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Operation Peace for Galilee is important and should be read not only for its discussion of the campaign in Lebanon and Israeli strategy, but because it contains larger, more far-reaching concepts. These concepts involve the connection between Israeli policy in Lebanon and US regional objectives as well as a classic example of the problems which military forces can have in limited wars with limited objectives.

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Gabriel, Richard A. *Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1984. 242pp. $16.95

Richard Gabriel has written what will likely be the definitive work on the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. But what really makes *Operation Peace for Galilee* even more appealing is that in addition to analyzing the Lebanese campaign, it ranges deep into Israeli military strategy and policy. Gabriel is well-qualified to do this; he probably knows the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) as well as any Western writer. A former US Army Intelligence Officer turned professor with teaching posts both in the United States and in Jerusalem, he has lectured frequently in IDF schools and, in fact, many of his writings are required reading for the Israeli military. Fortuitously, he was researching a book on the IDF when the invasion of Lebanon occurred. This prior research, along with his well-developed military connections, has provided Gabriel with an extremely interesting perspective on the Lebanese campaign.

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Gabriel's discussion of Israeli military strategy is especially interesting in light of our own recent strategic agreement with them. As discussed in *Operation Peace for Galilee*, the Israeli strategy is based on four underlying assumptions: they lack strategic depth; they must have a fast war; they will never be able to ultimately defeat the Arabs militarily; and they must take into account the effects of any war on the Israeli people in terms of its economic, sociological, political and psychological impact. According to Gabriel this forces the Israelis to operate with high quality closely held intelligence and to mobilize rapidly and strike with surprise for quick and decisive victories prior to any US or Soviet intervention. The book's insightful discussion of Israeli strategy is a useful backdrop for considering the long-term aspects of our military relationship with them, and in his discussion it is obvious that Gabriel comes down on the side of the military analysts who believe that Israel will be an enduring strategic asset for the United States.

Gabriel is an unabashed Israeliphile, yet he still presents a fairly balanced view of the campaign. If there is any weakness at all in the book it is minor, and it stems from his admiration of the Israeli Army and an understandable bias against the PLO. From the 1975 massacre at Ain Rummanah, which became Lebanon's Sarajevo, to the evacuation of Beirut in 1982, Gabriel characterizes the Palestinian Movement as made up of international terrorists whose motivations are greed and self-interest. This description probably will not win him any friends among his Arab readers. Also the Lebanese Muslims might take issue with being generally left out of the descriptions of the fighting in the South and the IDF's subsequent actions to control their rear areas. Gabriel also echoes the IDF complaint that the US Marine positions around Beirut airport formed a barrier which protected PLO ambush teams from Israeli retaliation. *Operation Peace for Galilee* makes no mention of the exasperation the Marines felt on their side of the wire with the aggressive IAF behavior. This situation tapered off only after General Barrow's letter to Secretary of Defense Weinberger criticizing the Israeli actions was made public. But these comments are really differences of perspective, and they do not detract from the overall excellent analysis of the campaign.

When the Israeli cabinet approved the 6 July 1982 attack of Southern Lebanon, it believed that the mission it had agreed to was to push the PLO back beyond the 40-kilometer range and destroy PLO infrastructure in South Lebanon. Unfortunately, this operation began a series of uncontrollable events which would attach the Israelis to the Lebanese tarbaby and eventually also draw the United States into Lebanon. At the outset of the fighting, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon had a larger goal in mind—he wanted to remake the political map of the Middle East—and his real war aim was not against the PLO, but against Syria. Gabriel carefully details the change of the military objectives and Sharon's subtle orchestration of the campaign from what was initially believed to be a limited operation into a two-front war,

with broad regional objectives. Sharon alleges that he previously cleared his objectives with Secretary of State Haig, and the debate over whether Haig actually gave Sharon a green light or even an amber light still continues in the press. According to Sharon, he thought he received the go-ahead and thereupon proceeded with his secret objectives which, in addition to securing Israel's northern border, were to expel the PLO and Syria from Lebanon, create a new government in Beirut, and obtain peace and normal relations with Lebanon.

Operation Peace for Galilee describes in detail how Sharon manipulated both the IDF and the Israeli government during the initial phase of the campaign. The IDF gradually outflanked the Syrians who initially were spectators, thus placing Syrian SAMs within range of IDF artillery. When the Syrians reinforced their SAM sites, Sharon persuaded Begin to authorize a preemptive strike to remove that serious threat to the operation. The attack on the Syrian SAMs along with the loss of large numbers of Syrian aircraft sealed the eventual fate of the Syrians in Lebanon and expanded Sharon's military options. After the strike against the Syrians the campaign broke down into engagements in the flat Bekaa Valley, fighting in the mountains and amphibious landings along the coast termed by Gabriel "a series of minor improvizations . . . each with little relation to the objectives of the other." The Defense Minister had opened his two-front war and was headed for Beirut. Some Israelis have been worried about the decline of civilian control over the Israeli military since the June 1967 War and events described in *Operation Peace for Galilee* will do little to allay those fears.

Less than a month after the invasion the IDF was at the outskirts of Beirut, ready to begin the siege of Beirut. Viewed from a post-campaign perspective, the attempt to seize Beirut was a monumental miscalculation. As Gabriel states "For the first time, the Israeli Defense Force found itself employing tactics and strategies dictated more by political considerations than by military expedience. The struggle for Beirut was far more a test of will, endurance and politics than of military might." (These comments might also fit our own involvement in Beirut.) Gabriel makes it evident that the Israeli government was not prepared for nor had it considered the consequences of the siege of Beirut. First Israel had not considered its own domestic reaction to the heavy casualties it would take. Neither did it take into account the public relations impact that Israeli bombs and artillery shells falling on apartment buildings would have on world opinion. Even though Gabriel describes in detail the Israeli desire to avoid civilian casualties, the besieged Arafat received much prime time media coverage and the PLO won the TV battle hands down. Perhaps the most frustrating development was the inaction of the Christian Militias who waited to see how the operation would turn out rather than launch an attack against the PLO from their side of the city. Also disregarded by the Israelis was the limited wars axiom "before you

get in, plan on how you're getting out." There was no prior concept of how or when or under what conditions to terminate the operation short of military victory.

Besides the serious political problems the Israelis were to face with siege warfare, there was the IDF's lack of urban warfare experience and training. Gabriel points out also that the restructuring of the IDF after the 1973 war had reduced the infantry in its force structure in order to build up its combined arms attack, and it did not have the large numbers of infantry in its brigades to do the job properly. On the other hand, the PLO was able to regroup after fleeing the South and adapt to urban warfare. It had its camps and neighborhoods in Beirut, and it had been preparing its positions, stockpiling supplies and training there for years.

On 29 August, thirty-three days after the siege was ended through negotiations, Israel's problems were only beginning: the Sabra Shatilla massacre, Bashir Gemayel's assassination, the difficulties in the Shuf and South Lebanon, the continuing attrition of Israeli soldiers, Prime Minister Begin's resignation, previously unheard of instances of military disobedience, civilian peace marches, abrogation of the 17 May 1983 agreement with Lebanon, and continued terrorist attacks. Was it really worth it? Gabriel says that the Israelis were militarily successful, but most Middle East analysts agree that Israel failed to obtain its political objectives. The PLO was not destroyed, Palestinian nationalism is as fervent as ever, the volatility of Lebanon continues, the northern borders are not really secure and the IDF occupying force continues to take casualties. In fact, even David Kimche, the Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry has stated that as soon as they can achieve some security arrangements on their northern border, "we shall get the hell out of there."

The discussion on Lessons Learned is both interesting and useful. It is interesting because US operating forces are for the most part still waiting to study our own lessons learned from Beirut. The Long Commission Report was helpful, but it was an investigation rather than a detailed tactical study. The military reader will find *Operation Peace for Galilee*'s comments and lessons on armor, infantry, artillery, medical care, engineers, logistics and helicopters extremely useful. One interesting comment by Gabriel was his grudging acknowledgment that the Syrian military's fighting ability was "probably the best the Israelis had seen." Gabriel feels that Israeli superiority in manpower and material produced the victory, and if all had been equal, the terrain and Syrian tactics may have made it a close thing. His description of the performance of the Syrian helicopter gunships and their infantry-tank tactics point out that there will not be any more easy wars in the Middle East for anybody. Another interesting lesson which must be relearned by the IDF (but as Gabriel says, probably won't be) is that Israel was preparing for the last war and, because it was training for the 1973 Suez operation all over

again, it was not prepared to fight in the mountains and cities of Lebanon. But if Gabriel has one single important message, it is to study the Clausewitzian dictum that before starting a war, there should be a clear understanding of its political purpose and operational objective. *Operation Peace for Galilee* showed that the Israelis not only ignored Clausewitz, but they paid scant attention to their own strategic assumptions. Further, they ignored the basic ingredients for the successful use of force which they have used so well in the past: it should be in pursuit of vital interests, be used as a last resort, support the diplomatic effort, have clear objectives, have domestic support, and be winnable.

Operation Peace for Galilee is important and should be read not only for its discussion of the campaign in Lebanon and Israeli strategy, but because it contains larger, more far-reaching concepts. These concepts involve the connection between Israeli policy in Lebanon and US regional objectives as well as a classic example of the problems which military forces can have in limited wars with limited objectives.

Coutau-Bégarie, Hervé. *La puissance maritime soviétique*. Paris: Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, 1983. 198pp. 95F.

Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, a young French political scientist writing under the auspices of the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), has taken a major step toward a needed diffusion of knowledge by producing this work. It merits our attention for two principal reasons. First, it is, in its own right, a first-class professional job on a complex topic. Drawing from an extensive bibliography, the author carefully and comprehensively discusses the functional components of maritime power which have been exploited to bring the Soviet fleet to today's place of prominence. The second reason is equally important. H. Coutau-Bégarie brings a fresh voice and differing insights to the problem. He also represents a continental West European constituency which has a vital stake in Soviet developments. As he notes in his bibliography, most of the major works on the subject are *not* available in French libraries. Only when the dimensions of this relatively new Soviet threat to Western democracies are known to those threatened will national consensuses be reached to counter the threat.

The back cover provides a good encapsulation of the author's views:

"Confronted with that new situation, the Anglo-Saxon strategists have reacted in contradictory ways and are mired in Byzantine squabbles over the real import of this new dimension of the Soviet threat. . . .

One learns then that the USSR has been able to become a maritime power on all counts: its strategic force rivals that of the United States; its fleet and naval aviation threaten the positions and traffic of the West and support diplomacy all over the world. The interventions in Angola, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Exercise Okean are very clear warnings."

The author points out the importance of the watershed of Cuba in 1962 when the Soviets not only embarked on an accelerated building of maritime power but also mandated the progressive enlargement of the navy's missions to allow it to intervene in local crises. Thus a major step was taken away from the traditional defense of Soviet territory toward the much broader role of "protection of the interests of the state." He also notes that the new role of the Soviet Navy did not really become apparent to Western observers until the Six-Day War in 1967 when they were taken aback by the appearance of Soviet warships on the scene.

Throughout this writing, M. Coutau-Bégarie sensibly takes a cautious approach and urges discretion in predicting the actions of the Soviet Navy in time of war. Drawing upon the writings of our own Frank Uhlig, he cites the examples of the Germans before 1914 and the Americans before 1941 on the switch from the anticipated use of submarines against warships to their employment against merchant shipping. He also warns against focusing on the strategic ASW battle or the anticarrier battle because Soviet literature reserves them a major role. He notes that the Gorshkov writings are viewed by most Western analysts as self-serving and not an actual expression of doctrine. An interesting and instructive quotation from Moltke the Elder is used: "In war, the enemy always has the choice among three solutions, in general it is the fourth that he selects."

In summing up the difficulties of analyzing the Soviet naval enigma, the author warns against coming to a single conclusion as long as the flexibility of maritime power exists. He does not feel that the analyses done to date have been in vain. Rather, he says that a number of valid conclusions have been reached over the past decade (once the futile discussions on the offensive or defensive nature of Soviet naval strategy are set aside). He thus concludes that the differences in view on Soviet naval posture are in degree rather than kind. He postulates that a fleet of the first rank must fulfill three functions: strategic nuclear, general military, and political. Each of the ensuing chapters is then dedicated to each of these functions with an objective examination of them and an assessment of how well the Soviet Navy can perform them.

A great deal of factual information is presented textually and in accompanying tables and annexes. The chapter on general military functions is particularly good as types of ships and naval aviation are described as well as bases, logistics and personnel. Each is analyzed in the context of overall strategy. While the primary

theater of operations has now been changed from neighboring waters to the high seas, possible scenarios in both areas are discussed with a careful eye to Soviet weaknesses as well as strengths. The author judges that, for now, Soviet deployments are very limited and can only be seen as demonstrating a presence. Soviet deployments are thus for political as well as military purposes.

It is in the political realm that the author is at his best. His final chapter provides an excellent overview of Soviet naval diplomacy and the importance the Soviet Union attaches to it. The credibility of the USSR in the Third World and the symbolism of the fleet as evidence of US-Soviet parity in the strategic arena rank high as Soviet aims. Short but fascinating case histories of Soviet naval diplomacy—adventures as well as misadventures—are used to illustrate its coercive and its cooperative nature. Successes have been limited and failures have been many.

However, Coutau-Bégarie cautions that one should not underestimate the effectiveness of Soviet naval diplomacy. Just because one cannot measure its influence beyond local crises, one should not conclude that it has no influence. He believes that the fundamental goal of Soviet naval diplomacy is the maintenance of the *status quo*. What really counts is the maintenance of total power and parity with the United States. One should especially not conclude that the military or diplomatic functions are secondary. On the contrary, he asserts, the fleet is now a key player of the Soviet armed forces and an indispensable instrument in local crises. The author concludes with the view that, whatever the military worth or the degree of effectiveness of its naval diplomacy, the Soviet fleet is first and foremost a method of affirmation of power, and in this role, it has acquired a privileged place in the structure of Soviet power—a role which will only be increased in the course of the coming years.

The "good news" is the book itself. The "bad news" is the fact that it is presently available only in French. Since this work is the first in a series on "Maritime Power in the 1980's," one hopes that IFRI will provide an English version as a significant contribution toward the better understanding of a serious problem.

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Sigal, Leon V. *Nuclear Forces in Europe: Enduring Dilemmas, Present Prospects*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984. 181pp. $22.95, paper $8.95

At first blush it would seem like an impossible task to fit the myriad complexities of the Euronuclear issue into 173 pages of text. But Leon Sigal has come close, in this well-organized and cogently argued book.

Sigal reminds the reader that while deterrence is the *raison d'etat* behind the Euromissile force, deterrence

itself may present contradictions with *assurance* (the political dimension of European security), and especially with *stability*. Particularly with respect to the latter, Sigal notes that extending US deterrence to Europe theoretically implies first use—itself not exactly conducive to the stability of the European military situation. He returns to this point in the last chapter on battlefield nuclear weapons, whose vulnerable presence near borders and difficulty of use imply special stability problems. One can disagree with Sigal's implied recommendation of "no first use" of battlefield nuclear weapons (which would erode what deterrent effect they may have) and still appreciate their very limited contribution to European security, especially comingled with conventional weapons.

In his examination of the rationale for the Euromissile modernization decision of 1979, Sigal looks at the most common justifications and finds them wanting. The new weapons do not give more target coverage, as Pact targets are already covered by present systems. This is true, though Sigal might have noted that many of these systems are aircraft, which would have difficulty penetrating Soviet antiaircraft defenses. He also finds flaws with the "continuum of deterrence" argument, which implies that escalation must only run up a "ladder" of weapons structured according to their range. He additionally faults the public rationale for long-range modernization, noting that both the Pershing IIs and cruise missiles were planned in advance of the first Soviet SS-20 site preparation.

The vulnerability to preemption of these systems is noted by Sigal, as is the difficulty of crisis dispersion; a move in itself that could raise the risk of Soviet preemption. But Sigal does find limited rationale for the long-range theater weapons in that their presence in Europe complicates Soviet ability to perform an overall nuclear first strike. But, for Sigal, the overall contribution of these forces to European security is quite marginal, in *military* terms.

Indeed most of the Euromissile controversy, according to Sigal, is *political*, with the initial decision to modernize the force made largely to mollify the political right in several European Nato nations, particularly Germany. The ensuing debate has imposed its own cost on the European Nato host nations, with large-scale demonstrations against the weapons breaking out. Moreover, Chancellor Schmidt found himself caught between his political left and right, as well as in conflict with both the Carter and Reagan administrations. Political problems existed in the other host nations as well, and Sigal gives a good account of the internal political factors that made it difficult for Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy to either fully embrace or reject the new weapons scheduled to be based on their soil.

Political problems in the host nations gave a real impetus to arms control negotiations at the Euro-theater level. But these negotiations were hampered seriously from the

start by the distance between opening US and Soviet positions, and by Soviet insistence that British and French systems be placed on the agenda. The distance began to narrow with the so-called "walk in the woods" arrangement (75 launchers each) in July 1982, but ultimately no agreement emerged. Sigal indicates that serious differences may continue this state, noting that equal ceilings on weapons may be difficult to achieve, given that Soviet weapons seem related to target requirements different from Nato's. Moreover, verification and monitoring problems remain formidable, particularly given the mobility characteristic of European-based nuclear systems and especially the short-range weapons which are virtually identical to conventional weapons.

British and French nuclear systems compound not only arms control negotiations, but also Western nuclear policy. Sigal points out that French doctrine not only implies first use, but also a limited ability to extend deterrence into Germany. And while British policy is more restrictive and closely tied to Nato, both European nuclear powers steadfastly refuse to have their weapons negotiated away from them by the United States.

Given the breadth of the topic, Sigal has covered it admirably. It is a one-sided treatment, as Sigal concentrates on the Nato side, and one will have to find the Soviet postures elsewhere. But it is a fair and comprehensive treatment and should be required reading for anyone desiring a well-documented scholarly overview of Nato's nuclear posture and problems.

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Bradley, Omar N. and Blair, Clay. *A General's Life: An Autobiography by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. 752pp. $19.95

This autobiography, written in the first person by Clay Blair, author of *Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan* and other books, takes Bradley from his youth in Missouri through his tenure as the first chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with an Afterword covering his subsequent activities. A studious boy, he "loved every minute" of his four years at West Point and graduated with the class of 1915. During the interwar years Bradley spent much of his time as an instructor at service schools, "not a bad way," he concluded, "to learn your profession thoroughly." At Ft. Benning Infantry School he met and favorably impressed George Catlett Marshall. "No man," says Bradley, "had a greater influence on me personally or professionally."

Ordered to duty on the General Staff in 1938, Bradley learned the politics of War Department management and the Washington scene, while acquiring administrative experience that prepared him for

future roles. Rearmament following the fall of France, brought rapid promotions and Marshall appointed him commandant of the Infantry School at Ft. Benning with the rank of brigadier general. Soon a major general, he reactivated the 82nd Division in 1942 and then commanded a National Guard division in need of improvement. Finally, in February 1943, he arrived in North Africa for his first taste of combat. Critical of the British "peripheral" strategy and Eisenhower's direction of the North African campaign, Bradley concludes that "Ike was a political general of rare and valuable gifts, but as his African record clearly demonstrates, he did not know how to manage a battlefield."

Holding several jobs in the North African and Sicily campaigns, Bradley points out mistakes and missed opportunities with critical assessments of several colleagues, including Generals Patton and Montgomery. Although sharing with Marshall and Eisenhower a distaste for this diversion from a cross Channel assault, Bradley came to believe that the North African venture served as an essential training ground for the American troops destined to land in France.

Sent to London to prepare for the long-delayed invasion of the continent, Bradley presents a detailed account of the planning, staffing, strategy, and tactics of the successive campaigns. Portraying much of the high command bickering, animosity, resentment, faultfinding, and blame among those in the higher echelons, Bradley concentrates most of his ire on Montgomery and Eisenhower's failure to control the "megalomaniac" British commander. He supports the decision to concentrate on bombing the French railway and bridge systems in preparation for the invasion, and credits the Navy with saving "our hides" at Omaha Beach by close in-shore bombardment as it did in Sicily. The decision to refrain from racing the Russians to Berlin is defended, as is the "broad front" strategy over the "single thrust" favored by Montgomery. Insights on the intra and inter-service squabbles over strategy and the allocation of resources, involving top military and political leaders of Britain and the United States, provide some of the most fascinating reading.

The war's end in Europe found President Truman faced with demobilization and a flood of ex-service personnel, many with problems to be handled by the Veteran's Administration. Notified by Marshall that the President wanted him to head the agency, Bradley was "devastated," though he accepted the post after being assured by Eisenhower that he would have a good chance of later becoming Chief of Staff of the Army. With full support from Truman and the Congress, Bradley made numerous changes in the organization to improve medical care and handle the complex demands imposed on the agency.

Appointed Army Chief of Staff in February 1948, Bradley struggled with the recently "unified" Defense Department, the austere military

budget, war plans, the overseas commitments of the Truman Doctrine and the North Atlantic Treaty, and the frequent crises that erupted during the cold war. Unification had created a four-headed monster with the services and the Secretary striving for strategic and budgetary dominance. Military capability to support containment was virtually nonexistent. As Bradley put it, "the Army of 1948 could not fight its way out of a paper bag."

Soon after he assumed the newly created position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Bradley was confronted with what he calls the "Navy's mutiny"—an attack on Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, the B-36 and the Air Force, and the whole concept of strategic bombing. Bradley is vitriolic in his account of this episode, in which he publicly labeled the insurgents "fancy Dans" and privately considered Chief of Naval Operations Louis Denfeld "an affable glad-handing Washington bureaucrat," with "no grasp at all of large-scale land warfare." Yet some progress was being made on formulating a military policy to cope with cold war demands by two papers known as National Security Council No. 20/4, distributed on 24 November 1948, and No. 68 in April 1950. These studies constituted a virtual blueprint for the expansion following the outbreak of war in Korea.

Bradley's previous frustrations seem miniscule compared with those he suffered during the Korean conflict. The conviction that ROK forces could defend against the North Koreans proved mistaken. Douglas MacArthur, inflicted with "localitis," pursued an absurd strategy, gave wrong advice, and was insubordinate, while the Joint Chiefs failed to exercise proper control of the battlefield. Of primary concern was the possibility that the Korean attack signalled the first of numerous Soviet initiatives in other parts of the world that could lead to general war, contingencies that demanded a global approach to the allocation of military resources which were all too meager. As Bradley notes, "In those days we held the rather simplistic belief that *all* communist moves worldwide were dictated from Moscow by Stalin personally." Agonizing about what to do with MacArthur plagued the Washington hierarchy and is a constant theme during this chaotic period.

Bradley emerges from this book as a dedicated, strictly professional soldier, devoted to his country and his family, whose appeal was in startling contrast to the more flamboyant military heroes. Most revealing are his perspective and his unsparing judgments of other leaders, with whom he was associated, and the issues and events with which he was involved during these troubled years. Based on numerous taped interviews with Bradley and others, private papers, memoirs, government documents, and authoritative studies, this readable narrative presents a personal account of the man in his time. Ably assisted by his wife Joan, Blair has produced an admirable blending of autobiography

and biography that will remain a classic in its field.

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Hamilton, Nigel. *Master of the Battlefield: Monty's War Years 1942-1944.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983. 863pp. $25.95

Nigel Hamilton's middle volume of his monumental three-volume biography of Montgomery covers the period 1942-1944, beginning with Alamein and ending with victory in the Battle of Normandy. It is of special interest to Americans because it was during this period that Monty was first thrown into close contact with Patton, Bradley, Eisenhower, and other Americans. In Normandy, Monty had serious disagreements with Ike and the others over basic strategic questions. This led to thriving controversies over what Monty did or did not say, and what he did or did not intend to do. In dealing with these controversies, Hamilton takes Monty's point of view. He agrees with Monty on every issue, indeed sometimes claiming more for Monty's genius than even Monty himself would claim. The one criticism Hamilton has of Monty is that Monty simply could not or would not adjust himself to his role, or take some pains to be aware of the pressures on his superior, Eisenhower.

What will be of most interest to serving officers, however, is not Hamilton's defense of Monty on this or that disagreement, but rather Hamilton's admirable discussions of Monty on the subject of command. Monty had a fine mind, and he had used his powers of thought to concentrate on the problem of command. He had tested his ideas in battle, at almost every level of command. He knew what he was talking about, and can be read with great profit today by those put into command situations.

Although Eisenhower never benefited from it, in certain areas Monty did have broadness of mind. Far more than Patton or indeed most other fighting generals, Monty was sensitive to the problem of public morale. In the spring of 1944, for example, during the preparations for Overlord, Monty took the time to visit the factories where the war goods were being manufactured. He would make a speech, urging the workers to one last great effort, to give his boys the tools with which to win the war. Then he would break off and chat informally with the workers. He was tremendously popular, a man who cultivated his own image, vain, difficult—but a superb showman and politician as well as general. He really did do wonders for British morale. It is one of Hamilton's virtues that he brings this out.

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Rivlin, Alice M., ed. *Economic Choices 1984.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984. 171pp. $22.95, paper $8.95

Kaufman, William W. *The 1985 Defense Budget.* Washington, D.C.:

Brookings Institution, 1984. 54pp. paper $6.95

After fourteen years the Brookings Institution has ceased publication of its widely acclaimed annual analysis of the proposed federal budget. In place of that volume this year Alice M. Rivlin, director of the Brookings Economic Studies Program and former director of the Congressional Budget Office, has edited a work by herself and other Brookings staff and consultants that examines key issues affecting the US economy. The proposed FY 1985 defense budget is treated in a chapter in *Economic Choices 1984* that is based upon Kaufman's longer monograph *The 1985 Defense Budget*.

The Brookings authors see the principal challenge to the US economy in 1984 to be the development of policies that will sustain economic growth and facilitate economic change. Economic growth is essential to meet the expectations of Americans for a rising standard of living and to ease the process of economic change that forces like technology require of dynamic economies. After a period of relative economic stagnation and increasing inflation in the 1970s, factors seem favorable for a return to noninflationary growth as in the 1960s. However, the Brookings analysts believe that the otherwise optimistic outlook for a growing US economy is marred by federal budgetary policies which have created high deficits and interest rates that will discourage the private investment necessary for a growing, productive, and internationally competitive economy.

Although these prospective budget deficits could be reduced or eliminated by raising taxes, by cutting nondefense spending, or by less defense spending, the Brookings analysts argue for a compromise plan which would eliminate part of the deficit through actions in each of these areas. They recognize that one's policy preferences depend upon value judgments about the relative size of the public and private sectors, and the importance of the various functions performed by the federal government. However, if the basic economic assumptions of the Brookings study are accepted (and the Reagan administration has tended to make more optimistic ones that result in a smaller deficit problem), less action in one direction such as raising taxes means more vigorous moves in other areas such as cutting government spending programs. While some have argued that excessive defense spending has been the source of the deficit problem, a review of the data shows that increases in defense spending have been offset by even greater cuts in nondefense spending, and the budget deficits result principally from revenue losses due to tax cuts and the decline in national income when the economy has been in recession.

In the Brookings plan for deficit reduction about half of the deficit eliminated through legislative actions would come from tax increases. In raising taxes one wants to avoid impacts that would retard economic growth and make the tax system less

equitable. The Brookings study proposes a tax on the cash flow of individuals and corporations. Such a tax would fall on spending rather than income and eucourage the savings and investment that fuel economic growth. Alternatives to this proposal such as a value-added tax are discussed, but the emphasis is that increasing tax rates to raise more revenue to deal with the deficit problem is not enough. The tax system also needs reform to improve fairness and to promote economic efficiency.

Although domestic spending as a percentage of GNP is projected to decline through the end of the decade as a result of large cuts in a number of programs, further cuts are called for to deal with the deficit problem. In the short run the Brookings plan would make the greatest reductions in federal spending growth in nondefense categories, while by 1989 these reductions would about equal the proposed cuts in the growth of defense spending. In the first stage they call for a one-year freeze on nondefense spending, except for programs to help the poor. In later years the growth of spending would be reduced through changes in social security benefits, payment to hospitals for medicare services, civil service and military retirement programs, and agricultural assistance. Such proposals are likely to meet substantial resistance from the affected parties, and it will be hard to secure their passage by Congress. Reforms of military retirement will take a considerable period to show any favorable budgetary effect if present service members and retirees are not subjected to benefit reductions. Also any changes in retirement benefits would have to be considered in terms of the total military compensation package and what form that package must take in order to attract and retain enough persons to meet military personnel requirements.

Given the difficulties in raising taxes and in cutting nondefense spending further, defense spending is almost certainly going to be reduced below the levels considered most desirable by administration defense planners. Although the Reagan administration has been able to accelerate sharply the rate of growth in real defense spending, it has not been able to increase budget authority at the rate it believes necessary. Unless there is some international crisis that raises Congressional and public perception of the threat to national security, it is likely that the real growth in defense spending will be at a slower pace than proposed by the administration. What are the implications for national security? If all defense programs cannot be funded fully, where should cuts be made? Much debate has been generated on these questions and Kaufman's analysis of the FY 1985 defense budget will add more fuel to this discussion.

Although Kaufman does not disagree with the basic national defense strategy of planning to defend against expected threats to Western Europe, the Persian Gulf, and Korea, he believes that with more efficient defense programs the FY 1985

defense budget could be reduced to about $260 billion and almost $175 billion in outlays could be saved over the FY 1985-89 period without weakening the nation's defense capability. He would achieve these savings by reducing duplication in defense programs, by slowing the pace of modernization of defense equipment, and by eliminating programs that support questionable objectives. An example of each type of action will be given to show the flavor of his analysis. (Kaufman also provides alternative five-year defense plans for high-threat and low-threat situations.)

An example of duplication that Kaufman sees in defense programs is the Navy's procurement of the F-18 fighter, A-18 attack aircraft, the AV-8B Marine attack aircraft, and the F-14 fighter. If only the F-18 and A-18 are purchased, Kaufman sees savings of $3.1 billion in FY 1985 budget authority. However, he does not explain why he believes these different aircraft are close enough substitutes so that only two types could be procured.

The requirement for carrier battle groups provides an illustration of savings that Kaufman argues are possible by eliminating programs that support questionable objectives. Although he sees some missions for carrier battle groups in contingencies in the Persian Gulf, in the Atlantic or Mediterranean, and in the Far East, he does not believe that the Navy will require 15 deployable carrier battle groups as the FY 1985-89 program calls for by the end of the 1980s. Allowing three battle groups for each contingency and another three in overhaul or refresher training would reduce the carrier battle group requirement to 12 with billions of dollars in budgetary saving. He does not think that it makes sense to use carrier battle groups to attack the Soviet Navy in its protected bases or to use carrier battle groups to deal with the long-range Soviet naval air threat when land-based interceptors could do it more cheaply. Hence, Kaufman concludes that serious justification has not yet been provided for 15 carrier battle groups and would cut three of them from the defense plan.

Although Kaufman agrees that US military equipment needs periodic upgrading and replacement, he finds the current modernization program is acquiring equipment at a pace that is too rapid and could make it difficult to afford to operate and support weapons systems. He finds the historical relationship is that, on average, operation and support costs will equal about 11 percent of the value of the equipment in inventory. If weapons are acquired so fast that operations and support funding falls below this proportion, it may be difficult to realize the full potential of all equipment. To avoid such problems Kaufman proposes an investment strategy that says, in the absence of dramatic technological improvements or more rapid Soviet acquisition of equipment, the United States should replace military equipment only at the end of its normal service life and the replacement value

of weapons and the investment budget should only grow at a rate of 5 percent a year in real terms. Many persons may find these rules-of-thumb too mechanical and believe that the pace of Soviet modernization is faster than Kaufman assumes. But defense planners do have to face the question of how to modernize without compromising readiness. If not Kaufman's approach, another is needed.

Both of the works reviewed here are worth reading. Even if one disagrees with the conclusions of the Brookings analysts, the reader will be stimulated by the arguments on some important issues facing US policymakers.

JOHN A. WALGREEN
Wheaton College

Rohwer, Jürgen. *Axis Submarine Successes 1939-1945*. Introductory material translated by John A. Broadwin. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1983. 386pp. $23.95

Axis Submarine Successes 1939-45 is a translation and complete revision of Rohwer's *Die U-Boote-Erfolge der Achsenmachte*. Entirely superseding the earlier work, Rohwer's English version has now corrected and expanded the data using recently released action reports from archives in London, Washington, and Ottawa as well as extensive correspondence with naval officers involved in both sides of the submarine war and available Ultra signal information. After more than thirty years of compilation and analysis, Rohwer has produced unquestionably, the most accurate listing of Axis submarine attacks and their targets for World War II. Rohwer has replaced the inflated wartime claims from all sides of the war with solid data, based on critical examination of all available evidence.

The book is divided into two major portions. The largest of them (291 pages) is a chronological listing of submarine attacks in each major operating area: North Sea, Northern Theater, Baltic, Black Sea, Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Pacific. Each of these listings has 15 columns of data. Three of them give the nationality, name, and commanding officer of the submarine, while the remaining columns describe the time, the position, the ship attacked, and the weapons used. This information is supplemented by extensive footnotes explaining any discrepancies between the reports of attacking submarines and other evidence.

The second portion of the book (83 pages) is devoted to four different indexes which give page references to individual submarines, the names of submarine captains, the designations of allied convoys, and the names of the ships attacked. The indexes are followed by nine pages of charts which legibly reproduce the worldwide, standard grid system which the German Navy used during World War II.

Rohwer's book is a gold mine of information which can be used in a variety of ways. It will be useful and interesting for survivors, relatives, and students who search for data on a

particular ship or individual and it will delight those buffs who glory in all types of statistics. More importantly, Rohwer's compilation is a research tool for historians who seek broader understanding about the nature and role of submarine warfare. For these historians, this book provides the carefully refined data from which they can more confidently measure the results which Axis submarines achieved in relation to the objects which Germany sought. This type of generalization will require extensive use of this book in conjunction with analysis of other types of historical material. It is a difficult task which remains to be done satisfactorily. While Rohwer has provided the basis for important future work, he has already drawn some valuable conclusions about the nature of wartime statistics.

Even very recently in America, the statistics which support claims of success in warfare have been controversial, but Rohwer's analysis of those from a different problem, in a different time, sheds some light on a larger issue which often confronts students of military and naval affairs. In many instances, Rohwer notes that the figures for German U-boat success contained in the reports of the German Armed Forces High Command greatly exceeded the actual numbers. In the postwar period, these extreme overestimates were often made out to be deliberately falsified reports, inflated estimates by Headquarters or complete fabrications for propaganda purposes. Rohwer's detailed analysis shows that, with minor exceptions, these are false conclusions. The real cause of the overestimates was the difficulty which submarine commanders faced in getting accurate data following an attack. Interestingly, when single U-boats attacked solitary merchant ships, false reports of hits or sinkings were rare. When visual conditions were normal, tonnage estimates were generally good. However, when Allied counterattacks made visual observation difficult, submarine commanders were prone to misinterpret acoustical information.

For example, U-boat captains generally classified all torpedo explosions as hits, and all types of acoustical noise as "sinking sounds," even though, for a variety of reasons, torpedoes often misfired. In addition, when U-boats operated together against convoys, the claims of one submarine often duplicated that of others. U-boat officers often assumed that multiple detonations indicated hits on more than one ship, although in fact, different torpedoes often struck the same ship. Similarly, an explosion heard by one submarine may well have been the result of another submarine's torpedo, while its own failed to fire. These are some of the usual causes which made the figures reported by submarines in a wolfpack to be exaggerated. In addition, one needs to take into account the conditions of light during night attacks and the extent of antisubmarine activity to understand the large errors in wartime statistics. Another source of error can be found in the

estimate of size in attacking merchant ships. The convoy runs between Gibraltar and the United Kingdom often consisted of small ships, sailing in ballast. U-boat commanders easily overestimated their tonnage under difficult conditions. In short, Rohwer has stressed that we understand the human element in warfare before we leap to broad conclusions, even about statistical data.

After having examined all reports in detail, Rohwer concludes that there was seldom a wrong report for which there was no reasonable explanation. Most errors were caused by reduced chances for visual observation; a few from the overoptimistic temperament of the observer or from lack of experience. Only very rarely were exaggerations solely the product of a captain's imagination.

In terms of decisionmaking in high command, Rohwer's most interesting conclusion is that Command Headquarters accepted and forwarded, with few exceptions, the unverified data from U-boat commanders. Staff officers failed to use other intelligence sources to examine critically the overestimates. Therefore, they allowed policy and strategy to be formulated on the basis of inflated data.

With Rohwer's remarkable compilation in hand, historians can now move forward. By juxtaposing the original reports with actual successes, one can now begin to evaluate the extent to which overinflated figures affected High Command decisions. Naval historians can look forward to such new insights and generalizations which Rohwer's long research now makes possible.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College

Homze, Edward L. *German Military Aviation*. New York: Garland, 1984. 244pp. $39

With *German Military Aviation* Edward L. Homze, already one of the leaders in his field, establishes a claim to be the front runner. This volume is a part of a series titled as *Military History Bibliographies* edited by Robin Higham and Jacob W. Kipp. It covers the literature on the German air arm from the days of Kaiser Wilhelm II down to those of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Homze logically organizes his work along chronological lines. In addition to the mandatory chapters on the great wars, he includes one on the infantry of aviation and another that covers the story after German rearmament began in the fifties. Each of these chapters begins with an authoritative bibliographic essay that demonstrates the erudition of the author that is clear and readable. Official and private works are considered in both the English and German languages, and some French literature is included. Each of these essays closes with some astute recommendations for further research which should be useful for either students at the war colleges or in graduate schools. The treatment is

largely confined to documentary sources and books.

The literature on the *Luftwaffe* has been *so* massive that one could not hope to treat the periodical writings in the same comprehensive way that the book literature is considered and still remain within one volume. The essays are particularly valuable to a researcher at the beginning of any given study in the field for Homze's complete grasp of his subject gives quick and understandable surveys of the various interpretations that have been placed on the history of the episodes of the German air arm—it makes it possible for the new student to organize his thinking on the subject with far greater ease. At the end of each of the chapters there is a comprehensive listing of the books relevant to that period.

The production work on *German Military Aviation* was carefully done and the mistakes are few and far between. The index is far superior to those usually found in works of this kind and that greatly enhances the value of the book as a research tool. Of course, as Homze himself points out, there is something new published on the *Luftwaffe* every day. Thus, any bibliography would quickly become dated. But *German Military Aviation* is a definitive work that will long hold its value as a research tool. Meanwhile, periodic updates will suffice to enable its owners to work their research gardens with dispatch and confidence.

The purchase of the book is imperative for any library with pretensions in the field of military history; its acquisition for the personal collections of airpower historians is highly recommended.

DAVID R. METS
Lieutenant Colonel, US Air Force

Burns, Richard Dean and Leitenberg, Milton. *The Wars in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos 1945-1982: A Bibliographic Guide*. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio Press, 1984. 290pp. $58.50

This new, comprehensive bibliographic guide will be of value to both the specialist and the beginner interested in the Vietnam war or—to use the more accurate phrase of the authors—the *wars* in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. A number of other bibliographies and guides have previously appeared but most resemble library catalogues rather than bibliographies. The Burns and Leitenberg's guide is well organized, divided into logical subject chapters (with each chapter arranged into topical subheadings), well indexed, and easy to use. Also included are a number of graphs and tables on subjects ranging from "U.S. Expenditure of Munitions in Indochina" to "A Statistical Portrait of the Vietnam Veteran."

Each chapter contains a general introduction by the authors presenting what they view as the essential issues and problems of the period or subject discussed, together with brief descriptions of what they consider the most important books and articles bearing on those issues. For the most part, the authors' observations are judicious and balanced, although

there are occasional inaccuracies and lapses as when the one-dimensional and long outdated books by Alexander Kendrick and Thomas Power on "the war at home" are described as "solid surveys."

The authors also include a graph which purports to illustrate "the technological substitution of firepower for manpower: decline in ratio of casualties to manpower deployed." What the graph actually shows is a decline in the rate of battle deaths per thousand since World War II. That such figures are practically meaningless for determining the combat intensity of a war like Vietnam seems not to have occurred to the authors. Their idea that increased use of firepower is directly connected to lower casualty rates is as simplistic as charges by writers like John Helmer that US tactics in Vietnam produced unnecessarily high casualties.

Vietnam specialists will doubtless find other things to quarrel with in this guide; but despite any such shortcomings, it is nonetheless a valuable contribution to Vietnam studies and one certain to be extensively utilized.

RONALD SPECTOR
University of Alabama

Shultz, Richard H., and Godson, Roy. *Dezinformatsia Active Measures in Soviet Strategy*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1984. 210pp. $19.95

The Soviet active measures program involves the use of overt and covert techniques for influencing the actions of foreign countries. Active measures may entail influencing the policies of another government, undermining confidence in the leaders and institutions of the target state, disrupting relations among rival nations and discrediting and weakening both governmental and nongovernmental enemies. Active measures may be conducted overtly through officially sponsored foreign propaganda channels, diplomatic relations and cultural diplomacy. Covert techniques include the use of covert propaganda, disinformation, agents of influence and international front organizations. Active measures programs are coordinated at the highest levels of the Soviet regime and are executed by important elements of the state and party bureaucracy including the KGB.

Professor Richard Shultz and Professor Roy Godson have written a detailed accurate study of Soviet disinformation. They describe the organizational structure for active measures and offer a detailed discussion of Soviet overt propaganda themes from 1960 to 1980. They go on to provide examples of Soviet techniques including the use of international front organizations, agents of influence and forgeries. They provide interviews with former Soviet bloc intelligence officers which reveal many of the techniques used by the KGB. They conclude that active measures do indeed form an important element in the Kremlin's approach to foreign policy.

Although based exclusively on unclassified published sources Shultz and Godson have written a clear informative and detailed

exposition. There is more they could have said. For example, elements in the Dutch peace movement are Soviet controlled and the Hungarians under Soviet direction once forged and distributed throughout Africa a bogus edition of *Newsweek*. They might also have attempted to judge the impact of active measures initiatives, although such an effort might not in fact be possible. In any case these are minor points. Shultz and Godson have produced a fine book on an important aspect of Soviet foreign policy methods. Their contribution is especially important because active measures have not heretofore been studied in such detail.

STEVEN ROSS
Naval War College

Griffith, Samuel B. II. *The Battle for Guadalcanal*. Annapolis: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company, 1979. 282pp. $18.95

Lee, Robert Edward. *Victory at Guadalcanal*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1981. 260pp. $15.95

Two years ago in my review of Herbert C. Merillat's *Guadalcanal Remembered*, I made the point that while the volume was one of the best of the Guadalcanal books, it was not apt to nudge aside Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith's *The Battle for Guadalcanal*. What I should have added was that Griffith's classic account was once again in print.

The Battle for Guadalcanal was first published in 1963. The present edition forms part of the Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company's Great War Stories series which also includes such titles as Colonel Robert D. Heinl's *Victory at High Tide*, Captain Cyril Falls' *Armageddon*, John Buchan's *History of the Great War*, and two particular favorites of mine, C.S. Forester's *The General*, and Alan Moorehead's *Gallipoli*. The books are facsimile copies of the original editions, printed on good paper, uniformly bound, and with matching book jackets, so that they make a handsome set.

Sam Griffith died last year after a very full life as Marine, scholar, and author. As a lieutenant, he chased the elusive Sandino in Nicaragua. Then came service in China as a language student and an observer of the Sino-Japanese War. He was probably the first person to translate Mao Tse-tung's *Guerrilla Warfare* into English (1941) and one of the first Westerners to rediscover Sun Tzu. He had first-hand knowledge of Guadalcanal: he fought there with Edson's Raiders, first as executive officer, then as commanding officer.

Winston Churchill, in his *Marlborough*, speaks of great battles which "won or lost, change the entire course of events, create new standards of values, new moods, new atmospheres in armies and in nations, to which all must conform." Griffith applies Churchill's definition to the Battle of Guadalcanal.

CominChUSFlt Admiral Ernest J. King had tersely defined the US plan of operations in the Pacific in nine

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words: "Hold Hawaii; Support Australasia; Drive northwestward from New Herbrides." In mid-April 1942, Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift was told to ready his 1st Marine Division, then in North Carolina, for a move to New Zealand. On 25 June, Vandegrift reported to Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley at Auckland and learned that his division was to wrest Guadalcanal from the Japanese.

The main landing on 7 August by the 1st and 5th Marine regiments was virtually unopposed, but there was hard fighting for the 1st Raider and 1st Parachute Battalions across Skylark Channel at Tulagi and Gavutu. Japanese air raids roared overhead the next day, mostly Betty medium bombers with Zero fighter cover. After an ineffective intercept, Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, short of fuel, withdrew his carrier task force.

That night, 8/9 August, Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa came down The Slot with his cruisers and in the Battle of Savo Island smashed up British Rear Admiral V.A.C. Crutchley's escort group of Australian and US cruisers and destroyers. Next day, Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, left uncovered and with his amphibious ships only partially unloaded, pulled out of the objective area.

Left alone on the beach, Vandegrift saw his greatest threat as coming from the sea and the air, but there was also an unknown number of Japanese on the island. He decided to throw a defensive perimeter around the unfinished airfield the Japanese had begun. His engineers, using mostly captured Japanese equipment, went to work on the airfield (soon to be named Henderson Field for a Marine squadron commander killed at Midway). On 20 August two Marine squadrons, one of SBD Dauntless bombers, the other of F4F Wildcat fighters, landed on the coral-surfaced airstrip.

The Japanese were receiving reinforcements of their own. The Ichiki regiment had arrived. On the 21st it destroyed itself in *banzai* attacks against the Marines' left flank along the line of the Ilu River (because of bad maps, both the Japanese and the Marines thought it was the Tenaru). Next day news reached Vandegrift that the Japanese Combined Fleet had sortied from Truk. Fletcher's carriers held off the Japanese carriers in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, but the transports and their escorts pushed through to 100 miles north of Guadalcanal where they were pounded by a mixed bag of Marine and Navy aircraft from Henderson Field.

The flyers could not stop all Japanese reinforcements. Most of those who got through came by destroyers and barges, and were landed at night. So it was that Major General Kiyotaki Kawaguchi had most of his brigade in hand by the end of August. After an almost incessant day-and-night air and naval gunfire bombardment of the Marine positions, Kawaguchi on 12 September began his attack against what would come to be called "Bloody Ridge." His brigade took 20 percent casualties

in the two-day battle before falling back into the jungle.

On 18 September, Kelly Turner's transports brought in a fresh regiment, the 7th Marines. Vandegrift used them first for some inconclusive attacks to the west against Japanese positions along the Matanikau.

Lieutenant General Harukichi Hyakutake moved the headquarters of his Seventeenth Army to Guadalcanal on the night of 9 October. He planned to take personal command of an attack to begin 17 October using the 2d ("Sendai") Division and the still en route 38th Division.

On the night of 11 October Rear Admiral Norman Scott with four cruisers and five destroyers intercepted a Japanese force thought to be two cruisers and five destroyers (it turned out to be stronger) near Savo Island. He squeaked out a victory in a close-fought action, shielding the Marines from another naval gunfire bombardment but not stopping the steady parade of reinforcements joining Hyakutake.

Vandegrift was also receiving reinforcements. The National Guard's 164th Infantry regiment disembarked on 13 October. That night the airfield received a 70-minute bombardment by the battleships *Kongo* and *Haruna*.

Hyakutake had planned a complicated three-pronged attack. His columns had trouble moving into position and the attack did not get off until late on the 23d. Even then it was badly coordinated and got off piecemeal. Each prong was defeated by the Marines as it came, the last on 26 October.

The ground action overlapped the standoff naval Battle of Santa Cruz Islands which pitted the Japanese Second and Third Fleets against the US Navy's carrier Task Forces 17 and 61. Ashore, Vandegrift planned once more to advance west of the Matanikau. The attack, begun at midnight on 31 October with a crossing of the river, did not go well. Vandegrift fed the newly arrived 8th Marines into the fight. It managed a 400-yard advance before Vandegrift broke off the attack on 11 November. From 13 through 15 November the naval Battle of Guadalcanal was fought, possibly history's last great surface action of opposing battleships, cruisers, and destroyers.

Hyakutake's two divisions were down to about half strength but they were strongly dug in. On 8 December, Vandegrift turned over command of the operation to Major General Alexander M. Patch, US Army, commander of the American Division, most of which was now on the Canal. Vandegrift departed for Australia. His malaria-ridden regiments soon followed. Patch decided to wait for the arrival of the US 25th Division before continuing the attack.

The 2d Marine Division's organic infantry regiments—the 2d, 6th, and 8th Marines—were already in the fight. A bobtailed 2d Marine Division headquarters arrived to take over command. The two Army and one Marine divisions were bundled together into a brand new XXIV Corps

under Patch. He began the final attack against the Matanikau line on 10 January 1943.

Hyakutake, in a remarkable evacuation conducted during the first week of February, managed to extricate the remnants of his Seventeenth Army, some 10,000 men who lived to fight another day.

Although Griffith writes vividly of the great sea battles that intersticed the ground operations, he writes, understandably, from the viewpoint and perspective of the Marines looking outwardly from the island. For a reader who wants a fuller appreciation of the air-sea-land battle, a comparative reading of Samuel Eliot Morison's *The Struggle for Guadalcanal* is recommended.

There are many other good books on Guadalcanal; so many, in fact, that there seems to be no reason for a book such as Robert Edward Lee's well-intentioned but poorly executed *Victory at Guadalcanal*. Presidio Press is one of the foremost publishers of military history, and it has brought out a number of good Marine Corps books. This, unfortunately, is not one of them. Lee's book is written in adventure magazine language with imagined dialogue that can best be described as being at the television docu-drama level.

EDWIN H. SIMMONS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps (Ret.)

Karnow, Stanley. *Vietnam: A History*. New York: The Viking Press, 1983. 750pp. $20.

In *Vietnam: A History*, Stanley Karnow has produced an interesting, factual, and unbiased volume that makes a substantial contribution to the growing bibliography of works about the war in Southeast Asia. The book was written as a companion to the television series produced by the Public Broadcasting System (PBS), and serves in that role well. The volume, divided into sixteen chapters, smoothly covers not only the American experience in Vietnam, but the long centuries of war that preceded US involvement and the bitter years since our withdrawal. It contains a fairly good if sketchy chronology, thumbnail portraits of some of the major actors, and a superb set of photographs that precede each chapter. Finally, the book contains six clear and useful maps. It is well indexed and captioned throughout, functioning as an excellent resource work and reference on the war.

Yet Mr. Karnow has given the reader more than a simple chronological treatment of the war. The work has the lean yet anecdotal style common to wartime journalism, and manages to mix the reporter's traditional cynicism and the observer's distant concern about the fate of Vietnam.

Of particular note is the first chapter, the title of which, "The War Nobody Won," more or less illustrates Mr. Karnow's central theme. Agreeing with Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., Karnow points out that the "United States won a tactical victory but suffered a strategic failure in Vietnam." The essence of the conflict, according to the author

was the fanatical sense of dedication felt by the North to unify the country. This led to the North's ability to accept tremendous casualties and physical destruction from the bombing campaigns with equanimity. While hardly a new thesis concerning the war, Mr. Karnow's workman-like and reasoned analysis represents a centrist view of the conflict. He manages to discuss the US involvement in Vietnam without becoming emotional or biased, and carefully points out the various stages of American presence and the political decisions that motivated the action. The author is particularly cogent on the subject of Vietnam today (1983), showing a country that is learning that winning a war can be easier than running a country. The Vietnamese Gulags and the story of the boat people are told well under Mr. Karnow's steady approach.

From a critical standpoint, there are a few problems with the volume. The scope of the war, of course, was vast. It would hardly be possible to complete the history of the US involvement in less than 10 volumes, as one group of writers is currently doing. Additionally, the war wasn't prone to dividing up into neat segments as Mr. Karnow presents it. There was, of course, much overlap between the stages of the war; yet Mr. Karnow seems to provide little transition between many of the chapters—giving one the sensation that the war was only a series of vignettes,connected only by the geographic theater. One could also fault the author for an excess of color and anecdote at the expense of larger events, particularly in a volume that calls itself "The First Complete Account of Vietnam at War."

But these are relatively small concerns when compared to the overall effort of the work. Mr. Karnow has contributed a solid, reportorial volume to the literature of America's longest war. One leaves *Vietnam: A History* with a sense that a good deal of work and tribulation went into the book. It is a large canvas that Mr. Karnow seeks to paint,and he does a credible job of covering the detail and the sweep of a long and bitter struggle.

JAMES STAVRIDIS
Lieutenant Commander, US Navy

Beckett, Ian, and Gooch, John, eds. *Politicians and Defence: Studies in the Formulation of British Defence Policy, 1845-1970*. Manchester, NH: Manchester University Press, 1983. 202pp. $20

Too little has been researched and written in the field of defense policy-making, and this work by two academic men, the coeditors, and authors of two of the eight articles, is a well-written addition. Ian Beckett, Senior Lecturer in War Studies at Sandhurst, and John Gooch, Lecturer in History at the University of Lancaster, have researched and written in the field of defense policy-making in which too little work has been done. *Politicians and Defence* is principally concerned with several British cabinet ministers responsible for the Army, and two of those more

recently in charge of overall defense policies. There is relatively little here on the Royal Air Force. The last two chapters chronicle efforts to coordinate all the services under one minister, Duncan Sandys (Minister of Defence, 1957-1959), and Denis Healey (1964-1970).

The book is not a continuing history and analysis of political leaders of the services, but rather a series of twenty-page selections by different authors. These subjects are Earl Grey, Secretary of State for War in the mid-nineteenth century; Lord Cardwell, who dealt while in office in 1868-1874 with the purchase of commissions; H.O. Arnold-Forster, caught in the controversies following the Boer War; his brilliant successor, Lord Haldane, in office into World War II; the popular but ill-fated Earl Kitchener, a career soldier pushed into the frock coat of a wartime cabinet minister; and Leslie Hore-Belisha, charged with preparing the Army just before World War II.

The chapters on Arnold-Forster and Haldane give some new insights on the Esher Committee, the formation and early work of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and the pre-World War I intrigues among politicians and the military. That on Hore-Belisha enlarges our understanding of the role of his *éminence grise*, Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, which so weakened the Secretary's position in the government and the army.

Beckett and Gooch supply evidence of the declining status of defense in peacetime Britain, in spite of its large budget compared with other departments of state, and its key role in the Government's responsibility for national survival. In peacetime, ministers for defense and the services have increasingly been felt unneeded in the inner cabinet, as their constituencies have shrunk in numbers and importance, contrasted with the advocates of the welfare state. And defense ministers may do threatening things such as drafting voters' sons, or demanding expensive deterrents against a war which may never occur, or sending soldiers to defend a few colonists and large sheep meadows. Ambitious politicians tend to avoid these portfolios.

The difficulties of these men who were (except for Haldane and Kitchener) quite uninformed on taking office as to the complexities of strategic planning and weapons systems, were compounded by the existing procedure of rendering professional advice. Unlike the political heads of all other departments of state, they received *two* streams of overlapping and often conflicting official advice prior to collegial policymaking in the cabinet. They received reports from the civil service manager of the War Office, the Permanent Secretary, as well as the uniformed head of the Army, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, backed by his various staffs. A chief scientific adviser might well add another strong view. After World War II, this flood of expert recommendations, now tripled by bringing the three services into a single

ministry, brought governments (in the United States and Canada, as well as Britain) to structure a process which would, at least in theory, reduce the options before the elected decisionmakers.

The effort to induce coordination of defense policy, and relate it to foreign policy, has been long and hard fought. The problems of interface in a democracy between the cabinet and the professional military level led Leonard Beaton to write in *The Guardian* a quarter century ago, "America is moving gradually and Britain imperceptibly towards a central authority commanding and controlling the separate Services." That this movement took place at all in a Britain whose overseas responsibilities were steadily declining and whose people were demanding the transfer of defense costs to America, the new superpower, was largely due to Sandys and Healey. Sandys was well-connected politically, ambitious and possessed of an unusual level of *chutzpah*. Healey had nearly six years in office and thus was not a member of the unfortunate postwar "defence minister of the month club." But he inherited a greatly strengthened central machinery from its chief architect, the late Admiral of the Fleet Earl Mountbatten.

Even though Mountbatten did not accept the Secretaryship of State for Defence when it was offered to him and remained as Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), he is entitled to more than the half-dozen sentences allotted to him in this book. He served as CDS under Sandys, Watkinson, Thorneycroft and Healey, bringing his talents, contacts experience and commitment since World War II to interservice and interdepartmental reforms.

A complication to the policy-making process which was just beginning to make its appearance during Healey's regime has been the demand to be heard by the Select Committee on Expenditures of the House of Commons. Politicians deeply involved with defense are now not only in the cabinet and among a few retired Colonel Blimps in Parliament, but they now serve on the Subcommittee on Defence and External Affairs, made up both of the governing party and the opposition.

More effective policies may come out of this development, but the committee investigations, debates and reports will surely focus public opinion more pointedly upon the Secretary of State and the cabinet. This will doubtless include both such examples of strong opposition to government war policy as Suez, and of support, such as the Falklands. And possibly this added Parliamentary involvement will improve the decisionmaking in all its complexity of those politicians mentioned in the authors' Introduction, who are, " . . . transient figures, dependent upon professional advice and, whatever the administrative structure, reliant on winning the respect and confidence of both political and professional colleagues if they are to have much chance of success."

FRANKLYN A. JOHNSON
Florida Atlantic University

Trefousse, Hans L. *Pearl Harbor: The Continuing Controversy*. Malabar, Fla.: Krieger Publishing, 1982. 215pp. $6.50

This book is part of the extensive series of Anvil paperbacks prepared for use in college courses, and was obviously designed for undergraduate students who are new to the controversy over the reasons why US forces in Hawaii were taken by surprise. Trefousse presents a defense of Franklin Roosevelt against charges by the late president's critics that somehow Roosevelt maneuvered the Japanese into attacking the US Fleet so that he could openly support Britain in its struggle against Germany. Trefousse includes over one hundred pages of documents relating to the attack, including deciphered Japanese messages, official state papers (such as the Tripartite Pact) and excerpts from testimony given to the Naval Board of Inquiry. There is also a brief but comprehensive bibliography of major hooks and papers which address the issue of a possible conspiracy at the highest level of the US government to incite the Japanese to war.

The problem with this version of *Pearl Harbor* is that it confronts the wrong issue. Trefousse refutes the charges of past critics such as Harry Elmer Barnes and Charles Beard, but he also notes (rather late) that "Even modern revisionists no longer maintain that the fleet was deliberately exposed at Pearl Harbor to provide Japan with a worthwhile target." The only "modern revisionist" who has picked up where Barnes and Beard left off is John Toland, and Toland's argument (in *Infamy*, 1982) is basically that Roosevelt allowed the attack to take place. The claim that Roosevelt deliberately set up Pearl Harbor by gradually and carefully leaving the Japanese no other alternative is just not taken seriously anymore, and Trefousse can be accused of wasting time on what is, in effect, a "nonissue." Remember, though, that Trefousse has written for undergraduates unfamiliar with the evolution of the Pearl Harbor controversy who may nevertheless harbor strong opinions about Roosevelt's culpability and motives. Even given this important qualification, however, it is still fair to say that Trefousse misses the point of much recent controversy about the attack.

In fact, writers such as John Costello (*The Pacific War*, 1981) have argued that the real focus of attention should not be on Roosevelt but on Winston Churchill. Costello believes that somehow British code-breakers got wind of the Japanese attack plans and that Churchill chose not to warn Roosevelt because he knew Pearl Harbor would bring the United States into the war. Costello's conjectures run afoul of the very pertinent claim that they are based completely on circumstantial evidence. Costello's rejoinder has been that we may learn the truth when Churchill's most confidential papers are finally opened in the *21st* century. Trefousse is a healthy and concise antidote to such speculation, if only because he demonstrates that it makes little sense to put the blame for

Pearl Harbor on one individual or office. However, the strange disappearance of HMAS *Sydney* on 19 November 1941, coupled with the fact that not everything is yet known about the work of US and British code-breakers and radio traffic analysts in the Pacific in the fall of 1941, means that the controversy over who knew or inferred how much (and when) will continue. (In his *Who Sank the Sydney?*, published by Cassell, Milbourne, in 1981, Michael D. Montgomery claims the Australian cruiser was sunk by a Japanese submarine, and that the Australian government may have known this.)

There are two matters which Trefousse did not consider but which he should have: (1) the rapid destruction of Army air power in the Philippines in light of General MacArthur's claims that it was the key to his defenses and despite the fact that his forces had ample warning that the war was on, and (2) what Admiral Kimmel might have done to resist the Japanese attack on Hawaii if he had been given one or several days' warning. Pearl Harbor was bad enough, but what about the Philippines? Why didn't MacArthur's forces develop the kind of ground observer organization which Major General Claire Chennault's Chinese allies created to warn the American Volunteer Group? Why didn't Army B-17s attack Japanese airfields on Formosa before the Japanese could raid Clark Field in the Philippines? These are important questions, and they should be considered whenever the causes of Pearl Harbor are argued.

Perhaps a more obvious question is whether Kimmel could have defeated the Japanese with the Navy and Army forces available in Hawaii in 1941. What if the "Winds-Execute" message had indeed been intercepted and translated by Navy code-breakers on 4 December? What if its specific "meaning" had been grasped immediately and Kimmel warned? Had Kimmel sent his eight battleships to California immediately, he might have saved them. However, the approaching Japanese were by then committed to attack. They might have been recalled by a signal from Tokyo, but they might also have worked over Pearl Harbor and/or searched for Kimmel's carriers. *Lexington* and *Enterprise* were Kimmel's only available carriers on 4 December. Together, they did not have the force to overwhelm the six attacking Japanese carriers, even if they were to hit first. To strike the Japanese with some hope of success, Kimmel would have had to rely on Army bombers, but the Army's bomber strength in Hawaii was minimal because of the effort to pass B-17s through to the Philippines.

Kimmel's position was nearly impossible. He had been told not to attack first; he had also been denied the resources he needed to absorb the first blow and then return the attack; finally, he was expected not to lose. His predecessor, who strongly protested against this situation, was relieved. Kimmel accepted the situation. Could he have made it

acceptable? That is the interesting question—not whether Roosevelt knew something he did not reveal or whether Churchill withheld vital intelligence from Roosevelt. Kimmel was outnumbered and his enemy had the initiative. What could he have done? Thinking about that question is important because there are US military commanders today who find themselves in a similar situation. *Pearl Harbor: The Continuing Controversy*, like most of the literature on the topic, does not address that question. It is, however, an accurate summary of the other issues raised by investigators of the attack, and its lengthy documents section is valuable even to people who have some knowledge of the Pearl Harbor debate.

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Goldrick, James. *The King's Ships Were at Sea: The War in the North Sea August 1914-February 1915*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1984. 356pp. $21.95

This work by an Australian naval officer starts with late June 1914, when the newly enlarged Kiel Canal permitted the German navy to swing between the North Sea and the Baltic. After a comparison of British and German naval strengths and the steps that led to war, James Goldrick correctly notes that "The North Sea was to be the critical theatre of operations for both British and Germans." He sketches the geographical and material advantages and disadvantages on both sides and notes that the British Board of Admiralty was much better than the German organization. The latter, with three offices where one would do, resulted in departmental in-fighting and an inability to agree upon policy. Goldrick's vignettes of major naval leaders are well done, as are the characteristics he gives of all classes of surface ships, submarines, aircraft, and lighter-than-aircraft.

After these introductory chapters Goldrick concentrates npon operations: the firing of the first shots; the northern and southern blockades of the North Sea by the British and French; reciprocal use of submarines, minelayers, and major combatants; the crossing of the British Expeditionary Force; and, except for the Battle of the Heligoland Bight on 28 August, the inactivity of the High Seas Fleet until the end of 1914. The chapter devoted to that battle contains an excellent analysis of the successes and failures of the commanders, ships, and weapons on both sides.

Chapter 5 deals with the first operations undertaken by submarines. The sinking of warships and then of merchant ships by U-boats opened German eyes to the submarines' utility for blockade and a war of attrition against the British fleet. If the British rushed to develop anti-submarine devices and doctrine, the careful Adm. John R. Jellicoe's caution grew with respect to his fleet's operations. Germany meanwhile occupied twenty-one miles along the Flemish coast and built U-

boat and destroyer bases thereon. British ships and aircraft failed to drive them from this advantageous position.

In Britain, for lack of a staff, a small group comprised of Winston Churchill, Sir John Fisher, and Sir Arthur Wilson, aided by Henry Oliver, made the decisions. In Germany, following the Battle of the Heligoland Bight, Adm. Friedrich von Ingenohl on the Kaiser's orders kept his High Seas Fleet tethered except for raids on the British east coast by Commander, Scouting Forces, Franz Hipper, in October and December 1914. Though Room 40 decoded German wireless radio intercepts and obtained a fair idea about German intentions. British errors enabled Hipper to escape.

One of Hipper's sorties led to the Battle of the Dogger Bank, 24 January 1915. Goldrick describes the battle in the penultimate chapter, and analyzes the reasons why the British were able to do better than the Germans despite their many errors. Ingenohl was discredited; he had not reduced the strength of the Grand Fleet by attrition tactics. His successor, Adm. Hugo von Pohl, shifted his efforts to a U-boat campaign.

Goldrick concludes, first, that navies must "derive sufficient knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of novel technology during peacetime operations so as to minimize the deficiencies of their equipment and to be able to create realistic strategy and tactics for a possible conflict. Second, navies must develop systems by which operational experience at all levels can be assessed effectively and rapidly in order to maintain advantages and remove deficiencies in wartime."

Goldrick has obtained more British and German naval records than the official British historians, Corbett and Newbolt, did for their 5-volume *Naval Operations*, published in 1920-1931. He says that his objective is to retell the story they told in their first two volumes but without the official and unofficial constraints under which they labored. Since he prefers not to state where the earlier writers—and also Arthur Marder in *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow*—fell short in their analyses and interpretations, he leaves the readers up in the air. He says little about the reaction of neutrals to either British or German attempts to control sea trade, and he shortchanges French naval contributions. While he has provided a fine operational history, he might have included an analysis of the mistakes in Grand Adm. Alfred Tirpitz's prewar assumptions. It was those errors that did much to cause Germany to lose the naval war and, in the end, enabled Allied sea power to strangle German land power.

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Miller, Kenneth E. *Tiger the Lurp Dog*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1983. 214pp. $14.95

Tiger the Lurp Dog is not an animal story for children. It is a novella

encapsulating the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP =Lurp) microcosm of the American war in Vietnam. As a war story it is not a latter day "All Quiet on the Western Front." It is a *tranche de vie* cut out of a specialized experience.

As a means of communicating the techniques of Lurp, the book somewhat resembles a remarkable combination of a vivid Army Field Manual with a highly personalized unit history. The author achieves the smell of authenticity in a setting which might have tempted the odor of verisimilitude. There are no heroes, no human heroics and no real point or message. Perhaps the one dimensional result is a significant accomplishment.

In its tightly controlled narrowness, there is a strong resemblance to a prison novel. The young airborne troopers emulate their role model "lifer" NCO leaders, and all are subordinated to the techniques—the tricks of the trade. The language and setting are well done and set the stage for a predictable drama; but when it is over there is no sense of tragedy nor residual sadness. Two Lurp teams get wiped out in the same nasty jungle area and are never heard from again.

Tiger, ". . . the sneakiest little thief and coward in the world . . .," is the vehicle threading the various parts of the story together. It is always risky to attribute human thoughts and actions to dumb animals. However, to challenge the dog is pointless: he is a necessary ingredient. One entire chapter uses the dog as a means of describing a Special Forces Camp on the Laotian border. The high mark of the chapter is Tiger getting into the maze of minefields, punji stakes, claymores, etc., and then working himself out while various characters—Americans, Vietnamese, Chinese Nungs, Cambodians —react. The low position of dogs in Vietnamese society counters any romantic thought that his safe return through a seemingly impenetrable defense perimeter represents an apocryphal portrait of Vietnamese survivability.

This short novel is in many respects a reflection of the total war— remote, exotic and lacking in clearly defined purpose. Whether this is art or just making the best of the situation, the author writes with skill. Reading the book is a help in understanding the Lurp operation. It is sometimes funny; it is not light reading.

The flaw as well as the strength is in the narrow drawing of the scene. It is strictly a soldier's story. Officers are an embarrassment, and when inserted are (like the civilians) caricatures—negative or antagonistic outsiders. The enlisted people, particularly the young, seem to have learned how to kill and to die; not how to live. Perhaps there ought to be a worldwide school for this purpose that is as proficient as the many educations in the techniques of death. It always seems a shame to see men so alienated that all they have to live for is a chance to die well.

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