces. It was this last featnre which compelled realism and honesty. Staff work conducted through adversarial debate had another compelling advantage, as the Americans found out to their cost at the Casablanca conference: "minds were thoroughly prepared, and few counter-arguments were new."[30]

Peacetime presented very different requirements from war, and between December 1945 and February 1946 a study group headed by Ismay and Jacob weighed the alternatives: absorption of the service departments within a ministry of defence; a combined general staff on the lines of the German Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW); and a powerful independent chairman of the chiefs of staff reporting direct to the Minister of Defence. All these were rejected in favour of a Defence Committee of the Cabinet, including the three service ministers and their chiefs of staff, and a minister of defence whose peacetime powers were drastically curtailed by reason of the fact that the political heads of the three services remained responsible to parliament for expenditure.[31] Without prime ministerial authority the Minister of Defence became, as Macmillan put it after a brief and unhappy sojourn in the job, "a co-ordinator, not a master."[32] To counteract any future moves towards undue centralization, the 1946 Defence White Paper laid down as a cardinal principle of British organization that it should be the men responsible in the Service Departments for carrying out the approved policy who were brought together in the central machine to formulate it.[33]

The postwar system had to deal with familiar problems of demarcation, such as the struggle for control of Coastal Command, which went to the RAF. It also had to cope with the enormous problem of the development, production, and control of nuclear weapons. The first effect of this was to set the services against one another as they struggled for control of a weapon which appeared to be appropriate to only one medium, and which would therefore enable one of them to claim the primary task in defence policy. In the prerocketry years it was the Navy which felt most threatened: in a note to Lord Mountbatten urging him to take up the position of First Sea Lord, the Vice Chief of Naval Staff stressed the need to refute "the 'one big bang and it is all over' theory so cleverly sponsored by Jack Slessor and the US Strategic Air Force."[34]

The second effect of the nuclear revolution was to place the chiefs of staff in an environment in which the complexity of the new weapons and the pace of their development posed unforeseen problems of cost-control in a domestic environment in which economy was almost always the tune of the day. Research and development costs of the first generation of nuclear missiles were huge, and budgeting was a total failure—largely the result of the absence of centralized control. The scandalous inability to control weapons costs was to be one of the most powerful factors in the move towards centralization.[35]

In 1955, following the example of the United States, Canada and France, Anthony Eden created the position of chairman of the chiefs of staff. The aims behind this were to add continuity to the defence decisionmaking process and to lighten the burdens imposed upon one man by the requirements of Nato and the Western European Union. Almost immediately afterwards

the new system was tested in the fire of the Suez crisis of 1956. It apparently had little influence on Eden's attitudes or behaviour, and in several major respects he ignored its advice completely.[36]

In 1957 Harold Macmillan appointed Duncan Sandys as Minister of Defence to work out a new defence policy in the light of present strategic needs which would secure a substantial reduction in expenditure and manpower; and at the same time to prepare a plan for reshaping and reorganising the armed forces.[37] The result was Sandys' advocacy of an independent British nuclear deterrent. In devising that policy he worked largely through his own senior departmental staff and the chief scientist, prompting the chiefs of staff formally to protest in February 1958 that they were not being consulted over important decisions.

To some extent, the chiefs of staff were themselves to blame for the position they now found themselves in. For one thing, as so often in the past, they were incapable of speaking with one voice on the desirability or otherwise of an independent British deterrent. In September 1958 the First Sea Lord and CIGS wrote a joint memorandum flatly opposing it, in direct contradiction to the view of the then current chief of air staff. For another, in trying to block Duncan Sandys they worked independently of the new chairman of the chiefs of staff, fearing that to do otherwise would be to contribute to a process of aggrandizement which would result in their losing control of their own affairs. The position of the first chairman, Air Chief Marshal Sir William Dickson, grew so bad that in January 1958 he wrote to the minister complaining that the cooperation he was getting was reluctant almost to the point of nonexistence.[38]

Macmillan reacted by strengthening the powers of the Minister of Defence, and by creating the position of Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). The CDS was given the responsibility of issuing operational orders; the Joint Planning Staff was put under his control; and he was also empowered to call on the staffs of the three services for assistance. Macmillan's purpose in reconstructing the staff system was to produce an independent officer who could give the minister impartial advice.[39]

Two years later, in 1960, Lord Mountbatten was appointed CDS and began a personal crusade to centralize control of the armed forces. His experience in South East Asia Command during the Second World War had led him to favour unified control and he had many weapons at his disposal in trying to bring it about, not least the very best of social connections. It was not a prospect the services looked forward to with much relish; Marshal of the RAF Sir Dermot Boyle told Mountbatten to his face "I consider your appointment as Chief of the Defence Staff the greatest disaster that has befallen the British Defence Services within memory."[40]

Mountbatten prepared the ground by setting up unified commands in the Near East in 1960, in the Middle East in 1961, and in the Far East in 1962. Then,

on 10 October 1962, he presented his proposals to the Minister of Defence, Peter Thorneycroft. They amounted to unification of the higher levels of the armed forces. A secretary of state for defence would be serviced by two functional ministers; a Defence Staff would be created to service the CDS, who would now only be "advised" by the chiefs of staff; and the CDS would select and promote senior officers of one-star rank and higher from a single list. All three service chiefs were opposed in varying degree to Mountbatten's proposals. Their main grounds of concern were two: that those making plans and policy should not be divorced from those carrying them out (here the German OKW was once again pressed into service as a good example of a thoroughly bad practice); and that the new structure would prevent the cabinet from having the opportunity to hear dissenting views.

Lord Ismay and General Jacob were called out of retirement to examine the proposals, and made one very significant change in them; contrary to Mountbatten's intentions, they recommended that the three service chiefs of staff should continue to have access to the prime minister and that all alternative military policies originating in the chiefs of staff committee should always go up to the Defence Committee for decision.[41] The 1963 White Paper set up a three-tier structure, at the top of which was the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee of the cabinet, with the CDS and the chiefs of staff in attendance. Below this a Defence Council was established, to be chaired by the newly titled Secretary of State for Defence. And the chiefs of staff committee remained untouched: chaired by the CDS, it was to be collectively responsible to the government for professional advice on strategy, military operations and the military implications of defence policy. The position of the CDS was strengthened by the addition of a headquarters staff comprising a Defence Operations Executive, a Defence Signals Staff, a Defence Intelligence Staff, and a Defence Operations Requirements Staff.[42] These latter were small, and were intended to work alongside the existing Joint Planning Staff and Joint Warfare Staff.

The Labour government which came to power in 1964 considered the higher war machinery chiefly from the point of view of the degree to which it constituted an efficient and effective machine to control defence expenditure. Unacceptable cost acceleration and technological supercession—neither of which the military could do much about—had led to expensive cancellations of weapons systems.[43] The record, however, was undeniably poor: the RAF had spent £11 billion between 1947 and 1965 and was left after the cancellation of TSR2 with an aging fleet of 150 V-bombers and not very much more. The government intended to hold defence costs down to a fixed ceiling of £2 billion, and to do this the new Secretary of State, Denis Healey, conducted a far-reaching Defence Review based on cost-benefit analysis. There was little input from the services, and Healey apparently ignored the Defence Council almost completely.[44]

The government moved slowly forward towards Mountbatten's goal. In 1968 a single Defence budget replaced the triservice budgets, and in 1972 managerial functionalization on commercial lines reached new heights when a Minister of Defence Procurement was created to work under the Secretary of State. That same year the new post was dropped.[45]

The staff machine was struck by a second wave of managerial economics in 1974-75, when a Defence Review was again instituted with the aim of reducing defence expenditure from 6 percent of GNP in ten years time to 4½ percent. Now, however, the machinery had learned better how to cope with the demands of politicians; and it had as its head a CDS who was willing to disregard official procedures in order to meet requirements. Care was taken to involve Treasury representatives in the review from the earliest stages in order to avoid producing a report which was financially unacceptable. The Assistant CDS on the review body worked to brief the CDS, who in turn brought round any recalcitrant chief of staff, either by individual meetings or through group discussion. And, thirdly, denied a satisfactory basis for setting strategic priorities, the CDS invented his own, in which priority was given to Nato and within that to the Central Front and the Atlantic. In one respect the system hampered the CDS in his task: he was required by the rules to gain the agreement of his colleagues before tasking either the chiefs of staff secretariat or his own Central Policy Staff and initiating studies. This rule was overcome by the simple expedient of breaking it.[46]

The process of incrementing the powers of the CDS has been carried a stage further with the proposals made in 1984 by Secretary of State Michael Heseltine. Under the scheme he appears to envisage, the CDS will continue to chair the COS committee but will tender independent military advice on strategy, forward policy, resource allocation, commitments and operations; he will plan, direct and conduct all military operations; and he will direct the work of the Central Defence Staff. In a major departure from all previous practice the appointment of a CDS will be at the discretion of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence rather than being held on a "turn and turn about" basis, and will be for an indeterminate period. Four Deputy Chiefs of the Defence Staff will be responsible for strategy and policy, for programmes and personnel, for systems, and for commitments. The process of squeezing the heads of the three armed services has been taken a step further, leaving them with responsibility for little more than morale, management, discipline and efficiency in their separate arms, although they retain the right of direct access to the Prime Minister. The proposals have drawn strong criticism from Admiral Lord Lewin and Field Marshal Lord Carver, both former Chiefs of the Defence Staff. Their arguments—that single-service chiefs of staff must be left with adequate staffs to enable them to fulfil their responsibilities as professional heads of service and to contribute considered advice to the CDS on matters of strategy and policy, and that the

single-service machinery is best qualified to determine the weapons systems and organization which is required—will be hard to controvert, save by those who believe that management and policy are separate functions.[47]

Notes

1. J.P. Mackintosh, *The British Cabinet* (London: Stevens, 1962), p. 274.

2. N.H. Gibbs, *The Origins of Imperial Defense* (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1955), pp. 2-9; J. Gooch, *The Plans of War: The General Staff and British Military Strategy c. 1900-1916* (London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), pp. 32-59.

3. Gooch, p. 44.

4. S.W. Roskill, *Hankey: Man of Secrets*, 3 vols. (London: Collins, 1970-74), *passim*.

5. N. d'Ombrain, *War Machinery and High Policy: Defence administration in peacetime Britain, 1902-1914* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 13, 99, 180, 211; see also Fisher to Tweedmouth, 9 July 1906, quoted in A.J. Marder, ed., *Fear God and Dread Nought* (London: Cape, 1956), v. II, p. 83.

6. P. Guinn, *British Strategy and Politics 1914 to 1918* (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 115; John Ehrman, *Cabinet Government and War 1890-1940* (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1958), p. 61.

7. Gooch, p. 304.

8. A.J. Marder, *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1965), v. II, pp. 89-90, 196.

9. Admirals Oliver and Jackson were subsequently very vague as to what they had actually counselled at the Dardanelles Committee; and the CIGS, Wolfe Murray, admitted that he left meetings of the War Council and the Dardanelles Committee without having any idea that a decision had been reached at all: T. Higgins, *Winston Churchill and the Dardanelles* (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1963), p. 81; Gooch, pp. 303-304. See also Marder, *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow*, p. 218.

10. Personal information from Field Marshal Lord Harding of Petherton.

11. D.R. Woodward, *Lloyd George and the Generals* (London: Associated University Press, 1983), p. 176.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 196, 213, 224-225, 258-274.

13. A.J. Marder, *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1966), v. III, pp. 56-57, 177-178, 219-223; *ibid.* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1969), v. IV, pp. 314-315, 327-328.

14. Roskill, v. II, p. 290.

15. H.G. Welch, *The Origins and Development of the Chiefs of Staff Subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defence: 1923-1939*, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of London 1973, pp. 36-42.

16. Public Record Office, Co-ordination of the Fighting Services, memorandum by Field Marshal Sir W.R. Robertson, 28 June 1923, Cab. 21/262, *cit.* Welch, p. 50.

17. Roskill, v. II, pp. 345-346.

18. J. Gooch, *The Prospect of War: Studies in British Defence Policy 1847-1942* (London: Frank Cass, 1981), pp. 73-79.

19. Welch, pp. 163-164.

20. Public Record Office, Chatfield to Hankey, 17 February 1936, Cab. 21/424, quoted in Welch, p. 115.

21. The Ten Year Rule, instituted in 1919 and put on a rolling basis in 1928, guided British military planners by allowing them to assume that Great Britain would not be engaged in a major war for the next ten years.

22. M.S. Smith, "Rearmament and Deterrence in Britain in the 1930s," *Journal of Strategic Studies* (London), December 1978, pp. 313-337.

23. Roskill, v. III, pp. 52-53; Welch, p. 250; M.S. Smith, *The Development of British Strategic Air Power Doctrine and Policy in Period of Rearmament preceding the Second World War c. 1934-1939*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Lancaster 1975, p. 107.

24. Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill: Vol. VI, Finest Hour 1939-1941* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983), pp. 38-40.

25. David Fraser, *Alanbrooke* (London: Collins, 1982), p. 183.

26. *The Memoirs of Lord Ismay* (New York: Viking Press, 1960), pp. 167-170.

27. Joan Beaumont, *Comrades in Arms: British Aid to Russia 1941-1945* (London: Davis-Poynter, 1980), p. 71.

28. Gooch, *Prospect of War*, pp. 25-26.

29. Roskill, v. III, p. 506; D. Carlton, *Anthony Eden: A Biography* (London: A. Lane, 1981), pp. 168-169.

30. Fraser, p. 313.

31. Her Majesty's Stationery Office (hereafter, H.M.S.O.). Statement Relating to Defense, Cmd. 6743, 1946; J. Hughes-Hallett, "The Central Organisation for Defence," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution*, v. CIII, 1958, p. 490.

32. Harold Macmillan, *Tides of Fortune* (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 561.
33. H.M.S.O. Central Organisation for Defence, Cmd. 6923, 1946, p. 2.
34. Vice-Chief of Naval Staff to Lord Louis Mountbatten, 31 October 1954. Quoted in Philip Ziegler, *Mountbatten: The Official Biography* (London: Collins, 1985), p. 526.
35. F.A. Johnson, *Defence by Ministry. The British Ministry of Defence 1944-1974* (London: Duckworth, 1980), p. 42.
36. Ziegler, p. 543.
37. Harold Macmillan, *Riding the Storm* (London: Macmillan, 1971), p. 244.
38. Dickson to Sandys, 2 January 1958. Quoted in Ziegler, p. 562.
39. Harold Macmillan, *At the End of the Day* (London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 411.
40. Ziegler, p. 582.
41. Johnson, pp. 111-112.
42. H.M.S.O. Central Organisation for Defence, Cmd. 2097, 1963.
43. Peter Nailor, "Denis Healey and rational decision-making in defence," in I.F. Beckett and J. Gooch, *Politicians and Defence: Studies in the Formulation of British Defence Policy 1845-1970* (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1981), p. 159.
44. "Does the present Central Organisation for Defence meet the requirements of the 1970s," *Report of a discussion held at the Royal United Services Institution on Wednesday, 13 January 1971*, p. 2.
45. H.M.S.O. Government Organisation for Defence Procurement and Civil Aerospace, Cmd. 4641, 1971.
46. Personal information.
47. *The Times*, 20 and 23 March 1984.

Naval History Prize

The first US Navy Prize in Naval History, for the best scholarly article to be published on the history of the United States Navy in 1984, has been awarded to Professor John E. Talbott of the University of California, Santa Barbara, for his article "Weapons Development, War Planning, and Policy: The U.S. Navy and the Submarine, 1917-1941," published in the May-June issue of *The Naval War College Review*.

Professor Talbott's article discusses the development of the long-range submarine and the impact of the capabilities of that weapon on American naval strategy and foreign policy. The prize, sponsored jointly by the Naval Historical Center and the Naval Historical Foundation, consists of a certificate and a cash award of $500. The purpose of the prize, to be awarded annually, is to encourage excellence in research and writing on the history of the US Navy. Nominations for articles published in scholarly journals in 1985 may be sent to Director, Naval Historical Center, Building 57, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC 20374-0571.

US Arms For China—A New Look

Lieutenant Colonel Andrew R. Finlayson, US Marine Corps

If there is not sufficient equipment, supplies, and training, even the best army . . . will be wiped out by the enemy at once.

V.I. Lenin

In the fall of 1975 Michael Pillsbury, an analyst with the Rand Corporation, authored an article in *Foreign Affairs* that examined the feasibility and advisability of initiating US military assistance and arms sales to the People's Republic of China (PRC).[1] This article produced a plethora of scholarly debate and, as could be expected, a strong and negative reaction from the Soviet Union.[2] Since the publication of Mr. Pillsbury's article, the official US policy on this snbject has been one of caution—a "go slow" approach to arms transfers to China that reflects a broad consensus among government and academic analysts who have studied the problem. Although the United States has permitted the sale of transport aircraft, helicopters, flight training systems, trucks, aerial cameras and certain types of radar, as well as Tow antitank and Hawk antiaircraft missiles, it has been reluctant to provide China with the types of sophisticated, technologically advanced systems that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) appears interested in when the subject of security is discussed by the two nations.[3]

This cautious policy is the product of careful analysis of the strategic implications that US arms transfers to China *might* have. Basically, the salient arguments made in defense of this policy are:

- Providing arms to the PRC would cause a shift in the balance of power in East Asia, thus posing a threat to friends and allies of the United States in the region, principally Japan and Taiwan, and could motivate the Soviet Union to launch a preemptive strike against the PRC.[4]
- Strengthening a China that does not now possess a stable leadership, or an orderly process for the transfer of power between competing factions, could result in the United States providing arms to a country that at some future date might use these weapons contrary to US interests.[5]

A graduate of the Naval Academy, Lieutenant Colonel Finlayson earned an M.S. in Management Engineering from George Washington University and an M.A. in Chinese Studies from the University of Michigan. He is a recent graduate of the Naval War College and is currently serving with the Second Marine Division.

- Rearming China is too costly for the United States and would place an unacceptable strain on the industrial capability of our nation.[6] One 1980 Department of Defense study placed a price tag of between $41 billion to $63 billion on such a program.[7] A 1984 estimate placed the cost as high as $100 billion.[8]
- China's military doctrine has not advanced to the point where high technology weapons can be employed effectively.[9]
- China's industrial base is incapable of absorbing the advanced technologies associated with US weaponry.[10]

These arguments against providing China with US arms are cogent and valid when viewed in isolation. However, they fail to take into account that the employment of any weapon system is based on the capability of the weapon system to support a tactical or strategic scenario. The basic flaw of these contrary arguments to China's defensive needs is a purely American interpretation of how that defense ought to be achieved. It is both simplistic and dangerous to examine the question of arms transfers to China, or any other country for that matter, with the predisposition that the best solution to any country's defense problem is a transposition of American organizations, doctrines and technologies regardless of their fit.

This paper will deal with the problem of arms transfers to China by addressing the most likely form of Soviet attack on the PRC and the most likely response by China. By using China's defense scheme of maneuver, it will attempt to identify a weapons mix of US arms that would greatly enhance China's ability to counter a Soviet attack and, yet, not run counter to the legitimate concerns of the United States as outlined above.

Soviet Threat Scenario

A Soviet attack on China would most likely follow the 1945 model for the destruction of the Japanese Kwangtung Army, when the entire northeast of China was conquered in ten days.[11] Today's Soviet troop dispositions are quite similar to those of Soviet forces prior to their attack in 1945.[12] Their planned scheme of maneuver would necessitate that the following general requirements be met in order to be successful: strategic surprise; terrain suitable for the employment of large mechanized forces; secure supply lines, especially fuel supply lines; and absolute air superiority in the area of operation.

If any of these requirements are not met by the attacking Soviet forces, the likelihood of a Soviet success would not be good. Soviet logistical constraints will necessitate a strategy of rapid annihilation, taking advantage of its superiority in firepower and mobility. The Soviets simply cannot allow a recurrence of the logistical bottlenecks that occurred during the 1945 Manchurian campaign or their 1968 occupation of Czechoslovakia, when entire brigades ran out of fuel and food and were unable to carry out their

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assigned missions.[13] In essence, the Soviet scheme of maneuver is dependent upon the massive application of supporting arms, possibly including chemical and tactical nuclear weapons; the rapid neutralization or destruction of the less mobile Chinese forces; the maintenance of an effective logistical flow to maintain heavy ammunition and fuel expenditures; and the prevention of Chinese forces from massing at close range, thus negating the effect of the Soviet supporting arms advantage.



The Soviet offensive scheme of maneuver can be divided into three distinct phases (see map).

Phase I—A three-pronged attack with one army group crossing the Amur River and advancing south through the Lesser Khingan Range onto the

Manchurian Plain to Ch'i-ch'i-ha-erh and Ha-erh-pin (Harbin), while another army group attacks west and south from the line Khabarovsk-Vladivostok, and a third army group drives east from Borzya toward Ha-erh-pin across the Greater Khingau Range. Siuce speed is essential in order to trap forward-deployed Chinese units, extensive use of both airborne and airmobile units will be essential. The necessity to maintain a high rate of advance may require selective tactical nuclear employment. A naval blockade would most likely be imposed during this phase and maintained during subsequent phases.

The most propitious time of the year for a Soviet attack of Manchuria would be during the winter months—there are several good reasons for this. First, the rivers in Heilungkiang and Kirin provinces are frozen for seven months out of the year, thus making it possible for trucks, infantry and some armored personnel carriers to cross these rivers without benefit of bridging equipment. Second, the Soviet Army is better equipped to fight in cold weather than the Chinese. The Soviet forces are mechanized and can use their armored vehicles as protection, while the predominantly foot-mobile Chinese infantry would find the process of digging in extremely difficult with a frostline that is several feet deep.[14] Being unable to dig in quickly would make the Chinese very vulnerable if caught in the open by the mobile combined forces of the Soviet Army. Third, the stable high-pressure cell over central and northeast Asia during the winter months would make flying conditions excellent, thus facilitating close air support operations for the Russian ground forces and vital reconnaissance and interdiction missions ahead of the advancing Russian columns.[15] Finally, the prevailing winter winds are to the southeast and southwest. This condition would allow the Soviet forces to more efficiently employ chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, since the downwind fallout patterns would blow away from the attacking Russians.[16]

Both rainfall and flooding would affect military operations in Manchuria and North China. During the winter months, precipitation in this area is light. However, with the advent of summer, rainfall becomes a serious problem to both attacker and defender alike. In Manchuria, heavy rains begin in May and continue until September, turning much of the Manchurian Plain into a muddy quagmire. The same is true from June to September for North China when heavy rains make off-road travel nearly impossible.[17] The impact of heavy summer rains would most likely have a greater effect on the Soviet forces, since few roads in Manchuria or North China are hard-surfaced, all-weather roads, and the highly mechanized-motorized forces of the Soviet Army would be more dependent on road trafficability than the Chinese infantry. Consequently, it would be most advantageons to the Russians to launch their Phase I operations during the early winter months.

Phase II—Once Chinese strategic reserve units have been deployed to the Manchurian Plain, a massive strike along the Dzamin Uud-Kalgan-Peking caravan route would most likely be launched by an armored-motorized army group. Concurrent with this main attack will be an economy of force secondary attack by the three Soviet Manchurian Army groups on Shen-yang and the Liaoning Peninsula. The three Manchurian Army groups will utilize the Ch'i-ch'i-ha-erh to Hsin Li Tun, Ha-erh-pin to Shen-yang, and Kirin to Fu-shun rail routes as axes of advance for their converging attack on Shen-yang.

Phase III—Follow-on (KGB) units will consolidate and pacify the area north and northeast of Peking, while the four Soviet Army groups drive south, stopping at the Yellow River, while continued air interdiction strikes will be mounted against the remaining Chinese units south of the Yellow River. No attempt will be made to occupy any territory south of the Yellow River. A Soviet occupation of Manchuria alone will result in the loss of half of China's confirmed oil resources, a third of its steel-making capability, half of its motor vehicle industry, and nearly 70 percent of its railroad rolling stock and aircraft production.[18] Such losses would have a catastrophic, if not fatal, impact on China's ability to wage any form of conventional warfare, especially if the Soviet naval blockade was effectively deployed to the China-Vietnam border.

China's Defensive Response

The Chinese would face a dilemma in dealing with the preceding offensive scheme of maneuver employed by the Russians. They could either defend forward positions and try to prevent a Soviet penetration of the Manchurian and North China Plain, or they could pursue their expressed defensive policy of "luring in deep" the Soviet Army groups, trading space for time and forcing a war of attrition on their enemy. If executed properly, both defensive schemes of maneuver could be successful; however, both courses of action also entail considerable risk for the Chinese.

To deploy valuable combined arms divisions in forward positions along the Sino-Soviet border in an attempt to block or slow down the Soviet advance in terrain favorable to the defense could invite disaster. Such action would play to the Soviet strength in the initial phase of the Soviet Manchurian offensive, by allowing them to take advantage of superior firepower and mobility to cut off and destroy forward-deployed units. Furthermore, Manchuria's terrain and transport system in the border regions does not lend itself to lateral movement, and the advantages that accrue from operating on interior lines would not be realized until the border areas had been penetrated and the area of operations shifted to the Ha-erh-pin region with its radiating road and rail net.

An "in depth" defense also carries with it severe risks for the Chinese. By allowing the Soviet Army groups to penetrate to the Manchurian and North China Plain without inflicting any appreciable attrition allows the Soviet forces to deploy in terrain favorable for the employment of their combined arms armies. Chinese units, which are relatively deficient in organic transport assets, would find themselves under severe pressure from Soviet mobile divisions while being subjected to intense air attack. Not to be overlooked is that the distance from the Soviet-occupied Outer Mongolian border to Peking is less than 400 miles. A very limited amount of space can be traded for time before the symbolic political center of the PRC is threatened.

There is strong evidence that China's military leadership recognizes that the defensive strategy of "luring in deep" the Soviet Army groups is no longer viable. Chinese articles on defensive strategy indicate that the Chinese would like to conduct a mobile defense—one that would force the Soviets to fight in terrain that would minimize their mechanized, combined arms superiority and not allow the Soviets to occupy Manchuria and North China.[19] If it is China's intention to pursue a policy of forward, mobile defense, then it is necessary for China to develop doctrine to support such a defense and to field an appropriate weapons mix to implement it.

China has already taken the first steps in developing a doctrine for dealing with the Soviet threat and has formulated a basic conceptual framework for the integration of an appropriate synthesis of weapons and tactics.[20] Primary emphasis has gone to upgrading the mobility and firepower of its infantry divisions and armored units. It has also conducted several joint exercises involving the coordination of supporting arms, and naval forces and airborne units in support of rapidly moving ground forces.[21] China has also begun to modernize and expand her railway system and to build modern, all-weather highways throughout the nation. These efforts, along with the purchase of foreign trucks, will increase the mobility of its forces.

Clearly, it is within the capability of China to increase the mobility of its forces and, with practice, to master the complexities of coordinating joint operations. However, China does not now possess the capability to overcome deficiencies in two areas vital for the success of any doctrine involving a mobile defense—air supremacy and mobile, antimechanized firepower. Without a weapons mix that would allow them to overcome these critical weaknesses, they would be unable to inflict sufficient attrition on Soviet forces before they deployed in terrain favorable to Soviet tactics and weapons. In short, if Soviet forces gain access to favorable terrain, the Chinese efforts at improving mobility and training will be of little value.

China's Arms Requirements

As stated earlier, any Soviet attack against China requires four general requirements be met in order to be successful. The problem of *strategic surprise*

has been made much more difficult for the Soviets since the United States has made electronic intelligence available to the Chinese—this should provide the PLA with early warning of any impending Soviet attack. For the Soviets to ensure that their mechanized forces deploy in *suitable terrain*, the Soviets must now allow these forces to be significantly weakened before they have penetrated the Greater Khingan and Ch'ang-pai Shan Ranges of Manchuria or before they have taken the Kalgan Pass northwest of Peking. These geographical obstacles must be cleared and remain open if Soviet mechanized forces are to exploit the advantages that accrue to such forces operating on the North China Plain. The Red army's *secure supply lines* can only be sustained by preventing the Chinese from disrupting the Trans-Siberian railroad and destroying the fuel depots that are supporting the advancing mechanized columns. Finally, Soviet *air superiority* over Manchuria and North China is essential, without it the other three requirements cannot be met.

If these four ingredients are fundamental to the success of the Soviet attack, what weapons could the United States provide to China—either through sales or grants or a combination of both—that would provide her with the capability to mount an effective defensive scheme of maneuver? To deal with this problem we must first identify those weapons for which China needs procurement assistance in order to implement a forward defense strategy.

Of first priority is China's aviation industry. Although China is deficient in many areas of defense production, her most serious problems exist in aircraft production.[22] It is unlikely that China will be able to overcome these problems in the near future without external assistance; thus, her ability to challenge Soviet air superiority is extremely limited.[23]

Following close behind aircraft production is the production of precision-guided munitions. China does not possess the design technology and manufacturing base to produce the antitank precision-guided weapons (ATGM) necessary to defeat the Soviet mechanized threat. Although China is currently making a variant of the Soviet "Sagger" ATGM, it is being produced in limited numbers and is restricted in range and effectiveness.[24]

Taking these deficiencies into account, China's two most pressing weapons needs are: a first line, air supremacy fighter capable of denying local air superiority to the Soviets; and a mobile, precision-guided, antiarmor weapon system that can be deployed rapidly in both Manchuria and North China to defeat Soviet mechanized forces before they deploy in favorable terrain.

A Proposed Weapons Mix

There are two US weapons systems that are well suited to the defensive strategy of the PRC. They provide strength where China is weak and the acquisition of these systems by the Chinese would be difficult to challenge by the proponents of the "go slow" arms transfer policy. These two systems are

Northrop's F-20 Tigershark export fighter and Bell Corporation's AH-1S antiarmor attack helicopter (see chart).

High Yield—Low Cost US Weapons Mix for the PRC

	F-20	AH-1S
Type	Air Supremacy Fighter	Antiarmor Attack Helo
Speed	2.1 Mach	170 kts
Range	345 miles	315 miles
Armament	Sidewinder Missiles 20-mm Cannon	8 Tow 20/30-mm MG
Avionics	Advanced	Simple, Lightweight
Cost	$9.4 million	$4.9 million

Sources: *Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1984-85*, pp. 399-400, 282; also *Military Cost Handbook 1984*, pp. 2-1, 2-2.

Chart

The F-20 is an improved version of the very capable F-5E. It is easier to maintain and less expensive than the F-15 or F-16; yet, it is an excellent air supremacy fighter fully capable of defeating the latest Soviet aircraft. It is not second-rate but represents the worldwide "state of the art" in avionics and weapons efficiency. Its relatively low cost stems from the interchangeability of many F-5E components, the ability to use existing F-5E support and training systems, and the high reliability and low maintenance associated with its General Electric F404 engine.[25] Two hundred F-20s stationed in China's Shen-yang and Peking Military Regions could prevent the Soviet Union from achieving air superiority over Manchuria and North China during the critical first week of a Soviet invasion. In this respect, the F-20 represents the single most important weapon system the Chinese could obtain from the United States in terms of strategy implementation.

The AH-1S is a powerful antitank attack helicopter with simple, lightweight, easily maintained avionics. Its eight Tow antitank guided missiles and 20-mm machine gun make it an efficient and extremely deadly tank killer, ideally suited for employment in the mountainous terrain of Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and the Kalgan Pass area where Soviet armored columns could be confined and exposed. With F-20s providing local superiority, these attack helicopters could exact a heavy toll upon the Soviet mechanized Army groups. Two hundred AH-1Ss would be needed by the Chinese to implement their mobile, forward defense strategy.

The cost of this weapons mix of two hundred F-20s and 200 AH-1Ss, along with 12,000 Tows for the helicopters, would come to approximately $2.99 billion in 1984 dollars.[26] Although this figure is not small, it is substantially less than the Pentagon figures cited earlier and is clearly within China's means. As Lucian Pye has pointed out, it could be a test of China's sincerity about responding to the Soviet threat by offering weapons such as these that are clearly to her advantage to possess.[27] Coproduction agreements could be worked out that would allow China to assemble the F-20 and AH-1S in their homeland, thus reducing the cost of such a weapons mix and making it even more attractive to the Chinese leadership. The Chinese could further reduce the cost of the weapons mix by purchasing the Hughes 500MD/Tow helicopter instead of the AH-1S. It is a less capable aircraft but still a potent tank killer.

Obviously, the provision of arms to China cannot be viewed in isolation, nor can it be addressed only in terms of the dynamics of Sino-Soviet-United States relations. China is a regional power with neighbors who view any increase in China's military strength as a possible threat. The concerns of these nations are legitimate and must be considered by the United States before any attempt is made to provide weapons to the PRC. However, the weapons mix identified in this paper poses no real threat to any of the allies of the United States in East Asia. The short combat ranges of both the F-20 and AH-1S make them of limited value in any scenario involving South Korea, and Japan is clearly far beyond the combat range of these aircraft. These systems are designed primarily as defensive weapons with the only practical utility of the AH-1S being antimechanized defense. Both Japan and South Korea would find it difficult to mount effective counterarguments for China possessing such weapons.

Taiwan would be another matter. The F-20 could well pose some threat to Taiwan. Air superiority is a necessary component of any successful amphibious operation and the F-20's range could make it a potent weapon over the Taiwan Straits. But most analysts do not believe that China possesses the sea or airlift capabilities to assure the success of an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. They argue that such an undertaking would be too costly in terms of men, equipment and materiel. Should the PRC decide to move against Taiwan, the more likely form of action would be a naval blockade.[28] Given this rationale, the utility of the F-20 would be greatly reduced and the AH-1S would, of course, be of no use at all.

The F-20's limited range does not make it a serious threat to South Korea, even if the Chinese station these aircraft in the Shen-yang Military Region. However, should the Chinese transfer these aircraft to the North Koreans, the problems of South Korea's air defense will be significantly complicated. However, this is a moot question since North Korea could obtain an equally capable aircraft from the Soviets.

As regards the Soviets, since both the F-20 and the AH-1S are primarily defensive weapons, it would be difficult for Moscow to argue that they pose an offensive threat to them. But they do pose a significant obstacle to the offensive intentions of the Soviet Union and represent a complex planning problem for the Soviet military leadership.

There are opportunities, as well as risks, in every sale or transfer of weapons. Obviously, policymakers must carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each situation before committing this nation to providing weapons to any nation. This paper, while not necessarily advocating the sale of weapons to the PRC, has sought to broaden the scope of thought in this important area by attempting to identify a weapons mix that is compatible with current Chinese military doctrine, that is technologically absorbable, that is affordable and, finally, that is benign in terms of threat to either the United States or her allies in East Asia. While not a panacea for China's defense needs, this weapons mix would provide the maximum utility to the Chinese with the minimum risk to her non-Soviet neighbors. By making this weapons mix available to the Chinese, the United States could increase stability and reduce the danger of conflict in East Asia by reducing the Soviet Union's overall military advantage. It would also add to the Soviet Union's uncertainty as to whether or not the United States would aid China in the event of a Soviet attack. At the very minimum, it would probably cause the Soviet Union to tie down an ever greater percentage of its forces on the Sino-Soviet border where the cost of maintaining these units is relatively expensive. Such a situation would surely provide a concomitant advantage to Nato, where the imbalance in conventional forces is of considerable concern to the United States and her West European allies.

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Captain Mahan, Admiral Fisher and Arms Control at The Hague, 1899

William R. Hawkins

On 3 September 1898, the Russian Foreign Minister Count Mikhail Muraviev issued a call in the name of the young Tsar Nicholas II for a conference to exchange "ideas in furtherance of national economy and international peace in the interests of humanity." In popular perception it was to be a conference to promote disarmament, but the Russians had a more modest aim. The conference was only "to put an end to the constantly increasing development of armaments." It was not to disturb the current level of armaments or upset the balance of power. Still, it was a landmark act. Though there had been various schemes and even some treaties limiting armaments in the past (usually imposed at the end of wars by the winners on the losers), there had never been a conference of all the great powers to place arms control at the center of negotiations.

"The first arms control conference set a pattern for subsequent efforts to limit weaponry—a pattern of *failure*. Diplomatic efforts which attempt to treat symptoms independent of causes are not likely to produce meaningful results."

The Russian call was viewed with suspicion by most governments. Russia had just completed a buildup of forces in Asia and had recently reequipped its army with a new rifle. An arms race involving all of the major European powers was in progress. All the major Continental nations had adopted conscription, and were fielding peacetime armies large even by today's standards from a population half the size. These standing armies were backed up by extensive reserve organizations. Military service was universal with three years of active duty and 10-12 years reserve duty average. Russia massed the largest peacetime establishment with 896,000 soldiers with some four million reservists. Germany mustered 545,000 in peacetime with 6,213,000

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reservists, half of whom were earmarked for offensive use. France counted 544,000 normal establishment with 4,660,000 on reserve; Austria had 350,000 active duty and about three million in reserve; and Italy kept 222,000 in its standing forces with 3,325,000 ready for mobilization. Even England, which was still a volunteer service, could count 236,000 British Regulars, a 198,000 Indian Army, 288,000 other Imperial Forces and a 486,000 reserve.[1]

Arms races in the industrial age concentrate more on machines than men. Germany had just developed a new field gun with a rate of fire of six rounds per minute. Russian guns could only manage one round per minute. Germany's ally, Austria, was planning to obtain the new gun. However, the cost for Russia to acquire similar artillery from France would be more than Finance Minister Sergei Witte could spare for new military programs. Russia needed a "freeze" to keep from falling behind.[2]

The Russian Minister of War, General Alexei Kuropatkin had originally proposed to the tsar a bilateral agreement with Austria for a 10-year moratorium on the acquisition of new artillery. This would maintain the current balance. Witte proposed that an international conference be sought instead of the more traditional diplomacy in an attempt to arrest the arms race across the board; an arms race Witte was convinced was driving all of Europe toward bankruptcy. A conference might also disguise Russia's particular financial weakness behind a cloud of idealism and mutual concern, whereas opening talks with Austria alone would draw attention to it.

Russia's motives were well-known in diplomatic circles and were not confused with idealism. However, the pressure of the peace movement was such that no major government could openly reject an invitation to negotiate. The peace movement had been growing in both America and Europe. It was composed of a diffuse and often contradictory coalition of factions: religious pacifists, socialists who rejected nationalism in favor of the international solidarity of the working class, conservative lawyers and businessmen seeking world order under a system of universal law, and classical liberals advocating individual self-interest and free trade as alternatives to governmental authority and power politics. During the eight months between the calling of the conference and its convening, all the major capitals were bombarded with petitions, deputations and demonstrations by peace and disarmament advocates. Newspapers in both America and Europe exaggerated both the scope and the chance for success of the conference. When the conference opened, thousands of antiwar activists flocked to it. As one journalist reported at the time "Young Turks, old Armenians, emancipated and enthusiastic women, ancient revolutionaries from the 'forties, buzzed around The Hague like bees."[3]

Yet, the peace movement did not have a monopoly on public opinion. National feelings were running high in all lands as was distrust for the motives and ambitions of other countries. Russia was perhaps the least trusted of all.

Thus Rudyard Kipling found a ready audience for his poem "The Truce of the Bear" written in response to the tsar's proposal for arms limitation. The poem tells of "the Bear that walks like a Man" and the hunter who held his fire when "touched by pity and wonder" when he saw the "paws like hands in prayer." The bear used the hunter's hesitation to attack, blinding and maiming the hunter. Kipling concludes:

> When he stands up as pleading, in wavering man-brute guise,
> When he veils the hate and cunning of his little swinish eyes;
> When he shows as seeking quarter, with paws in hands of prayer,
> *That* is the time of peril—the time of the Truce of the Bear!

In all, 26 states sent delegations to the conference which opened at the Huis ten Bosch (the House in the Woods), the royal summer palace of the House of Orange in The Hague on 18 May 1899.[4] It was the largest diplomatic gathering of the powers since the Congress of Vienna.

Most of the delegates were sent by governments with severe reservations about the goals of the conference. Some were openly hostile to the very idea of such a conference. France was afraid that a "freeze" would perpetuate its inferiority to Germany and was upset with their entente ally for initiating the idea, especially since St. Petersburg did not consult with Paris before issuing its call. Italy and Austria wished to avoid any interference with their arms buildup. Japan would only listen to proposals for naval limitations after she had reached parity with the major maritime powers. England would have liked to "freeze" the naval balance in her favor, but without concrete measures to insure against cheating (including on-site inspection which no major power would allow as an intrusion on sovereignty), could not risk her first line of defense. Serbia was opposed to any arms limitations on the grounds that only by military means could the Serbian people be united in a single nation.[5]

Germany was well aware of Russia's financial weakness and did not care to help St. Petersburg out of its predicament. Berlin wanted the strategic advantages that a strong, industrial economy afforded. Germany since unification in 1871 had prospered. National income had doubled, coal and steel production had increased by a factor of four, surpassing England. Population had increased by 50 percent. Germany the most heavily armed nation on the Continent was also the wealthiest, a point its delegates never ceased to point out whenever anyone denounced "the crushing burden of armaments" as a factor impeding economic growth. The Germans were expected to be the main obstacle to any successful agreement at The Hague. Kaiser Wilhelm II's first reaction on hearing of the conference and fearing that its goal was disarmament was to send a note to Tsar Nicholas. In it he reproached the Russian ruler and reiterated his central identification of the military with the state. Imagine, "a Monarch holding personal command of his Army, dissolving his regiments, sacred with a hundred years of

history . . . and handing over his towns to Anarchists and Democracy."[6] Wilhelm wanted no part in such a scene.

The international environment was not favorable to such a novel diplomatic effort. Even the decision to hold the meeting at The Hague was a reflection of this. The first choice had been Geneva, but the Swiss city had become a haven for radicals of all persuasions and nationalities and was considered too dangerous because of terrorist activity. The Empress Elizabeth of Austria had been assassinated there only the year before.[7]

The American attitude toward the talks was mixed. The United States had been the first nation to accept the Russian invitation, an indication of the more active role in the world that the new Secretary of State, John Hay, wished the United States to play in the wake of the Spanish-American War. The head of the delegation was Andrew D. White, the Ambassador to Germany. White was a cofounder of Cornell University and a moderate Republican committed to the furtherance of international law. He worked hard for the establishment of an international court of arbitration. He had less faith in the ability of the Great Powers to negotiate arms limitations and, as a former ambassador to Russia, had misgivings as to St. Petersburg's motives. In his *Autobiography* he summed up his instructions from Secretary Hay on the arms control issue. "As regards the articles relating to the non-employment of new firearms, explosives and other destructive agencies, the restricted use of the existing instruments of destruction, and the prohibition of certain contrivances employed in naval warfare, it seems to the department that they are lacking in practicality and that the discussion of these articles would provoke divergency rather than unanimity of view . . . . The expediency of restraining the inventive genius of our people in the direction of devising means of defense is by no means clear, and considering the temptations to which men and nations may be exposed in time of conflict, it is doubtful if an international agreement of this nature would prove effective."[8]

Among the other members of the US delegation was Alfred Thayer Mahan whose 1890 classic *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History* easily made him among the best known delegates. Mahan had no delusions about arms control. Only two years earlier he had written: "Time and staying power must be secured for ourselves by that rude and imperfect, but not ignoble arbiter, force—force potential and force organized—which so far has won, and still secures, the greatest triumphs of good in the checkered story of mankind."[9]

Nor did his views change. Writing about The Hague conference afterwards, he said "Step by step in the past, man has ascended by means of the sword, and his more recent gains, as well as present conditions, show that the time has not yet come to kick down the ladder."[10] White noted of Mahan that "his views are an excellent tonic, they have effectively prevented any lapse into sentimentality. When he speaks, the millennium fades and this stern, severe actual world appears."[11]

Mahan's appointment to the conference took most people by surprise. Mahan had retired from active duty in 1896 and had devoted his time to writing—*The Life of Nelson* and *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Past and Present* were both published in 1897. He had been called back to serve on the Navy War Board during the Spanish-American War. The reasons for his appointment and for his acceptance appear tied to the fact that Britain had announced that its best known naval officer and strategist, Admiral Sir John Fisher, would serve as London's delegate from the Royal Navy. Washington wanted someone with an international reputation to draw attention to the US delegation at its first major conference, while Fisher's presence gave participation in the conference credibility in Mahan's eyes.[12]

Both the American captain and the British admiral were approaching their sixtieth birthdays with over eighty years of combined naval experience. In personality the two men were quite different. Mahan was a scholar, Fisher was a man of action. Mahan had retired to a life of letters while Fisher was on his way to command Britain's Mediterranean Fleet. In thought, however, the two men had much in common. Mahan's history was written in admiration of the British Fleet and Fisher was an admirer of Mahan's history, often quoting passages in his correspondence.[13] One of the strategic reforms which Fisher pushed was for the reorganization of the units of the Royal Navy, which were scattered across the Empire in local commitments, into concentrated battle fleets as per Mahan's dictates. Though in future years they would disagree on specific issues of weapons and tactics (such as on the utility of the all-big-gun battleship and the submarine), at The Hague Mahan and Fisher shared a common outlook on the utility of military and naval power in world affairs and a profound skepticism towards arms control diplomacy. Their cooperation at the conference reflected in microcosm the "Great Rapprochement" then in progress between the American and British Governments.

Mahan was a strong advocate of cooperation between Washington and London, and had personally experienced the good will which was growing between the two countries. In 1893, Mahan had served on the European station aboard the cruiser *Chicago* and had been enthusiastically received in England. He was the guest of honor at receptions with the Queen, the Admiralty and the Royal Navy Club and was given honorary degrees by Oxford and Cambridge. He was well aware that an Anglo-American alliance based on cultural kinship would guarantee command of the seas.[14] Eventually, of course, such an alliance would save Western Europe in two world wars.

Admiral Fisher's biographer, Richard Hough, believes "It was one of Lord Salisbury's shrewdest moves in his last ministry to show the world the nature of the man they would have to break if they took up arms against England."[15] Fisher was the Tory Prime Minister's personal choice as a man who could be counted on not to compromise the power of the British Fleet. James Stokesbury has described Fisher as the man who "dragged the Royal Navy

kicking and screaming into the twentieth century."[16] He introduced the destroyer as a warship class and pushed for the conversion from coal to oil. He reformed training with particular emphasis on gunnery and engineering. But he did not limit his pursuit of modernization only to administrative reform and technological progress. He also wanted to bring the way people thought about war and strategy into line with the modern reality of the industrial world. He upset the Victorian complacency. The British admiral, a blunt and colorful individual, described his early deterrence theory as follows: "If you rub it in both at home and abroad, that you are ready for instant war with every unit of your strength in the first line, and intend to be first in, and hit your enemy in the belly, and kick him when he is down, and boil your prisoners in oil (if you take any!), and torture his women and children, then people will keep clear of you."[17]

As First Sea Lord, Fisher made the decision to revolutionize battleship design with the launching of the *Dreadnought* in 1906 and he was among the first to predict the use of unrestricted submarine warfare (Winston Churchill thought this view was extremist in 1913). He served again as First Sea Lord during World War I. He listened to the speeches at The Hague "wondering that they could think that any of their resolutions would be recognized in war."[18] Fisher hated war and the suffering it caused. He had experienced war firsthand in China and Egypt. But he understood the form it would take in the industrial age and was determined that England would be prepared for the worst. The journalist Harold Begbie wrote of Fisher's impact on the meeting: "The polite gentlemen at the House in the Woods were debating as to how war might be conducted with as little pain and inconvenience as possible, when Sir John broke in with the way in which he intended to fight his sea battles . . . . Men sat listening with blanched faces, with horror in their eyes, and at the end a shudder ran round the circular yellow room. It was said to be the most dreadful and appalling picture of war ever drawn by a human mind."[19]

Yet, he impressed the delegates in other ways as well. His journalist friend, W. T. Stead, who was covering the conference, took pride in recalling that Fisher "danced down everyone else in the ballroom" and was "instantly acclaimed as the heartiest, jolliest and smartest delegate at The Hague."[20]

The Hague conference was divided into three committees. Fisher and Mahan served on the First Committee dealing with arms limitation. Several proposals had been placed on the agenda by the Russians. Leading the list were Russian plans limiting army force levels and budgets to their current figures for five years and freezing naval forces for three years. Each nation would be obligated to publish data each year on troop strength, budgets, fortifications, and ship tonnage. Only colonial troops were exempt from the limitation, a loophole which the Russians planned to exploit by counting their forces in Asia as colonial. These proposals were rejected by a subcommittee as

unworkable with only the Russian delegate in favor. Mahan read the official American position stating that since the United States was not engaged in the present arms race (its army numbered only 100,000 men), the issue was purely a European matter.[21]

Most of the attempts to ban specific weapons were also unsuccessful. Russian proposals to limit fleets, naval gun sizes and armor plate were overwhelmingly defeated, with Mahan and Fisher in strong opposition. While the United States was not engaged in the European arms race, Mahan told Fisher that the coming struggle for the China market would require an increase in America's Asian squadron.[22] Proposals to limit field artillery as to size and rate of fire also lost. The main issue which had prompted Russia to call the conference never had a chance. A ban on submarines and torpedo boats was opposed by Austria and France, both of whom wanted the relatively inexpensive naval weapons for coastal defense. Mahan made no statement on the value of such weapons even though their concept ran counter to his philosophy of the battle fleet. He merely reserved the right for the United States to build them if Washington so desired. The elimination of rams was endorsed by Russia, England, France and Japan and Mahan said that the United States would agree if everyone else did. Sweden and Austria, however, refused and Germany claimed that its designs could not be changed.[23] Repeatedly, throughout the conference, nations would use the requirement of unanimity to disguise their objections. Thus positions which were opposed in private could be taken in public without the risk that they would become commitments.

Only three concrete measures for restricting weapons were adopted at The Hague: a ban on the use of poison gas in naval warfare, a ban on the "dum-dum" expanding bullet, and a five-year moratorium on the dropping of bombs from balloons or from other similar airborne platforms. Fisher, Mahan, and Mahan's colleague from the Army, Capt. William Crozier, led the opposition to all three restrictions. Indeed, they provided virtually all the open opposition. It was only a slight exaggeration when Fisher informed a Royal Navy colleague, "It's very hard work here. It's a case of *Britannia contra mundum*!"[24]

Mahan was quite vigorous in his opposition to the ban on chemical projectiles in naval warfare. Since no tests had been run on such weapons, it was impossible to determine whether they could be decisive in combat. If poison gas was a "decisive" weapon, rather than just a "cruel" weapon, it should not be banned. Indeed, it probably could not be successfully banned. Its utility would make its use inevitable. Mahan also doubted that chemical weapons were any more cruel than other weapons (he pointed out the torpedo and the magnetic mine as examples) which were used without scruple. He argued that, "It is illogical to be tender about a weapon that would asphyxiate men when it is allowable to blow the bottom out of an

ironclad at midnight, throwing four or five hundred men into the sea to be choked by water."[25]

The ban on gas projectiles was passed with only the United States casting a negative vote. However, the British had voted in the affirmative with the stipulation that the measure must be passed unanimously for London to abide by it. Since Fisher knew the US position, he knew that this escape clause would render the vote meaningless.[26] Britain did not sign this convention until after a change of government in 1907 when the Liberal Party ended two decades of Conservative rule. Gas weapons at sea proved impractical so it is impossible to say whether The Hague treaty had any restraining effect. Since the major powers made extensive use of poison gas on land in World War I, it is doubtful arms control diplomacy can take much credit for halting the spread of chemical warfare to the oceans.

The ban on expanding bullets was passed to annoy the British who had developed them for use in colonial warfare where the "stopping power" of the outnumbered soldiers of the Queen needed to be augmented. Since the United States was engaged in a guerrilla war in the Philippines, there was a common interest in such munitions. The United States and England cast the only negative votes on banning the "dum-dum." The vote did nothing to impede the advancement of small arms.

The arguments of the military experts carried more weight in regard to aerial weapons. The committee had originally voted to ban aerial projectiles completely. However, a discussion between Mahan and Crozier the evening after the vote led to a new American proposal the next day. Using the same argument which Mahan had used earlier on gas warfare, Crozier convinced the committee that not enough information was available about aerial weapons to justify an indefinite ban. Thus, he proposed that the ban be limited to only five years. His argument was accepted. It is doubtful that the development of air warfare would ever have been hampered by treaty. The Germans used their zeppelins for bombing raids on London in World War I before they were replaced by more capable aircraft.

When it came time to sign the arms limitation declarations, Andrew White urged that the United States drop its opposition and sign all three declarations. Mahan and Crozier refused to sign the declarations covering "dum-dum" bullets and poison gas in naval warfare, but did allow the United States to sign the 5-year ban on aerial bombs. Actually, the number of dissenters among the powers increased. England, Germany, Japan, Austria, Italy, Serbia, China and Luxembourg refused to sign any of the declarations.

Other topics drew the attention of Mahan and Fisher. Secretary of State Hay had expressed the hope in his instructions to Andrew White that the traditional American concern for freedom of the seas be introduced at the conference even though it was not mentioned in the Russian agenda.[27] Mahan as the naval delegate should have been the man to make the proposal to the

First Committee which dealt with ways to make war more humane. However, he was opposed to it in principle. Five years earlier, Mahan had written an essay for *The North American Review* in which he laid out the case for breaking with the traditional American view of neutral rights. The question was one of strategy, not morality. " . . . all maritime nations more or less, depend for their prosperity upon maritime commerce, and probably upon it more than any other factor. Either under their own flag or that of a neutral, either by foreign trade or coasting trade, the sea is the greatest of boons to such a state; and under every form its sea-borne trade is at the mercy of a foe decisively superior.

"Is it then, to be expected that such a foe will forego such advantage—will insist upon spending blood and money in fighting or money in the vain effort of maintaining a fleet which, having nothing to fight, also keeps its hands off such an obvious means of crippling the opponent and forcing him out of his ports? Great Britain's navy in the French wars, not only protected her own commerce, but also annihilated that of the enemy; and both conditions—not one alone—were essential to her triumph.

"It is because Great Britain's sea power, though still superior, has declined relatively to that of other states, and is no longer supreme, that she has been induced to concede to neutrals the principle that the flag covers the goods. It is a concession wrung from relative weakness—or possibly from a mistaken humanitarianism; but to whatever due, it is all to the profit of the neutral and to the loss of the stronger belligerent."[28]

The United States had been in an inferior naval position during most of its history. Politically isolated but involved in commerce on a global scale, it had thus adopted the claim of neutral rights, "the dream of weaker sea belligerents in all ages." But conditions had now changed. The 1890s witnessed the birth of an American battle fleet and the acquisition of the Philippines. Now, the United States was on its way to becoming a major world naval power and like England, would both want and need to exercise command of the sea. Mahan believed that an international agreement upholding freedom of the seas would conflict with America's new strategic interests. The American delegation was thus split.

The proposed American article was not as strong a declaration of neutral rights as the United States had favored in the past. It was to read as follows, "The private property of all citizens or subjects of the signatory powers, with the exception of contraband of war, shall be exempt from capture or seizure on the high seas or elsewhere by the armed vessels or by the military forces of any of the said signatory powers. But nothing herein contained shall extend exemption from seizure to vessels and their cargoes which may attempt to enter a port blockaded by the naval forces of any of the said powers."[29]

Still, this was very close to the affirmation of rights made by the Armed Neutrality of 1800 which Mahan had earlier written contesting the "maritime

claims upon which Great Britain conceived her naval power, and consequently her place among the nations, to depend."[30] A new affirmation would do the same to undermine American naval power.

Mahan returned to this theme again in 1904 when President Theodore Roosevelt suggested that a second Hague conference be convened to discuss the protection of private property at sea. In a long letter to Roosevelt, Mahan, now an admiral, argued, "There is no more moral wrong in taking 'private' property than in taking 'private' lives; and I think my point incontestable, that property employed in commerce is no more private, in uses, than lives employed on the firing lines are private."[31]

Mahan also argued, in anticipation of an Anglo-American alliance, that the United States had an interest in England exercising its traditional power at sea against trade. "Great Britain and the British Navy lie right across Germany's trade with the whole world. Exempt it, and you remove the strongest hook in the jaw of Germany that the English-speaking people have—a principal gag for peace."[32]

He enclosed with the letter part of his *Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812*, a work then in progress which was critical of the American commitment to neutral rights and which upheld the logic of the traditional British doctrine of sea control. Theodore Roosevelt had written his own book on *The Naval War of 1812* in 1883 in which he had defended the American position.

Mahan was supported in his revisionist views by most high-ranking naval officers, including Admiral Charles S. Sperry. Sperry was a former president of the Naval War College and future commander of Roosevelt's "Great White Fleet" during most of its global voyage. He was also America's naval delegate to the Second Hague Conference. Asst. Secretary of State Alvey Adee and State Department Solicitor James Brown Scott also made Mahan's argument to the President and to the Secretary of State, Elihu Root. In the end, Mahan's views won the day with Roosevelt and Root concluding that it would not be in the national interest to push neutral rights at The Hague in 1907.[33]

White attempted to rebut Mahan with a line with which he knew Mahan agreed. White argued that one of the lessons of the American Civil War was that commerce raiding is not a decisive strategy. That even if Union losses to Confederate cruisers "had been ten times as great, they would still have contributed nothing towards ending the contest . . . the only effective measure for terminating war by the action of a navy is the maintenance of a blockade" which the American proposal did not restrict.[34] What White's argument did not consider was that technological progress had rendered obsolete the sort of close blockade of coasts and harbors as practiced in the days of sail. Mahan was also able to reply that there was a fundamental difference between the raiding strategy of the *guerre de cours* practiced by weak naval powers like the Confederacy and the strategy of total commerce

destroying which could be practiced by a powerful navy exercising comprehensive sea control. While White was correct in concluding that raiding was not a decisive strategy, he had failed to understand the difference between raiding and the total denial of the use of the seas which can be accomplished by naval supremacy.

The official American proposal stood between two eras. As a compromise it was bound to fail, for once the door was open to the realities of naval strategy, the old idealism of neutral rights could no longer be maintained. Mahan and most other American proponents of naval expansion recognized this contradiction and how it must be resolved. So, of course, did Fisher.

Fisher did more than defend the traditional strategy of the Royal Navy in his opposition to White. He continued his argument that in modern war, nations and their commanders will do what they must to win. After one debate over the status of neutral coal-carrying merchantmen, Fisher sketched an example of what he meant. "When I leave The Hague, I go to take command of the Mediterranean Fleet. Suppose that war breaks out, and I am expecting to fight a new Trafalgar on the morrow. Some neutral colliers try to steam past me into the enemy's waters. If the enemy gets their coal into his bunkers, it may make all the difference in the coming fight. I tell you that nothing that you, or any power on earth, can say will stop me from sending them to the bottom, if I can in no other way keep their coal out of the enemy's hands; for to-morrow I am to fight the battle which will save or wreck the Empire. If I win, I shall be far too big a man to be affected by protests about neutral colliers; if I lose it, I shall go down with my ship into the deep and then protests will affect me still less."[35]

White found some support among the delegates from Sweden and Holland, states with long histories of drawing profits from neutral trade in wartime. The leader of the German delegation, Count Georg Münster, also said he would support the proposal, though White feared this was only a ploy to separate the Americans from the British. By the same token, the British, though opposed to the proposal, said that they would not oppose an open discussion and a vote on its merits in order to smooth over the split with the United States. The Germans, of course, had every strategic reason to favor anything which would limit British naval power. They were aware as were Mahan and Fisher of the Royal Navy's position across their trade routes.

The Russians, however, ruled the proposal out of order because it had not been on the original agenda. The Russians claimed that in principle they had supported the American position since 1823 and that their opposition now was only procedural. Yet, White believed that the real Russian motive was an attempt to keep faith with their French allies who did oppose the American plan.[36] In the end, the Russian objection carried the day and no vote was allowed.

The Third Committee dealt with the establishment of a Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. This was the principal achievement of the conference. Arbitration was the top priority of Ambassador White and he played a major role in working out a proposal the major powers could accept. No nation would allow issues of national honor or vital interest to be settled by arbitration. There was hope, though, that a first step could be taken to settle lesser disputes so that they would not escalate into matters of vital concern. However, the stumbling block was Germany, whose delegates would agree to nothing. White, as ambassador in Berlin, knew well the Kaiser's attitude. As a last effort he persuaded Count Münster to send one of his legal advisers, Phillip Zorn, back to Berlin with the secretary of the American delegation, Frederick Holls, to make a direct plea to Wilhelm II. The argument White used with the conservative German diplomat was that for the conference to fail on the arbitration issue would play into the hands of the socialists and anarchists who claimed that it was impossible for the existing governments of the Great Powers to curb war.[37] Though the Kaiser avoided seeing Holls and Zorn, their trip underscored the reports coming out of The Hague that Germany was diplomatically isolated on the issue. The Kaiser relented, though in private he maintained that "In practice, I shall rely on God and my sharp sword!"[38]

White finally saw the way clear for establishment of an Arbitration Tribunal. But suddenly, once again he was confronted by Captain Mahan. "Diplomacy first, arbitration only in case of diplomacy failing" was the proposition as Mahan saw it, " . . . but diplomacy will fail more readily when one of the parties thinks it will gain substantially by insisting on arbitration . . . maintenance of policies such as the Monroe Doctrine must rest upon diplomacy and its instrument, armament; not upon law."[39]

The French version of the arbitration convention, which was adopted, called upon the signatories to urge arbitration on other powers which were in dispute. Mahan pointed out that this was an obligation to intervene in the affairs of others which violated the premise of the Monroe Doctrine. Mahan threatened to split the delegation and refuse to sign if the offending article was not amended. Embarrassed at having to present a change in a proposal he had worked so long to hammer out, White nevertheless attempted to persuade the French to accept an amendment which reduced the requirement of third parties to intervene in disputes. He was rebuffed. White had to settle for the reading of a statement to the conference proclaiming that nothing in the convention would be allowed to entangle the United States in purely European questions or to countervene the Monroe Doctrine.

The United States joined 15 other states in signing the arbitration convention at The Hague and it was ratified by the US Senate in February 1900. Mahan continued to oppose arbitration as an alternative to diplomacy and war, writing letters and articles calling for a rejection of the arbitration

convention and publishing a book entitled *Armaments and Arbitration* in 1911. In it he expressed the fear that the growth of arbitration sentiment and international law would cause the civilized states to be reluctant to use force in defense of liberty, that " . . . it may lead men to tamper with equity, to compromise with unrighteousness, soothing their conscience with the belief that war is so utterly wrong that beside it no other tolerated evil is wrong."[40]

Admiral Fisher did not say much about arbitration during the debates at The Hague, because he felt that it was useless to talk about such matters. However, he expressed his views to the German naval delegate, Capt. S. Siegel between sessions. According to Siegel, "In the event of war in the Mediterranean, he would not hesitate for an instant to brush aside, without orders, any equivocal agreement reached about arbitration and mediation, if he was persuaded that the political and military position of his country called for this."[41]

Arbitration courts and conferences like that of The Hague were "bad jokes" which would not survive the first salvo of war. Fisher also believed, as did the Admiralty, that the superior state of readiness at which the Royal Navy was maintained was a strategic advantage which could be lost during the delays imposed by a lengthy arbitration.[42] In this, the British Navy's argument matched the German Army's argument—that calls for arbitration would be used as delaying tactics to offset its faster mobilization rate. Thus the arbitration issue saw two Anglo-American partnerships confronting each other. The two civilian heads of delegation, White and Sir John Pauncefote, in favor and the two naval delegates, Mahan and Fisher, opposed. The ambassadors won their point at The Hague, but it proved a victory on paper only.

The First Hague Conference accomplished virtually nothing toward the limitation of armaments. This is not surprising given the international environment and rivalries of the time. The conference did nothing to reduce the level of international tension which is the real cause of wars and arms races. The issues which split the major powers into warring camps were not even brought up for discussion. The year following the conference saw the Boer War and the new German Naval Law proposing the construction of 19 battleships and 23 cruisers be built over the next 20 years, further heating up the arms race at sea. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 was just over the horizon as was the series of crises which would eventually lead to World War I. In this sense, the first arms control conference set a pattern for subsequent efforts to limit weaponry—a pattern of *failure*. Diplomatic efforts which attempt to treat symptoms independent of causes are not likely to produce meaningful results.

A Second Hague Conference was held in 1907, the idea of President Roosevelt, though again the Russian Government was allowed to send the formal invitations to maintain continuity with the First Hague Conference. The

meeting was larger than that of 1899 with 44 nations sending 256 delegates. For the first time the nations of Latin America participated at the insistence of the United States. However, arms control was not even on the agenda. As President Roosevelt wrote to Whitelaw Reed, the US ambassador to the Court of St. James, in 1906: "It is eminently wise and proper that we should take real steps in advance toward a policy of minimizing the chances of war among civilized people, of multiplying the methods and chances of honorably avoiding war in the event of controversy, but we must not grow sentimental and commit some Jefferson-Bryan-like piece of idiotic folly such as would be entailed if the free people that have free governments put themselves at a hopeless disadvantage with military despotisms and military barbarians."[43]

Roosevelt would support the Arbitration Tribunal as established at the 1899 Hague conference, as long as it did not weaken either the Monroe Doctrine or his commitment to American military strength. The first case which went to arbitration at The Hague was an old dispute between the United States and Mexico over church property dredged up by President Roosevelt in 1902 specifically to activate the tribunal. Yet, there were practical limits to what such measures could accomplish. As Roosevelt wrote to Charles William Eliot, the president of Harvard, "In The Hague, my chief problem will come from fantastic visionaries who are crazy to do the impossible. Just at present, the United States Navy is an infinitely more potent factor for peace than all the peace societies of every kind and sort."[44]

The question of disarmament was brought up at the 1907 conference even though it was not on the agenda, but the discussion lasted less than 30 minutes and nothing was accomplished. The only significant arms limitations were the extension for another five-year period the ban adopted in 1899 on bombs dropped from balloons and some articles on the use of magnetic mines at sea and on naval bombardment of shore targets. None were adhered to once war broke out.

Perhaps the futility of The Hague Conferences can best be demonstrated by the mention of one fact. At the end of the Second Hague Conference a resolution was adopted to hold a Third Hague Conference. The year chosen: 1915!

Notes

1. David Woodward, *Armies of the World 1854-1914* (New York: Putnam, 1978), figures cited are for 1900.

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4. The states participating were: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Rumania, Russia, Serbia, Siam, Spain, Sweden-Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States.

5. Calvin D. Davis, *The United States and the First Hague Peace Conference* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 40-41.
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9. A. T. Mahan, "A Twentieth Century Outlook," *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1897), pp. 177-178.
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11. White, p. 346.
12. West, p. 314.
13. Letter to Joseph Chamberlain, 10 November 1900, Arthur J. Marder, *Fear God and Dread Nought* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1952), v. I, p. 165.
14. A. T. Mahan, "Possibilities for an Anglo-American Reunion," *Interest of America in Sea Power*, pp. 107-136.
15. Richard Hough, *Admiral of the Fleet: The Life of John Fisher* (New York: Macmillan, 1969), p. 114.
16. James L. Stokebury, *Navy and Empire* (New York: Morrow, 1983), p. 288.
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18. *Ibid.*, p. 117.
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21. Frederick W. Holls, *The Peace Conference at The Hague* (New York: Macmillan, 1900), p. 91.
22. Charles Carlisle Taylor, *The Life of Admiral Mahan* (New York: Doran, 1920), p. 99.
23. Davis, pp. 120-121.
24. Marder, p. 141. Letter to Capt. Wilmott H. Fawkes, 4 June 1899.
25. Holls, p. 119.
26. Mackay, p. 220.
27. Holls, p. 311.
28. Mahan, "Anglo-American Reunion," pp. 129-130.
29. White, p. 340.
30. A. T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire* (1892; reprint ed., New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), v. II, p. 37.
31. William E. Livezey, *Mahan on Sea Power* (Norman, Okla: University of Oklahoma Press, 1981), p. 275.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 277.
33. Davis, pp. 139-140.
34. Holls, p. 312.
35. Hough, p. 117.
36. White, p. 303.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 285.
38. Tuchman, p. 266.
39. Holls, p. 272.
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41. Mackay, p. 221.
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43. Letter to Whitelaw Reed, 7 August 1906, Elting E. Morison, ed., *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), v. V, pp. 348-349.
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Service College Selection and 1985-86 Class Profile

Much has been written in these pages and the *Newsletter for Navy Officers* of the Chief of Naval Operations' concern about the "best and the brightest" attending the Naval War College. In keeping with this program the Senior Service College (SSC) selection procedures were changed beginning with the spring 1985 screening board. The first period of eligibility will be for three years—the period being between 14 and 17 years of commissioned service. The selection board for this window will be comprised of members of the annual commander promotion board. They will select 30 percent of each year's quotas. The second period of eligibility for SSC will be officers with 17-22 years of commissioned service, selection here will be made by a separate board based on PRD-compatibility with the forthcoming academic year.

Selection for a command and staff college will take place between 8-10 years of commissioned service with a second screening window between 11-13 years. The first selection period provides eligibility for three years.

The service experience and education level of officers attending the Naval War College make for a cosmopolitan and rich setting. Largely as a result of the challenging academic environment, Newport is unparalleled for professional and personal development.

1985-86 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE CLASS PROFILE

	Composition	Degrees	Naval Specialty	
College of Naval Warfare—188 Students (CAPTs, CDRs, Equivalent Other Services)	102 USN, 27 USMC 32 USA, 14 USAF 2 USCG, 11 CIVs	11 Doctorates 110 Masters 65 Undergrads 2 None	Aviation Surface Submarine Other	48 23 13 18
College of Naval Command and Staff—159 Students (CDRs, LCDRs, Equivalent Other Services)	84 USN, 24 USMC 30 USA, 12 USAF 4 USCG, 5 CIVs	0 Doctorates 86 Masters 73 Undergrads	Aviation Surface Submarine Other	46 10 1 27

Note: About sixty-five percent of the annual Navy students are officers who recently came from operational commands.

PROFESSIONAL READING

"If we have learned nothing else from this unique experience, we should have learned one lesson. Our effectiveness as a global power will increasingly depend on our effectiveness in bridging the gulf between our world and the world where most of the globe's people will live."

The Honorable L. Bruce Laingen

Christopher, Warren et al. *American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985. 443pp. $25

November 1985 marked the sixth anniversary of the seizure by student militants of the American Embassy in Tehran. The events of that traumatic day, and those that followed over the next 14 months, preoccupied our government and the American people as few events in history have. They reshaped and significantly, if not decisively, determined the outcome of the Presidential elections of 1980. That result and the many other consequences of that dramatic event in Tehran are yet to be fully felt, not least by Iran itself.

This book, *American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis*, is an exhaustive examination of the management of that crisis, billed as "The inside account of how American Diplomacy met an extraordinary challenge." The product of a study launched by the Council on Foreign Relations in 1982, it is made up of nine separate papers/chapters discussed in the course of that study by their authors, all of whom were insiders in the Carter administration's handling of the crisis. There is occasionally some rationalization in defense of policy, but very little. It is a determined and generally objective effort on the part of

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these principals to examine the "diplomatic, economic, and legal issues at stake in the crisis, the negotiations to resolve it, and possible lessons for the future."

Few Americans will ever forget the felt pain of that long crisis: the enormity of Iran's challenge to previously accepted norms of international behavior; the compounding of the costs to American strategic interests in the area, already felt in the Shah's collapse; the frustrations felt in trying to find means to deal with the crisis that took account of those interests without hurt to the hostages themselves; the way the American public embraced those hostages, thanks to the American media—the latter's role in the crisis touched on, but is too large an issue in itself to find space in this book.

The whole affair, as the then Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher points out in his eloquent introduction to the book, is "a story of almost incredible complexity." And as former Senator Abraham Ribicoff notes in his final chapter on "Lessons and Conclusions," it was as well a "crisis of the future," in the way it so dramatically posed the new and difficult challenge faced by the United States in the threat of terrorism—particularly state-sponsored terrorism of the kind the Tehran crisis symbolized.

The book is an impressive source book, written by those at the working level just below the President who provided Carter his policy options. Three chapters by Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East, are as succinct accounts of the intense and sustained involvement by top policymakers in the course of the crisis as can be found. Gary Sick, his counterpart on the National Security Council staff, and whose more recent book, *All Fall Down*—in itself a monumental contribution to our understanding of both the revolution and the hostage crisis in Iran—reviews the military options in the crisis and the tragic failure of the rescue mission. Three chapters by two senior Treasury officials and a Citibank banker recount the economic and financial aspects of the settlement in probably more detail than the average reader would ever want to know. But in doing so they effectively convey both the singular and tireless efforts of those involved in getting agreement on disposition of the frozen Iranian assets and the extremely important leverage that those frozen assets represented in achieving an acceptable resolution to the crisis. There is also an excellent chapter by Oscar Schacter discussing the legal issues involved. For the long reach of history, perhaps nothing will matter more than the way the Carter administration's handling of the crisis dramatized the importance of the rules of law and diplomacy that were at stake, not simply for this country but for the international community at large. In doing so this chapter, and indeed the book as a whole, is a reminder of the limits that present themselves to a country in dealing with terrorism inflicted upon it—especially a country such as ours, committed and responsible as a Great Power to the rule of law. We have had a dramatic and telling reminder of that in the recent TWA 847 crisis in Beirut.

The lessons are legion in this book's pages. The "deceptively attractive" nature of economic sanctions in confronting such crises. The difficulty of getting effective multilateral cooperation, on these or other sanctions, despite the rhetoric that abounds. The danger of a government's entire focus becoming hostage to a terrorist crisis, as ours did so often in the Tehran affair. The hard choices in considering a resort to force, especially when geography is against one as it was in Iran. The difficulty, as Gary Sick points out, of reconciling the contradiction between the protection of innocent human lives and the preservation of national honor, apparent again with such pain in the Beirut TWA 847 crisis. The utility of having friends among the nonaligned, in this case the Algerians. The need for a deeper and more perceptive understanding of the root causes of terrorism, and whether better ways can be found to get at those causes. As Harold Saunders observes: "If we have learned nothing else from this unique experience, we should have learned one lesson. Our effectiveness as a global power will increasingly depend on our effectiveness in bridging the gulf between our world and the world where most of the globe's people will live."

For most Americans, however, the most lasting impression from that crisis will be in the human domain—the way in which, as Secretary Christopher said in his salute to the Algerians as the hostages arrived in Algiers, 52 men and women and their families "emerged from the chasm of fear" and emerged as well in an unprecedented national celebration of freedom regained, an event of no small impact on our national psyche. Perhaps if this book is deficient in any aspect, it is in its very limited focus on the hostages themselves, their families included, and on such questions as the government's obligations to them in the post-release period—medical, psychological, and indeed financial. The hostages have yet to see any action to this date to provide some kind of "compensation" to them, despite a recommendation to this effect by a Presidential Commission in 1982. On these matters and on all the other human costs inherent in a terrorist crisis, there remains much to learn.

Moineville, Hubert. *Naval Warfare Today and Tomorrow.* New York: Basil Blackwell, 1984. 141pp. $19.95

Rear Adm. Hubert Moineville, French Navy (retired) originally published this book in 1982 under the title *La Guerre Navale: Reflexions sur les affrontements navals et leurs avenir.* In the three years since its first appearance, it has deserved far more attention in the English-speaking world than it has received. The present excellent translation by Comdr. P.R. Compton-Hall, RN, Director of the Royal Navy Submarine Museum at Gosport, Hampshire, now makes the book readily accessible to English readers. Admiral Moineville has added a short postscript to the English edition, written in 1982, on his immediate reaction to the Falklands War.

This book is a short and unpretentious-looking book but, in fact, it is a remarkable and ambitious study. It is a rare work among naval studies that reflects the nature of modern naval warfare and expresses a general concept that is tied neither to some particular naval construction program nor to the blind repetition of age-old naval concepts. It is an experienced naval officer's attempt to analyze logically the current situation, the various possible types of confrontation, the likely aims of participants, and the range of roles for navies as well as changes in technology and their effect on planning naval operations.

Moineville's book is divided into four topical sections: the possibilities of naval confrontation today; general characteristics and context of naval operations; development of forces and naval strategy; and some thoughts on the conduct of naval action. Each of these sections logically builds upon its predecessor and creates a clear and concise examination of the subject.

The book culminates with some general conclusions on the main features that would characterize a battle between naval forces of the future. First, Moineville notes, the battle will take place against a background of strategic deterrence. Effective means of reconnaissance will allow each side to be well informed about the dispositions and movements of each other's surface units. At the same time, however, knowledge and current intelligence about the capabilities and characteristics of enemy equipment and resources will not be as precise as in the past. When the battle occurs, it will have a very technical character. Indeed, Moineville points out, that with the increasing importance of self-guided missiles, the part played by the expertise of those who are fighting has decreased in relation to those who design and produce the missiles. Additionally, computerized information about the enemy will be crucial. With this in mind, the hit advantage will undoubtedly lie with the one who fires first, since the hit probability of a missile is greater than with ordinary gunnery systems. Structural design and damage control will also be of the utmost importance in order to

ensure that a single missile will not sink a ship.

The site of the battle will be a key factor and it will be important to try to choose a location where land-based aircraft, fixed acoustic arrays and submarines can be directly involved in support of ship and sea-based aircraft. Speed and range will continue to be as important as always, but it will be important to try to create the ideal situation in which an enemy is held outside his own range of weapons but within one's own reach. Moreover, weapons will be used in an environment of electronic warfare and electronic countermeasures.

All of these factors suggest the need of technical compatibility at a variety of levels, from issues of allied interoperability to tactical command within the variety of one's own forces. One is faced by a conundrum in which the development of policy may be impeded by techuical factors. Technicians, scientists and designers require policy decisions for further developments, but these decisions are difficult to make until problems in technical compatibility are solved.

Concluding his work, Moineville enumerates three main impressions which come from the multitude of naval developments since 1945: First of all, the range of political purposes which naval operations can serve has widened. Secondly, the range of confrontation that naval support of political objectives can bring about has widened at both ends on the scale of violence. Thirdly, technical developments have also widened and diversified for navies. "Ultimately, then," Moineville writes, "the naval game remains interrelated with our technological explosions and the political changes that shake our world. It is very complex, highly technical, continually changing and very difficult, but it is also very important."

This is a book for any student of naval affairs. It is simple and straightforward enough for the beginning student, and at the same time, thought provoking for even the most advanced theorist. Moreover, it is the most concise and complete statement of the present state of naval warfare available to the general public.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
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Cable, James. *Britain's Naval Future.* Anuapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1983. 220pp. $24.95

James Cable retired from a British diplomatic career in 1980. He now writes and lectures on international and naval affairs. He became well-known, in Western naval circles at least, after writing the excellent *Gunboat Diplomacy* (1971), one of the first analyses of the achievement of political ends by the use of limited naval force.

Like his earlier book, *Britain's Naval Future* is elegantly written with wit and logic and a virtually flawless attempt to present impartially all relevant facts and arguments. In his introduction, Cable notes that in the many British defence white papers

published since 1945, there has been much discussion of political, economic, technical and institutional factors, but rarely a sentence, let alone a sustained exposition, on strategy. Forecasting in the political climate typical of Western industrial democracies—the battle for government funds between welfare and defence requirements—will inevitably lead to more cuts in Britain's defences. Cable says that it is essential that a proper strategy be argued out before major structural changes are forced upon the armed services. He fears that the British Ministry of Defence may now be institutionally incapable of initiating this argument and, therefore, offers his book as a stimulus.

While acknowledging that Nato and other alliances are important to Britain, he states that any strategy must be based on enduring national interests. In Britain, these are all to do with being an island-state off a continent of other sovereign states with different national interests. After a brief historical survey, he notes that the Soviet Union is the latest in a long line of continental states which have posed a threat to Britain. The major differences now being the new dimension of nuclear weapons and for the first time since the days of the Vikings, the continental power has a significantly larger navy than Britain (and here Cable is only considering the Soviet Northern Fleet).

Stating that a democratic electorate needs to be presented with a strategy that is comprehensible, plausible and adaptable, Cable begins by posing the question "what can the Royal Navy do?" He answers this by an exhaustive analysis of several broad scenarios of war and "violent peace," which are qualified where appropriate to produce subordinate contingency events. Together they describe what the Royal Navy can and cannot do in war and in peace to prevent or limit war, or otherwise further national and alliance interests.

One chapter deals with Britain's nuclear deterrent and concludes there is one scenario which cannot be ignored—where this force of four SSBNs would repay its extensive costs, not all of which are economic. On the Royal Navy's contribution to Nato, he considers it is best employed in the defence of the sea lines of communications terminating in or near Britain and in reinforcing Nato's northern flank and islands. He emphasizes the importance of Norway to Britain's defence and adds that a demonstrable peacetime capability to reinforce the northern flank is a valuable deterrent in itself. Showing his grasp of all aspects of the "violent peace," Cable contends that pictures on TV of British ships shadowing a Soviet amphibious force in a time of high crisis, would be an invaluable stiffener to the resolve of politicians faced with Soviet threats and blandishments.

Other scenarios include situations arising from foreign pressure against British seaborne trade and her distant dependencies, and the gloomy possibility of the collapse of the Nato

alliance. Cable states that it is an irony of history, but in the latter case, the Royal Navy's role would become that of a "riskflotte," as envisaged by Tirpitz for the Imperial German Navy in 1900.

In his final chapter, Cable looks at the four major components of Britain's current defences—namely the nuclear deterrent, the defence of the United Kingdom itself, the presence of a British Army Corps and supporting forces in Nato's central front, and the Royal Navy. The Navy is mainly disposed in the Eastern Atlantic but is flexible enough to operate over wider ocean areas. He concludes that the first two components are essential for national survival, and that the Air Defence of the UK also makes a vital contribution to Nato. He concludes however that the other two components (the Army in Germany and the Royal Navy at sea) are incompatible in view of the inevitable relative decline in defence funding. Picking his way carefully he proposes that the army should be withdrawn from Germany and reorganised in order to maintain funding for, and hopefully strengthen, the Royal Navy. This strengthened naval capability would include projecting elements of the army ashore to assist in the defence of the northern flank and islands.

Nonetheless, he admits that it will be a difficult task to persuade the Nato allies, the British electorate and, not least, the army itself of the vital necessity for this change. But feels it must be attempted.

Cable completed his book early in 1982, just before the South Atlantic War between Britain and Argentina. Before publication and without altering his original text, he wrote a special preface including some first thoughts on this war. Here he asks whether anything in the war made nonsense of the rest of the book. Except for the one point that he (like the Argentinian Government) failed to forecast that Britain would fight to recover the Falkland Island dependencies, he concludes that the war does not affect his arguments. He warns about drawing hasty conclusions from the war, which he thinks cannot be paralleled in the range of options available to Britain, and the dependencies' distance giving time for consideration of these options. However, he feels that the war did reinforce some of his points; namely, the value of versatility in the shape of a navy, the movement of warships giving time for negotiation, the fallacy of the single scenario, and that island-states need navies.

Like Cable, I hope this book is read by many of those who can influence British defence policy. Even for those who are not in this position, it is a joy to read for its elegance and its thorough approach to strategic analysis.

M.G.M.W. ELLIS
Commander, Royal Navy

Olsen, Edward. *U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity: A Neo-International View*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1985. 193pp. $24.95

Professor Olsen calls for a revised US policy towards Japan based on neo-internationalism. The foundations of neo-internationalism rest upon reciprocity in defense and reciprocity in trade. He sees the two seemingly separate issues of defense and trade as, in fact, closely linked. Since the United States has in effect subsidized Japanese defense, this has bolstered Japan's ability to compete economically. As the author states in a recent *Christian Science Monitor* editorial comment, "Japanese officials know Japan is vulnerable to U.S. linkage of these issues. Consequently, this is precisely where the U.S. ought to target its pressures on Japan." What would then happen is that, "With neo-internationalism as a guiding principle, the United States should invite Japan to the table for talks on a wide range of subjects to solicit Tokyo's views on an acceptable regional and global strategy. This would signal to the Japanese people and their Asian neighbors that Washington is giving practical effect to its frequently heard rhetoric about making Japan the cornerstone of U.S. Asia policy."

A reasoned and amply documented book, *U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity* briefly reviews the history of US-Japanese strategic relations since World War II, devotes considerable space to an analysis of the present state of the relationship and concludes with a set of policy recommendations for the United States as well as an estimation of their impact on Japan and other interested regional countries.

Though critical of what he terms "existing U.S. oversensitivity to Japanese sensibilities," Olsen avoids "Japan-bashing" and seeks to provide an informed, unemotional critique of the challenge Japan poses to productive bilateral ties. (But it should be noted that Olsen is not above suggesting that, "skillfully administered shokku [shock], carefully signalled to receptive Japanese leaders, could work wonders in motivating Tokyo," a thought that might not sit well with those who argue extra understanding and sympathy for Japan's positions on contentious issues.)

One of the by-products of continuing debate on US-China policy has been a stimulation of interest in the most important US bilateral relation in Asia, that with Japan. Critics may argue with Olsen's view that, "most of what the United States has done to influence Tokyo has been simplistically one-sided," but the fact remains that Japan has only reluctantly inched in the direction Washington has asked, and without "indication of the existence of the true mutuality of interests that the United States ostensibly seeks."

In the face of the pressure put on US-Japanese relations by trade differences, it may well be the time for Washington to "initiate changes that will stimulate the sort of strategic and economic interdependence that will put U.S.-Japan relations on a firm footing in the 1990's and in the next century." Professor Olsen's arguments that it is possible to nudge Japan toward a truly reciprocal

commitment to mutual defense of the global interests it shares with the United States offer a basis for these changes while avoiding either a "Japan-bashing" or "Japanophile" approach.

U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity is a professionally written book whose author sticks to his goal of evaluating the past, present and future course of US-Japan security relations. This short book—154 pages of text and 193 pages in all—is another Hoover Institution Press quality effort, with excellent editing and error-free text. One small word of caution: it presupposes general knowledge of the region and the issues. Beyond that, the book is eminently readable and provides a clear, beneficial contribution to the ongoing and crucial debate as to the future course of our vital US-Japan relationship.

R.S. CLOWARD
Captain, US Navy
American Enterprise Institute

Lind, William S. *Manuever Warfare Handbook*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985. 133pp. $16.50

Kross, Walter. *Military Reform: The High-Tech Debate in Tactical Air Forces*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985. 240pp. $7.50

The debate over military reform continues to play a key role in defense planning and budgeting, yet the concept of military reform remains an enigma. To many, it represents a panacea that will correct the deficiencies of America's fighting forces. To others, military reform poses a threat to all that is good in the military. While the truth is somewhere in between these views, military reform remains a mystery to those that seek to understand it. Based on a theory of warfare both subtle and, of necessity, lacking in concrete rules, military reform has taken many different facades. In its most recognizable form, however, it has come to be associated with two critical areas—maneuver warfare and the debate over high-technology weapons. It is into these two areas that William Lind and Walter Kross, in two widely divergent books, have attempted to end the confusion.

William Lind, longtime critic and supporter of the Marine Corps, has written his book for Marines. Although narrow in its focus, *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* attempts to explain the principles of maneuver warfare and, for the first time, apply those concepts to the realities of tactics. Beginning with a thorough explanation of the theory of maneuver warfare, Lind draws heavily on previously published writings by Marine officers to offer concrete examples of maneuver warfare as it may be applied down to the squad level. He then provides chapters on amphibious operations and Marine Corps education and training. Of particular note is his annotated bibliography, which provides an excellent means for professional expansion. Finally, the author devotes almost half his book to a series of tactical lesson plans written

by Col. Michael D. Wyly, US Marine Corps, former head of the Tactics Department at the Amphibious Warfare School. *Maneuver Warfare Handbook*, by providing the first collection of concrete "how to" examples of maneuver warfare for Marines, is a potentially valuable book. Lind's recent political reputation and his occasional tendency in his book to criticize the Marine Corps, however, could alienate the audience he is trying to reach. Additionally, some of his examples are dated and may lead overly critical readers to miss important points. Rather than being a handbook, the book should be considered a guide, offering under one cover a succinct, easily read beginning for those Marines who seek to apply maneuver warfare at the tactical level.

Walter Kross attempts to clarify the military reform debate by concentrating on the controversy over high-technology weapons, in particular those of the Tactical Air Forces. Unfortunately, he never quite succeeds. Following a too brief look at the military reform movement—which he labels the "Reformers" and inaccurately describes as a few bureaucrats located outside the Department of Defense—Kross takes the reader through two lengthy chapters in which he displays a firm grasp of the quantitative arguments against the procurement of anything but high-technology aircraft. A careful reader may occasionally garner bits of praise for the "Reformers," but they are quickly hidden in his analysis of current defense policy as proposed by the "Defense Planners," obviously the besieged protagonists.

While the author's arguments may be correct, they suffer from his haphazard explanation of the fundamental elements of the reform movement. The OODA decision cycle developed by Col. John Boyd, the cornerstone of military reform, is mentioned but inadequately defined. William Lind is quoted, largely out of context, but his theory of maneuver warfare is poorly examined and mistakenly equated to war with movement. Kross' book begins with admirable motives, to finally define the arguments involved in the military reform debate, but his biases too quickly become evident. Carefully read, it does offer a picture of the current debate over high-technology weapons that surrounds the defense budget and even offers insight into the pros and cons of military reform. As such, it may achieve the author's purpose, to give Washington decision makers an appreciation of the argument. The military practitioner searching for a clear understanding of military reform would do well to look elsewhere.

Lind's and Kross' books examine different corners of the military reform debate. Neither, however, provides a comprehensive examination of the full ramifications of the debate nor do they integrate the disparate elements. Both are narrow in their focus, aimed at specific sectors of the defense establishment.

But both hold value for those sectors. Where Lind seeks to challenge conventional thinking, Kross seeks only to put forth the questions. The need continues for a book able to do both.

RICHARD S. MOORE
Captain, US Marine Corps

Volkman, Ernest. *Warriors of the Night: Spies, Soldiers and American Intelligence.* New York: Morrow, 1985. 443pp. $17.45

There is no reliable history of the American intelligence community. Without a solid factual baseline we cannot judge the plethora of books which feed an all too poorly guided public interest. Books are usually of two types. Either they call for reform, or they market sensation. Volkman makes the conventional nod to the need for change, but basically his book is traffic in tales.

As an indictment of American secret intelligence it is not convincing. As a call for reform it is fatuous. Even the author's conviction seems sometimes to flag. This is not just because the stories Volkman tells are familiar and well digested. In fact, he tells them well. It is not just that the opinions he rehashes are conventional and stylish. The problem lies deeper. The essential weakness of this book, and the others like it, is that it begins from imperfect standards for judgment. Volkman, like most commentators, does not have a clear idea of what American intelligence operations should be because he has only a partial grasp of what American intelligence operations have been. Hence, he can only guess at the institutional development of the various organizations in the community and must base his narrative on personalities and anecdotes.

A delphic sentiment opens and closes his book: "American intelligence has been operating in a flawed democracy, and one of the costs of that democracy may be that its intelligence is equally flawed." Apparently this mysterious statement means that Americans respect "facts" more than evaluation; technology more than wisdom. Volkman says we must restore the human dimension to the mountains of data generated by machines, both through human sources in the field and in terms of manageable analysis. No doubt this is true enough, bur it is tepid tea, all the weaker as Volkman shows plenty of examples of solid, useful evaluation. In his own illustrations political masters ignore, misuse, or abuse the products of their intelligence services. But is this natural political behavior somehow a "flaw" in the democracy? It is hard to understand the point. The record of nondemocratic states is no better. That America has not pursued human espionage as systematically and as ruthlessly as the Soviet Union is less a "flaw" of our culture than a professional decision. Humint is an appropriate and successful method for the Soviets in America, but does the reverse so equally apply?

Volkman's laments seem to stem from a platonic position that perfect knowledge, invariably accurate assess-

ments, sound utilization, and approvable behavior are the norms. Such idealism which expects everything is perpetually disappointed by reality. It is profoundly unhistorical. Hence, it is an impossible standard for critical judgment, or reliable narrative.

In short, what is missing is deep sociological and institutional understanding of the fundamental interactions of our society and its intelligence operations. There are in fact many ways to this. For instance, Harry Howe Ransom has explained the wild swings between permissiveness and public accountability, between acceptability and denial, in terms of a dichotomy in American thinking between war and peace. When relations with the Soviet Union are hostile, secret intelligence operations are unleashed. When things appear calm, when we move into a peace compartment, the rein is pulled. On the question of what facts are available and relevant to commentators, until we have comprehensive institutional histories, we are left with tales of episodes and personalities. To make enlightened judgments about secret intelligence and its place in the American democracy we need better tools of information and insight than we are given here.

A favorite model of mine is Professor Harry Hinsley's official history of British intelligence in the Second World War. When the first volumes appeared, the English establishment gasped in dismay. It was a history without names. Men and women who had waited for decades for their wartime achievements to be confirmed by Her Majesty's Stationery Office found their work described in terms of an organizational process. Brilliant exploits disappeared in a faceless bureaucratic record. Yet once the shock passed, Sir Hinsley's message was clear. In the story of the organization of intelligence it is the intelligence of the organization that is decisive. So well were matters ordered, so well was a great pool of talent channeled, that in the course of the war even should the quality of command diminish the quality of intelligence would improve. With this record, and helped by this perspective, serious analysis of British intelligence in the period begins.

Here, until the agencies give us more to go on, commentary on the American way of spying will remain fragmented and impressionistic. Public oversight and professional planning will lack the wisdom, and perspective, of what the French call "the long wave." And the intelligence communities themselves will have to accept the public impressions of incompetence that Volkman reflects. They will have to suffer (or even perhaps benefit) from periodic demands for change. Outside the curtain we will all remain, with Volkman, critics in the night.

GEORGE BAER
Naval War College

Shultz, Richard H., and Godson, Roy. *Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy*. Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984. 211pp. $19.95 paper $12.95

It is not a new technique—it is found in Sun-tzu's *The Art of War* and Kautilya's *Artasastra*. The suggestion is that one can confuse an opponent and split any alliance he may possess by planting "stories." The technique has been around for years and many would argue that it is the normal technique of statecraft. With the trend toward information societies, one can appreciate the role that states and interest groups play in forming opinions in target groups. However, when it involves faslehoods, half-truths, suggestions or manufactured evidence that will get the target, person, or group to believe in the veracity of the message and will consequently result in some form of action beneficial to those conducting the operation, we call that disinformation. It can be overt and/or covert, but in a democracy, it is considered unsportsmanlike behavior. The authors have examined the Soviet use of such "propaganda" techniques in the 1960-80 time frame to achieve their objectives.

The book has essentially four parts. The first deals with the broad topic of disinformation and is descriptive in nature. For anyone unfamiliar with the topic, the section will provide clear descriptions and several examples that illustrate what comes into play with this game. The Soviet apparatus is described, as is their methods to meet their foreign policy objectives through information and disinformation. The authors then examine how Moscow uses overt propaganda and front groups and this is followed with a section on the covert operations of disinformation. Again, the examples are excellent. All this is then tied into the parry and thrust of their foreign policy and objectives, depending upon the stimuli from world events or American reactions. The next section is the authors' content analysis of the Soviets' work in the period 1960-1980 to achieve their ends, with the emphasis on the disinformation. Lastly, the reader is provided with some special insight into disinformation techniques by interviews conducted with some very experienced people.

Ladislav Bittman, a former member of the Czech intelligence establishment from 1954 until 1968, was actively involved in several active measure operations, or disinformation. His area of operations was Europe and he provides considerable insight into Soviet activities and their use of the eastern satellites. Another experienced person, but, with a different area and style of operation is Stanislav Levchenko. He operated from Tokyo and fronted as a newspaperman. His work dealt with politicians and members of the press. These interviews provide a good deal of insight into the "how its done." And if you are of the school that there exist many gullible souls and then can be easily had, these interviews will confirm it. But both men do their jobs so well that naiveté is not an excuse.

While propaganda is expected and does have its uses, it is usually identified as such and the receiver can act accordingly. The problem in a democracy is the public expects their

journalists to be objective and wise to manipulation. Totalitarian states simply trust no one and act accordingly. *Dezinformatsia* provides the reader with insight into how one uses lies, incomplete information or misleading information to weaken their adversary. Besides the general reader, this should be required reading for students in schools of journalism.

PETER C. UNSINGER
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Nacht, Michael. *The Age of Vulnerability: Threats to the Nuclear Stalemate.* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985. 209pp. $26.95 paper $9.95

This broadly gauged evaluation of the dilemmas of nuclear armaments will be found useful by students and the lay public as an introduction to the subject and to basic terminology and concepts. Experts on the subject will find it somewhat disappointing because of its survey character and lack of depth on issues of current concern. It is, however, readable and lucid and does not suffer the common failing of making the subject sound more esoteric than it is.

The title is an apt description of Nacht's central preoccupations with the nation's vulnerability to nuclear weapons and the stalemate between the superpowers that arises from the mutuality of that vulnerability. He explores a series of threats to the stalemate—or to the stability of mutual deterrence—from which nuclear war could arise. He sees these destabilizing factors as the insecurity of Soviet leaders, the new assertiveness of US strategic policy, the high accuracy and first-strike potential of new offensive weapons and of the warfighting doctrines that go along with them, the failure of arms control agreements to stabilize weapons competition, the increasing frictions between the United States and its allies, and the trends that indicate the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries is proceeding.

There is a deep ambivalence in this book that is never really resolved, on two counts. The first is with the vulnerability issue related to hard-target weapons. Nacht recognizes this as theoretically destabilizing and not something to be complacent about—or at least not something that political interplay in a democratic society will allow leaders to ignore. But he appears to disbelieve in the final analysis that leaders on either side could really decide to initiate nuclear war. There is so much second-strike power available that it would be suicidal for either to launch an attack. So the stalemate is really stable. But if so, why worry? Why rehearse the other destabilizing factors? One is left with the feeling that the stability problem is not so simple, and that Nacht feels that too.

The other point has to do with the disappointment over the results of arms control. The tension here is that Nacht is a believer in the classical virtues of arms control, but knows that the scorecard of actual agreements (he exempts the ABM Treaty from this shortcoming) has yielded

very little that measures up to what those virtues are supposed to be. He is quite honest about that so that one can fully sympathize with his quandry. It is not quite so easy to follow how he seeks to resurrect arms control with his concept of "threat control," which supposedly is a more realistic objective, but once again he does not seem quite so sure: "If arms control is to play a constructive role in foreign and defense policy, it must be seen for what it is intended to be: threat control. Each side seeks to reduce the threats to its own society and, in military terms, to minimize the vulnerability of its forces. In the latter case, arms control is but one of several means—others include deception, mobility, and defenses—to satisfy this objective. Insofar as arms control can contain threats, especially threats against a country's capability to retaliate, it is a valuable diplomatic instrument that could help reduce the uncertainties of force planning. If arms control is to succeed, it must demonstrate through negotiated agreements that both sides have the political will to reach mutually satisfactory formulas that control the threats to them. If arms control achieves threat control, then all kinds of political payoffs are also within grasp. If, however, major threats continue unabated despite arms control negotiations and agreements, political opposition will eventually halt the process altogether. In short, for arms control to succeed and even continue to exist, it must control threats." To control threats may be too big a burden for arms control, unless we restrict the meaning to the technical threat of first-strike advantage. That is where the rub now lies. Unfortunately, between real adversaries it takes threats to impose the desire for threat control as the basis for agreement. That is no simple task, and there seems with technological advance to be no final stopping point. The final threat to be controlled is not the weapons; it lies in the ambitions behind them. To Nacht's credit, he recognizes this. Much of his book is written (in a way that would please George Kennan) to chasten American propensities to expect that the Soviet Union can be made to change by the external exertion of a properly chosen policy that lies within our means.

The most original part of Nacht's book comes at the end with his discussion of geographical nuclear proliferation and the grim alternatives this poses for the United States. While he suspects the Soviet Union will also lose rather than gain from proliferation, he clearly points out that the costs of US security management will rise greatly and that in certain places—the Middle East or Persian Gulf being the easiest to visualize now—that proliferation will increase the likelihood of US-Soviet confrontation. In fact, the stability of the superpower stalemate could hardly not be threatened by the multiplication of other nuclear powers, however small they otherwise seem on an international scale.

The issues Nacht wrestles with are real and if he has not somehow

resolved them he can be excused because they are not easily tractable. His final note is realistic and sound, which is to work on the problems and manage them, for however small the chance they will be solved, there is much hope they can be kept in bounds or under control.

RODNEY W. JONES
Georgetown University

Staar, Richard F., ed. *Arms Control: Myth Versus Reality*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1984. 195pp. $14.95

This compendium is the product of a conference held at and sponsored by the Hoover Institution in the latter part of 1983. Attended by over 60 governmental and nongovernmental experts in the field, the contents are a series of conference papers and commentaries on those papers.

The tone of the work is uniformly antiarms control, in the sense that the writers consistently challenge the notion that the arms control process per se is beneficial to the United States or that the results have generally served American interests. Rather, the recurring theme is the "myth" in the subtitle—that one can expect outcomes of value from strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union. The "reality" is that the Soviets have quite different—from the US perspective devious—purposes when entering into these negotiating fora, and that for cultural and other reasons, they are likely to abridge and even negate American expectations. The Soviets have, in a word, a contrasting agenda.

Although I largely agree with the positions argued in these pages, I was somewhat overwhelmed and disappointed with the unrelenting litany against strategic arms negotiations as they have become a part of the strategic landscape. There is, within these pages, very little disagreement or debate; the authors are clearly playing from the same sheet of music to a homogeneous crowd. The effort, and the intellectual task of interpreting it, would have been more challenging and stimulating had the other side of the story been presented and counterargued.

As in any multiauthored work, there are variations in both tone and quality. Generally speaking, the more ideologically committed papers were the weaker. Mark B. Schneider, an arms control counsel within OSD at the time of the conference, produced a paper "The Future: Can It Be Resolved?" that is little more than cheerleading for the Administration position at the time, including the uncritical presentation of contradictions in that policy, e.g., he argues that ICBMs are highly vulnerable at a time when silo-basing MX is being advocated. At the other end of the spectrum, Edward Teller's "Defense: Retaliation or Protection" and Richard Pipes' "Diplomacy and Culture: Negotiation Styles" are very scholarly, dispassionate works.

Because it forcefully takes a position which has not always been given adequate attention in Washington, this book merits attention and reading, especially among those who take a contrary position. Those

already suspicious of arms control outcomes will have their positions reinforced and their arsenals of argumentations augmented, if not their horizons expanded greatly. The initially neutral observer will find a forceful and articulate rending of this Administration's position.

DONALD M. SNOW
Naval War College

Wallensteen, Peter et al., eds., *Global Militarization*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Special Studies on Peace, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution, 1985. 240pp. $24.95

This stimulating book rewards careful reading by the observer and practitioner of military affairs—not because it is a book about war, but because it is about underlying social, cultural and economic shifts in the global interstate system that help to explain the phenomenon of militarization.

For example, Keiichi Matsushita, in his chapter, "The Urban Type of Society and International War," argues that war between developed industrialized states is the least likely form of conflict; rather, conflict springing from the context of a mature urban type of society, whether developed or developing, is more characteristic of the present situation. The problems that terrorism pose to developed societies, therefore, are not necessarily attributes of industrialization any more than such problems can be attributes of a rural orientation in Third World states or societies. Both developed and developing societies are becoming vehicles for—and targets of—forms of warfare that spring from the urban social context—and the gigantic concentrations of peoples into megalopolises, such as Cairo, Mexico City, and Tokyo are occurring everywhere, not just where industrialization has advanced the farthest.

In his chapter, "Global Conflict Formations: Present Developments and Future Directions," Johan Galtung goes further to assert that the real division of the world is not on a North-South or East-West axis, but rather on a "North-West and South-East" axis with the North-West losing ground to the South-East. His thesis is that the industrial center of gravity is shifting, with concomitant shifts in power relationships that are only beginning to be understood—hence the confusion in the United States and Western Europe as to why they are less and less able to control the world economy and the power relationships that flow therefrom. Galtung argues that the capitalist world economic structure has not in fact changed very much. Rather, its spread has brought to bear the same techniques of economic cooperation, competition, and exploitation that have been around a long time. The only problem is that the North-West countries do not much like it when these techniques are used for the benefit of others rather than for themselves.

There are chapters discussing militarization in Thailand, in Chile, and in Ghana, that point up differences and similarities as to how the

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militarizing institutions in the Third World affect their societies. Switzerland and Poland in 1980-82 are also discussed as alternatives to show how formal militarization need not be necessary to avoid social conflict.

Finally, in his concluding chapter, "Incompatibility, Militarization, and Conflict Resolution," Peter Wallensteen points out that nonstate actors are playing an increasing role in global conflict, but that the major interstate actors (Iran, Egypt, the USSR and the United States for example) still confront each other as if war was still their monopoly. Even the use of the term "state-sponsored terrorism" presupposes the primacy of the territorial state as the major actor.

In fact, if we link the notion that global conflict derives from the robust urbanizing process, then the distinctions between "state" and "nonstate," between "external" and "internal" conflict, will diminish. This will increase the current confusion among the major "North-West" industrialized states as to how to deal with a seemingly endless series of threats and humiliations. Those unpleasant experiences reflect not only changes in the nature of the international political system, but more fundamentally, shifts in the center of gravity of the global economy. In other words, global militarization does not presuppose that a universal empire is evolving. Rather, in the view of the editors of this book, it presupposes just the opposite: greater diversification of national economies according to capitalist principles and practices, with accompanying political, cultural and social pluralism, as people everywhere are drawn into urban concentrations.

ROBERT S. JORDAN
Naval War College and
the University of New Orleans

Crankshaw, Edward. *Putting up with the Russians*. New York: Viking Penguin, 1984. 269pp. $17.95

The international tensions and troubles of the 1930s and the years of World War II stimulated a great surge of interest in the Soviet Union. After 1945 there occurred a veritable explosion in the field of Soviet studies which paralleled and indeed was partly inspired by the coming of the atomic age.

Among the most insightful and wise of these scholars was Edward Crankshaw—a British journalist, author and commentator. His published works reveal the range of his interests and of his creative mind. Yet the major emphasis of Crankshaw's intellectual and scholarly efforts was concentrated on Russia and the Russians—from 1947 to 1984 he wrote eight books on the Soviet Union.

During World War II he served for nearly two years in Moscow with the British military mission. Thereafter, he was drawn, as if by some irresistible force, to things Russian. One of Crankshaw's earliest published writings appeared in the *Observer* in 1947. In this article Crankshaw presented an argument which he would return

to many times during the next 37 years. The article was entitled, "Russia's Weakness and Our Duty." It was Crankshaw's conviction that "one of the most damaging illusions of modern times is the belief in Russia's invulnerable might." He continued with what would be another of his persistent and strongly held opinions that "The Soviet Union, for all the magnificence of its achievements, is not a brand-new realm. Under entirely new management it is still Eternal Russia."

Putting Up with the Russians is a carefully selected collection of "articles, essays, lectures, prefaces, reviews, etc." on the Soviet Union. Part I consists of newspaper articles or essays which span the years from 1947 to 1984 and comprises nearly two-thirds of the volume; part II contains mostly book reviews. What is remarkable is how well these analyses stand up despite the fact that they range over nearly four decades of events. It is a delight to reread these commentaries on the Soviet Union and again to be informed and guided by a wise and literate observer.

Most of the selections are short articles of four to six pages in length, and constitute what can be best described as think pieces. Many are as relevant today as when they were first set down on paper. Throughout the writings are judgments and arguments which Crankshaw repeated persistently: the need for coexistence between the USSR and the West, especially with the United States; the weaknesses of the Soviet Union; the inevitability of rivalry between the USSR and the United States, regardless of the political form the Soviet Union might assume; the inevitability of Chinese and Soviet enmity. That there would be a relationship of hostility between the Chinese and the Russians was argued by Crankshaw as early as 1950.

Some of Crankshaw's harshest judgments remained largely unchanged over his entire career. In the introduction to this work he set forth as clearly and directly as possible one of his major theses: "Nothing . . . that has happened in Afghanistan or Poland or Angola, or in the way of a shift in the balance of armaments, in the least way changes the picture of Russia built up over the past forty years—an intolerable, disgraceful regime imprisoned by its own past, an imperial power run by men who got where they are by conspiracy and still think of the world in terms of a gigantic counter-inspiracy . . . . " Yet, in 1947 Crankshaw insisted on the need "to find a way of living side by side with . . . Russia . . . . " He noted its "mindless inefficiency." In 1950 he argued that "the effect of the new bomb may, in fact, reduce the risk of war," and that "the present aims of Soviet foreign policy, which is a belligerent policy, may be summarized as an effort to achieve without war certain objectives of a kind traditionally achieved by war: the ruin of the Western economy; the integration of the satellites with the Soviet economy; the penetration of Asia; the overthrow of sovereign governments in non-communist countries."

Contained in approximately three dozen articles are an examination of the problems faced by the Soviet Union since the end of the war in 1945, and the actions taken by Moscow in response to these difficulties. Among the subjects which Crankshaw comments upon are China, Czechoslovakia, Revisionism, East Europe, nuclear weapons, détente, nationalities, ideology, and others. Crankshaw was not always right in his analyses of Soviet policies and actions, but his insights and judgments were thought provoking, cogently argued, and were seldom matched in their wisdom.

Throughout his life Crankshaw held firmly to a number of convictions about the Soviet Union, "I wanted to show that while the Bolshevik regime was even more vile than it was possible for anyone who had not experienced it to imagine, that although it would make mischief on every possible occasion and find it hard to resist every opportunity for easy expansion and subversion, there was next to no danger of the Kremlin launching a formal war and it could always be stopped by a clear declaration of the line it must not cross—backed by sufficient force to make that declaration credible."

Crankshaw offered his views on many of the powerful political figures of the Soviet system. On Stalin he observed: "Stalin was an adept at using, or abusing, a doctrinaire theory of history as a smokescreen to cover his imperial designs." As for the great founder of Bolshevism, Lenin, Crankshaw commented that "The most remarkable thing about him was his changeless conviction that he alone among all men was right." Lenin, in Crankshaw's judgment, was not an original thinker—"His whole contribution was to practice." Commenting on Brezhnev at the time of the 1968 invasion into Czechoslovakia by Soviet forces, he characterized him as the "brainless wonder of our age. You have to look to Alabama or California to find his equal."

Crankshaw commented that "Mr. Andropov (as compared to Western political leaders) . . . is irresponsible (that is, he is not responsive to Soviet citizens). He is *Kremlin Man* . . . . And *Kremlin Man* is different from all other politicians, speaking his own language and basing his conduct on assumptions radically different from those of the rest of mankind." Crankshaw apparently believed that Gorbachev was the most likely successor in the near future and raised several fundamental questions about him and the other new leaders: "What we do not know, and may not know for some time to come, is the way the Gorbachevs are thinking—they and what must be a host of their contemporaries . . . . Are they so coloured by their lifelong environment and corrupted by their rivalries that they are incapable of launching any radical attempt to make the Soviet Union work and bring it into the brotherhood of Nations? Or have they minds of their own?"

Putting Up with the Russians provides a fine epitaph for the extraordinary contributions made by Edward Crankshaw. Perhaps we should not mourn

the passing of a wise and good man who gave to us brilliant insights on many of the significant issues of the times. But the death of Edward Crankshaw leaves a void, and the publication of this book in 1984 coincident with his passing, reminds us of what he gave to us, and what in turn we have lost because of his death.

HENRY M. SCHREIBER
Naval War College

Hood, Ronald Chalmers III. *Royal Republicans: The French Naval Dynasties between the World Wars.* Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985. 221pp. $25

When British naval guns under Vice Admiral Somerville's command roared out on the powerful French Fleet at Oran and Mers-el-Kebir in the early evening hours of 3 July 1940, an enigmatic chapter in the history of the French Navy neared its tragic close. In *Royal Republicans*, Ronald Hood seeks to illuminate the period between the two World Wars and to explain those factors which influenced the French Navy to play its curious role during those years.

The French Navy has not had a happy history. Even after its major triumph in helping to secure American independence off Yorktown, the French Fleet was destroyed within a few months. Neglect of the fleet and subordination to the army had been a constant in this history. In World War I, the navy was again relegated to a minor role of protecting the sea lanes and ensuring that the army received the necessary supplies and reinforcements from abroad. To add to the navy's frustration, the navy's shipyards were handed over to the army for four years to manufacture army weapons. The armistice of 1918 left an embittered and resentful French Navy which was to grow in alienation from and suspicion of the republic it served.

Hood divides his analysis into three major areas: (1) the sociological underpinnings of the French Navy, especially the line officers (the *grand corps*); (2) the monastic education and inward orientation of the *grand corps* together with their intellectual leanings; and (3) the growing politicization of the navy, its sympathy for authoritarian rule including the fascism of Franco and Mussolini, and the preponderant role played by admirals in the Vichy government.

A picture is painted of the *grand corps* as the aristocracy of the navy, graduates of the *Ecole navale*, frequently sons of naval officers, all from landed families, preponderantly from Brittany and the Midi, and bound together through the alumni association of the *Ecole navale*. Drawing extensively from the records of the alumni association, the author presents statistical data on social and geographic origins, nobility in the *grand corps*, marriages and academic preparation. The French naval household consisted of the father at sea or in the colonies, generally resided in the port cities (or in Paris in later years) with the mother exercising the major influence on the young son. Much of this influence was dedicated to the proper

schooling and preparation for entry into the *École navale*.

At the *École navale*, the curriculum focused heavily on the humanities, with an accompanying lack of emphasis on science and engineering. Graduates were meant to know a great deal about the classics and history; technicians could handle the details of running a warship. Over all this intellectual preparation, the Catholic ethic loomed large. To the naval officer of this era, professional and devotional duties were considered inseparable. (Never mind that the deployed officers frequently took up with a mistress or a native girl—one must recognize the difference between planning and operations.)

The author emphasizes the prevailing mind-set of French naval officers of this period. Latins were good; Anglo-Saxons were bad; the monarchy had led France to greatness; the republicans were trying to destroy that greatness; communists were very, very bad; and fascism, on the Italian and Spanish models, had its good points.

According to Hood, Morris Janowitz's thesis that the career military officers are natural adversaries of the democratic societies that spawn them fits the French experience much better than the American one; there was no real counterpart in the United States for the widespread rejection of the French republic by an aristocratic officer corps. In the French Navy, the 1930s saw a shift from wardroom polemics against the republic and the parliament to political activism. Rallying to the standard of Action Francaise, an extreme right-wing neomonarchist group, the *grand corps* participated actively in the Alliance de l'Action Francaise and supported the voice of the movement, the daily newspaper *Action Francaise*. The feeling grew that the only cure for the paralyzed and bumbling leadership of the Third Republic was authoritarian rule from above. Mussolini and Franco were admired as guardians of civilization.

The author devotes considerable space to the enigmatic figure of Admiral Darlan. Darlan was the consummate political opportunist, driven by an almost pathological hatred of the British and a hope, in 1940, that France would ultimately do better with a deal with the Germans than with the British. The fact that Darlan's greatgrandfather had been killed at Trafalgar may have had a bearing on his anglophobia, but the London Naval Conference of 1930 probably had the major influence on his thinking. Darlan and many other French naval officers felt strongly that Britain, through the conference, sought to ensure its dominance over all European navies.

Appointed as chief of naval staff in 1936 (curiously by the Popular Front government of Léon Blum), Darlan moved quickly to centralize his power. He brought his close friends into the top leadership, completely reshuffled the navy bureaucracy, and even proposed that he personally write the fitness reports on all captains. Walking both sides of the

political street, Darlan gained for the navy its largest budget to date from the detested Popular Front government, but he did little to tamp down the swelling sentiment within the navy against the Third Republic. In fact, Hood states that Darlan felt that the government was incapable of coping with the wartime crisis in 1939 and that a war cabinet with full powers should replace the parliament. With his anglophobia as a driving force, Darlan refused to throw in with the British at sea. Rather, when Marshal Petain formed the Vichy regime in 1940, Darlan was at his side as Minister of Marine. After the armistice, he told his admirals that the armistice benefited Frenchmen everywhere and assured them that "It is for us Frenchmen to profit from their [Germany's] hopes and, if we play the game with enough finesse, it is possible that we will come out of this adventure in good shape."

Darlan, of course, did not come out of the adventure in good shape, for he was assassinated in North Africa in 1942. Nor did his coterie of friends emerge from Vichy with laurels. The Vichy government, known as the "Society for the Protection of the Admirals," was indeed heavily laced with Darlan's followers. Ten admirals served at the cabinet or subcabinet level and later stood before the *Haute Cour de Justice* to receive their punishments as Nazi collaborators. Dreams, fostered by sincere convictions and bolstered by background, education, isolation, anglophobia and royalist hopes, turned into tragedy in the reality of the times. It is a sad and instructive tale.

Hood has done a commendable job in presenting this analysis. His thorough research, including his interviews with former naval officers and their families, makes this a book of value to historians and sociologists who may wish to delve further into this unfortunate chapter in the history of the French Navy.

EDWARD F. WELCH, JR.
Rear Admiral, US Navy (Ret.)

Croizat, Victor. *The Brown Water Navy: The River and Coastal War in Indo-China and Vietnam, 1948-1972.* New York: Sterling Publishing, 1985. 160pp. $17.95

The subtitle of Colonel Croizat's book is *The River and Coastal War in Indo-China and Vietnam, 1948-1972.* It is unfortunate that relatively little space in the book is devoted to telling the story of that war, and so much is taken up with dry, organizational matter that, quite frankly, reads as if it were lifted from poorly written command histories.

If anyone is equipped to tell the story of the Brown Water Navy in Southeast Asia, Colonel Croizat should be the one. He had a number of interesting assignments there during the period 1954-68. He participated in the evacuation of Haiphong after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. He served with the Franco-American Military Training Mission (TRIM), with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in Bangkok, with the Fleet Marine Force Riverine Warfare Study (South

Vietnam), and finally with the Rand office in Saigon.

And the Brown Water Navy's story is worth telling. It is a story filled with drama, courage, self-sacrifice and, ultimately, tragic failure as the US Navy, unwittingly, contributed mightily in a process that created in *Communist* Vietnam one of the strongest military powers in the world.

One of the duties of a writer of history is to separate wheat from chaff. Colonel Croizat seems to have done this but, inexplicably, he has given us mostly the latter. A good editor, perhaps, could have saved him, but his book shows little evidence of having been edited at all.

Buy it for the pictures. Some of them, particularly the US Navy's, are quite good.

R.L. SCHREADLEY
Charleston, South Carolina

Fowler, William M., Jr. *Jack Tars and Commodores: The American Navy, 1783-1815*. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1984. 299pp. $17.95

Americans are a maritime people with vital interests upon the seas. During colonial times Great Britain's navy protected American seaborne commerce. During the War for Independence the French Navy provided the margin of victory at Yorktown. Yet, for a decade following the peace American leaders seemed to disregard these facts and the United States was without a navy. Some leaders went so far as to question the need for such a force, but the establishment of a navy was inevitable. Whether American political leaders realized it or not, the use of the North Atlantic was, and remains of vital interest to the nation. Sooner or later the United States has been drawn into every major war involving the North Atlantic.

In this fast-paced narrative Fowler chronicles the nascent years of the US Navy from the first debates over how to meet the threat posed to American trade by the Barbary Corsairs, through the quasi-war with France to the Barbary wars and the War of 1812. An underlying theme is that the navy grew to become the nation's "chief glory" and that it brought to the new nation and to itself a high level of international respect. This record stands in sharp contrast to the navy of the Revolution as described by Fowler in his *Rebels Under Sail* (1976).

As in his earlier work, Fowler's research and use of secondary sources is thorough and his writing is excellent. He has a particular knack for selecting the telling phrase, as for example, when he calls Edward Preble "as hard and sharp as the Maine coast from which he came," and for selecting just the right document to cogently support the interpretations which he interweaves with the text.

His focus is on naval operations but he does not neglect naval policy, administration, or life in the navy. He is best in dealing with the 1790s, very good on the first decade of the

new century, and weakest on the War of 1812. In his analysis of congressional debates and explanation of Federalist and Republican naval policy, the most sophisticated and concise in print, he tends to side with the Jeffersonians and to endorse their preference for guerre de cours. He sees the quasi-war as "outstanding [a] success" for the navy as its action in the American Revolution was a failure. Yet he believes that the US Navy came of age during the Barbary wars, not during the quasi-war as many historians believe.

It comes as no surprise that Fowler devotes more coverage to the "commodores" than to the "jack tars." Nor is it surprising that he finds far more unity within the officer corps than Guttridge and Smith did in their *The Commodores* (1968). It would be difficult to image a group as faction ridden as the one described by Guttridge and Smith accomplishing anything. Fowler may even verge on the other extreme since he virtually ignores the Perry-Elliott controversy which arose out of the Battle of Lake Erie and spawned cliques which plagued the navy for a generation. Fowler includes civilian shipbuilders and administrators in his assessments. He judges two of the first four navy secretaries—Benjamin Stoddert and William Jones—to have been excellent and the other two—Robert Smith and Paul Hamilton—to have been near-failures.

Though he focuses on naval leaders, he does not totally neglect the life of the sailor. Nor does he glamorize it. He pictures conditions on the lower deck as harsh, makes the point that few sailors served for many years, and reminds us that "the myth of the old salt is just that—a myth" but he concludes that "despite the unpleasantness associated with naval service, men did go to sea, and more important than that, they served well."

This is clearly the best survey of the early US Navy yet written and thus provides an excellent introduction to the era. The tables are informative and the maps models of utility. Naval history specialists may find little new in this book, but Fowler writes so well that they will certainly enjoy reading it.

JAMES C. BRADFORD
Texas A&M University

Kiriakopoulus, G.C. *Ten Days to Destiny, The Battle for Crete, 1941.* New York: Franklin Watts, 1985. 408pp. $18.95

In 1941 the invasion of Crete was another of a series of spectacular German victories over the British which began with Norway in the spring of 1940 and progressed through Dunkirk, Egypt and the Libyan desert, and just prior to Crete, the debacle in Greece. The myth of an invincible *Wehrmacht* supported by an all-conquering *Luftwaffe* captured the imagination of almost everyone. Crete was the first airborne invasion of an island in the history of warfare. Hitler, in defiance of the Royal Navy's "control" of the Mediterranean had overflown that obstacle and snatched Crete with its Greek, British and Commonwealth defenders.

The capture of Crete was a tremendous propaganda victory for Hitler. As a sidelight, one of the ballyhooed heroes of the "Master Race" was trooper Max Schmeling who a few years before had been humbled in the ring at Madison Square Garden by Joe Louis. The plight of the Royal Navy was immortalized later by Noel Coward's *In Which We Serve*, a fictionalized film account of Lord Louis Mountbatten's loss of HMS *Kelly*.

There are kernels of truth to those 1941 myths. Schmeling did jump in Crete but was a malingerer and, Mountbatten's lost destroyer was only one of many British warships sent to the bottom attempting to evacuate the British forces; but as the author skillfully brings out, Crete was a Pyrrhic victory in the wrong place and at the wrong time for Germany. The victory was as much a disaster for the victors as for the vanquished, in the analysis of history.

Mr. Kiriakopoulus, a professor at Columbia University, has written much about World War II. This book is the result of his curiosity about the events that took place in 1941 in the land of his ancestors. His research was extensive and included interviews as well as archives.

Significantly, Crete was the graveyard of the German airborne concept. Never again did German paratroopers fight in the airborne mode. German casualties in the ten-day battle exceeded those suffered by the *Werhmacht* during all campaigns up to that time. It took two days longer to take Crete than it did to topple France in 1940.

In describing the events—the author uses narrative to lay the groundwork for subsequent analysis—Mr. Kiriakopoulus brings out that the Germans jumped into a hostile environment. The natives rose up to defend their soil and the tradition of individual and family defense of their homeland took a heavy toll among the troopers. There was little expectation among the assault troops of being speared by a farmer's pitchfork or shot while hanging in their harnesses. But this is what happened, what made the initial casualties so high, and delayed the eventual triumph.

The inevitability of a German victory comes through the pages even though the author implies a sentimental hope that the Allies could have snatched victory from defeat. The key is that only once does he mention the Royal Air Force. In that brief paragraph, he tells of ten Hurricanes being sent to Crete from Fighter Command in Egypt. Six were misidentified and shot down by friendly antiaircraft fire and two aborted after seeing the fate of the six and headed back to sea. Low on fuel, they were never seen again. The other two landed only to be destroyed on the ground by the *Luftwaffe* the next day. So much for Allied air support.

It was also the *Luftwaffe* which defeated the Royal Navy and drove it back to port. Ashore, the Allied troops under New Zealander Victoria Cross holder, Gen. Bernard Freyberg, were plagued with a

complex command system aggravated by a lack of communications. Shortages of artillery and of all kinds of ammunition was a significant factor in tactical defeats. A British or Greek unit would obtain an objective and then be forced back for lack of ammunition to conduct a proper defense. Meanwhile, the key airfield was lost, opening it to a constant flow of German aerial resupply and troop buildup.

Recurring tactical defeats led to the decision to evacuate. Evacuees included the British and Commonwealth troops who could disengage and make their way over the mountains to the southern beaches. No provision was made for the evacuation of Greek troops, although the King and his entourage were rescued by the Royal Navy. The valiant civilians who had gallantly defended their soil were left to the "tender mercies" of German reprisals. The post-invasion toll was high and hardly a family was spared some loss. Age or sex were not a bar to German revenge.

The author points out that the tactical victory, which was less than the propaganda of the time would have us believe, was a strategic blunder for both sides. Although it was probably a mistake for the British to attempt to defend Crete at the time (another Churchillian whim), it paid off in the future. The German airborne capability was almost erased, both in the sense of manpower and of vital air transports. Another two-week delay was tacked on to Hitler's invasion of Russia. The lack of air transport was later to prove critical in that campaign. But for the Germans, the strategic blunder was greater. First, as the author points out, Crete was not the key to control of the Mediterranean. Malta was. Crete, therefore, was not a vital objective. Further, the aforementioned losses and delays became critical in the invasion of Russia.

Thus, the title projects a double *entendre*. It surely portended destiny, but whose?

JAMES W. HAMMOND, JR.
Colonel, US Marine Corps (Ret.)

Kotsch, William J. and Henderson, Richard. *Heavy Weather Guide*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1984. 399pp. $21.95

> She dipped into the hollow straight down, as if going over the edge of the world. The engine-room toppled forward menacingly, like the inside of a tower nodding in an earthquake. An awful racket, of iron things falling, came from the stokehold.

From the near hypnosis of Conrad's *Typhoon* to the near pedantry of some of the tables, Admiral Kotsch and Mr. Henderson have compiled and revised a fine second edition of this informative text. There is almost too much, at times, with instructive cases ranging from carrier task group operations, to merchant transits, to single-handed sailing. One wishes there were a ready reference section among the sea stories, to permit a shiphandler to find in short order the guidance applicable to his ship and situation. Paragraphs on staysails and

trysails are intermingled with those on handling destroyers and container ships to the distraction of a reader in extremis. That aside, this is a superior textbook with a wealth of data from buoy locations, to forecasting systems, to ship stability tables.

Despite increases in the complexity of naval warfare over the past 40 years, and the technological changes to naval ships which go with it, the power of a raging sea remains the same. So does the helplessness of indecisive and inexperienced men who face it. Today's forecasting techniques would have been deemed impossible just a few decades ago, but the capriciousness of a storm at sea seems to more than have kept pace. Faced with the annual hurricane season, naval leaders ashore too often issue self-protecting platitudes in early summer, then wait too long to sortie ships from east coast ports when the storm approaches—until the COs are forced into the most dangerous quadrant of the storm. The Navy is not alone in this. Witness the millions of dollars of beachfront housing built 10 feet below the high-water mark of our last big storm. As one admiral pointed out here at the War College, a task larger than learning new lessons is that of teaching old ones to new generations.

This past summer ComSecondFlt chose to avoid platitudes and simply restate one splendid set of old lessons for all his ships to peruse. His 181418Z JUL 85 message was a partial restatement of Admiral Nimitz' timeless letter to the Pacific Fleet, 14CL-45 of 18 February 1945. Appendix VII of *Heavy Weather Guide* contains that letter *in toto* along with all the comments it generated in the US Naval Institute *Proceedings* when it was declassified and published in January 1956. The topic of that letter was the horrendous damage done to Halsey's fleet off Luzon during the typhoon of 17-18 December 1944—790 men lost, 200 planes lost, three destroyers lost and 28 ships severely damaged. As both Nimitz and Halsey pointed out, "this was the Navy's greatest uncompensated loss since the Battle of Savo Island." Operational commitments to support MacArthur had caused Halsey to delay fueling until the small buoys were at 10-15 percent of capacity. Most had not ballasted because they were to refuel on short notice. Crews were exhausted and inexperienced at shiphandling in heavy weather. The wind was near 100 knots, the seas at 70 feet. Halsey states that *New Jersey* shook worse than she had when hit by 5″ gunfire. Regular Navy commanding officers had fewer than eight years out of the Academy, some less than five. Halsey awarded the Legion of Merit to Lt. Cmdr. Henry L. Plage, USNR, commanding the destroyer escort *Tabberer*, "who had been to sea exactly once before, for a short cruise during his ROTC course at Georgia Tech!," yet brought his ship through with only mast and radios gone and rescued survivors from the sunken destroyer *Hull* during the worst of the storm. One is reminded of Herman Wouk's vivid portrayal of Captain Queeg and his crew on the old destroyer-mine-

sweeper *Caine*, when he fell apart and was relieved by his XO during such a storm.

This fine text should be perused at leisure by the officer coming newly to command. Before passing the sea buoy he should tab those pages he may need when "operational commitments" to a hard-changing admiral practicing at war or facing the enemy ashore may leave him with no option but to sail, as the sea shanty says, "in the teeth of the boomin' gale!"

DAVID G. CLARK
Captain, US Navy
Naval War College

Sinke, Ralph E.G., Jr. *Don't Cry For Us*. Dale City, Va.: REGS Enterprises, 1984. 140pp. $12.95

Don't Cry For Us is a book of poetry and vignettes written by a Marine Corps major who first fought in Vietnam as a private first class in 1966. The simplicity of the verse in this book is effective in establishing the theme of lost innocence and accelerated maturation in the laboratory of life—Vietnam. Many of the pieces in part I were written by Sinke as he recovered from battle wounds. The poem of the title is an unapologetic account of the Vietnam veterans' contributions to their nation. Like many of the poems in the book, it captures the pulse of a nation and a generation. It is angry, bitter, tired and sad—most of all, it is proud. The pride of the Vietnam veterans and the recent and long overdue acceptance of their gallant efforts provide Major Sinke with the material for his work.

From the lost youth, realities and sacrifices addressed in the initial poems, Major Sinke moves to the tragic homecoming of American fighting men in part II. The poems are sad because they tell of how the veterans became the object of the American people's confusion, frustration and hatred. The transference of their wrath to the veterans increased the guilt of the warriors and inflicted psychological wounds that complement their physical wounds.

Part III, "The Reconciliation," was written by Sinke the day after the dedication of the Vietnam War Memorial. It ties together loose ends, and is a reflection of pain and sacrifices which have lately been recognized because of our nation's collective guilt; it signals the end of an era and the ushering in of a new era of legitimacy and acceptance of our Vietnam veterans. "The Reconciliation" is a definitive explanation of the catharsis of the Vietnam War and its warriors. It makes as eloquent a statement about the meaning of the war as the Memorial Wall itself.

The title of the book, *Don't Cry For Us* is ironic because many of Sinke's pieces will bring the reader to tears. "Just Three Days" and "We Called Him 'Abe'" are emotional, gut-wrenching, soul-searching, beautiful and profound instances of Sinke's unabashed intensity and heart. Although Ralph Sinke is a United States Marine, his work transcends service. It is a book for men who fought in Vietnam and for Americans who only now, a decade after the war in Vietnam ended, have begun to

believe that the sacrifices of Vietnam veterans were equal to the sacrifices of other veterans in past wars. It is a book about the human spirit and heart in the crucible of war.

W.T. DeCAMP
Captain, US Marine Corps

RECENT BOOKS

Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library

Annotated by
George Scheck and Mary Ann Varoutsos

Alnasrawi, Abbas. *OPEC in a Changing World Economy*. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985. 188pp. $22.50

In this study, Alnasrawi, an economics professor at the University of Vermont, surveys developments in the oil industry since the creation of OPEC in 1960. Following a brief overview of OPEC's performance and its impact on the world economy, the author examines oil-price determination using both historical and analytical approaches. He also presents a history of the organization's various unsuccessful attempts to regulate output during the 1960s and 1970s. Turning to OPEC's world role, he describes its relations with the industrialized countries (increased dependence) and with the Third World (increased interdependence). The concluding chapter treats OPEC in the 1980s and suggests some future trends.

Bethlen, Steven and Volgyes, Ivan, eds. *Europe and the Superpowers*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985. 164pp. $18.50

Based upon papers presented at a 1984 Munich conference by European and American scholars, these essays offer their perceptions on relations between the superpowers and the nations of Eastern and Western Europe. The topics include the political, economic, and military aspect of Europe's international relationships; the role of Nato and the Warsaw Pact; and Europe's goals, objectives and future. Also considered is the impact of Soviet and East European internal developments on present and future East-West relations.

Bullock, John. *The Gulf*. London: Century, 1984. 218pp. $21

This book offers a portrait of the Persian Gulf states of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Along with vignettes of the people, the discussion includes historical backgrounds and the economic, social, and political development of each of

the states. The larger Gulf states of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Oman are considered only in terms of their influence on their smaller neighbors. The author feels that, although petrodollars have brought great wealth to the region, many basic problems remain to be solved; his conclusion examines future trends affecting the role of the Gulf in the 21st century.

Cable, James. *Diplomacy at Sea.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1985. 191pp. $24.95

This collection of essays examines various aspects of international relations and naval affairs, including disputes that lead to conflict and the short-of-war resolution of conflict. Some of the topics covered are: the nature and prevalence of coercive diplomacy; the use of naval forces in support of diplomatic goals; and the relationship between theory and practice. The essays on cant in foreign policy and the political influence of stories of intrigue are used to illustrate the way cultural factors can affect political assumptions as well as reasoned assessments.

Cohen, Eliot A. *Citizens and Soldiers: the Dilemmas of Military Service.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985. 227pp. $22.50

While countries such as Canada, Switzerland, Britain, and France have utilized their systems of peacetime military service for almost a century, the United States has failed to develop a system of any duration. At one time or another, the United States has either implemented or seriously considered universal military service, universal military training, selective service, a lottery, or an all-volunteer force. In addition to providing historical background about the United States and foreign systems, this study includes sections on types of systems, domestic ideology and principle, the effect of small and large scale wars, and domestic political influence. Indeed, the author notes that the study of American military manpower is also a study in American politics. Thus conscription debates have been sharpest during periods of conflict from the War of 1812 to the present day.

Feld, Werner and Wildgen, John K. *Congress and National Defense.* New York: Praeger, 1985. 126pp. $27.95

Some members of Congress, who are recognized as long-term strategic thinkers, have exercised an influence over their colleagues and the executive branch that transcends party interests of constituency. Shrewd defense planners have been known to tailor their arguments to appeal to the sentiments of these congressional strategists. This book surveys some strategic and not-so-strategic congressional thinking, describes how pragmatic problems can distract Congress from long-term planning, and concludes that some of the best and most important strategic thinking in the US Congress is concentrated on arms control and Europe.

Flanagan, Edward M., Jr. *Before the Battle; a Commonsense Guide to Leadership and Management.* Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1985. 228pp. $10.95

Contending that everyone can be taught leadership skills, retired Lieutenant General Flanagan has distilled a lifetime of experience as a military officer into this book. His main objective is to pass along proven leadership principles to newer officers and

NCOs. Topics such as the role of the Army officer, achieving discipline, developing morale, and the importance of troop welfare are treated in short essays arranged alphabetically from "administration" to "wives." A list of 43 "commandments" completes the volume.

Fugate, Bryan I. *Operation Barbarossa: Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941.* Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1984. 415pp. $22.50

This study takes a close look at German and Soviet strategic planning and tactics in the early years of the Second World War. Following a brief historical survey of Soviet military doctrine, an examination is made of pre-war Soviet defense planning and strategy as well as Germany's plans for the invasion. Additional chapters treat the race to the Dnieper River, the battles in the upper Dnieper region, and the pause at the Yelnia salient. A great deal of attention is paid to the reasons for the failure of the Wehrmacht to conquer the USSR, and the entire operation is reevaluated in the final chapter. Detailed appendixes covering the organization and structure of the German and Soviet units, tank strengths, and orders of battle complete the text.

Getty, J. Arch. *Origins of the Great Purges; the Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933-1938.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 276pp. $34.50

This work differs from most other Soviet political histories, because it relies mainly on archival and press sources rather than on émigré memoirs or Soviet underground press writings. It is not intended to be an exhaustive history of the Great Purges, but attempts to explain their origins through examination of the structure, organization, composition, and evolution of the Soviet Communist Party in the 1930s. The factional struggles that occurred in the years leading up to the height of the terror in late 1937 are scrutinized at length, while less space is given to the events of 1938 due to a paucity of archival evidence for that year. Several of Getty's findings run counter to traditional views about Soviet politics in the 1930s.

Goren, Roberta. *The Soviet Union and Terrorism.* Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1984. 232pp. $27.50

Central to this historical analysis is the contention that the Soviet Union has actively supported international terrorism outside the Soviet bloc since 1917. Moreover, it is felt that this active support is consistent with Soviet ideology. The introductory chapters treat the legitimization of terrorism in Marxist-Leninist ideology, explore the legal aspects of the USSR's attitudes toward aggression, and trace the evolution of terrorist policies in the Soviet Union since its founding. Additional chapters present documentation on Moscow's current involvement with various terrorist groups worldwide including the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

Herken, Gregg. *Counsels of War.* New York: Knopf, 1985. 409pp. $18.95

Counsels of War examines the history of the nuclear era from the perspective of the civilian experts on the bomb. Utilizing published sources, declassified documents, and interviews with scientists, strategists, and policymakers, Herken traces the development of nuclear war thinking from the time of Hiroshima to the present and attempts to highlight the fundamental impact of the ideology of the thinkers. The

contemporary nuclear weapons debate is seen as a competition between deeply held and often unstated rival perceptions of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Hughes, Barry B. *World Futures: a Critical Analysis of Alternatives.* Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985. 243pp. $25 paper $10.95

In this monograph, Hughes summarizes major competing perspectives on global futures as described in studies by such groups as the Club of Rome and the Hudson Institute. Examining them by issue area, he treats population, economics, energy, food and agriculture, technology, and the environment. He also considers the values and political structures underlying the various scenarios. Maintaining that each world view has strengths and weaknesses, he argues that a synthesis of several alternatives is more viable than any one considered alone. In addition, Hughes offers some conclusions about the global development system in this era of major transition.

Hunt, James G. and Blair, John D., eds. *Leadership on the Future Battlefield.* McLean, Va.: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1985. 349pp. $30

This study was the result of a 1983 Texas Tech University symposium that was supported by the US Army Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. The symposium brought together scholars in the field of management and key military leaders, who examined the organizational, management, and leadership implications of the battlefield of the future. This was done in the context of such concepts as the Airland Battle 2000 and ARMY 21. The editors believe that the implications of the future battlefield are so far-reaching that new research and new ways of thinking are needed.

Langley, Lester D. *Central America: the Real Stakes.* New York: Crown, 1985. 280pp. $15.95

This guide to the politics, culture, and conflicts of Central America is written from the perspective of those who have power, those who want power or economic security, and those with little hope of obtaining either. The author describes persons or events ranging from the time of the Spanish conquerors down to the present, and he highlights the salient features of the region. While written as neither an indictment of US policy nor a detailed analysis of the problems, still, the book suggests that a timely understanding of Central America is vital for the future of the people there.

May, Ernest R., ed. *Knowing One's Enemies.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984. 561pp. $29.50

In recent years the access to various intelligence archives has not only broadened the documentary base, but has increased the number of interpretive factors to consider in studies of government decisionmaking. Using such archival materials, these essays focus on intelligence appraisals made by major powers before the two world wars and lend support to the premise that intelligence has done well in short-term predictions, warnings, and military estimates. It has been less successful in making long-term projections, determining weapons procurement needs, or gauging the actions of an opponent in a crisis. Included are examples of decisions made despite the intelligence indicators and decisions based on preconception despite the information available. The editor concludes with some useful lessons for present-day decision makers.

Mueller, G.O.W. and Adler, Freda. *Outlaws of the Ocean; the Complete Book of Contemporary Crime on the High Seas.* New York: Hearst Marine, 1985. 362pp. $17.95
This sweeping survey of criminality at sea includes information on drug smuggling, piracy, theft, insurance fraud, espionage, and pollution. It also touches upon past incidents of ocean crime and makes some recommendations for controlling it in the future. An extensive list of notes accompanies the text, which is written in a highly personal style. Mueller is a former chief of crime prevention at the United Nations, and Adler is a professor of criminology.

Sick, Gary. *All Fall Down.* New York: Random House, 1985. 366pp. $17.95
Sick chronicles the events surrounding the rise of the Khomeini regime and the 444 days of the American hostage ordeal in Tehran. As principal White House aide for Iran on the National Security Council staff, he was in a unique position to observe the White House policy process. This was also a vantage point that ensured an unsurpassed view of the politics and internal disputes at the highest levels of the Administration. The author points to events that occurred in Iran during the 1950s and 1960s as the basis of much of the later hostility toward the United States. The suggestion is made that the United States is ill-equipped to deal with radical revolutionary societies.

Silk, Leonard S. *Economics in the Real World.* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984. 298pp. $16.95
Silk, an award-winning journalist for *The New York Times,* analyzes the manner in which political decisions have affected the American economy during the last two decades. He outlines the major shifts that have occurred in economic policy and illustrates the way national and international events have influenced the marketplace, using examples such as the Vietnam War, the War on Poverty, Nixon's New Economic Policy, the Arab oil embargo, and Reaganomics. Other sections describe the Soviet economic system; review the opinions of major political and economic leaders (based on interviews); and examine the nature of the political business cycle. Finally, Silk offers a summary of the lessons he has learned from his observations over the last 20 years.

Waters, K.H. *Herodotus the Historian; His Problems, Methods and Originality.* Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985. 194pp. $19.95
Aimed primarily at undergraduates with little knowledge of Greek, this monograph presents an introduction to Herodotus' background, aims, and methods. Some of the topics explored include contemporary Greek thought; Herodotus' education, religious attitudes, and prejudices; and the sources, subject matter, structure, and narrative style of his work. Atrention is given to his strengths and weaknesses as a historian and a writer. An up-to-date bibliography concludes this book.

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Defense Financial and Investment Review. Stock Number: 008-000-00431-5, 208pp., $7.50, 1985

The Defense Financial and Investment Review was chartered to study contract pricing, financing and profit (markup) policies to determine if they are resulting in effective and efficient spending of public funds and maintaining the viability of the defense industrial base, and to make recommendations for improvements. The review was confined to examining the results of the application of those policies by Government personnel, along with a review of defense contractor financial results achieved in performing contracts which are negotiated based on those policies. Data were examined from both Government and private sources, including questionnaires and financial data collection instruments specifically designed to elicit information bearing on the policies being studied.

Finnegan, John Patrick. *Military Intelligence—A Picture History*. Stock Number: 008-020-01010-3, 196pp., $7, 1985

One hundred years have passed since the establishment of a permanent military intelligence organization within the War Department in 1855. Publishing a history on the role which modern military intelligence has played in the life of the Army and the nation seemed a fitting way to mark the anniversary. Because of the nature of the subject matter and the limited amount of accessible research sources, official Army histories have tended to integrate the contribution of intelligence into more general works and have not isolated it as a specialized topic. A picture history of military intelligence is believed to be a suitable format for an introductory study. The use of images permits the telling of a story which might otherwise remain untold while at the same time preserves a balance in coverage between the early and recent years.

Jones, Vincent C., *United States Army in World War II—Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb*. Stock Number: 008-029-00132-2, 680pp., $21, 1985

The US Army played a key role in the formation and administration of the Manhattan Project, the World War II organization which produced the atomic bombs that not only contributed decisively to ending the war with Japan but also opened the way to a new atomic age. This volume describes how the wartime Army, already faced with the enormous responsibility of mobilizing, training, and deploying vast forces to fight a formidable enemy on far-flung fronts in Europe and the Pacific, responded to the additional task of organizing and administering what was to become the single largest technological project of its kind undertaken up to that time. To meet this challenge, the Army—drawing first upon the long-time experience and considerable resources of its Corps of Engineers—formed a new engineer organization, the Manhattan District, to take over from the Office of Scientific Research and Development administration—a program earlier established by American and refugee scientists to exploit the military potentialities of atomic energy.

Kross, Walter. *Military Reform—The High-Tech Debate in Tactical Air Forces.* Stock Number: 008-020-01019-7, 260pp., $7.50, 1985

To the average American, the phrase "military reform" may bring to mind media stories about outrageously overpriced spare parts. Though not unimportant, these widely publicized procurement problems are only incidental to the fundamental issue of current military reform—the continuing debate over high- and low-tech weapon systems. Throughout history, military reform usually comes to nations the hard way, the result of resounding defeat on the battlefield or social upheaval at home. Historically, the United States and its military have not been spared from this general rule. However, today's brand of reform is more subtle. Military reform's onset is less dramatic, but its pace is sustained.

USSR Energy Atlas. Stock Number: 041-015-00160-4, 82pp., $13, 1985

The USSR is the largest country in the world and the second-largest producer and consumer of energy. Its vast landmass and adjacent continent shelves contain enormous energy resources. Only in recent years, however, has the extent of the exploration and development of its fuel resources spanned the entire country. Soviet energy is a strategic issue that transcends international boundaries. Soviet oil and gas exports have increasingly become available to Western buyers since the 1970s, and the Soviets also import large amounts of Western equipment and technology to upgrade the capabilities of the domestic energy industry. This atlas uses a wide variety of information to portray many aspects of Soviet energy. Maps, graphics, photographs, and text provide a general understanding and appreciation of the major Soviet energy resources—oil, gas, coal, and primary electric, as well as minor fuels and alternative energy sources.

United States Army in World War II—The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany. Stock Number: 008-029-00131-4, 628pp., $31, 1985

Because of the thin neutrality to which the United States government clung in 1941, the first introduction of American engineer elements into England was clandestine, but even with the earliest American theater command existing only in embryo, the need for engineers was implicit in Allied strategy. The Anglo-American decision in March 1941 to deal first with Germany as the most dangerous enemy required the construction of strategic bomber bases and huge troop cantonments in England, all with the object to bring Allied might to bear against Germany from the west. The story of how this was accomplished necessarily concerns itself with organizational structures, operating procedures, statistical data, and descriptions of vast logistical effort. The redirection of the entire strategy in 1942 to a second theater in the Mediterranean brought American engineer troops to their first encounters with a determined and skilled adversary in that part of the world and to sober realization of their own strengths and weaknesses in combat. In sustained operations across two continents and through two and a half years of war, these engineers carried out the basic mission of the military engineer in the field.

Ψ

—Founders Hall-

Naval War College Museum Schedule of Special Exhibits for 1986

The college museum located in historic Founders Hall on Coasters Harbor Island announces its 1986 program for special exhibits. "Steichen at War, the works of Second World War Navy Combat Photographer Edward Steichen" opened on 7 December 1985 and will continue through March 1986. The presentation commemorates the anniversary of Ameirca's entry into the Second World War in December 1941. "The Navy of One Hundred Years Ago: Currier and Ives Prints of Naval Subjects," is scheduled for 1 May-30 June 1986. The collection of prints is being presented on loan by the Naval Academy Museum. The opening of an exhibit on naval greats Oliver and Matthew Perry entitled: "The Perrys of Newport, A Navy Family of the Young Republic" will take place on 10 July. The presentation, which will complement the Black Ships Festival in Newport in July, will run through October.

The college museum features exhibits on the history of naval warfare and the history of the Navy in the Narragansett Bay regions. Literature on the museum is available on request by writing the President, Naval War College, Newport, R.I. 02841-5010 or calling (401) 841-4052, Autovon 948-4052.